exclusion clause in Oregon

2013Co., 298 Or 765, 771 , 696 P2d 1082 (1985) (use of the term “any aircraft” as opposed to simply “aircraft” was intended to give an insurance policy’s exclusion clause a broad meaning); Oregon State Denturist Assn. v. Board of Dentistry, 172 Or App 693, 702 , 19 P3d 986 (2001) (the legislature’s use of the article “any” indicated an intent that the definition be “broadly inclusive”).

2013Co., 298 Or 765, 771 , 696 P2d 1082 (1985) (use of the term “any aircraft” as opposed to simply “aircraft” was intended to give an insurance policy’s exclusion clause a broad meaning); Oregon State Denturist Assn. v. Board of Dentistry, 172 Or App 693, 702 , 19 P3d 986 (2001) (the legislature’s use of the article “any” indicated an intent that the definition be “broadly inclusive”).

2013Co., 298 Or 765, 771 , 696 P2d 1082 (1985) (use of the term “any aircraft” as opposed to simply “aircraft” was intended to give an insurance policy’s exclusion clause a broad meaning); Oregon State Denturist Assn. v. Board of Dentistry, 172 Or App 693, 702 , 19 P3d 986 (2001) (the legislature’s use of the article “any” indicated an intent that the definition be “broadly inclusive”).

2013Co., 298 Or 765, 771 , 696 P2d 1082 (1985) (use of the term “any aircraft” as opposed to simply “aircraft” was intended to give an insurance policy’s exclusion clause a broad meaning); Oregon State Denturist Assn. v. Board of Dentistry, 172 Or App 693, 702 , 19 P3d 986 (2001) (the legislature’s use of the article “any” indicated an intent that the definition be “broadly inclusive”).

2026Here, the trial court ruled that the evidence was inadmissible under OEC 404(3), which provides, in relevant part, “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admis- sible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith.” That rule 428 State v. Perez-Martinez prohibits the introduction of “propensity evidence,” meaning evidence that seeks to prove that “a person has a propensity to engage in certain types of behavior and that the person acted in conformance with that propensity on a particular occasion.” State v. Skillicorn, 367 Or 464, 47

2026Here, the trial court ruled that the evidence was inadmissible under OEC 404(3), which provides, in relevant part, “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admis- sible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith.” That rule 428 State v. Perez-Martinez prohibits the introduction of “propensity evidence,” meaning evidence that seeks to prove that “a person has a propensity to engage in certain types of behavior and that the person acted in conformance with that propensity on a particular occasion.” State v. Skillicorn, 367 Or 464, 47

2022Id.

2015“Except” in that context means Cite as 357 Or 333 (2015) 341 “with the exclusion or exception of” or “other than : BUT.” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 791 (unabridged ed 2002).

2011The word “except,” as used here, can mean “with the exclusion or exception of,” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 791 (unabridged ed 2002); “exception,” in turn, means “the act of excepting or excluding: exclusion or restriction (as of a class, statement, or rule) by taking out something that would otherwise be included,” id. (emphasis added).

2006Co., 298 Or 765, 771 , 696 P2d 1082 (1985) (use of the term “any aircraft” as opposed to simply “aircraft” was intended to give an insurance policys exclusion clause a broad meaning); Argonaut Insurance Co. v. Ketchen, 243 Or 376 , 413 P2d 613 (1966) (holding that the phrase “any employee” in an exclusion clause was intended to “enlarge the scope of the phrase” and to “preclude [ ] limiting the application of the phrase to a particular kind of employee”).

2006Co., 298 Or 765, 771 , 696 P2d 1082 (1985) (use of the term “any aircraft” as opposed to simply “aircraft” was intended to give an insurance policys exclusion clause a broad meaning); Argonaut Insurance Co. v. Ketchen, 243 Or 376 , 413 P2d 613 (1966) (holding that the phrase “any employee” in an exclusion clause was intended to “enlarge the scope of the phrase” and to “preclude [ ] limiting the application of the phrase to a particular kind of employee”).

2002Ocean, 24 Or App at 292 . 10 The parties in Ocean agreed that the defendant had not been charged under ORS 164.205(3)(b). 24 Or App at 293 . 11 Ocean has been cited in only one subsequent Oregon case, see State v. Cargill, 100 Or App 336 , 786 P2d 208 (1990), aff'd by an equally divided court 316 Or 492 , 851 P2d 1141 (1993), and then only for the innocuous proposition that “[o]rders that a known shoplifter not enter any of a company’s stores or that a disruptive person leave a public hearing are lawful.” Id. at 342.

2002Ocean, 24 Or App at 292 . 10 The parties in Ocean agreed that the defendant had not been charged under ORS 164.205(3)(b). 24 Or App at 293 . 11 Ocean has been cited in only one subsequent Oregon case, see State v. Cargill, 100 Or App 336 , 786 P2d 208 (1990), aff'd by an equally divided court 316 Or 492 , 851 P2d 1141 (1993), and then only for the innocuous proposition that “[o]rders that a known shoplifter not enter any of a company’s stores or that a disruptive person leave a public hearing are lawful.” Id. at 342.

2002Ocean, 24 Or App at 292 . 10 The parties in Ocean agreed that the defendant had not been charged under ORS 164.205(3)(b). 24 Or App at 293 . 11 Ocean has been cited in only one subsequent Oregon case, see State v. Cargill, 100 Or App 336 , 786 P2d 208 (1990), aff'd by an equally divided court 316 Or 492 , 851 P2d 1141 (1993), and then only for the innocuous proposition that “[o]rders that a known shoplifter not enter any of a company’s stores or that a disruptive person leave a public hearing are lawful.” Id. at 342.

2002Ocean, 24 Or App at 292 . 10 The parties in Ocean agreed that the defendant had not been charged under ORS 164.205(3)(b). 24 Or App at 293 . 11 Ocean has been cited in only one subsequent Oregon case, see State v. Cargill, 100 Or App 336 , 786 P2d 208 (1990), aff'd by an equally divided court 316 Or 492 , 851 P2d 1141 (1993), and then only for the innocuous proposition that “[o]rders that a known shoplifter not enter any of a company’s stores or that a disruptive person leave a public hearing are lawful.” Id. at 342.

2002Ocean, 24 Or App at 292 . 10 The parties in Ocean agreed that the defendant had not been charged under ORS 164.205(3)(b). 24 Or App at 293 . 11 Ocean has been cited in only one subsequent Oregon case, see State v. Cargill, 100 Or App 336 , 786 P2d 208 (1990), aff'd by an equally divided court 316 Or 492 , 851 P2d 1141 (1993), and then only for the innocuous proposition that “[o]rders that a known shoplifter not enter any of a company’s stores or that a disruptive person leave a public hearing are lawful.” Id. at 342.

2002Ocean, 24 Or App at 292 . 10 The parties in Ocean agreed that the defendant had not been charged under ORS 164.205(3)(b). 24 Or App at 293 . 11 Ocean has been cited in only one subsequent Oregon case, see State v. Cargill, 100 Or App 336 , 786 P2d 208 (1990), aff'd by an equally divided court 316 Or 492 , 851 P2d 1141 (1993), and then only for the innocuous proposition that “[o]rders that a known shoplifter not enter any of a company’s stores or that a disruptive person leave a public hearing are lawful.” Id. at 342.

1993Co. v. White, 60 Or App 666, 670 , 655 P2d 599 (1982), rev den 294 Or 569 (1983), we held that a passenger’s action in grabbing a steering wheel did not constitute “ ‘using’ or ‘operating’ a motor vehicle within the meaning” of the exclusion clause in that case.

1993Co. v. White, 60 Or App 666, 670 , 655 P2d 599 (1982), rev den 294 Or 569 (1983), we held that a passenger’s action in grabbing a steering wheel did not constitute “ ‘using’ or ‘operating’ a motor vehicle within the meaning” of the exclusion clause in that case.

1990Co. v. Sunnes, supra, 77 Or App at 141 .

1989It also noted that the meaning of that exclusion “is not to be found in an abstract analysis of the word ‘control.’ We must turn to the reasons for the adoption of the exclusion clause and determine whether in light of those reasons the policy was intended to exclude coverage in the circumstances of the particular case.” 254 Or at 504 .

1985The court held that the risk was not covered because of an exclusion clause in the policy which provided: “Risk Not Assumed: Death of Insured resulting from travel or flight in * * * any kind of aircraft.” See also Wilson v. Insurance Company of North America, 453 F Supp 732 (ND Cal 1978); Fireman’s Fund American Life Insurance Company v. Long, 148 Ga App 216, 251 SE2d 133 (1978); Deschler v. Fireman’s Fund American Life Ins., 663 P2d 97 (Utah 1983); Scarboro v. Pilot Life Ins.

1985The court held that the risk was not covered because of an exclusion clause in the policy which provided: “Risk Not Assumed: Death of Insured resulting from travel or flight in * * * any kind of aircraft.” See also Wilson v. Insurance Company of North America, 453 F Supp 732 (ND Cal 1978); Fireman’s Fund American Life Insurance Company v. Long, 148 Ga App 216, 251 SE2d 133 (1978); Deschler v. Fireman’s Fund American Life Ins., 663 P2d 97 (Utah 1983); Scarboro v. Pilot Life Ins.

1985The court held that the risk was not covered because of an exclusion clause in the policy which provided: “Risk Not Assumed: Death of Insured resulting from travel or flight in * * * any kind of aircraft.” See also Wilson v. Insurance Company of North America, 453 F Supp 732 (ND Cal 1978); Fireman’s Fund American Life Insurance Company v. Long, 148 Ga App 216, 251 SE2d 133 (1978); Deschler v. Fireman’s Fund American Life Ins., 663 P2d 97 (Utah 1983); Scarboro v. Pilot Life Ins.

1985Co., 242 NC 444, 88 SE2d 133 , 54 ALR2d 407 (1955).

1984Ass’n v. Johnson, 294 SE2d 116 (W Va 1982); Stanley v. American Fire & Casualty Co., 361 So2d 1030 (Ala 1978); Gulf Insurance Co. v. Tilley, 280 F Supp 60 (ND Indiana 1967), aff’d 393 F2d 119 (7th Cir 1968), and other cases cited in Annot., 48 ALR3d 1096 (1973).

1984Ass'n v. Johnson, 294 S.E.2d 116 (W.

1984Ass’n v. Johnson, 294 SE2d 116 (W Va 1982); Stanley v. American Fire & Casualty Co., 361 So2d 1030 (Ala 1978); Gulf Insurance Co. v. Tilley, 280 F Supp 60 (ND Indiana 1967), aff’d 393 F2d 119 (7th Cir 1968), and other cases cited in Annot., 48 ALR3d 1096 (1973).

1983The reasoning for our holding was well said by the Washington Supreme Court in Castleman v. Schiffner, 160 Wash 313, 318, 294 P 983 (1931), where the court held: “It has been stated as a general rule, in substance, that the matter of receiving the testimony of a witness who has violated an exclusion rule is within the discretion of the trial *15 court.

1983In State v. Sheeler, 15 Or App 96 , 514 P2d 1370 (1973), a prosecution for assault and robbery, defendant tried to impeach the complaining witness for bias and interest by showing that the witness stood some chance of future prosecution for an offense arising from the same events that had led to defendant’s prosecution.

1983In State v. Sheeler, 15 Or App 96 , 514 P2d 1370 (1973), a prosecution for assault and robbery, defendant tried to impeach the complaining witness for bias and interest by showing that the witness stood some chance of future prosecution for an offense arising from the same events that had led to defendant’s prosecution.

1982Paul Companies, supra, 283 Or at 281 .

1973The judgment is affirmed. ① Frontier Ins. v. Hartford Fire Ins., 262 Or 470 , 499 P2d 1302 (1972); May v. Chicago Insurance Co., 260 Or 285 , 490 P2d 150 (1971). ② See Oregon Farm Bureau v. Thompson, 235 Or 162, 202-204 , 378 P2d 563 , 384 P2d 182 (1963).

1973The judgment is affirmed. ① Frontier Ins. v. Hartford Fire Ins., 262 Or 470 , 499 P2d 1302 (1972); May v. Chicago Insurance Co., 260 Or 285 , 490 P2d 150 (1971). ② See Oregon Farm Bureau v. Thompson, 235 Or 162, 202-204 , 378 P2d 563 , 384 P2d 182 (1963).