38 Nebraska opinions name it 3 courts 1987–2022 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Nebraska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Terry v. Ohiogreen2 sentences2017We explained: [W]e [have] noted that . . . field sobriety tests were more akin to a Terry stop as authorized by Terry v. Ohio, [ 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 20 L. 2017We explained: [W]e [have] noted that . . . field sobriety tests were more akin to a Terry stop as authorized by Terry v. Ohio, [ 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 20 L. | 8 | 16 |
State v. Shiffermillergreen2 sentences2019Because we also find that Shiffermiller’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated, we affirm. 3 State v. Wiedeman, 286 Neb. 193 , 835 N.W.2d 698 (2013). 4 Id. 5 Id. 6 State v. Rivera, 297 Neb. 709 , 901 N.W.2d 272 (2017). 7 State v. Botts, 299 Neb. 806 , 910 N.W.2d 779 (2018). 8 See Terry v. Ohio, supra note 2 . - 254 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 302 Nebraska R eports STATE v. SHIFFERMILLER Cite as 302 Neb. 245 1. 2019Because we also find that Shiffermiller’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated, we affirm. 3 State v. Wiedeman, 286 Neb. 193 , 835 N.W.2d 698 (2013). 4 Id. 5 Id. 6 State v. Rivera, 297 Neb. 709 , 901 N.W.2d 272 (2017). 7 State v. Botts, 299 Neb. 806 , 910 N.W.2d 779 (2018). 8 See Terry v. Ohio, supra note 2 . - 254 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 302 Nebraska R eports STATE v. SHIFFERMILLER Cite as 302 Neb. 245 1. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Ellingtongreen2 sentences1995The Terry stop has been thoroughly discussed by the Nebraska Supreme Court in State v. Ellington, 242 Neb. 554, 558 , 495 N.W.2d 915, 919 (1993): However, in order to protect an individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers, limited investigatory stops are permissible only upon a reasonable suspicion supported by specific and articulable facts that the person is, was, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. 1995The Terry stop has been thoroughly discussed by the Nebraska Supreme Court in State v. Ellington, 242 Neb. 554, 558 , 495 N.W.2d 915, 919 (1993): However, in order to protect an individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers, limited investigatory stops are permissible only upon a reasonable suspicion supported by specific and articulable facts that the person is, was, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Placegreen2 sentences1993Sharpe teaches that in distinguishing a true investigative stop from a de facto arrest, we must not adhere to “rigid time limitations” or “bright line rules,” 470 U.S. at 685 , 105 S.Ct. at 1575 , but must use “common sense and ordinary human experience.” Id.; accord United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 , 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2645 , 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983) (declining to adopt “outside time limitation” for permissible Terry stop). 1993Sharpe teaches that in distinguishing a true investigative stop from a de facto arrest, we must not adhere to “rigid time limitations” or “bright line rules,” 470 U.S. at 685 , 105 S.Ct. at 1575 , but must use “common sense and ordinary human experience.” Id.; accord United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 , 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2645 , 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983) (declining to adopt “outside time limitation” for permissible Terry stop). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Charles Gilbert Hardy and Buddy Huffman, Jr.green2 sentences2006While the Hardy court expressed “some unease on encountering a Terry stop lasting as long as fifty minutes,” because the “other aspects to the stop demonstrated] that the police acted with propriety . . . and [because of] the expedition with which the police arranged for a narcotics dog, the doubts raised by the length of the detention are not sufficient for us to find that the stop violated the fourth amendment.” 855 F.2d at 761 . 2006U.S. v. Hardy, supra. See, also, State v. Lee, 265 Neb. 663 , 658 N.W.2d 669 (2003). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Van Ackerengreen2 sentences2004We note that this seizure, or detention, does not fit precisely into any of the three categories of police-citizen encounter detailed in State v. Van Ackeren, 242 Neb. 479 , 495 N.W.2d 630 (1993) — she was not arrested, it was not a Terry stop, and it was not voluntary compliance by a citizen after a noncoercive contact between a police officer and that citizen. 2004We note that this seizure, or detention, does not fit precisely into any of the three categories of police-citizen encounter detailed in State v. Van Ackeren, 242 Neb. 479 , 495 N.W.2d 630 (1993) — she was not arrested, it was not a Terry stop, and it was not voluntary compliance by a citizen after a noncoercive contact between a police officer and that citizen. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Kimminaugreen2 sentences1997See, State v. Williams, 249 Neb. 582 , 544 N.W.2d 350 (1996); State v. Kimminau, 240 Neb. 176 , 481 N.W.2d 183 (1992); State v. Chitty, ante p. 412, 559 N.W.2d 511 (1997); § 29-829. 1997See, State v. Williams, 249 Neb. 582 , 544 N.W.2d 350 (1996); State v. Kimminau, 240 Neb. 176 , 481 N.W.2d 183 (1992); State v. Chitty, ante p. 412, 559 N.W.2d 511 (1997); § 29-829. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Thomasgreen2 sentences2022See State v. Thomas, 240 Neb. 545 , 483 N.W.2d 527 (1992) (holding reliable informant’s tip to police concerning criminal activity may furnish basis for reasonable suspicion supporting a Terry stop). 2022See State v. Thomas, 240 Neb. 545 , 483 N.W.2d 527 (1992) (holding reliable informant’s tip to police concerning criminal activity may furnish basis for reasonable suspicion supporting a Terry stop). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Wollamgreen2 sentences2021The fact that the officers had no personal knowledge regarding the specific circumstances of the shots-fired incident is irrelevant, because this court has adopted the collective knowledge doctrine. “‘[I]nformation known to all of the police officers acting in concert can be examined when determining whether the officer initiating the stop had reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop.’” 39 Thomas concedes that reasonable suspicion may be based on a vehicle description alone when in relation to a crime 36 State v. Montoya, 305 Neb. 581 , 941 N.W.2d 474 (2020). 37 Id. 38 See Terry, supra not 2021The fact that the officers had no personal knowledge regarding the specific circumstances of the shots-fired incident is irrelevant, because this court has adopted the collective knowledge doctrine. “‘[I]nformation known to all of the police officers acting in concert can be examined when determining whether the officer initiating the stop had reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop.’” 39 Thomas concedes that reasonable suspicion may be based on a vehicle description alone when in relation to a crime 36 State v. Montoya, 305 Neb. 581 , 941 N.W.2d 474 (2020). 37 Id. 38 See Terry, supra not | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ewinggreen2 sentences2010"Under the `collective- or imputed-knowledge' doctrine, information known to all of the police officers acting in concert can be examined when determining whether the officer initiating the stop had reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop." People v. Ewing, 377 Ill.App.3d 585, 593 , 316 Ill.Dec. 851, 859 , 880 N.E.2d 587, 595 (2007). "[I]f the officer initiating the stop relies on a dispatch, the officer who directed the dispatch must have possessed sufficient facts to establish probable cause to make the arrest." Id. at 594 , 316 Ill.Dec. at 859 , 880 N.E.2d at 595 . 2010"Under the `collective- or imputed-knowledge' doctrine, information known to all of the police officers acting in concert can be examined when determining whether the officer initiating the stop had reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop." People v. Ewing, 377 Ill.App.3d 585, 593 , 316 Ill.Dec. 851, 859 , 880 N.E.2d 587, 595 (2007). "[I]f the officer initiating the stop relies on a dispatch, the officer who directed the dispatch must have possessed sufficient facts to establish probable cause to make the arrest." Id. at 594 , 316 Ill.Dec. at 859 , 880 N.E.2d at 595 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cravengreen2 sentences2004See State v. Craven, 253 Neb. 601 , 571 N.W.2d 612 (1997), citing Terry . 2004See State v. Craven, 253 Neb. 601 , 571 N.W.2d 612 (1997), citing Terry . | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Williamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Chronistergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Hayesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Robert Lee Alexandergreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Sharpegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dimascio v. Municipality of Anchoragegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Nebraska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Rivera
green
2 sentences2019Because we also find that Shiffermiller’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated, we affirm. 3 State v. Wiedeman, 286 Neb. 193 , 835 N.W.2d 698 (2013). 4 Id. 5 Id. 6 State v. Rivera, 297 Neb. 709 , 901 N.W.2d 272 (2017). 7 State v. Botts, 299 Neb. 806 , 910 N.W.2d 779 (2018). 8 See Terry v. Ohio, supra note 2 . - 254 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 302 Nebraska R eports STATE v. SHIFFERMILLER Cite as 302 Neb. 245 1. 2019Because we also find that Shiffermiller’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated, we affirm. 3 State v. Wiedeman, 286 Neb. 193 , 835 N.W.2d 698 (2013). 4 Id. 5 Id. 6 State v. Rivera, 297 Neb. 709 , 901 N.W.2d 272 (2017). 7 State v. Botts, 299 Neb. 806 , 910 N.W.2d 779 (2018). 8 See Terry v. Ohio, supra note 2 . - 254 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 302 Nebraska R eports STATE v. SHIFFERMILLER Cite as 302 Neb. 245 1. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Botts
green
2 sentences2019Because we also find that Shiffermiller’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated, we affirm. 3 State v. Wiedeman, 286 Neb. 193 , 835 N.W.2d 698 (2013). 4 Id. 5 Id. 6 State v. Rivera, 297 Neb. 709 , 901 N.W.2d 272 (2017). 7 State v. Botts, 299 Neb. 806 , 910 N.W.2d 779 (2018). 8 See Terry v. Ohio, supra note 2 . - 254 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 302 Nebraska R eports STATE v. SHIFFERMILLER Cite as 302 Neb. 245 1. 2019Because we also find that Shiffermiller’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated, we affirm. 3 State v. Wiedeman, 286 Neb. 193 , 835 N.W.2d 698 (2013). 4 Id. 5 Id. 6 State v. Rivera, 297 Neb. 709 , 901 N.W.2d 272 (2017). 7 State v. Botts, 299 Neb. 806 , 910 N.W.2d 779 (2018). 8 See Terry v. Ohio, supra note 2 . - 254 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 302 Nebraska R eports STATE v. SHIFFERMILLER Cite as 302 Neb. 245 1. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Wiedeman
green
2 sentences2019Because we also find that Shiffermiller’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated, we affirm. 3 State v. Wiedeman, 286 Neb. 193 , 835 N.W.2d 698 (2013). 4 Id. 5 Id. 6 State v. Rivera, 297 Neb. 709 , 901 N.W.2d 272 (2017). 7 State v. Botts, 299 Neb. 806 , 910 N.W.2d 779 (2018). 8 See Terry v. Ohio, supra note 2 . - 254 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 302 Nebraska R eports STATE v. SHIFFERMILLER Cite as 302 Neb. 245 1. 2019Because we also find that Shiffermiller’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated, we affirm. 3 State v. Wiedeman, 286 Neb. 193 , 835 N.W.2d 698 (2013). 4 Id. 5 Id. 6 State v. Rivera, 297 Neb. 709 , 901 N.W.2d 272 (2017). 7 State v. Botts, 299 Neb. 806 , 910 N.W.2d 779 (2018). 8 See Terry v. Ohio, supra note 2 . - 254 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 302 Nebraska R eports STATE v. SHIFFERMILLER Cite as 302 Neb. 245 1. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
United States v. Tyjuan Jones
green
2 sentences2018Id. [9] In State v. Wells, supra, the Nebraska Supreme Court stated that whether a detention is reasonable under the circum- stances depends on a multitude of factors, including those fac- tors set forth in United States v. Jones, 759 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1985), an Eighth Circuit case examining the reasonable use of force during a Terry stop. 2018In State v. Wells, supra , the Nebraska Supreme Court stated that whether a detention is reasonable under the circumstances depends on a multitude of factors, including those factors set forth in United States v. Jones , 759 F.2d 633 (8th Cir.1985), an Eighth Circuit case examining the reasonable use of force during a Terry stop. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Prescott
green
2 sentences2017In this case, we agree that the administration of a PBT is more in line with field sobriety testing and a Terry stop than it would be with a formal arrest. . . . . . . [A]n officer is reasonable in administering a PBT if he can point to specific, articulable facts indicating that an individual has been driving [while] under the influence of alcohol. - 956 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 295 Nebraska R eports STATE v. McCUMBER Cite as 295 Neb. 941 State v. Prescott, 280 Neb. at 110-11 , 784 N.W.2d at 885-86 . 2017In this case, we agree that the administration of a PBT is more in line with field sobriety testing and a Terry stop than it would be with a formal arrest. . . . . . . [A]n officer is reasonable in administering a PBT if he can point to specific, articulable facts indicating that an individual has been driving [while] under the influence of alcohol. - 956 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 295 Nebraska R eports STATE v. McCUMBER Cite as 295 Neb. 941 State v. Prescott, 280 Neb. at 110-11 , 784 N.W.2d at 885-86 . | 2 | 2013–2017 |
State v. Chitty
green
2 sentences2000State v. Chitty, 5 Neb. 1997See, State v. Williams, 249 Neb. 582 , 544 N.W.2d 350 (1996); State v. Kimminau, 240 Neb. 176 , 481 N.W.2d 183 (1992); State v. Chitty, ante p. 412, 559 N.W.2d 511 (1997); § 29-829. | 2 | 1997–2000 |
State v. Montoya
green
2 sentences2021The fact that the officers had no personal knowledge regarding the specific circumstances of the shots-fired incident is irrelevant, because this court has adopted the collective knowledge doctrine. “‘[I]nformation known to all of the police officers acting in concert can be examined when determining whether the officer initiating the stop had reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop.’” 39 Thomas concedes that reasonable suspicion may be based on a vehicle description alone when in relation to a crime 36 State v. Montoya, 305 Neb. 581 , 941 N.W.2d 474 (2020). 37 Id. 38 See Terry, supra not 2021The fact that the officers had no personal knowledge regarding the specific circumstances of the shots-fired incident is irrelevant, because this court has adopted the collective knowledge doctrine. “‘[I]nformation known to all of the police officers acting in concert can be examined when determining whether the officer initiating the stop had reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop.’” 39 Thomas concedes that reasonable suspicion may be based on a vehicle description alone when in relation to a crime 36 State v. Montoya, 305 Neb. 581 , 941 N.W.2d 474 (2020). 37 Id. 38 See Terry, supra not | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Thomas
green
1 sentence2021The fact that the officers had no personal knowledge regarding the specific circumstances of the shots-fired incident is irrelevant, because this court has adopted the collective knowledge doctrine. “‘[I]nformation known to all of the police officers acting in concert can be examined when determining whether the officer initiating the stop had reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop.’” 39 Thomas concedes that reasonable suspicion may be based on a vehicle description alone when in relation to a crime 36 State v. Montoya, 305 Neb. 581 , 941 N.W.2d 474 (2020). 37 Id. 38 See Terry, supra not | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Lowman
green
2 sentences2021We agree with the State. 13 Id. 14 Id. 15 Id. 16 Id. 17 Id. 18 State v. Hartzell, 304 Neb. 82 , 933 N.W.2d 441 (2019). - 493 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 308 Nebraska Reports STATE v. LOWMAN Cite as 308 Neb. 482 The interaction started with noncoercive questioning. 2021We agree with the State. 13 Id. 14 Id. 15 Id. 16 Id. 17 Id. 18 State v. Hartzell, 304 Neb. 82 , 933 N.W.2d 441 (2019). - 493 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 308 Nebraska Reports STATE v. LOWMAN Cite as 308 Neb. 482 The interaction started with noncoercive questioning. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Hartzell
green
1 sentence2021We agree with the State. 13 Id. 14 Id. 15 Id. 16 Id. 17 Id. 18 State v. Hartzell, 304 Neb. 82 , 933 N.W.2d 441 (2019). - 493 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 308 Nebraska Reports STATE v. LOWMAN Cite as 308 Neb. 482 The interaction started with noncoercive questioning. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Shiffermiller
green
2 sentences2018Motion to Suppress The issues presented by this case are whether the stop of Shiffermiller exceeded the permissible scope and duration of a Terry stop, and whether Shiffermiller’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated, necessitating suppression of the evidence gathered during the stop. - 258 - Nebraska Court of A ppeals A dvance Sheets 26 Nebraska A ppellate R eports STATE v. SHIFFERMILLER Cite as 26 Neb. 2018A search of Shiffermiller’s - 269 - Nebraska Court of A ppeals A dvance Sheets 26 Nebraska A ppellate R eports STATE v. SHIFFERMILLER Cite as 26 Neb. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. McCumber
green
1 sentence2017In this case, we agree that the administration of a PBT is more in line with field sobriety testing and a Terry stop than it would be with a formal arrest. . . . . . . [A]n officer is reasonable in administering a PBT if he can point to specific, articulable facts indicating that an individual has been driving [while] under the influence of alcohol. - 956 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 295 Nebraska R eports STATE v. McCUMBER Cite as 295 Neb. 941 State v. Prescott, 280 Neb. at 110-11 , 784 N.W.2d at 885-86 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Thomte
green
2 sentences2008We stated that other jurisdictions have determined that a roadside sobriety test "is more analogous to a limited Terry stop than to a formal arrest and may be justified by an officer's reasonable suspicion, based on specific articulable facts, that the driver is intoxicated." State v. Thomte, 226 Neb. at 664 , 413 N.W.2d at 919 . 2008We stated that other jurisdictions have determined that a roadside sobriety test "is more analogous to a limited Terry stop than to a formal arrest and may be justified by an officer's reasonable suspicion, based on specific articulable facts, that the driver is intoxicated." State v. Thomte, 226 Neb. at 664 , 413 N.W.2d at 919 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
People v. Laino
green
2 sentences2007The defendant in People v. Vasquez argued the Texas set-aside was similar to a pardon and cited People v. Terry, 61 Cal. 2d 137 , 390 P.2d 381 , 37 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1964), overruled, People v. Laino, 32 Cal. 4th 878 , 87 P.3d 27 , 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 723 (2004), to support the propositions that a pardon must be given full faith and credit in accord with article IV, § 1, of the U.S. Constitution and that the Texas set-aside should have the same effect in his case as an Oklahoma pardon which was held in Terry to prevent the use of the pardoned conviction in the Terry defendant’s case. 2007The defendant in People v. Vasquez argued the Texas set-aside was similar to a pardon and cited People v. Terry, 61 Cal. 2d 137 , 390 P.2d 381 , 37 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1964), overruled, People v. Laino, 32 Cal. 4th 878 , 87 P.3d 27 , 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 723 (2004), to support the propositions that a pardon must be given full faith and credit in accord with article IV, § 1, of the U.S. Constitution and that the Texas set-aside should have the same effect in his case as an Oklahoma pardon which was held in Terry to prevent the use of the pardoned conviction in the Terry defendant’s case. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Terry
green
2 sentences2007The defendant in People v. Vasquez argued the Texas set-aside was similar to a pardon and cited People v. Terry, 61 Cal. 2d 137 , 390 P.2d 381 , 37 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1964), overruled, People v. Laino, 32 Cal. 4th 878 , 87 P.3d 27 , 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 723 (2004), to support the propositions that a pardon must be given full faith and credit in accord with article IV, § 1, of the U.S. Constitution and that the Texas set-aside should have the same effect in his case as an Oklahoma pardon which was held in Terry to prevent the use of the pardoned conviction in the Terry defendant’s case. 2007The defendant in People v. Vasquez argued the Texas set-aside was similar to a pardon and cited People v. Terry, 61 Cal. 2d 137 , 390 P.2d 381 , 37 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1964), overruled, People v. Laino, 32 Cal. 4th 878 , 87 P.3d 27 , 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 723 (2004), to support the propositions that a pardon must be given full faith and credit in accord with article IV, § 1, of the U.S. Constitution and that the Texas set-aside should have the same effect in his case as an Oklahoma pardon which was held in Terry to prevent the use of the pardoned conviction in the Terry defendant’s case. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Lee
green
2 sentences2006U.S. v. Hardy, supra. See, also, State v. Lee, 265 Neb. 663 , 658 N.W.2d 669 (2003). 2006U.S. v. Hardy, supra. See, also, State v. Lee, 265 Neb. 663 , 658 N.W.2d 669 (2003). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Benson
green
2 sentences2001Ed. 2d 604 (1985) (officer may rely on flyer or bulletin in making Terry stop if bulletin is based on articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion); State v. Benson, 198 Neb. 14 , 251 N.W.2d 659 (1977) (where no evidence was provided at suppression hearing regarding information or facts relied on as factual foundation for broadcast message, radio message alone did not establish existence of reasonable suspicion); State v. Micek, 193 Neb. 379 , 227 N.W.2d 409 (1975) (upholding traffic stop made solely on basis of radio bulletin that was based on facts creating reasonable suspicion or proba 2001Ed. 2d 604 (1985) (officer may rely on flyer or bulletin in making Terry stop if bulletin is based on articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion); State v. Benson, 198 Neb. 14 , 251 N.W.2d 659 (1977) (where no evidence was provided at suppression hearing regarding information or facts relied on as factual foundation for broadcast message, radio message alone did not establish existence of reasonable suspicion); State v. Micek, 193 Neb. 379 , 227 N.W.2d 409 (1975) (upholding traffic stop made solely on basis of radio bulletin that was based on facts creating reasonable suspicion or proba | 1 | 2001–2001 |
State v. Micek
green
2 sentences2001Ed. 2d 604 (1985) (officer may rely on flyer or bulletin in making Terry stop if bulletin is based on articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion); State v. Benson, 198 Neb. 14 , 251 N.W.2d 659 (1977) (where no evidence was provided at suppression hearing regarding information or facts relied on as factual foundation for broadcast message, radio message alone did not establish existence of reasonable suspicion); State v. Micek, 193 Neb. 379 , 227 N.W.2d 409 (1975) (upholding traffic stop made solely on basis of radio bulletin that was based on facts creating reasonable suspicion or proba 2001Ed. 2d 604 (1985) (officer may rely on flyer or bulletin in making Terry stop if bulletin is based on articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion); State v. Benson, 198 Neb. 14 , 251 N.W.2d 659 (1977) (where no evidence was provided at suppression hearing regarding information or facts relied on as factual foundation for broadcast message, radio message alone did not establish existence of reasonable suspicion); State v. Micek, 193 Neb. 379 , 227 N.W.2d 409 (1975) (upholding traffic stop made solely on basis of radio bulletin that was based on facts creating reasonable suspicion or proba | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| State v. Anderson green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
State v. Mays
neutral
2 sentences2001Ed. 2d 604 (1985) (officer may rely on flyer or bulletin in making Terry stop if bulletin is based on articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion); State v. Benson, 198 Neb. 14 , 251 N.W.2d 659 (1977) (where no evidence was provided at suppression hearing regarding information or facts relied on as factual foundation for broadcast message, radio message alone did not establish existence of reasonable suspicion); State v. Micek, 193 Neb. 379 , 227 N.W.2d 409 (1975) (upholding traffic stop made solely on basis of radio bulletin that was based on facts creating reasonable suspicion or proba 2001App. 855 , 578 N.W.2d 453 (1998) (reasonable suspicion not present where State offered no factual foundation for fellow officer’s warning to arresting officer that driver of red pickup was drug dealer and had drugs on his person), overruled on other grounds, State v. Anderson, 258 Neb. 627 , 605 N.W.2d 124 (2000). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Ybarra v. Illinois green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| State v. Garland green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Minnesota v. Dickerson green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| United States v. John Timothy Armstrong green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| United States v. Robinson green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Snyder v. State green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| State v. Caples green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| State v. Jackson green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Thomas green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Alabama v. White green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| People v. Aldridge green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Talbot green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| People v. Shabaz green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Watkins v. State green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Reid v. Georgia green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| People v. Jordan green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Horn green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Oregon v. Niles green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.