exclusion clause in Connecticut

2019As this court has explained, however, ‘‘[t]he reason for or purpose of an exclusion clause in a policy is to eliminate from cover- age specified losses . . . [that] except for the exclu- sion clause would remain under the coverage. . . . [T]he word exclusion signifies . . . circumstances in which the insurance company will not assume liability for a specific risk or hazard that otherwise would be included within the general scope of the policy.’’ (Cita- tions omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hammer v. Lumberman’s Mutual Casualty Co., 214 Conn. 573 , 588–89, 573 A.2d

2019As this court has explained, however, ‘‘[t]he reason for or purpose of an exclusion clause in a policy is to eliminate from cover- age specified losses . . . [that] except for the exclu- sion clause would remain under the coverage. . . . [T]he word exclusion signifies . . . circumstances in which the insurance company will not assume liability for a specific risk or hazard that otherwise would be included within the general scope of the policy.’’ (Cita- tions omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hammer v. Lumberman’s Mutual Casualty Co., 214 Conn. 573 , 588–89, 573 A.2d

2010“Further, the exclusion of defense evidence may deprive the defendant of his constitutional right to present a defense.” State v. DeJesus, 270 Conn. 826, 835 , 856 A.2d 345 (2004). “[T]he confrontation clause does not [however] suspend the rules of evidence to give the defendant the right to engage in unrestricted cross-examination.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brown, 273 Conn. 330, 338-39 , 869 A.2d 1224 (2005).

2010“Further, the exclusion of defense evidence may deprive the defendant of his constitutional right to present a defense.” State v. DeJesus, 270 Conn. 826, 835 , 856 A.2d 345 (2004). “[T]he confrontation clause does not [however] suspend the rules of evidence to give the defendant the right to engage in unrestricted cross-examination.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brown, 273 Conn. 330, 338-39 , 869 A.2d 1224 (2005).

2021The defendant’s challenge to the trial court’s ruling precluding admission of the letters is governed by the following settled principles. ‘‘Generally, an accused must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence in exercising his right to present a defense.’’ State v. Cerreta, 260 Conn. 251, 261 , 796 A.2d 1176 (2002). ‘‘While the [c]onstitution . . . prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, [well estab- lished] rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude

2021The defendant’s challenge to the trial court’s ruling precluding admission of the letters is governed by the following settled principles. ‘‘Generally, an accused must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence in exercising his right to present a defense.’’ State v. Cerreta, 260 Conn. 251, 261 , 796 A.2d 1176 (2002). ‘‘While the [c]onstitution . . . prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, [well estab- lished] rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude

2012Co., 259 Conn. 527, 545 , 791 A.2d 489 (2002).

2012Co., 259 Conn. 527, 545 , 791 A.2d 489 (2002).

2010“Further, the exclusion of defense evidence may deprive the defendant of his constitutional right to present a defense.” State v. DeJesus, 270 Conn. 826, 835 , 856 A.2d 345 (2004). “[T]he confrontation clause does not [however] suspend the rules of evidence to give the defendant the right to engage in unrestricted cross-examination.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brown, 273 Conn. 330, 338-39 , 869 A.2d 1224 (2005).

2010“Further, the exclusion of defense evidence may deprive the defendant of his constitutional right to present a defense.” State v. DeJesus, 270 Conn. 826, 835 , 856 A.2d 345 (2004). “[T]he confrontation clause does not [however] suspend the rules of evidence to give the defendant the right to engage in unrestricted cross-examination.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brown, 273 Conn. 330, 338-39 , 869 A.2d 1224 (2005).

1999In her motion to reargue, Egan claims additionally that her complaint in the underlying action contains an allegation of "wanton and/or reckless assault" and that this does not amount to "an intentional act triggering the exclusion clause." In a declaratory judgment action, the defendant "must show that the court could not, in the exercise of sound discretion permit the [plaintiffs] action to proceed." England v. Coventry , supra, 183 Conn. 365 ; Connecticut Savings Bank v. First National Bank , supra, 133 Conn. 410 -11. "[C]onstruction of a contract of insurance presents a question of law for

1999In her motion to reargue, Egan claims additionally that her complaint in the underlying action contains an allegation of "wanton and/or reckless assault" and that this does not amount to "an intentional act triggering the exclusion clause." In a declaratory judgment action, the defendant "must show that the court could not, in the exercise of sound discretion permit the [plaintiffs] action to proceed." England v. Coventry , supra, 183 Conn. 365 ; Connecticut Savings Bank v. First National Bank , supra, 133 Conn. 410 -11. "[C]onstruction of a contract of insurance presents a question of law for

1998Thus, "when an exclusion clause is relied upon to deny coverage, the insurer has the burden of demonstrating that the allegations of the complaint cast that pleading solely and entirely within the policy exclusions, and further, that the allegations in toto, are subject to no other interpretation." (Emphasis in the original.) State of N.Y. v. Amro Realty Corp., 936 F.2d 1420 , 1427 (2d Cir. 1991), cited in Berdon v. Chicago Title Ins.

1997Thus, "when an exclusion clause is relied upon to deny coverage, the insurer CT Page 12142 has the burden of demonstrating that the allegations of the complaint cast that pleading solely and entirely within the policy exclusions, and further, that the allegations in toto, are subject to no other interpretation." (Emphasis in the original.) State of N.Y. v. Amro Realty Corp., 936 F.2d 1420 , 1427 (2d Cir. 1991), cited in Berdon v. Chicago Title Ins.

1992Group, 36 Conn. Sup. 256, 258 , 417 A.2d 366 (1980), to support its public policy rationale for narrowly construing the exclusion clause. 17 The court in Englehardt also stated that “[r]egardless of how persuasive the public policy stated by the New Jersey court may be, this court cannot premise a decision on public policy in defiance of state statutes or valid administrative regulations.” Id., 259 .

1992Group, 36 Conn. Sup. 256, 258 , 417 A.2d 366 (1980), to support its public policy rationale for narrowly construing the exclusion clause. 17 The court in Englehardt also stated that “[r]egardless of how persuasive the public policy stated by the New Jersey court may be, this court cannot premise a decision on public policy in defiance of state statutes or valid administrative regulations.” Id., 259 .

2023Co., 186 Conn. 507, 514 , 442 A.2d 920 (1982) (‘‘We cannot say that the clause in question is clear and unambiguous.

2023Co., 186 Conn. 507, 514 , 442 A.2d 920 (1982) (‘‘We cannot say that the clause in question is clear and unambiguous.

2021The defendant’s challenge to the trial court’s ruling precluding admission of the letters is governed by the following settled principles. ‘‘Generally, an accused must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence in exercising his right to present a defense.’’ State v. Cerreta, 260 Conn. 251, 261 , 796 A.2d 1176 (2002). ‘‘While the [c]onstitution . . . prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, [well estab- lished] rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude

2021The defendant’s challenge to the trial court’s ruling precluding admission of the letters is governed by the following settled principles. ‘‘Generally, an accused must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence in exercising his right to present a defense.’’ State v. Cerreta, 260 Conn. 251, 261 , 796 A.2d 1176 (2002). ‘‘While the [c]onstitution . . . prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, [well estab- lished] rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude

2021Ed. 2d 503 (2006); see, e.g., State v. Sandoval, 263 Conn. 524, 545 , 821 A.2d 247 (2003) (‘‘evidence of [a witness’] abortion, in certain circumstances, may give rise to a real risk of unfair prejudice because such evidence necessarily implicates a woman’s sexual history and her highly personal decision to terminate a pregnancy’’); State v. Swain, 101 Conn. App. 253, 269 , 921 A.2d 712 (‘‘[T]he fact that [the complaining witness] was incar- cerated might be expected to cause a negative reaction in the eyes of the [jurors].

2021Ed. 2d 503 (2006); see, e.g., State v. Sandoval, 263 Conn. 524, 545 , 821 A.2d 247 (2003) (‘‘evidence of [a witness’] abortion, in certain circumstances, may give rise to a real risk of unfair prejudice because such evidence necessarily implicates a woman’s sexual history and her highly personal decision to terminate a pregnancy’’); State v. Swain, 101 Conn. App. 253, 269 , 921 A.2d 712 (‘‘[T]he fact that [the complaining witness] was incar- cerated might be expected to cause a negative reaction in the eyes of the [jurors].

2012Co., 159 Conn. 252, 257 , 268 A.2d 663 (1970), "an obvious purpose of the exclusion clause [applying to automobiles off the premises or the ways immediately adjoining] was to limit the territorial scope of the ... liability coverage in cases involving automobiles. ...

2012Co., 159 Conn. 252, 257 , 268 A.2d 663 (1970), "an obvious purpose of the exclusion clause [applying to automobiles off the premises or the ways immediately adjoining] was to limit the territorial scope of the ... liability coverage in cases involving automobiles. ...

2006Compliance with the constitutionally guaranteed right to cross-examination requires that the defendant be allowed to present the jury with facts from which it could appropriately draw inferences relating to the witness' reliability. . . . [P]reclusion of sufficient inquiry into a particular matter tending to show motive, bias and interest may result in a violation of the constitutional requirements of the sixth amendment. . . . [Furthermore], the exclusion of defense evidence may deprive the defendant of his constitutional right to present a defense." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

2006Compliance with the constitutionally guaranteed right to cross-examination requires that the defendant be allowed to present the jury with facts from which it could appropriately draw inferences relating to the witness' reliability. . . . [P]reclusion of sufficient inquiry into a particular matter tending to show motive, bias and interest may result in a violation of the constitutional requirements of the sixth amendment. . . . [Furthermore], the exclusion of defense evidence may deprive the defendant of his constitutional right to present a defense." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

2005Even when the improper exclusion of defense evidence amounts to a denial of the right to present a defense; see State v. Bova, 240 Conn. 210, 236 , 690 A.2d 1370 (1997); thereby placing on the state the burden of proving the exclusion to have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; State v. Cavell, 235 Conn. 711, 720 , 670 A.2d 261 (1996); a defendant, when claiming that a court’s ruling on relevance and admissibility was improper, bears the initial burden of demonstrating that that ruling was an abuse of discretion.

2005Even when the improper exclusion of defense evidence amounts to a denial of the right to present a defense; see State v. Bova, 240 Conn. 210, 236 , 690 A.2d 1370 (1997); thereby placing on the state the burden of proving the exclusion to have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; State v. Cavell, 235 Conn. 711, 720 , 670 A.2d 261 (1996); a defendant, when claiming that a court’s ruling on relevance and admissibility was improper, bears the initial burden of demonstrating that that ruling was an abuse of discretion.

2001(Business provider policy ¶ B.1.j.) "[W]hen an exclusion clause is relied upon to deny coverage, the insurer has the burden of demonstrating that the allegations of the [underlying] complaint cast that pleading solely and entirely within the policy exclusions, and, further, that the allegations, in toto , are subject to no other interpretation." Technicon Electronics Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co ., 542 N.E.2d 1048 , 1050 (N.Y. 1989).

2001THE WATER DAMAGE EXCLUSION If definitive language is absent in the contract, "the determination of what the parties intended their contractual commitments to encompass is a question of the intention of the parties and hence an inference of fact to be resolved by the trier of fact." Gionfriddo v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 192 Conn. 280 , 296 (1984).