15 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1970–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Clark v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2023“While the Constitution . . . prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury.” Clark, 548 U.S. at 770 (alteration in original) (quoting Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 326 (2006)). 2023“While the Constitution . . . prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote,” see Clark, 548 U.S. at 770 (alteration in original), the trial court’s evidentiary rulings here do not fall into this category. | 1 | 1 |
Holmes v. South Carolinagreen2 sentences2023“While the Constitution . . . prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury.” Clark, 548 U.S. at 770 (alteration in original) (quoting Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 326 (2006)). 2023The trial court applied “well-established rules of evidence” that allow it to exclude irrelevant evidence and relevant “evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury.” Id. (quoting Holmes, 547 U.S. at 326 ). ¶42 Although Cruz may not present evidence of his intellectual disability at trial, he may present evidence that he is illiterate. | 1 | 1 |
Keggi v. Northbrook Property & Casualty Insurancegreen2 sentences2019Id. at 47-50, ¶¶ 15-29 . ¶27 We noted in Keggi that “the exclusion clause appears to describe events, places, and activities normally associated with traditional environmental pollution claims,” id. at 48, ¶ 22 , and in relation to the language of the exclusion, we stated, These provisions appear to be directed at industrial insureds who must handle, store, and treat “hazardous wastes” in conducting their daily operations. 2019Id. at 47-50, ¶¶ 15-29 . ¶27 We noted in Keggi that “the exclusion clause appears to describe events, places, and activities normally associated with traditional environmental pollution claims,” id. at 48, ¶ 22 , and in relation to the language of the exclusion, we stated, These provisions appear to be directed at industrial insureds who must handle, store, and treat “hazardous wastes” in conducting their daily operations. | 1 | 1 |
Nautilus Insurance Company v. Michael G. Jabar, D/B/A Mike's Roofing Co., Lisa A. Varano and Stephen M. Varano, Stern Company, Inc.green1 sentence2019Co. v. Jabar, 188 F.3d 27, 30 (1st Cir. 1999) (“[T]he terms used in the exclusion clause, such as ‘discharge,’ ‘dispersal,’ ‘release’ and ‘escape,’ are terms of art in environmental law and are generally used to refer to damage or injury resulting from environmental pollution.” (citations omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Oaks v. Dupuygreen1 sentence2003Co., 788 P.2d 748, 752 (Colo.1990) (holding that an exclusion for the intentional acts of "any insured” precluded a negligent supervision claim despite a severability clause); Oaks v. Dupuy, 653 So.2d 165, 168 (La.Ct.App.1995) (concluding that a severability clause did not alter the scope of an exclusion clause phrased in terms of "any insured”); Am. | 1 | 1 |
West American Insurance Company v. Av & Sgreen1 sentence2003Co. v. AV & S, 145 F.3d 1224, 1229 (10th Cir.1998) ("[Tjhe term 'any insured’ in an exclusion clause in a policy that also contains a severability clause does not exclude coverage for all insureds when only one insured is at fault.”); Transp. | 1 | 1 |
Chacon v. American Family Mutual Insurance Companygreen1 sentence2003Co., 788 P.2d 748, 752 (Colo.1990) (holding that an exclusion for the intentional acts of "any insured” precluded a negligent supervision claim despite a severability clause); Oaks v. Dupuy, 653 So.2d 165, 168 (La.Ct.App.1995) (concluding that a severability clause did not alter the scope of an exclusion clause phrased in terms of "any insured”); Am. | 1 | 1 |
Goulder v. ARIZONA DEPT. OF TRANSP., MOTOR VEH.green2 sentences2001See Goulder v. Arizona Dep’t of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div., 177 Ariz. 414, 416 , 868 P.2d 997, 999 (App.1993) (explaining that statutory language should be interpreted in conjunction with other provisions of statute). 2001See Goulder v. Arizona Dep’t of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div., 177 Ariz. 414, 416 , 868 P.2d 997, 999 (App.1993) (explaining that statutory language should be interpreted in conjunction with other provisions of statute). | 1 | 1 |
Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Goettlgreen2 sentences1990Co. v. Goettl, 138 Ariz. 315 , 318-19, 674 P.2d 869, 872-73 (App. 1983) (citing Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 1096 , 1100 (1973)). 1990Co. v. Goettl, 138 Ariz. 315 , 318-19, 674 P.2d 869, 872-73 (App. 1983) (citing Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 1096 , 1100 (1973)). | 1 | 1 |
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Kohlgreen2 sentences1988See also State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Kohl, 131 Cal. App.3d 1031 , 182 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1982) (exclusion not applied where driver negligently drags injured victim from road after collision; no injury could have resulted absent vehicular negligence, as in the instant case). 1988See also State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Kohl, 131 Cal. App.3d 1031 , 182 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1982) (exclusion not applied where driver negligently drags injured victim from road after collision; no injury could have resulted absent vehicular negligence, as in the instant case). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brink Electric Construction Co. v. Arizona Department of Revenue
green
1 sentence2001Co., 184 Ariz. at 358 , 909 P.2d at, 4?ñ w9 rlppiflp that fh.p “nsp” Hpsi'vHhprI in *290 the exclusion clause of A.R.S. section 42-5069(B) refers to the use “by the lessee” as set forth in the preceding phrase. ¶ 13 Our interpretation is further bolstered by reference to exclusions from the commercial lease classification enumerated in A.R.S. section 42-5069(0 that explicitly address circumstances in which leased property is not used by the immediate lessee. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Kmart Corp. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance
green
1 sentence2000The vendor’s endorsement adds the School as an insured, but only for bodily injury “arising out of your [Scholastic’s] products which are ... sold in the regular course of the vendor’s [the School’s] business.” It does not purport to provide general commercial liability insurance for all aspects of the books’ sale nor provide premises liability coverage for all locations at which the books are sold. ¶ 21 Finally, Salerno cites K-Mart Corp. v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co., 88 F.Supp.2d 767 (E.D.Mich.2000), to argue that the “demonstration exclusion” to the vendor’s endorsement provides coverage | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Howard P. Foley Co. v. Cox
green
1 sentence1992Howard P. Foley Co. v. Cox, 679 S.W.2d 58 (Tex.App.1984). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Camara
green
2 sentences1988In State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Camara, 63 Cal. App.3d 48 , 133 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1976), the third district of the Court of Appeals disagreed with the Gonzalez court (second district) in holding that for the exclusion clause to be barred, the liability must arise from nonvehicular conduct and must exist independently of use of ownership of a vehicle. 1988In State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Camara, 63 Cal. App.3d 48 , 133 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1976), the third district of the Court of Appeals disagreed with the Gonzalez court (second district) in holding that for the exclusion clause to be barred, the liability must arise from nonvehicular conduct and must exist independently of use of ownership of a vehicle. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Gonzalez v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance
green
2 sentences1988Co., 60 Cal. App.3d 675 , 131 Cal. Rptr. 626 (1976), the exclusion clause in a homeowner's policy did not bar coverage with respect to liability for an accident occurring when, as a result of the insured's negligence in repairing his automobile brakes on the insured premises, the insured struck and killed the plaintiffs' son while driving the car at a point away from the premises. 1988Co., 60 Cal. App.3d 675 , 131 Cal. Rptr. 626 (1976), the exclusion clause in a homeowner's policy did not bar coverage with respect to liability for an accident occurring when, as a result of the insured's negligence in repairing his automobile brakes on the insured premises, the insured struck and killed the plaintiffs' son while driving the car at a point away from the premises. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Pennsylvania General Insurance Co. v. Cegla
green
2 sentences1988Co. v. Cegla, 381 N.W.2d 901 (Minn.App.1986), the Minnesota Court of Appeals found a similar exclusion clause not applicable where a motorcycle rider was killed as a result of negligent loading of a roll of wire mesh into a truck, which subsequently rolled onto the highway, causing the death of the motorcycle rider following behind the truck. 1988Co. v. Cegla, 381 N.W.2d 901 (Minn.App. 1986), the Minnesota Court *479 of Appeals found a similar exclusion clause not applicable where a motorcycle rider was killed as a result of negligent loading of a roll of wire mesh into a truck, which subsequently rolled onto the highway, causing the death of the motorcycle rider following behind the truck. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Pacific Indemnity Company v. Kohlhase
green
2 sentences1986Scottsdale supports its claim that the validity of the policy’s exclusion clause is not appropriate for summary judgment by citing Pacific Indemnity Company v. Kohlhase, 9 Ariz.App. 595 , 455 P.2d 277 (1969). 1986Scottsdale supports its claim that the validity of the policy’s exclusion clause is not appropriate for summary judgment by citing Pacific Indemnity Company v. Kohlhase, 9 Ariz.App. 595 , 455 P.2d 277 (1969). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Mid-Century Insurance v. Duzykowski
green
2 sentences1986Mid-Century Insurance Co. v. Duzykowski, 131 Ariz. 428 , 641 P.2d 1272 (1982). 1986Mid-Century Insurance Co. v. Duzykowski, 131 Ariz. 428 , 641 P.2d 1272 (1982). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Transamerica Insurance Group v. Meere
green
2 sentences1984The majority conclude that the policy definition of accident or occurrence as "a sudden event ... resulting in bodily injury ... neither expected nor intended by the insured" when read in conjunction with the exclusion clause has the same effect as the provision in Meere, 143 Ariz. at 355 , 694 P.2d at 185 . 1984The majority conclude that the policy definition of accident or occurrence as "a sudden event ... resulting in bodily injury ... neither expected nor intended by the insured" when read in conjunction with the exclusion clause has the same effect as the provision in Meere, 143 Ariz. at 355 , 694 P.2d at 185 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Pullen v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp.
green
2 sentences1976While the unqualified word ‘insured’ used in the omnibus clause refers to every insured covered by the policy, it does not follow that the use of the same word in the exclusion clause makes the same inclusive reference to every insured.” 89 So.2d at 375-376 . 1976In the final analy *137 sis, it is the meaning of the clause, rather than that of a single word, that requires interpretation.” 89 So.2d at 376 . | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Porter v. Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Company
green
2 sentences1970As to appellant’s argument that the exclusion clause should apply because the policy is a contract and shows the intention of the parties, we believe that Porter v. Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Company, 106 Ariz. 274 , 475 P.2d 258 (1970) recently decided by our state supreme court is controlling. 1970As to appellant’s argument that the exclusion clause should apply because the policy is a contract and shows the intention of the parties, we believe that Porter v. Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Company, 106 Ariz. 274 , 475 P.2d 258 (1970) recently decided by our state supreme court is controlling. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Van Erem v. Dairyland Mutual Insurance
green
1 sentence1970There would be a gap in such insurance protection if the insurance company, which has issued the certificate as to existence of an operator’s policy, were permitted to rely on an exclusion clause that would not cover the insured operator when he was operating any vehicle not registered in his name.” 93 N.W.2d at 514 . | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Tharp v. SECURITY INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW HAVEN
green
1 sentence1970In Tharp, supra, it was stated: “The objective of the Financial Responsibility Law to protect the public against irresponsible persons would be defeated by permitting an insurer under the law to deny coverage on the basis of interest of ownership not of public record. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Shirley C. Thompson
green
1 sentence1970State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Thompson, (C.A.Ariz.1967) 372 F.2d 256 . | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.