Terry stop in Washington

2026It’s a formal arrest, and the court is judging this based on whether they had probable cause to arrest based on the investigator’s 2 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).Such contact by law enforcement is commonly known as a “Terry stop” and is limited in scope as compared to other forms of interactions with law enforcement.

2025Thus, a detaining officer may ask a moderate number of questions during a Terry stop to determine the identity of the suspect and to confirm or dispel the officer’s suspicions without rendering the suspect “in custody” for the purposes of Miranda. 2 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). 9 State v. Heritage, 152 Wn.2d 210, 218 , 95 P.3d 345 (2004) (quoting Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439 ) (citations omitted). “[M]ere investigatory stops are not custodial interrogations requiring a Miranda warning.

2020The words and expressions include “social contact,” “stop,” “investigative stop,” “brief investigative stop,” “stop and frisk,” “Terry stop,” “Terry investigative stop,” “detainment” “detention,” “limited detention,” “involuntary detention,” “investigatory detention,” “brief, investigative detention,” “seizure,” “present confinement,” “restraint,” “physical restraint,” “physical intrusion,” “arrest,” “custody,” “custodial arrest,” “full custodial arrest,” and “formal arrest.” State v. Mecham, 186 Wn.2d 128, 138 , 380 P.3d 414 (2016); State v. Flores, 186 Wn.2d 506, 512 (2016); State v. Patton,

2020The words and expressions include “social contact,” “stop,” “investigative stop,” “brief investigative stop,” “stop and frisk,” “Terry stop,” “Terry investigative stop,” “detainment” “detention,” “limited detention,” “involuntary detention,” “investigatory detention,” “brief, investigative detention,” “seizure,” “present confinement,” “restraint,” “physical restraint,” “physical intrusion,” “arrest,” “custody,” “custodial arrest,” “full custodial arrest,” and “formal arrest.” State v. Mecham, 186 Wn.2d 128, 138 , 380 P.3d 414 (2016); State v. Flores, 186 Wn.2d 506, 512 (2016); State v. Patton,

2022See generally, State v. Mendez, 137 Wn.2d 208, 223 , 970 P.2d 722 (1999), abrogated on other grounds by Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 , 127 S. Ct. 2400 , 168 L. Ed. 132 (2007) (“Flight from officers where the officers have grounds a Terry stop and a refusal to halt at their order may constitute obstruction of a public servant under former RCW 9A.76.020.”).

2022While Butler had not obeyed the officer’s order to stop, “‘[F]light alone may not be enough to justify a Terry stop.’” Id. (quoting Mendez, 137 Wn.2d at 224 ).

2024“While Terry does not authorize a search for evidence of a crime, officers are allowed to make a brief, nonintrusive search for weapons if, after a lawful Terry stop, ‘a reasonable safety concern exists to justify the protective frisk for weapons’ so long as the search goes no further than necessary for protective purposes.” State v. Day, 161 Wn.2d 889, 895 , 168 P.3d 1265 (2007) (quoting State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 172 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002)).

2024“While Terry does not authorize a search for evidence of a crime, officers are allowed to make a brief, nonintrusive search for weapons if, after a lawful Terry stop, ‘a reasonable safety concern exists to justify the protective frisk for weapons’ so long as the search goes no further than necessary for protective purposes.” State v. Day, 161 Wn.2d 889, 895 , 168 P.3d 1265 (2007) (quoting State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 172 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002)).

2026“A Terry stop requires a well-founded suspicion that the defendant engaged in criminal conduct.” State v. Doughty, 170 Wn.2d 57, 62 , 239 P.3d 573 (2010).

2026“A Terry stop requires a well-founded suspicion that the defendant engaged in criminal conduct.” State v. Doughty, 170 Wn.2d 57, 62 , 239 P.3d 573 (2010).

2019In general, a court’s analysis of a Terry stop is similar under both article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment.3° The State must show that the officer reasonably suspected that the person was engaged in, or was about to engage in, criminal activity.31 Reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than 27 See, e.g., O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d at 581-82. 28 Sondergaard, 86 Wn. App. at 657-58 . 29Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31 . 30 State v. Z.U.E., 183 Wn.2d 610, 617 , 352 P.3d 796 (2015). 31 Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31; Weyand, 188 Wn.2d at 811. -13- No. 77480-8-I /14 probable cause, but the officer’s reasonable

2015We note, however, that under these facts the trial court correctly cited State v. O' Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 574 , 62 P. 3d 489 ( 2003) for authority that Stultz was not seized when LaClaire asked her for identification. 8 No. 45225 -1 - II An officer may conduct a Terry stop when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion based on "' specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrants an intrusion. "' State v. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177, 197 , 275 P. 3d 289 2012 ) ( quoting Terry, 392 U. S. at 21 ).

2026TERRY STOP AND REASONABLE SUSPICION One exception to the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7’s warrant requirement, a Terry stop, permits an officer to briefly detain a person for questioning without a warrant based on the officer’s “reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” State v. Fuentes, 183 Wn.2d 149, 158 , 8 352 P.3d 152 (2015).

2026TERRY STOP AND REASONABLE SUSPICION One exception to the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7’s warrant requirement, a Terry stop, permits an officer to briefly detain a person for questioning without a warrant based on the officer’s “reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” State v. Fuentes, 183 Wn.2d 149, 158 , 8 352 P.3d 152 (2015).

2025Thus, a detaining officer may ask a moderate number of questions during a Terry stop to determine the identity of the suspect and to confirm or dispel the officer’s suspicions without rendering the suspect “in custody” for the purposes of Miranda. 2 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). 9 State v. Heritage, 152 Wn.2d 210, 218 , 95 P.3d 345 (2004) (quoting Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439 ) (citations omitted). “[M]ere investigatory stops are not custodial interrogations requiring a Miranda warning.

2025Thus, “a detaining officer may ask a moderate number of questions during a Terry stop to determine the identity of the suspect and to confirm or dispel the officer’s suspicions without rendering the suspect ‘in custody’ for the purposes of Miranda.” Id.

2020In a Terry stop, a law enforcement officer “may briefly stop and detain an individual for investigation without a warrant,” and under proper circumstances, “briefly frisk the individual for weapons.” State v. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d 242, 250 , 207 P.3d 1266 (2009).

2020In a Terry stop, a law enforcement officer “may briefly stop and detain an individual for investigation without a warrant,” and under proper circumstances, “briefly frisk the individual for weapons.” State v. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d 242, 250 , 207 P.3d 1266 (2009).

2018Washington courts have long described the suspicion required to justify a Terry stop as “a substantial possibility that criminal conduct has occurred or is about to occur.” State v. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d at 198 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Johnson, 128 Wn.2d 431, 454 , 909 P.2d 293 (1996)).

2015We note, however, that under these facts the trial court correctly cited State v. O' Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 574 , 62 P. 3d 489 ( 2003) for authority that Stultz was not seized when LaClaire asked her for identification. 8 No. 45225 -1 - II An officer may conduct a Terry stop when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion based on "' specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrants an intrusion. "' State v. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177, 197 , 275 P. 3d 289 2012 ) ( quoting Terry, 392 U. S. at 21 ).

2024A Terry stop is permissible when an “officer has a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that the person stopped has been or is about to be involved in a crime.” State v. Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738, 747 , 64 P.3d 594 (2003).

2024A Terry stop is permissible when an “officer has a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that the person stopped has been or is about to be involved in a crime.” State v. Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738, 747 , 64 P.3d 594 (2003).

2023A permissible Terry stop requires the State to “show that the officer had a ‘reasonable suspicion’ that the detained person was, or was about to be, involved in a crime.” Id. (quoting State v. Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738, 747 , 64 P.3d 594 (2003)).

2023However, even with the presence of these factors, the Z.U.E. court still concluded that the informant’s tip did not “create a sustainable basis for a Terry stop.” Id. at 623 .

2017To conduct a valid Terry stop, an officer must have "reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based on specific and articulable facts known to the officer at the inception of the stop." Id. (citing State v. Gatewood, 163 Wn.2d 534, 539-40 , 182 P.3d 426 (2008); State v. Glover, 116 Wn.2d 509, 513-14 , 806 P.2d 760 (1991) (plurality opinion)).

2017To conduct a valid Terry stop, an officer must have "reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based on specific and articulable facts known to the officer at the inception of the stop." Id. (citing State v. Gatewood, 163 Wn.2d 534, 539-40 , 182 P.3d 426 (2008); State v. Glover, 116 Wn.2d 509, 513-14 , 806 P.2d 760 (1991) (plurality opinion)).

2020During a Terry stop, officers may ask the detained individual questions in order to dispel or confirm their suspicions, Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 , 103 S. Ct. 1319 , 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983)(plurality opinion), and can “take such steps as [are] reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety,” United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235 , 105 S. Ct. 675 , 83 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1985).

2020During a Terry stop, officers may ask the detained individual questions in order to dispel or confirm their suspicions, Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 , 103 S. Ct. 1319 , 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983)(plurality opinion), and can “take such steps as [are] reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety,” United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235 , 105 S. Ct. 675 , 83 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1985).

2019The purpose of a Terry stop “‘is to allow the police to make an intermediate response to a situation for which there is no probable cause to arrest but which calls for further investigation.’” State v. Armenta, 134 Wn.2d 1, 16 , 948 P.2d 1280 (1997) (quoting State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 17 , 726 P.2d 445 (1986) (Dolliver, C.J., dissenting)).

2019The purpose of a Terry stop “‘is to allow the police to make an intermediate response to a situation for which there is no probable cause to arrest but which calls for further investigation.’” State v. Armenta, 134 Wn.2d 1, 16 , 948 P.2d 1280 (1997) (quoting State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 17 , 726 P.2d 445 (1986) (Dolliver, C.J., dissenting)).

2024“While Terry does not authorize a search for evidence of a crime, officers are allowed to make a brief, nonintrusive search for weapons if, after a lawful Terry stop, ‘a reasonable safety concern exists to justify the protective frisk for weapons’ so long as the search goes no further than necessary for protective purposes.” State v. Day, 161 Wn.2d 889, 895 , 168 P.3d 1265 (2007) (quoting State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 172 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002)).

2024“While Terry does not authorize a search for evidence of a crime, officers are allowed to make a brief, nonintrusive search for weapons if, after a lawful Terry stop, ‘a reasonable safety concern exists to justify the protective frisk for weapons’ so long as the search goes no further than necessary for protective purposes.” State v. Day, 161 Wn.2d 889, 895 , 168 P.3d 1265 (2007) (quoting State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 172 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002)).

2020An investigative Terry stop is pretextual when used as “a mere pretext to dispense with [a] warrant when the true reason for the seizure is not exempt from the warrant requirement.” Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 358 .

2011See Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 352 ; State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 172-74 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002) (Terry stop requires a reasonable, articulable suspicion, based on specific, objective facts that the person stopped has committed or is about to commit a crime or a civil traffic infraction).

2025“Washington courts agree that a routine Terry stop is not custodial for the purposes of Miranda.” State v. Heritage, 152 Wn.2d 210, 218 , 95 P.3d 345 (2004).

2025“Washington courts agree that a routine Terry stop is not custodial for the purposes of Miranda.” State v. Heritage, 152 Wn.2d 210, 218 , 95 P.3d 345 (2004).

2020App. 2d 507, 516, 431 P.3d 514 (2018). 3 No. 81830-9-I/4 finding of fact is supported by substantial evidence when the record shows sufficient facts to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the finding.4 We review conclusions of law de novo.5 Article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution “protects the ‘private affairs’ of each person from disturbance imposed without ‘authority of law.’”6 A lawful Terry stop is “‘limited in scope and duration to fulfilling the investigative purpose of the stop.’”7 An officer’s actions will be viewed under the totality of the circumstances to deter

2020App. 2d 507, 516, 431 P.3d 514 (2018). 3 No. 81830-9-I/4 finding of fact is supported by substantial evidence when the record shows sufficient facts to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the finding.4 We review conclusions of law de novo.5 Article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution “protects the ‘private affairs’ of each person from disturbance imposed without ‘authority of law.’”6 A lawful Terry stop is “‘limited in scope and duration to fulfilling the investigative purpose of the stop.’”7 An officer’s actions will be viewed under the totality of the circumstances to deter

2015State v. Lesnick, 84 Wn.2d 940, 944 , 530 P.2d 243 (1975). ¶11 An informant’s tip can provide police with reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory Terry stop if the tip possesses sufficient “ ‘indicia of reliability.’ ” State v. Sieler, 95 Wn.2d 43, 47 , 621 P.2d 1272 (1980) (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 , 92 S. Ct. 1921 , 32 L.

2015State v. Lesnick, 84 Wn.2d 940, 944 , 530 P.2d 243 (1975). ¶11 An informant’s tip can provide police with reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory Terry stop if the tip possesses sufficient “ ‘indicia of reliability.’ ” State v. Sieler, 95 Wn.2d 43, 47 , 621 P.2d 1272 (1980) (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 , 92 S. Ct. 1921 , 32 L.

1993To decide whether the police made a valid Terry stop, it is necessary to address four questions set forth in State v. Belieu, 112 Wn.2d 587, 593-94 , 773 P.2d 46 (1989): (A) Was there a forcible stop as opposed to a consensual encounter?

1993To decide whether the police made a valid Terry stop, it is necessary to address four questions set forth in State v. Belieu, 112 Wn.2d 587, 593-94 , 773 P.2d 46 (1989): (A) Was there a forcible stop as opposed to a consensual encounter?

2025State v. Wheeler, 108 Wn.2d 230 , 235- 36, 737 P.2d 1005 (1987); State v. Mitchell, 80 Wn. App. 143, 146 , 906 P.2d 1013 (1995) (handcuffing may be appropriate to accomplish a Terry stop only when police have “a reasonable fear of danger”).

2025State v. Wheeler, 108 Wn.2d 230 , 235- 36, 737 P.2d 1005 (1987); State v. Mitchell, 80 Wn. App. 143, 146 , 906 P.2d 1013 (1995) (handcuffing may be appropriate to accomplish a Terry stop only when police have “a reasonable fear of danger”).

2020During a Terry stop, officers may ask the detained individual questions in order to dispel or confirm their suspicions, Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 , 103 S. Ct. 1319 , 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983)(plurality opinion), and can “take such steps as [are] reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety,” United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235 , 105 S. Ct. 675 , 83 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1985).

2020During a Terry stop, officers may ask the detained individual questions in order to dispel or confirm their suspicions, Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 , 103 S. Ct. 1319 , 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983)(plurality opinion), and can “take such steps as [are] reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety,” United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235 , 105 S. Ct. 675 , 83 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1985).

2022See generally, State v. Mendez, 137 Wn.2d 208, 223 , 970 P.2d 722 (1999), abrogated on other grounds by Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 , 127 S. Ct. 2400 , 168 L. Ed. 132 (2007) (“Flight from officers where the officers have grounds a Terry stop and a refusal to halt at their order may constitute obstruction of a public servant under former RCW 9A.76.020.”).

2022See generally, State v. Mendez, 137 Wn.2d 208, 223 , 970 P.2d 722 (1999), abrogated on other grounds by Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 , 127 S. Ct. 2400 , 168 L. Ed. 132 (2007) (“Flight from officers where the officers have grounds a Terry stop and a refusal to halt at their order may constitute obstruction of a public servant under former RCW 9A.76.020.”).