exclusion clause in Washington

2021In Jones, the court held that the trial court violated the defendant’s right to present a defense in a rape case when it did not allow him to testify or cross- examine witnesses about his claim that the alleged victim consented as part of a sex party. 168 Wn.2d at 721 .

2020Unlike in Jones, where the excluded testimony was the “entire defense” because it went to the issue of consent in a rape case, the excluded testimony here did not preclude Scheibe’s “entire defense.” Jones, 168 Wn.2d at 721 .8 The court still permitted Scheibe to introduce evidence that he was dating Frias, that Frias was Randall’s former girlfriend, that Randall wanted to get back together with Frias, that the gun that deputies found at the scene belonged to Randall, and that Randall kept the gun with him at all times.

2021“The more the exclusion of defense evidence prejudiced the defendant, the more likely we will find a constitutional violation.” State v. Burnam, 4 Wn. App. 2d 368 , 375, 421 P.3d 977 (2018).

2020“The more the exclusion of defense evidence prejudiced the defendant, the more likely we will find a constitutional violation.” State v. Burnam, 4 Wn. App. 2d 368 , 375, 421 P.3d 977 , review denied, 192 Wn.2d 1003 , 430 P.3d 257 (2018). 12 The trial court’s ruling did not deprive Scheibe of his right to present a defense.

2018State v. Jones, 168 Wn.2d 713, 720-21 , 230 P.3d 576 (2010). 1 The State also argues that Mr. Burnam did not preserve for review the constitutional argument he now raises.

2018State v. Jones, 168 Wn.2d 713, 720-21 , 230 P.3d 576 (2010). 1 The State also argues that Mr. Burnam did not preserve for review the constitutional argument he now raises.

2014Co. v. Schauf, 967 S.W.2d 74 (Mo. 1998) (holding “that particular part of real property’ was limited to the kitchen cabinets because that was the real property that was the subject of the insured’s operations at the time of the damage and the exclusion did not bar coverage for damage to the remainder of the house); ACUITY v. Burd & Smith Constr., Inc., 2006 ND 187 , 721 N.W.2d 33 (holding “that particular part of real property’ was limited to the roof the insured was hired to replace and the exclusion did not bar coverage for damage to the interior of the apartment building).

2014Co. v. Schauf, 967 S.W.2d 74 (Mo. 1998) (holding “that particular part of real property’ was limited to the kitchen cabinets because that was the real property that was the subject of the insured’s operations at the time of the damage and the exclusion did not bar coverage for damage to the remainder of the house); ACUITY v. Burd & Smith Constr., Inc., 2006 ND 187 , 721 N.W.2d 33 (holding “that particular part of real property’ was limited to the roof the insured was hired to replace and the exclusion did not bar coverage for damage to the interior of the apartment building).

2014State v. Hawkins, 157 Wn.

2014State v. Hawkins, 157 Wn.

2014Grp., LLC, 301 Ga. App. 17 , 686 S.E.2d 824 (2009) (holding “that particular part of real property” was limited to the room and plumbing of a building the insured was contracted to perform work on and the exclusion did not bar coverage for damage to those parts of the building the insured had not contracted to work); Columbia Mut.

2014Grp., LLC, 301 Ga. App. 17 , 686 S.E.2d 824 (2009) (holding “that particular part of real property” was limited to the room and plumbing of a building the insured was contracted to perform work on and the exclusion did not bar coverage for damage to those parts of the building the insured had not contracted to work); Columbia Mut.

2005Id. ¶ 22 While this court noted that the Court of Appeals had labeled the pollution exclusion ambiguous, it did not explicitly determine whether the clause was in fact ambiguous.

2005Id. ¶22 While this court noted that the Court of Appeals had labeled the pollution exclusion ambiguous, it did not explicitly determine whether the clause was in fact ambiguous.

2005Co., 711 So.2d 1135 , 1137 n. 2 (Fla.1998) (noting that insurers and amici cited to more than 100 cases from 36 other states that had applied the plain language of the exclusion clause to deny coverage).

2005Co., 711 So. 2d 1135 , 1137 n.2 (Fla. 1998) (noting that insurers and amici cited to more than 100 cases from 36 other states that had applied the plain language of the exclusion clause to deny coverage).

2000Id. at 495 , 969 P.2d 510 .

2000Id. at 495 .

1998State v. Glasper, 12 Wash.App. 36, 38 , 527 P.2d 1127 (1974) was the first case to interpret the rule.

1998State v. Glasper, 12 Wn.

1997Second, even if the exclusion clause were not unlawful (although it was, see Brown, 120 Wash.2d 747 , 845 P.2d 334 ), the contract of insurance between PCM and Leingang, while allowing for a right of subrogation against the third party tortfeasor, CP at 82, allowed no "security interest" against UIM proceeds to which the insured would otherwise be entitled from his own first party carrier. [7] Had PCM refrained from interfering with the relationship between Leingang and Farmers and simply sued Leingang to recover what PCM thought he owed it, the act of seeking a judicial remedy might not have

1997Second, even if the exclusion clause were not unlawful (although it was, see Brown, 120 Wn.2d 747 ), the contract of insurance between PCM and Leingang, while allowing for a right of subrogation against the third party tortfeasor, CP at 82, allowed no "security interest” against UIM proceeds to which the insured would otherwise be entitled from his own first party carrier. 10 Had PCM refrained from interfering with the relationship between Leingang and Farmers and simply sued Leingang to recover what PCM thought he owed it, the act of seeking a judicial remedy might not have been either unfair

2025Romero-Ochoa, 193 Wn.2d at 361 .

2020“The more the exclusion of defense evidence prejudiced the defendant, the more likely we will find a constitutional violation.” State v. Burnam, 4 Wn. App. 2d 368 , 375, 421 P.3d 977 , review denied, 192 Wn.2d 1003 , 430 P.3d 257 (2018). 12 The trial court’s ruling did not deprive Scheibe of his right to present a defense.

2020Condon, 182 Wn.2d at 316 ; Fernandez-Medina, 141 Wn.2d at 455-56 .

2020Condon, 182 Wn.2d at 316 ; Fernandez-Medina, 141 Wn.2d at 455-56 .

2018Hutchinson, 135 Wn.2d at 881 (discussing Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 412-13 , 108 S. Ct. 646 , 98 L.

2018Hutchinson, 135 Wn.2d at 881 (discussing Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 412-13 , 108 S. Ct. 646 , 98 L.

2018Hutchinson, 135 Wn.2d at 881 (discussing Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 412-13 , 108 S. Ct. 646 , 98 L.

2017Id. 8 Zhaoyun Xia, et al. v. ProBuilders Specialty Ins.

2014Co. v. Schauf, 967 S.W.2d 74 (Mo. 1998) (holding “that particular part of real property’ was limited to the kitchen cabinets because that was the real property that was the subject of the insured’s operations at the time of the damage and the exclusion did not bar coverage for damage to the remainder of the house); ACUITY v. Burd & Smith Constr., Inc., 2006 ND 187 , 721 N.W.2d 33 (holding “that particular part of real property’ was limited to the roof the insured was hired to replace and the exclusion did not bar coverage for damage to the interior of the apartment building).

2011Holmes, 547 U.S. at 329 (quoting State v. Holmes, 361 S.C. 333, 342 , 605 S.E.2d 19 (2004)). ¶40 In reversing, the Supreme Court reaffirmed at the outset that it is entirely appropriate for states to place limitations on the admission of other suspect evidence: While the Constitution thus prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that service no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such a

2011Holmes, 547 U.S. at 329 (quoting State v. Holmes, 361 S.C. 333, 342 , 605 S.E.2d 19 (2004)). ¶40 In reversing, the Supreme Court reaffirmed at the outset that it is entirely appropriate for states to place limitations on the admission of other suspect evidence: While the Constitution thus prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that service no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such a

2005Id. at 402 , 998 P.2d 292 (emphasis added).

1995App. 708, 712 , 664 P.2d 1262 , 39 A.L.R.4th 1040 , review denied, 100 Wn.2d 1018 (1983) compared the language of the occurrence clause with that of the exclusion clause and found a conflict.

1995App. 708, 712 , 664 P.2d 1262 , 39 A.L.R.4th 1040 , review denied, 100 Wn.2d 1018 (1983) compared the language of the occurrence clause with that of the exclusion clause and found a conflict.

1995Co. v. Woodhaven, 438 Mich. 154, 162 , 476 N.W.2d 374 (1991); see also Broderick, at 607 (focusing on discharge — i.e., placement of wastes into unlined pits; held that "[w]ithout the discharge into the holding ponds, the resulting groundwater contamination simply would not have developed”); Mays v. Transamerica Ins.

1995Co. v. Woodhaven, 438 Mich. 154, 162 , 476 N.W.2d 374 (1991); see also Broderick, at 607 (focusing on discharge — i.e., placement of wastes into unlined pits; held that "[w]ithout the discharge into the holding ponds, the resulting groundwater contamination simply would not have developed”); Mays v. Transamerica Ins.

1992See CrR 3.3(c). 7 As we have in the past, see Greenwood, 57 Wn. App. at 859-60 , we find Miffitt unpersuasive, because it departs from the express language of CrR 3.3. 8 The Supreme Court was required to solve this problem by judicially crafting an exclusion to the rule.

1989"The term 'public policy', . . . embraces all acts or contracts which tend clearly to injure the public health, the public morals, the public confidence in the purity of the administration of the law, or to undermine that sense of security for individual rights, whether of personal liberty or of private property, which any citizen ought to feel." Goodier v. Hamilton, 172 Wash. 60, 62 , 19 P.2d 392 (1933) (quoting 6 R.C.L. 712).

1989"The term 'public policy', . . . embraces all acts or contracts which tend clearly to injure the public health, the public morals, the public confidence in the purity of the administration of the law, or to undermine that sense of security for individual rights, whether of personal liberty or of private property, which any citizen ought to feel." Goodier v. Hamilton, 172 Wash. 60, 62 , 19 P.2d 392 (1933) (quoting 6 R.C.L. 712).