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12 West Virginia opinions name it 1 courts 1982–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Holmes v. South Carolinagreen2 sentences2018This Court recently analyzed Holmes and noted as follows: 6 the Supreme Court of the United States explained [in Holmes] that “[w]hile the [United States] Constitution . . . prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury.” State v. Zuccaro, 239 W.Va. 128, 143 , 2017In Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 , 126 S.Ct. 1727 , 164 L.Ed.2d 503 (2006), the Supreme Court of the United States explained that “[w]hile the [United States] Constitution ... prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury.” Id. at 326 , 126 S.Ct. 1727 | 1 | 2 |
Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Maxeygreen2 sentences2023However, this reasoning has been soundly rejected by a majority of courts and dismissed by one commentator as “not justifiable.” 10 At best, the “Separation of 10 As the commentator explained: (continued . . .) 20 Insureds” provision has largely been found to alter or create ambiguities in exclusionary language only when it refers to “the insured.” See Maxey, 110 S.W.3d at 214 (“If the exclusion clause uses the term ‘the insured,’ application of the separation of insureds clause requires that the term be interpreted as referring only to the insured against whom a claim is being made under the 2023Cf. Maxey, 110 S.W.3d at 214 (“[C]onstruing the term ‘any’ the same as the word ‘the’ in an exclusion clause when an insurance policy contains a separation of insureds or severability of interests clause would require a tortured reading of the terms of the policy.”). 25 we find that reliance on Politsopoulos I to render the ELE at bar inapplicable reflects a gross misunderstanding of the significance of both the policy language and the issue presented as a whole—as demonstrated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s analysis in Politsopoulos II. | 1 | 1 |
Nautilus Ins. Co. v. K. Smith Builders, Ltd.green1 sentence2023Corp. v. Maxey, 110 S.W.3d 203, 214 (Tex. App. 2003); see also Nautilus Ins., 725 F. Supp. 2d at 1229 (“To give full effect to the terms of the Policy, the court must interpret an exclusion barring coverage to ‘any insured’ differently from an exclusion barring coverage to ‘the insured.’”). 7 This distinction has most often been addressed in the context of intentional act exclusions which purport to eliminate coverage for one insured due to acts by another 7 See 3 Allan D. | 1 | 1 |
Mutual Ben. Ins. Co., Aplt v. Politsopoulosgreen2 sentences2023If, however, the exclusion clause uses the term ‘any insured,’ then application of the separation of insureds clause has no effect on the exclusion clause; a claim made against any insured is excluded.” (citations omitted)); Politsopoulos II, 115 A.3d at 854 (finding ELE’s reference to “the insured” ambiguous when viewed in light of “Separation of Insureds” provision). 2023If, however, the exclusion clause uses the term ‘any insured,’ then application of the separation of insureds clause has no effect on the exclusion clause; a claim made against any insured is excluded.” (citations omitted)); Politsopoulos II, 115 A.3d at 854 (finding ELE’s reference to “the insured” ambiguous when viewed in light of “Separation of Insureds” provision). | 1 | 1 |
State of West Virignia v. Rocco Zuccarogreen2 sentences2018This Court recently analyzed Holmes and noted as follows: 6 the Supreme Court of the United States explained [in Holmes] that “[w]hile the [United States] Constitution . . . prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury.” State v. Zuccaro, 239 W.Va. 128, 143 , 2018This Court recently analyzed Holmes and noted as follows: 6 the Supreme Court of the United States explained [in Holmes] that “[w]hile the [United States] Constitution . . . prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury.” State v. Zuccaro, 239 W.Va. 128, 143 , | 1 | 1 |
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Rossogreen2 sentences2013Co. v. Rosso, 521 A.2d 301, 304 (Me.1987) (“We find the language of the exclusion clause in Rosso’s insurance policy to be unambiguous. 2013Co. v. Rosso, 521 A.2d 301, 304 (Me. 1987) (“We find the language of the exclusion clause in Rosso’s insurance policy to be unambiguous. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Kruegergreen2 sentences2012See, e.g., People v. Krueger, 208 Ill.App.3d 897 , 153 Ill.Dec. 759 , 567 N.E.2d 717, 725 (1991) (Illinois) (holding that where the license revocation statute requires a finding of an arrest; if the arrest is not lawful, the exclusionary rule applies); Brownsberger v. Dep't of Transp., 460 N.W.2d 449, 450-51 (Iowa 1990) (Iowa) (if in the related criminal proceeding a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol cannot be obtained, the DOT may not then revoke a driver's license in a civil proceeding arising from the same circumstances as the criminal proceeding); Piotrowski v. Comm’r o 2012See, e.g., People v. Krueger, 208 Ill.App.3d 897 , 153 Ill.Dec. 759 , 567 N.E.2d 717, 725 (1991) (Illinois) (holding that where the license revocation statute requires a finding of an arrest; if the arrest is not lawful, the exclusionary rule applies); Brownsberger v. Dep't of Transp., 460 N.W.2d 449, 450-51 (Iowa 1990) (Iowa) (if in the related criminal proceeding a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol cannot be obtained, the DOT may not then revoke a driver's license in a civil proceeding arising from the same circumstances as the criminal proceeding); Piotrowski v. Comm’r o | 1 | 1 |
Brownsberger v. Department of Transportation, Motor Vehicle Divisiongreen1 sentence2012See, e.g., People v. Krueger, 208 Ill.App.3d 897 , 153 Ill.Dec. 759 , 567 N.E.2d 717, 725 (1991) (Illinois) (holding that where the license revocation statute requires a finding of an arrest; if the arrest is not lawful, the exclusionary rule applies); Brownsberger v. Dep't of Transp., 460 N.W.2d 449, 450-51 (Iowa 1990) (Iowa) (if in the related criminal proceeding a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol cannot be obtained, the DOT may not then revoke a driver's license in a civil proceeding arising from the same circumstances as the criminal proceeding); Piotrowski v. Comm’r o | 1 | 1 |
McClanahan v. Putnam County Commissiongreen2 sentences1993See Syllabus Point 2, McClanahan v. Putnam County Comm'n, 174 W.Va. 478 , 327 S.E.2d 458 (1985). [9] The text of the applicable exclusion and its exception in the Williams policy was: "B. 1993See Syllabus Point 2, McClanahan v. Putnam County Comm'n, 174 W.Va. 478 , 327 S.E.2d 458 (1985). [9] The text of the applicable exclusion and its exception in the Williams policy was: "B. | 1 | 1 |
Local Union Number 1638, United Mine Workers v. Consolidation Coal Co.green1 sentence1987See also Monongahela Power Co. v. Local 2332 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 484 F.2d 1209, 1213 (4th Cir.1973); Chicago Area Vending Employers Association v. Local 761 International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 564 F.Supp. 1186, 1193 (N.D.Ill.1983); Cox v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 468 F.Supp. 677, 681 (N.D.Ind.1979); Local 1638, United Mine Workers v. Consolidation Coal Co., 396 F.Supp. 971, 973 (N.D.W.Va.1975). | 1 | 1 |
Chicago Area Vending Employers Ass'n v. Local Union No. 761green1 sentence1987See also Monongahela Power Co. v. Local 2332 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 484 F.2d 1209, 1213 (4th Cir.1973); Chicago Area Vending Employers Association v. Local 761 International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 564 F.Supp. 1186, 1193 (N.D.Ill.1983); Cox v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 468 F.Supp. 677, 681 (N.D.Ind.1979); Local 1638, United Mine Workers v. Consolidation Coal Co., 396 F.Supp. 971, 973 (N.D.W.Va.1975). | 1 | 1 |
Monongahela Power Company, an Ohio Corporation v. Local No. 2332 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Afl-Cio-Clcgreen1 sentence1987See also Monongahela Power Co. v. Local 2332 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 484 F.2d 1209, 1213 (4th Cir.1973); Chicago Area Vending Employers Association v. Local 761 International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 564 F.Supp. 1186, 1193 (N.D.Ill.1983); Cox v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 468 F.Supp. 677, 681 (N.D.Ind.1979); Local 1638, United Mine Workers v. Consolidation Coal Co., 396 F.Supp. 971, 973 (N.D.W.Va.1975). | 1 | 1 |
Cox v. Guy F. Atkinson Co.green1 sentence1987See also Monongahela Power Co. v. Local 2332 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 484 F.2d 1209, 1213 (4th Cir.1973); Chicago Area Vending Employers Association v. Local 761 International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 564 F.Supp. 1186, 1193 (N.D.Ill.1983); Cox v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 468 F.Supp. 677, 681 (N.D.Ind.1979); Local 1638, United Mine Workers v. Consolidation Coal Co., 396 F.Supp. 971, 973 (N.D.W.Va.1975). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in West Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Allstate Insurance v. Kim
green
1 sentence2016The plain, ordinary meaning of the Limits of Liability Clause is that it spreads the protection of the insurance policy to all the insureds up to the policy limits and is not designed to negate the exclusions which are plainly worded. 121 F.Supp.2d at 1309 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Wheeling Dollar Savings & Trust Co. v. Hanes
green
2 sentences1998In 1977, in Wheeling Dollar Savings & Trust Co. v. Hanes, 160 W.Va. 711 , 237 S.E.2d 499 (1977), we essentially overruled the 1967 Willim decision by rejecting the exclusion presumption and adopting an inclusion presumption for trusts created prior to 1959. 1998In 1977, in Wheeling Dollar Savings & Trust Co. v. Hanes, 160 W.Va. 711 , 237 S.E.2d 499 (1977), we essentially overruled the 1967 Willim decision by rejecting the exclusion presumption and adopting an inclusion presumption for trusts created prior to 1959. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Security National Bank & Trust Co. v. Willim
green
2 sentences1998However, in Security National Bank & Trust v. Willim, 151 W.Va. 429 , 153 S.E.2d 114 (1967) this Court reaffirmed that the exclusion presumption governed the intent of testators for wills made before the 1959 amendment. 1998However, in Security National Bank & Trust v. Willim, 151 W.Va. 429 , 153 S.E.2d 114 (1967) this Court reaffirmed that the exclusion presumption governed the intent of testators for wills made before the 1959 amendment. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
green
2 sentences1994Beginning in 1972, the policies issued by Liberty Mutual also had an exclusion clause which provided: “ ‘[T]o bodily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water course body of water; but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental.’ ” 187 W.Va. at 744 , 421 S.E.2d at 495 . 1994Beginning in 1972, the policies issued by Liberty Mutual also had an exclusion clause which provided: “ ‘[T]o bodily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water course body of water; but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental.’ ” 187 W.Va. at 744 , 421 S.E.2d at 495 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Lower Paxon Township v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.
green
2 sentences1992Lower Paxton Township v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, 383 Pa.Super. 558 , 557 A.2d 393 (1989). 1992Lower Paxton Township v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, 383 Pa.Super. 558 , 557 A.2d 393 (1989). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Liberty Mutual Insurance v. Triangle Industries, Inc.
green
2 sentences1992The circuit court, in granting Liberty Mutual summary judgment, in essence, found that the exclusion clause precluded coverage for pollution damage unless the pollution was “sudden and accidental.” In reaching that conclusion, it appears that the circuit court, relying upon the holding of this Court in Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Triangle Industries, Inc., 182 W.Va. 580 , 390 S.E.2d 562 (1990), applied the law of Pennsylvania, which indicates that the exclusion clause in question relieves an insurer of liability unless the pollution was “sudden and accidental.” On appeal, Joy Technolog 1992The circuit court, in granting Liberty Mutual summary judgment, in essence, found that the exclusion clause precluded coverage for pollution damage unless the pollution was “sudden and accidental.” In reaching that conclusion, it appears that the circuit court, relying upon the holding of this Court in Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Triangle Industries, Inc., 182 W.Va. 580 , 390 S.E.2d 562 (1990), applied the law of Pennsylvania, which indicates that the exclusion clause in question relieves an insurer of liability unless the pollution was “sudden and accidental.” On appeal, Joy Technolog | 1 | 1992–1992 |
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.
green
2 sentences1987Specifically, the court held that “[i]n the absence of any express provision excluding a particular grievance from arbitration, we think only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail, particularly where ... the exclusion clause is vague and the arbitration clause quite broad.” Id. at 584-85 , 80 S.Ct. at 1354 , 4 L.Ed.2d at 1419 . 1987Specifically, the court held that “[i]n the absence of any express provision excluding a particular grievance from arbitration, we think only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail, particularly where ... the exclusion clause is vague and the arbitration clause quite broad.” Id. at 584-85 , 80 S.Ct. at 1354 , 4 L.Ed.2d at 1419 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Eaton v. State
green
2 sentences1982As the court stated: Accordingly, we hold that exclusion (o) excludes coverage for damage to the insured's work, or work done on his behalf, resulting from the work itself or any part of the work; that Gibson's work (or product) was the entire house and the damages to the house caused by the improper construction of the footings done on Gibson's behalf are not covered under Gibson's policy. 408 N.E.2d at 1281 . 1982As the court stated: Accordingly, we hold that exclusion (o) excludes coverage for damage to the insured’s work, or work done on his behalf, resulting from the work itself or any part of the work; that Gibson’s work (or product) was the entire house and the damages to the house caused by the improper construction of the footings done on Gibson’s behalf are not covered under Gibson’s policy. 408 N.E.2d at 1281 . | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.