exclusion clause in New Jersey

2024And, the Court further concluded that: bodily injuries, which are "intentionally caused" by the employer and are subject to the [C5] exclusion, encompassed only "intentional injuries." So interpreted, the exclusion was held not to apply to [the employee]'s claim, which involved "an unintended injury caused by an intentional wrong." The panel refused to read into the [C5] exclusion any additional words that would extend the exclusion to a claim of wrongful employer conduct that allegedly was substantially certain to have caused injury, which would satisfy the Laidlow standard for permitting a c

2024And, the Court further concluded that: bodily injuries, which are "intentionally caused" by the employer and are subject to the [C5] exclusion, encompassed only "intentional injuries." So interpreted, the exclusion was held not to apply to [the employee]'s claim, which involved "an unintended injury caused by an intentional wrong." The panel refused to read into the [C5] exclusion any additional words that would extend the exclusion to a claim of wrongful employer conduct that allegedly was substantially certain to have caused injury, which would satisfy the Laidlow standard for permitting a c

2003Hunt, 33 N.J. at 102-08 , 162 A. 2d at 563-67 .

2003Hunt, 33 N.J. at 102-08 , 162 A. 2d at 563-67 .

2000Id. at 100 , 492 A. 2d 1028 .

2000Id. at 100 , 492 A. 2d 1028 .

1997In Bauman v. Royal Indemnity Co., 36 N.J. 12, 21 , 174 A.2d 585 (1961), the Court stated: In all fairness to the ordinary layman who is the average insured, an exclusion clause should be so prominently placed and so clearly phrased that “he who runs can read.” See Lord St.

1997In Bauman v. Royal Indemnity Co., 36 N.J. 12, 21 , 174 A.2d 585 (1961), the Court stated: In all fairness to the ordinary layman who is the average insured, an exclusion clause should be so prominently placed and so clearly phrased that “he who runs can read.” See Lord St.

1996Accordingly, we held in Ruvolo, 39 N.J. at 498 , 189 A. 2d 204 *358 that the concept of insanity relevant to the exclusion clause of a liability policy was more expansive than the concept of insanity accepted in the defense of a criminal charge.

1996Accordingly, we held in Ruvolo, 39 N.J. at 498 , 189 A. 2d 204 *358 that the concept of insanity relevant to the exclusion clause of a liability policy was more expansive than the concept of insanity accepted in the defense of a criminal charge.

1967Substantially the same exclusion clause here involved was considered in Le Felt v. Nasarow, 71 N.J.

1965LeFelt v. Nasarow, supra ( 71 N.J.

1962In Boswell v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 38 N.J.

1961Boswell, supra .

2022Ibid.

2018While the Constitution thus prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude [defense] evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury. [Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 , 326- 27 (2006) (citing, e.g., Fed.

2017Generally, when reviewing the admission or exclusion of evidence, appellate courts afford "[c]onsiderable latitude" to a trial judge's determination, examining "the decision for abuse of discretion." State v. Kuropchak, 221 N.J. 368, 385 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 82 (1998), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 932 , 121 S. Ct. 1380 , 149 L.

2017Generally, when reviewing the admission or exclusion of evidence, appellate courts afford "[c]onsiderable latitude" to a trial judge's determination, examining "the decision for abuse of discretion." State v. Kuropchak, 221 N.J. 368, 385 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 82 (1998), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 932 , 121 S. Ct. 1380 , 149 L.

2009“In the absence of any express provision excluding a particular grievance from arbitration, ... only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail, particularly where ... the exclusion clause is vague and the arbitration clause quite broad.” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., supra, 363 US. at 584-85, 80 S.Ct. at 1354 , 4 L.Ed.2d at 1419 .

2009“In the absence of any express provision excluding a particular grievance from arbitration, ... only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail, particularly where ... the exclusion clause is vague and the arbitration clause quite broad.” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., supra, 363 US. at 584-85, 80 S.Ct. at 1354 , 4 L.Ed.2d at 1419 .

2008The homeowner’s insurance policy contained an exclusion clause for “the intentional or criminal acts of an insured person.” Ibid.

2008The homeowner's insurance policy contained an exclusion clause for "the intentional or criminal acts of an insured person." Ibid.

2004These limitations presuppose that the debtor shall be under a contract with the third person, not merely to pay a particular debt, but to devote to that debt the very money with which payment was made. *74 [Hitter, supra, 40 N.J. at 17-18 , 190 A.2d 380 (citing Restatement of Contracts (1932)).] The present version of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) provides: § 258.

2004These limitations presuppose that the debtor shall be under a contract with the third person, not merely to pay a particular debt, but to devote to that debt the very money with which payment was made. *74 [Hitter, supra, 40 N.J. at 17-18 , 190 A.2d 380 (citing Restatement of Contracts (1932)).] The present version of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) provides: § 258.

2003Romano v. Kimmelman, 96 N.J. 66, 90-91 , 474 A. 2d 1 (1984); State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 171-172 , 199 A. 2d 809 (1964).

2003Romano v. Kimmelman, 96 N.J. 66, 90-91 , 474 A. 2d 1 (1984); State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 171-172 , 199 A. 2d 809 (1964).

2003Romano v. Kimmelman, 96 N.J. 66, 90-91 , 474 A. 2d 1 (1984); State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 171-172 , 199 A. 2d 809 (1964).

2003Romano v. Kimmelman, 96 N.J. 66, 90-91 , 474 A. 2d 1 (1984); State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 171-172 , 199 A. 2d 809 (1964).

2002Co. v. Phillips, 66 N.J. 277, 292 , 330 A. 2d 360 (1974), the Supreme Court found an exclusion clause in violation of the statutory intent of N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.1 and thus unenforceable.

2002Co. v. Phillips, 66 N.J. 277, 292 , 330 A. 2d 360 (1974), the Supreme Court found an exclusion clause in violation of the statutory intent of N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.1 and thus unenforceable.

1999The court in Sphere Drake concluded that the ingestion or inhalation of lead paint that had flaked over time as being something other than the "discharge, dispersal, release or escape" of a pollutant and following earlier the holding in Lefrak, supra, regarded the definition of pollution in the exclusion clause to be suggestive of industrial and environmental pollution.

1999Sphere Drake, supra, 990 F.Supp. at 244-45 .

1998Ibid. *350 IV Courts have repeatedly stressed their role in, protecting the assets of the Fund because “[i]n essence, the judiciary ... is the guardian of the trust monies represented by our statutory Fund.” Szczesny v. Vasquez, 71 N.J.Super. 347, 358 , 177 A.2d 47 (App.Div.1962); Garcia v. Snedeker, 199 N.J.Super. 254, 261 , 489 A.2d 175 (App.Div.1985).

1998Ibid. *350 IV Courts have repeatedly stressed their role in, protecting the assets of the Fund because “[i]n essence, the judiciary ... is the guardian of the trust monies represented by our statutory Fund.” Szczesny v. Vasquez, 71 N.J.Super. 347, 358 , 177 A.2d 47 (App.Div.1962); Garcia v. Snedeker, 199 N.J.Super. 254, 261 , 489 A.2d 175 (App.Div.1985).

1998Schmidt, supra, 294 N.J.Super. at 582 , 684 A.2d 66 ; Aetna Ins.

1998Schmidt, supra, 294 N.J.Super. at 582 , 684 A.2d 66 ; Aetna Ins.