Terry stop in Washington

2026It’s a formal arrest, and the court is judging this based on whether they had probable cause to arrest based on the investigator’s 2 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).Such contact by law enforcement is commonly known as a “Terry stop” and is limited in scope as compared to other forms of interactions with law enforcement.

2025Thus, a detaining officer may ask a moderate number of questions during a Terry stop to determine the identity of the suspect and to confirm or dispel the officer’s suspicions without rendering the suspect “in custody” for the purposes of Miranda. 2 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 20 L.

2020The words and expressions include “social contact,” “stop,” “investigative stop,” “brief investigative stop,” “stop and frisk,” “Terry stop,” “Terry investigative stop,” “detainment” “detention,” “limited detention,” “involuntary detention,” “investigatory detention,” “brief, investigative detention,” “seizure,” “present confinement,” “restraint,” “physical restraint,” “physical intrusion,” “arrest,” “custody,” “custodial arrest,” “full custodial arrest,” and “formal arrest.” State v. Mecham, 186 Wn.2d 128, 138 , 380 P.3d 414 (2016); State v. Flores, 186 Wn.2d 506, 512 (2016); State v. Patton,

2020The words and expressions include “social contact,” “stop,” “investigative stop,” “brief investigative stop,” “stop and frisk,” “Terry stop,” “Terry investigative stop,” “detainment” “detention,” “limited detention,” “involuntary detention,” “investigatory detention,” “brief, investigative detention,” “seizure,” “present confinement,” “restraint,” “physical restraint,” “physical intrusion,” “arrest,” “custody,” “custodial arrest,” “full custodial arrest,” and “formal arrest.” State v. Mecham, 186 Wn.2d 128, 138 , 380 P.3d 414 (2016); State v. Flores, 186 Wn.2d 506, 512 (2016); State v. Patton,

2022While Butler had not obeyed the officer’s order to stop, “‘[F]light alone may not be enough to justify a Terry stop.’” Id. (quoting Mendez, 137 Wn.2d at 224 ).

2018Mendez, 137 Wn.2d at 223 . "[F]light alone may not be enough to justify a Terry stop." Mendez, 137 Wn.2d at 224 .

2024“While Terry does not authorize a search for evidence of a crime, officers are allowed to make a brief, nonintrusive search for weapons if, after a lawful Terry stop, ‘a reasonable safety concern exists to justify the protective frisk for weapons’ so long as the search goes no further than necessary for protective purposes.” State v. Day, 161 Wn.2d 889, 895 , 168 P.3d 1265 (2007) (quoting State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 172 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002)).

2024“For a permissible Terry stop the State must show that (1) the initial stop is legitimate; (2) a reasonable safety concern exists to justify the protective frisk for weapons; and (3) the scope of the frisk is limited to the protective purposes.” Duncan, 146 Wn.2d at 172 . 8 No. 58750-5-II Terry justifies protective frisks only when the officer can point to “‘specific and articulable facts’ that create an objective, reasonable belief that the suspect is armed and dangerous.” State v. Lennon, 94 Wn.

2026“A Terry stop requires a well-founded suspicion that the defendant engaged in criminal conduct.” State v. Doughty, 170 Wn.2d 57, 62 , 239 P.3d 573 (2010).

2022Ed. 2d 889 (1968). 7 No. 37762-8-III State v. Newell A Terry stop must be supported by “a well-founded suspicion that the defendant engaged in criminal conduct.” Doughty, 170 Wn.2d at 62 .

2026TERRY STOP AND REASONABLE SUSPICION One exception to the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7’s warrant requirement, a Terry stop, permits an officer to briefly detain a person for questioning without a warrant based on the officer’s “reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” State v. Fuentes, 183 Wn.2d 149, 158 , 8 No. 59854-0-II 352 P.3d 152 (2015).

2026TERRY STOP AND REASONABLE SUSPICION One exception to the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7’s warrant requirement, a Terry stop, permits an officer to briefly detain a person for questioning without a warrant based on the officer’s “reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” State v. Fuentes, 183 Wn.2d 149, 158 , 8 No. 59854-0-II 352 P.3d 152 (2015).

2024“While Terry does not authorize a search for evidence of a crime, officers are allowed to make a brief, nonintrusive search for weapons if, after a lawful Terry stop, ‘a reasonable safety concern exists to justify the protective frisk for weapons’ so long as the search goes no further than necessary for protective purposes.” State v. Day, 161 Wn.2d 889, 895 , 168 P.3d 1265 (2007) (quoting State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 172 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002)).

2021“For a permissible Terry stop, the State must show that (1) the initial stop is legitimate; (2) a reasonable safety concern exists to justify the protective frisk for weapons; and (3) the scope of the frisk is limited to the protective purposes.” State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 172 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002).

2025Thus, “a detaining officer may ask a moderate number of questions during a Terry stop to determine the identity of the suspect and to confirm or dispel the officer’s suspicions without rendering the suspect ‘in custody’ for the purposes of Miranda.” Id.

2020As the Court explained in Berkemer, an ordinary Terry stop generally does not render a person in custody for Miranda purposes because “the typical police-citizen encounter envisioned by the Court in Terry usually involves no more than a very brief detention . . . , a few questions relating to identity and the suspicious 12 State v. Escalante, No. 97268-1 circumstances, and an atmosphere that is ‘substantially less “police dominated” than that surrounding the kinds of interrogation at issue in Miranda.’” Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1464 (quoting Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439 ).

2019In general, a court’s analysis of a Terry stop is similar under both article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment.3° The State must show that the officer reasonably suspected that the person was engaged in, or was about to engage in, criminal activity.31 Reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than 27 See, e.g., O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d at 581-82. 28 Sondergaard, 86 Wn.

2015We note, however, that under these facts the trial court correctly cited State v. O' Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 574 , 62 P. 3d 489 ( 2003) for authority that Stultz was not seized when LaClaire asked her for identification. 8 No. 45225 -1 - II An officer may conduct a Terry stop when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion based on "' specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrants an intrusion. "' State v. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177, 197 , 275 P. 3d 289 2012 ) ( quoting Terry, 392 U. S. at 21 ).

2020In a Terry stop, a law enforcement officer “may briefly stop and detain an individual for investigation without a warrant,” and under proper circumstances, “briefly frisk the individual for weapons.” State v. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d 242, 250 , 207 P.3d 1266 (2009).

2020See also Garvin, 166 Wn.2d at 249 (officer’s act of squeezing defendant’s coin purse after determining there was no weapon in the coin purse exceeded lawful Terry stop).

2024App. 2d at 160 (quoting State v. Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738, 747 , 64 P.3d 594 (2003)). “[U]nder certain circumstances measures such as handcuffing, secluding, and drawing guns on the suspect may be appropriate to accomplish a Terry stop.” State v. Pines, 17 Wn.

2024A Terry stop is permissible when an “officer has a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that the person stopped has been or is about to be involved in a crime.” State v. Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738, 747 , 64 P.3d 594 (2003).

2023A permissible Terry stop requires the State to “show that the officer had a ‘reasonable suspicion’ that the detained person was, or was about to be, involved in a crime.” Id. (quoting State v. Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738, 747 , 64 P.3d 594 (2003)).

2023However, even with the presence of these factors, the Z.U.E. court still concluded that the informant’s tip did not “create a sustainable basis for a Terry stop.” Id. at 623 .

2017To conduct a valid Terry stop, an officer must have "reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based on specific and articulable facts known to the officer at the inception of the stop." Id. (citing State v. Gatewood, 163 Wn.2d 534, 539-40 , 182 P.3d 426 (2008); State v. Glover, 116 Wn.2d 509, 513-14 , 806 P.2d 760 (1991) (plurality opinion)).

2017To conduct a valid Terry stop, an officer must have "reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based on specific and articulable facts known to the officer at the inception of the stop." Id. (citing State v. Gatewood, 163 Wn.2d 534, 539-40 , 182 P.3d 426 (2008); State v. Glover, 116 Wn.2d 509, 513-14 , 806 P.2d 760 (1991) (plurality opinion)).

2026“A Terry stop requires a well-founded suspicion that the defendant engaged in criminal conduct.” State v. Doughty, 170 Wn.2d 57, 62 , 239 P.3d 573 (2010).

2021“A Terry stop requires a well-founded suspicion that the defendant engaged in criminal conduct.” State v. Doughty, 170 Wn.2d 57, 62 , 239 P.3d 573 (2010).

2014A Terry stop must be based on "' specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. "' State v. Mendez, 137 Wn.2d 208, 223 , 970 P. 2d 722 ( 1999) ( quoting.

2009Because article I, section 7 jurisprudence is parallel to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the Terry stop context, other than with regard to the so-called "pretext stop," see State v. Ladson, 138 Wash.2d 343, 358 , 979 P.2d 833 (1999), this clarification is equally applicable here. [7] Again, this holding addressed the more stringent probable cause standard. [8] An appellate court reviewing a CrR 3.5 suppression order "must determine de novo whether the trial court `derived proper conclusions of law' from its findings of fact." State v. Solomon, 114 Wash.App. 781, 789 , 60 P.3d 1215 (2002) (q

2024App. 2d at 160 (quoting State v. Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738, 747 , 64 P.3d 594 (2003)). “[U]nder certain circumstances measures such as handcuffing, secluding, and drawing guns on the suspect may be appropriate to accomplish a Terry stop.” State v. Pines, 17 Wn.

2024A Terry stop is permissible when an “officer has a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that the person stopped has been or is about to be involved in a crime.” State v. Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738, 747 , 64 P.3d 594 (2003).

2019The purpose of a Terry stop “‘is to allow the police to make an intermediate response to a situation for which there is no probable cause to arrest but which calls for further investigation.’” State v. Armenta, 134 Wn.2d 1, 16 , 948 P.2d 1280 (1997) (quoting State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 17 , 726 P.2d 445 (1986) (Dolliver, C.J., dissenting)).

2017Rather, they are vague generalizations of what might be perceived as suspicious activity-which does not provide a legal (or factual) basis for a Terry stop." Shira A. Scheindlin, The Impact of Race and Policing-Past, Present, and Future, 25 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 1, 13 (2016). 6 Judge Richard Posner has 5 See State v. Armenta, 134 Wn.2d 1, 13 , 948 P.2d 1280 (1997) (large sums of cash in suspect's pocket was innocuous fact) (citing State v. Tijerina, 61 Wn.

2020An investigative Terry stop is pretextual when used as “a mere pretext to dispense with [a] warrant when the true reason for the seizure is not exempt from the warrant requirement.” Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 358 .

2011See Ladson, 138 Wash.2d at 352 , 979 P.2d 833 ; State v. Duncan, 146 Wash.2d 166, 172-74 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002) ( Terry stop requires a reasonable, articulable suspicion, based on specific, objective facts, that the person stopped has committed or is about to commit a crime or a civil traffic infraction).

2024“While Terry does not authorize a search for evidence of a crime, officers are allowed to make a brief, nonintrusive search for weapons if, after a lawful Terry stop, ‘a reasonable safety concern exists to justify the protective frisk for weapons’ so long as the search goes no further than necessary for protective purposes.” State v. Day, 161 Wn.2d 889, 895 , 168 P.3d 1265 (2007) (quoting State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 172 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002)).

2020In a Terry stop, “[o]fficers may briefly, and without warrant, stop and detain a person they reasonably suspect is, or is -4- No. 78958-9-I/5 about to be, engaged in criminal conduct.” State v. Day, 161 Wn.2d 889, 895 , 168 P.3d 1265 (2007).

2025“Washington courts agree that a routine Terry stop is not custodial for the purposes of Miranda.” State v. Heritage, 152 Wn.2d 210, 218 , 95 P.3d 345 (2004).

2023To that end, an agent “may ask a moderate number of questions during a Terry stop to determine the identity of the suspect and to confirm or dispel the [agent]’s suspicions without rendering the suspect ‘in custody’” Id.

2018Thus, in the "two separate encounters" scenario, Officer Oates's decision to seize Butler must be justified by information premised solely on his own first- 10 "The United States Supreme Court applied these same principles to a Terry stop in United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 , 105 S. Ct. 675 , 83 L.

2018Thus, in the "two separate encounters" scenario, Officer Oates's decision to seize Butler must be justified by information premised solely on his own first- 10 "The United States Supreme Court applied these same principles to a Terry stop in United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 , 105 S. Ct. 675 , 83 L.

2020App. 2d 507, 516, 431 P.3d 514 (2018). 3 No. 81830-9-I/4 finding of fact is supported by substantial evidence when the record shows sufficient facts to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the finding.4 We review conclusions of law de novo.5 Article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution “protects the ‘private affairs’ of each person from disturbance imposed without ‘authority of law.’”6 A lawful Terry stop is “‘limited in scope and duration to fulfilling the investigative purpose of the stop.’”7 An officer’s actions will be viewed under the totality of the circumstances to deter

2019The trial court compared the facts in State v. Gatewood, 163 Wn.2d 534 , 182 P.3d 426 (2008) and State v. Graham, 130 Wn.2d 711 , 927 P.2d 227 (1996), and found Mans' circumstances more analogous to Graham, in which the Terry stop was found lawful.

2015State v. Lesnick, 84 Wn.2d 940, 944 , 530 P.2d 243 (1975). ¶11 An informant’s tip can provide police with reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory Terry stop if the tip possesses sufficient “ ‘indicia of reliability.’ ” State v. Sieler, 95 Wn.2d 43, 47 , 621 P.2d 1272 (1980) (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 , 92 S. Ct. 1921 , 32 L.

2015State v. Lesnick, 84 Wn.2d 940, 944 , 530 P.2d 243 (1975). ¶11 An informant’s tip can provide police with reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory Terry stop if the tip possesses sufficient “ ‘indicia of reliability.’ ” State v. Sieler, 95 Wn.2d 43, 47 , 621 P.2d 1272 (1980) (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 , 92 S. Ct. 1921 , 32 L.

2020App. 2d 507, 516, 431 P.3d 514 (2018). 3 No. 81830-9-I/4 finding of fact is supported by substantial evidence when the record shows sufficient facts to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the finding.4 We review conclusions of law de novo.5 Article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution “protects the ‘private affairs’ of each person from disturbance imposed without ‘authority of law.’”6 A lawful Terry stop is “‘limited in scope and duration to fulfilling the investigative purpose of the stop.’”7 An officer’s actions will be viewed under the totality of the circumstances to deter

2019The trial court compared the facts in State v. Gatewood, 163 Wn.2d 534 , 182 P.3d 426 (2008) and State v. Graham, 130 Wn.2d 711 , 927 P.2d 227 (1996), and found Mans' circumstances more analogous to Graham, in which the Terry stop was found lawful.

2024“While Terry does not authorize a search for evidence of a crime, officers are allowed to make a brief, nonintrusive search for weapons if, after a lawful Terry stop, ‘a reasonable safety concern exists to justify the protective frisk for weapons’ so long as the search goes no further than necessary for protective purposes.” State v. Day, 161 Wn.2d 889, 895 , 168 P.3d 1265 (2007) (quoting State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 172 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002)).

2020In a Terry stop, “[o]fficers may briefly, and without warrant, stop and detain a person they reasonably suspect is, or is -4- No. 78958-9-I/5 about to be, engaged in criminal conduct.” State v. Day, 161 Wn.2d 889, 895 , 168 P.3d 1265 (2007).