exclusion clause in Arkansas

2025App. 329 , 690 S.W.3d 133 (argument that time period should not have been excluded was not preserved when appellant failed to challenge the exclusion at the hearing on the motion to dismiss). 28 We agree that Govan did not contest these time periods at the speedy-trial hearing and instead stipulated that the 46-day time period from September 5 to the trial date (at that time scheduled for October 30 but cut short by the motion to dismiss filed on October 24) should be excluded.

2018See 547 U.S., at 331 , 126 S.Ct. 1727 (rule did not rationally serve any discernible purpose); Rock v. Arkansas , 483 U.S. 44 , 61, 107 S.Ct. 2704 , 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987) (rule arbitrary); Chambers v. Mississippi , 410 U.S. 284 , 302-303, 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (State did not even attempt to explain the reason for its rule); Washington v.Texas , 388 U.S. 14 , 22, 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967) (rule could not be rationally defended).

2018See 547 U.S., at 331 , 126 S.Ct. 1727 (rule did not rationally serve any discernible purpose); Rock v. Arkansas , 483 U.S. 44 , 61, 107 S.Ct. 2704 , 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987) (rule arbitrary); Chambers v. Mississippi , 410 U.S. 284 , 302-303, 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (State did not even attempt to explain the reason for its rule); Washington v.Texas , 388 U.S. 14 , 22, 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967) (rule could not be rationally defended).

2018See 547 U.S., at 331 , 126 S.Ct. 1727 (rule did not rationally serve any discernible purpose); Rock v. Arkansas , 483 U.S. 44 , 61, 107 S.Ct. 2704 , 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987) (rule arbitrary); Chambers v. Mississippi , 410 U.S. 284 , 302-303, 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (State did not even attempt to explain the reason for its rule); Washington v.Texas , 388 U.S. 14 , 22, 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967) (rule could not be rationally defended).

2018See 547 U.S., at 331 , 126 S.Ct. 1727 (rule did not rationally serve any discernible purpose); Rock v. Arkansas , 483 U.S. 44 , 61, 107 S.Ct. 2704 , 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987) (rule arbitrary); Chambers v. Mississippi , 410 U.S. 284 , 302-303, 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (State did not even attempt to explain the reason for its rule); Washington v.Texas , 388 U.S. 14 , 22, 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967) (rule could not be rationally defended).

2018See 547 U.S., at 331 , 126 S.Ct. 1727 (rule did not rationally serve any discernible purpose); Rock v. Arkansas , 483 U.S. 44 , 61, 107 S.Ct. 2704 , 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987) (rule arbitrary); Chambers v. Mississippi , 410 U.S. 284 , 302-303, 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (State did not even attempt to explain the reason for its rule); Washington v.Texas , 388 U.S. 14 , 22, 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967) (rule could not be rationally defended).

2018See 547 U.S., at 331 , 126 S.Ct. 1727 (rule did not rationally serve any discernible purpose); Rock v. Arkansas , 483 U.S. 44 , 61, 107 S.Ct. 2704 , 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987) (rule arbitrary); Chambers v. Mississippi , 410 U.S. 284 , 302-303, 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (State did not even attempt to explain the reason for its rule); Washington v.Texas , 388 U.S. 14 , 22, 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967) (rule could not be rationally defended).

2017Nevada v. Jackson, 133 S. Ct. 1990 (2013). “[T]he Constitution permits judges to exclude evidence that is “repetitive . . ., only marginally relevant” or poses an undue risk of “harassment, prejudice, [or] confusion of the issues.” Holmes, 547 U.S. at 326–27.

2012A. Constitutional Argument In Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 , 106 S.Ct. 2142 , 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986), the Supreme Court provided that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, both of the U.S. Constitution, guarantee criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.

2012A. Constitutional Argument In Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 , 106 S.Ct. 2142 , 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986), the Supreme Court provided that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, both of the U.S. Constitution, guarantee criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.

1984Co., 585 S.W.2d 593 (Tenn. 1979), the language of this exclusion clause has been the subject of many cases with divergent results for different reasons, and its application is “resolvable only in specific factual contexts.” In summary, therefore, we think the burden of proof was on the appellant to show that the injury in this case was excluded from the policy’s liability coverage; that the exclusion clause should be strictly interpreted with all reasonable doubts resolved in favor of the insured; that the issue involved is a question of fact; that the trial court’s finding was not clearly err

1984One of the cases cited by the appellant is Martinelli v. Security Insurance Co. of New Haven, 490 S.W.2d 427 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972), where Martinelli, while on the job, was pushing a large box onto a forklift and had his right leg outstretched to brace himself, when a fellow employee fell over the leg causing it to be fractured.

1982An argument similar to that made by Atkins was made in Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Bocanegra, 572 S.W. 2d 355 (Tex. Civ.

1980In the case of Goforth v. Allstate Insurance Company, 327 F. 2d 637 (4th Cir. 1964), it was stated: We agree with the district court that a private automobile being driven from the place of business of the owner by a garage-keeper to his garage for the purpose of effectuating repairs requested by the owner was not ‘used in the automobile business’ within the meaning of an exclusion clause in the owner’s liability insurance policy.

1980In the case of Travelers’ Indemnity Company v. Royal Indemnity Company, 275 Cal. App. 2d 554 , 80 Cal. Reporter 197 (1969), the Court refused to apply this precise exclusion to an accident which occurred while an employee was road-testing a privately-owned car after repairs had been performed on it.

1976In Bookman v. Rorex, 212 Ark. 948 , 208 S.W. 2d 991 (1948), we held that the same rules apply to the scope of cross-examination in civil cases as apply in criminal cases when credibility of a witness is attacked.

1976In Bookman v. Rorex, 212 Ark. 948 , 208 S.W. 2d 991 (1948), we held that the same rules apply to the scope of cross-examination in civil cases as apply in criminal cases when credibility of a witness is attacked.

1970Co., 86 N. E. 2d 340 , double indemnity was denied under a policy which provided: “Double indemnity shall not be payable if the insured’s death resulted from * * * war or any act incident thereto * * The insured was employed in a defense plant which was engaged exclusively in the manufacture of incendiary bombs.

1965This holding was based on an exclusion clause which had the identical provision of (2) in the instant case, i. e., “other employment by the insured.” 3 Inter alia, Clinton Cotton Oil Company v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, 186 S. E. 399 (S. C.); Church v. Consolidated Indemnity and Insurance Company, 174 Atl. 488 (N. J.) 4 From the evidence: “Q.

1965Co., S. C., 120 S. E. 2d 15, 16 , we said: ‘It is a well settled rule that the terms of an insurance policy must be construed most liberally in favor of the insured and where the words of a policy are ambiguous, or where they are capable of two reasonable interpretations, that construction will be adopted which is most favorable to the insured.

1965This holding was based on an exclusion clause which had the identical provision of (2) in the instant case, i. e., “other employment by the insured.” 3 Inter alia, Clinton Cotton Oil Company v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, 186 S. E. 399 (S. C.); Church v. Consolidated Indemnity and Insurance Company, 174 Atl. 488 (N. J.) 4 From the evidence: “Q.

1962This concept is strengthened by the case of Boswell v. Travelers Indemnity Company, 120 A. 2d 250 , 38 N. J., Super. 599, where the court said: “* * * that an insured ‘uses’ property within the meaning of the exclusion clause only where he puts it to his own service or to the purpose for which it was ordinarily intended. ’ ’ The purpose for which Mississippi Valley and its subcontractor were using the property was to comply with provisions one (1) of the contract between appellee and Mississippi Valley.

1955In the case of Galloway v. Marathon Insurance Company, 220 Ark. 548 , 248 S. W. 2d 699 , where the same exclusion clause mentioned above ivas considered under facts somewhat similar to the facts in the case at bar, this court made a clear distinction between possession and custody as applied to this kind of a case.

1955In the case of Galloway v. Marathon Insurance Company, 220 Ark. 548 , 248 S. W. 2d 699 , where the same exclusion clause mentioned above ivas considered under facts somewhat similar to the facts in the case at bar, this court made a clear distinction between possession and custody as applied to this kind of a case.

1955Co. 147 Neb. 237 , 22 N. W. 2d 700 , the court held there was no liability on the insurance company under an exclusion clause exactly like the one in the case at bar and where the facts in all essentials were also the same.

1955Co. 147 Neb. 237 , 22 N. W. 2d 700 , the court held there was no liability on the insurance company under an exclusion clause exactly like the one in the case at bar and where the facts in all essentials were also the same.

1955R. 1077.] “But when the dealer voluntarily parts with actual possession rather than mere custody, the loss is excluded from the coverage of the contract.” [Citing Jacobson v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 233 Minn. 383 , 46 N. W. 2d 868 .] In the Galloway case, supra, the court held that the exclusion clause prevented recovery, but that opinion is not decisive of the question we are considering here, first because in that case title as well as possession had passed to the purchaser which is not true here, and second because that case did not announce any rule by which to distinguish between possess

1955R. 1077.] “But when the dealer voluntarily parts with actual possession rather than mere custody, the loss is excluded from the coverage of the contract.” [Citing Jacobson v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 233 Minn. 383 , 46 N. W. 2d 868 .] In the Galloway case, supra, the court held that the exclusion clause prevented recovery, but that opinion is not decisive of the question we are considering here, first because in that case title as well as possession had passed to the purchaser which is not true here, and second because that case did not announce any rule by which to distinguish between possess

1955One of the most recent cases affirming the holding in the cases above referred to is Harry Dinkin, et al. v. The American Insurance Company, 268 Wis. 138 , 66 N. W. 2d 681 .

1955One of the most recent cases affirming the holding in the cases above referred to is Harry Dinkin, et al. v. The American Insurance Company, 268 Wis. 138 , 66 N. W. 2d 681 .

1955Co. of New York, 141 Kan. 897 , 44 Pac. 2d 236 , are “practically and materially the same as those in the case at bar. ’ ’ I agree that the exclusion clause in the Tripp Case is the same as in the present case, but there is a material distinction in the facts in that case with those in the present case before us.

1955Co. of New York, 141 Kan. 897 , 44 Pac. 2d 236 , are “practically and materially the same as those in the case at bar. ’ ’ I agree that the exclusion clause in the Tripp Case is the same as in the present case, but there is a material distinction in the facts in that case with those in the present case before us.

1955Co., 233 N. C. 251 , 63 S. E. 2d 538 , and the court, in holding the insurance company not liable stated: “. . . we think the exclusion clause does relieve the insurer from liability for theft where the possession of the car was voluntarily surrendered to another with the right to exercise control thereof for a purpose of his own.” The purpose for which the automobile was turned over to the prospective customer in that case was to test it and show it to his wife for her approval or disapproval.

1955Co., 233 N. C. 251 , 63 S. E. 2d 538 , and the court, in holding the insurance company not liable stated: “. . . we think the exclusion clause does relieve the insurer from liability for theft where the possession of the car was voluntarily surrendered to another with the right to exercise control thereof for a purpose of his own.” The purpose for which the automobile was turned over to the prospective customer in that case was to test it and show it to his wife for her approval or disapproval.

1945This Court held, in Howle v. Eminent Household of Columbian Woodmen, 118 Ark. 226 , 176 S. W. 313 , that where a policy similar to the one here involved was sued on, liability could not be avoided unless the insured met his death while voluntarily engaged in violation of the law; that where the insured was insane and not responsible for his acts he was incapable of violating the law in the sense intended by the exclusion clause.

1945This Court held, in Howle v. Eminent Household of Columbian Woodmen, 118 Ark. 226 , 176 S. W. 313 , that where a policy similar to the one here involved was sued on, liability could not be avoided unless the insured met his death while voluntarily engaged in violation of the law; that where the insured was insane and not responsible for his acts he was incapable of violating the law in the sense intended by the exclusion clause.