49 Florida opinions name it 3 courts 1955–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Alaska Steamship Co. v. Pettersongreen2 sentences2013However, the Supreme Court has held that “[t]here is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one; ... ‘the Due Process Clause has little to say regarding the amount of discovery which the parties must be afforded....’” Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 , 97 S.Ct. 837 , 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977) (quoting Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 , 93 S.Ct. 2208 , 37 L.Ed.2d 82 (1973)); see generally Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 415 , 108 S.Ct. 646 , 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) (holding that the exclusion of a defense witness’s testimony as a sanctio 2011See Comer v. State, 730 So.2d 769, 775 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (“ ‘In a criminal ease, the exclusion of a defense witness for a discovery violation implicates a defendant’s sixth amendment right to present witnesses as well as the fundamental right to due process.’ M.N. v. State, 724 So.2d 122 [, 124 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) ]; Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 , 108 S.Ct. 646 , 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988).”). | 3 | 5 |
Taylor v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2013However, the Supreme Court has held that “[t]here is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one; ... ‘the Due Process Clause has little to say regarding the amount of discovery which the parties must be afforded....’” Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 , 97 S.Ct. 837 , 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977) (quoting Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 , 93 S.Ct. 2208 , 37 L.Ed.2d 82 (1973)); see generally Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 415 , 108 S.Ct. 646 , 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) (holding that the exclusion of a defense witness’s testimony as a sanctio 2013However, the Supreme Court has held that “[t]here is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one; ... ‘the Due Process Clause has little to say regarding the amount of discovery which the parties must be afforded....’” Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 , 97 S.Ct. 837 , 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977) (quoting Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 , 93 S.Ct. 2208 , 37 L.Ed.2d 82 (1973)); see generally Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 415 , 108 S.Ct. 646 , 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) (holding that the exclusion of a defense witness’s testimony as a sanctio | 3 | 5 |
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Phelpsgreen2 sentences2020Co. v. Phelps, 294 So. 2d 362, 363 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974) (“When we consider the terminology used in the exclusion clause in pari materia with the affirmative statement of coverage from leaks in the plumbing system, we conclude that the exclusion was intended to relate only to damage from water not emanating from the plumbing system.”). 2020Co. v. Phelps, 294 So. 2d 362, 363 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974) (“When we consider the terminology used in the exclusion clause in pari materia with the affirmative statement of coverage from leaks in the plumbing system, we conclude that the exclusion was intended to relate only to damage from water not emanating from the plumbing system.”). | 2 | 4 |
MN v. Stategreen2 sentences2011See Comer v. State, 730 So.2d 769, 775 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (“ ‘In a criminal ease, the exclusion of a defense witness for a discovery violation implicates a defendant’s sixth amendment right to present witnesses as well as the fundamental right to due process.’ M.N. v. State, 724 So.2d 122 [, 124 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) ]; Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 , 108 S.Ct. 646 , 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988).”). 2009Rule 3.220(n)(l) provides sanctions for discovery, but “[i]n a criminal case, the exclusion of a defense witness for a discovery violation implicates a defendant’s sixth amendment right to present witnesses as well as the fundamental right to due process.” M.N. v. State, 724 So.2d 122, 124 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); see also Wessling v. State, 877 So.2d 877, 879 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (“Exclusion of exculpatory evidence denies a defendant his fundamental right to defend himself in violation of the Sixth Amendment.”). | 2 | 3 |
Richardson v. Stategreen2 sentences2017A court must first determine “whether the accused exhibited an actual subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at the time of the discussion.” Id. (quoting Richardson v. State, 706 So.2d 1349, 1353 (Fla. 1998)). 2017A court must first determine “whether the accused exhibited an actual subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at the time of the discussion.” Id. (quoting Richardson v. State, 706 So. 2d 1349, 1353 (Fla. 1998)). | 2 | 2 |
Laquila Construction, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co.green2 sentences2005See Laquila Construction, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co. of Illinois, 66 F.Supp.2d 543, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (involving a policy excluding the “[cjost of making good faulty or defective workmanship or material”). 2003The court rejected the insured's position and determined that the construction company's claim fell "squarely into the exclusion clause simply as a cost incurred to make good the defective concrete." Id. at 545 . | 1 | 2 |
Reid v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.green2 sentences1987See Reid v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 352 So.2d 1172 (Fla. 1977); Linehan v. Alkhabbaz, 398 So.2d 989 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Newman v. National Indem. 1982In addition to the policy reasons for such clauses stated in Reid [ v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 352 So.2d 1172 (Fla. 1977)], we also note that insurance premiums may be established in part by reference to potential exposure to liability by insurance companies and may be lower where those most likely to be passengers in the automobile are expressly excluded from coverage. *1070 Florida Farm Bureau Insurance Co. v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 387 So.2d 932, 934 (Fla. 1980). | 1 | 2 |
Schoenwetter v. Stategreen2 sentences2017“Where a party admission is not clearly part of an attempt to negotiate a plea bargain, this Court has adopted a two-tier analysis for determining whether a statement falls within the exclusion under rule 3.172(i).” Schoenwetter v. State, 46 So.3d 535, 546-47 (Fla. 2010) (citing Calabro v. State, 995 So.2d 307, 313-14 (Fla. 2008)). 2017Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.172(i) provides, “Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of an offer or a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, later withdrawn, or of statements made in connection therewith, is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding against the person who made the plea or offer.” -8- “Where a party admission is not clearly part of an attempt to negotiate a plea bargain, this Court has adopted a two-tier analysis for determining whether a statement falls within the exclusion under rule 3.172(i).” Schoenwetter v. State, 46 So. 3d 535, 546-47 (Fla. 2010 | 1 | 1 |
Calabro v. Stategreen2 sentences2017“Where a party admission is not clearly part of an attempt to negotiate a plea bargain, this Court has adopted a two-tier analysis for determining whether a statement falls within the exclusion under rule 3.172(i).” Schoenwetter v. State, 46 So.3d 535, 546-47 (Fla. 2010) (citing Calabro v. State, 995 So.2d 307, 313-14 (Fla. 2008)). 2017Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.172(i) provides, “Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of an offer or a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, later withdrawn, or of statements made in connection therewith, is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding against the person who made the plea or offer.” -8- “Where a party admission is not clearly part of an attempt to negotiate a plea bargain, this Court has adopted a two-tier analysis for determining whether a statement falls within the exclusion under rule 3.172(i).” Schoenwetter v. State, 46 So. 3d 535, 546-47 (Fla. 2010 | 1 | 1 |
Comer v. Stategreen1 sentence2011See Comer v. State, 730 So.2d 769, 775 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (“ ‘In a criminal ease, the exclusion of a defense witness for a discovery violation implicates a defendant’s sixth amendment right to present witnesses as well as the fundamental right to due process.’ M.N. v. State, 724 So.2d 122 [, 124 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) ]; Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 , 108 S.Ct. 646 , 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988).”). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Andrew Jackson Robertsongreen1 sentence2010First, a court “must determine ‘whether the accused exhibited an actual subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at the time of the discussion.’” Richardson v. State, 706 So.2d 1349, 1353 (Fla.1998) (quoting United States v. Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356, 1366 (5th Cir.1978)). | 1 | 1 |
Wessling v. Stategreen1 sentence2009Rule 3.220(n)(l) provides sanctions for discovery, but “[i]n a criminal case, the exclusion of a defense witness for a discovery violation implicates a defendant’s sixth amendment right to present witnesses as well as the fundamental right to due process.” M.N. v. State, 724 So.2d 122, 124 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); see also Wessling v. State, 877 So.2d 877, 879 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (“Exclusion of exculpatory evidence denies a defendant his fundamental right to defend himself in violation of the Sixth Amendment.”). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Stategreen1 sentence2008In reviewing the exclusion of defense evidence, we "must determine whether the erroneously excluded evidence could have had an effect on the jury favorable to the defendant, or, in other words, could the improper exclusion have reasonably affected the outcome of the case." Johnson v. State, 728 So.2d 1204, 1205 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). | 1 | 1 |
Gulf Life Insurance Company v. Nashgreen1 sentence2003Co. v. Nash, 97 So.2d 4, 9-10 (Fla. 1957)). [4] Thomas, 673 So.2d at 142-43 . [5] The inclusion of the foreseeability provision in this exclusion clause differentiates this clause significantly from the typical intentional act exclusion clause that has been the subject of so much litigation in the past. | 1 | 1 |
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.green2 sentences1996See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 , 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1352-53 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. 1996See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 , 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1352-53 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. | 1 | 1 |
Kalell v. Mutual Fire & Automobile Insurance Co.green1 sentence1996Id. at 867 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Protective National Insurance Co. of Omaha v. City of Woodhavengreen | 1 | 1 |
| SHOALS NAT. BANK OF FLORENCE v. Home Indemnity Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| NATIONAL BANK OF COM. IN NEW ORLEANS v. Fidelity & Cas. Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Fla. Farm Bureau Ins. v. Government Emp. Ins.green | 1 | 1 |
| Farrey v. Bettendorfgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Webb v. American Fire & Casualty Co.
green
2 sentences2011This Court concluded that if Louis were a named insured, Webb could not recover “because the accident occurred while she was engaged as an employee of the insured.” In the alternative, this Court determined that even if Sophie Davidson were the only named insured on the policy, Webb nevertheless could not recover “because the exclusion clause applies not only to the named insured but also applied to Louis Davidson who was using the automobile with the knowledge and consent of the named insured to transport his employee under his contract of employment with the plaintiff.” Id. 1966In Webb v. American Fire & Casualty Co., Fla. 1941, 5 So.2d 252 , the court noted that an exclusion clause similar to the case at bar with respect to an employee applies not only to the named insured, but also to an omnibus insured using the automobile with the knowledge and consent of the named insured, and held that a claim made by an employee of the additional insured was not covered. | 4 | 1955–2011 |
National Surety Corp. v. Windham
green
2 sentences1985In so doing, the court stated, as dicta, “[o]nly regular employees as distinguished from casual or incidental employees, are within the exclusion clause of the insurance contract.” 74 So.2d at 550 . 1965In the opinion before us for review the district court rejected Mrs. Griffin's contention that the judgment of the trial court was contrary to the decision of this court in National Surety Corp., supra, in which case, by way of obiter dictum, it was said that: "Only regular employees as distinguished from casual or incidental employees, are within the exclusion clause of the insurance contract." In addition to its rejection of this statement from the National Surety Corp. case as authority because it was mere dictum, the district court also concluded that the exclusionary clause involved there | 4 | 1955–1985 |
Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Anderson
green
2 sentences2018When the ambiguity arises -8- regarding an exclusion clause, courts construe them "even more strictly against the insurer than coverage clauses." Anderson, 756 So. 2d at 29 . 2001We are not unmindful of our obligation to "read each policy as a whole, endeavoring to give every provision its full meaning and operative effect." Anderson, 756 So.2d at 34 . | 2 | 2001–2018 |
Griffin v. Speidel
green
2 sentences1985Eleven years later, in Griffin v. Speidel, 179 So.2d 569 (Fla.1965), the supreme court expressly receded from its National Surety dicta, stating: Nowhere in the exclusion clauses, or elsewhere, do we find any reasonable basis for construing them to mean that the exclusion applies only to regular employees, but not to casual or incidental employees, as this court said in its dictum in the case of National Surety Corp. supra. 179 So.2d at 571 . 1974In Griffin v. Speidel, supra, wherein this same argument was made as to an identical "employee-exclusion" clause, Mr. Justice O'Connell, writing for the court, stated at 571 of 179 So.2d: "It is our opinion that the exclusion clause is clear and unambiguous. | 2 | 1974–1985 |
Oren v. General Accident Fire and Life Assur. Corp.
green
2 sentences1969While appellee candidly concedes in its brief that a verdict is not the same as a final judgment, it nonetheless urges us to hold that where a jury verdict has been returned and recorded, the entry of the verdict should be construed by us as the equivalent of a “prosecution to judgment” as such term is used in the policy exclusion, in order to give effect to the intent of the parties, 5 citing us to the case of Oren v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation, Fla.App.1965, 175 So.2d 581 . 1967The Third District, in Oren v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp., Fla.App. 1965, 175 So.2d 581 , held that the exclusion clause was clear and unambiguous, and the insured was denied recovery because of its failure to obtain written consent of the insurer prior to obtaining judgments against an uninsured motorist. [1] *792 In Phoenix Ins. | 2 | 1967–1969 |
EMPLOYERS'LIABILITY ASSURANCE CORP. v. Owens
green
2 sentences1964In Employers’ Liability Assurance Corp. v. Owens, Fla.1955, 78 So.2d 104 , factually similar to the case on review, the Florida Supreme Court distinguished the National Surety Corp. case, supra, by the following language: “In the case of National Surety Corporation v. Windham, Fla., 1954, 74 So.2d 549 , the language of the exclusion clause was before this Court. 1961In the cases of Webb v. American Fire & Casualty Co., 1941, 148 Fla. 714 , 5 So.2d 252 , and Employer's Liability Assurance Corp. v. Owens, Fla. 1955, 78 So.2d 104 , our Supreme Court had before it liability insurance policies containing exclusion provisions similar to sub-paragraphs (f) and (g) of the exclusion clause in the instant policy. | 2 | 1961–1964 |
Fabre v. Marin
red
1 sentence2024We therefore reverse and remand the case for a new trial on liability and damages. 1 Fabre v. Marin, 623 So. 2d 1182 , 1185–87 (Fla. 1993), receded from by Wells v. Tallahassee Mem’l Reg’l Med. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Gore v. State
green
1 sentence2017“Where the rule has been invoked, a hearing should be conducted to determine whether a witness’ exclusion from the rule will result in prejudice to the accused.” Gore, 599 So.2d at 986 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Weatherford v. Bursey
green
2 sentences2013However, the Supreme Court has held that “[t]here is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one; ... ‘the Due Process Clause has little to say regarding the amount of discovery which the parties must be afforded....’” Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 , 97 S.Ct. 837 , 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977) (quoting Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 , 93 S.Ct. 2208 , 37 L.Ed.2d 82 (1973)); see generally Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 415 , 108 S.Ct. 646 , 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) (holding that the exclusion of a defense witness’s testimony as a sanctio 2013However, the Supreme Court has held that “[t]here is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one; ... ‘the Due Process Clause has little to say regarding the amount of discovery which the parties must be afforded....’” Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 , 97 S.Ct. 837 , 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977) (quoting Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 , 93 S.Ct. 2208 , 37 L.Ed.2d 82 (1973)); see generally Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 415 , 108 S.Ct. 646 , 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) (holding that the exclusion of a defense witness’s testimony as a sanctio | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Wardius v. Oregon
green
2 sentences2013However, the Supreme Court has held that “[t]here is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one; ... ‘the Due Process Clause has little to say regarding the amount of discovery which the parties must be afforded....’” Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 , 97 S.Ct. 837 , 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977) (quoting Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 , 93 S.Ct. 2208 , 37 L.Ed.2d 82 (1973)); see generally Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 415 , 108 S.Ct. 646 , 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) (holding that the exclusion of a defense witness’s testimony as a sanctio 2013However, the Supreme Court has held that “[t]here is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one; ... ‘the Due Process Clause has little to say regarding the amount of discovery which the parties must be afforded....’” Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 , 97 S.Ct. 837 , 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977) (quoting Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 , 93 S.Ct. 2208 , 37 L.Ed.2d 82 (1973)); see generally Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 415 , 108 S.Ct. 646 , 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) (holding that the exclusion of a defense witness’s testimony as a sanctio | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Castro v. Allstate Ins. Co.
green
1 sentence2006Id. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Fabregas v. State
green
1 sentence2005Similarly, in Fabregas v. State, 829 So.2d 238 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), the court disapproved the exclusion of defense witness testimony that went directly to the credibility of the sole prosecution expert witness. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Crump v. State
green
1 sentence2004Later, in Crump v. State, 622 So.2d 963 (Fla.1993), this Court affirmed a trial court's exclusion of defense questions to a detective witness regarding whether he had been given information that another suspect had committed similar crimes. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Thomas v. Prudential Property and Cas.
green
1 sentence2003Co. v. Nash, 97 So.2d 4, 9-10 (Fla. 1957)). [4] Thomas, 673 So.2d at 142-43 . [5] The inclusion of the foreseeability provision in this exclusion clause differentiates this clause significantly from the typical intentional act exclusion clause that has been the subject of so much litigation in the past. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Brower v. Employers' Liability Assurance Co. green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Richardson v. State green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| United Services Automobile Ass'n v. Elitzky green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Linehan v. Alkhabbaz neutral | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| The First National Bank Of Decatur v. Insurance Company Of North America green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| The National Bank Of Commerce In New Orleans v. Fidelity And Casualty Company Of New York neutral | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Volkswagen Insurance Company v. Taylor green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| cluster 292125 green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| King v. Travelers Insurance Company green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Mullis v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Travelers Insurance Company v. Elkins green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Braswell v. Florida procedural | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Fox v. Lennon green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Feldstein v. United States green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Braswell v. State neutral | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Travelers Indemnity Company v. Powell green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Phoenix Insurance Company v. Bowen green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.