101 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1973–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Terry v. Ohiogreen2 sentences2014We must consider the delivery of these statements in the context of the scene as a whole.’’ [Emphasis in original.]). 17 The state asserts that the defendant’s detention was akin to a Terry stop; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 , 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 20 L. 2014We must consider the delivery of these statements in the context of the scene as a whole.’’ [Emphasis in original.]). 17 The state asserts that the defendant’s detention was akin to a Terry stop; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 , 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 20 L. | 7 | 26 |
State v. Millergreen2 sentences2007Ed. 2d 537 (1980); see also State v. Miller, 29 Conn. App. 207, 216 , 614 A.2d 1229 (1992) (“[because the seizure of the gun did not owe its origin in material part to the [illegal] Terry stop, the Terry stop cannot provide a basis for excluding the gun from evidence”), aff'd, 227 Conn. 363 , 630 A.2d 1315 (1993). 2007Ed. 2d 537 (1980); see also State v. Miller, 29 Conn. App. 207, 216 , 614 A.2d 1229 (1992) (“[because the seizure of the gun did not owe its origin in material part to the [illegal] Terry stop, the Terry stop cannot provide a basis for excluding the gun from evidence”), aff'd, 227 Conn. 363 , 630 A.2d 1315 (1993). | 6 | 7 |
State v. Millergreen2 sentences2007Ed. 2d 537 (1980); see also State v. Miller, 29 Conn. App. 207, 216 , 614 A.2d 1229 (1992) (“[because the seizure of the gun did not owe its origin in material part to the [illegal] Terry stop, the Terry stop cannot provide a basis for excluding the gun from evidence”), aff'd, 227 Conn. 363 , 630 A.2d 1315 (1993). 2007Ed. 2d 537 (1980); see also State v. Miller, 29 Conn. App. 207, 216 , 614 A.2d 1229 (1992) (“[because the seizure of the gun did not owe its origin in material part to the [illegal] Terry stop, the Terry stop cannot provide a basis for excluding the gun from evidence”), aff'd, 227 Conn. 363 , 630 A.2d 1315 (1993). | 5 | 7 |
United States v. Hensleygreen2 sentences2014Police officers are entitled to seize evidence revealed in ‘plain view’ during the course of a lawful ‘Terry stop.’ United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235 [ 105 S. Ct. 675 , 83 L. 2014Police officers are entitled to seize evidence revealed in ‘plain view’ during the course of a lawful ‘Terry stop.’ United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235 [ 105 S. Ct. 675 , 83 L. | 3 | 3 |
United States v. Sharpegreen2 sentences2002See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 , 684 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 , 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 , 500 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). 2002See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 , 684 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 , 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 , 500 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Lammegreen2 sentences2010See State v. Wilkins, supra, 240 Conn. at 507 , 692 A.2d 1233 ("[a]rticle first, §§ 7 and 9, of our state constitution permit a police officer in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner to detain an individual for investigative purposes even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest" [emphasis added]); State v. Lamme, 216 Conn. 172, 184 , 579 A.2d 484 (1990) ("circumscribed nature" of Terry stop minimizes risk of due process violation under Connecticut constitution); State v. Edwards, 214 Conn. 57, 72 , 570 A.2d 193 (1990) ("[a] Terry stop that is justified at its ince 2010See State v. Wilkins, supra, 240 Conn. at 507 , 692 A.2d 1233 ("[a]rticle first, §§ 7 and 9, of our state constitution permit a police officer in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner to detain an individual for investigative purposes even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest" [emphasis added]); State v. Lamme, 216 Conn. 172, 184 , 579 A.2d 484 (1990) ("circumscribed nature" of Terry stop minimizes risk of due process violation under Connecticut constitution); State v. Edwards, 214 Conn. 57, 72 , 570 A.2d 193 (1990) ("[a] Terry stop that is justified at its ince | 2 | 7 |
State v. Wilkinsgreen2 sentences2019If the Terry stop is lawful and ‘‘the officer reasonably believes that the detained individual might be armed and dangerous, he or she [also] may undertake a patdown search of the individual to discover weapons.’’ State v. Wilkins, 240 Conn. 489 , 495–96, 692 A.2d 1233 (1997). 2019If the Terry stop is lawful and ‘‘the officer reasonably believes that the detained individual might be armed and dangerous, he or she [also] may undertake a patdown search of the individual to discover weapons.’’ State v. Wilkins, 240 Conn. 489 , 495–96, 692 A.2d 1233 (1997). | 2 | 6 |
United States v. Cortezgreen2 sentences2016It is well settled that a Terry stop is constitutionally permissible only if three conditions are met: ‘‘(1) the officer[s] must have a reasonable suspicion that a crime has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur; (2) the purpose of the stop must be reasonable; and (3) the scope and character of the detention must be reasonable when considered in light of its purpose.’’ State v. Cyrus, 297 Conn. 829, 837 , 1 A.3d 59 (2010); see also United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 , 417–18, 101 S. Ct. 690 , 66 L. 2016It is well settled that a Terry stop is constitutionally permissible only if three conditions are met: ‘‘(1) the officer[s] must have a reasonable suspicion that a crime has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur; (2) the purpose of the stop must be reasonable; and (3) the scope and character of the detention must be reasonable when considered in light of its purpose.’’ State v. Cyrus, 297 Conn. 829, 837 , 1 A.3d 59 (2010); see also United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 , 417–18, 101 S. Ct. 690 , 66 L. | 2 | 6 |
State v. Hammondgreen2 sentences2016See State v. Santos, 267 Conn. 495 , 508–509, 838 A.2d 981 (2004) (presence of individual in high crime area at night not sufficient to justify seizure), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Burroughs, 288 Conn. 836 , 844 n.5, 955 A.2d 43 (2008); State v. Hammond, 257 Conn. 610, 625 , 778 A.2d 108 (2001) (relying on United States v. Gray, 213 F.3d 998, 1001 [8th Cir. 2000], for proposition that standing on street in high crime area before 10 p.m. in cold weather insufficient to justify Terry stop); see also United States v. Blair, 524 F.3d 740, 751 (6th Cir. 2008) (10:30 p.m. is ‘‘not late e 2016See State v. Santos, 267 Conn. 495 , 508–509, 838 A.2d 981 (2004) (presence of individual in high crime area at night not sufficient to justify seizure), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Burroughs, 288 Conn. 836 , 844 n.5, 955 A.2d 43 (2008); State v. Hammond, 257 Conn. 610, 625 , 778 A.2d 108 (2001) (relying on United States v. Gray, 213 F.3d 998, 1001 [8th Cir. 2000], for proposition that standing on street in high crime area before 10 p.m. in cold weather insufficient to justify Terry stop); see also United States v. Blair, 524 F.3d 740, 751 (6th Cir. 2008) (10:30 p.m. is ‘‘not late e | 2 | 4 |
State v. Santosgreen2 sentences2016See State v. Santos, 267 Conn. 495 , 508–509, 838 A.2d 981 (2004) (presence of individual in high crime area at night not sufficient to justify seizure), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Burroughs, 288 Conn. 836 , 844 n.5, 955 A.2d 43 (2008); State v. Hammond, 257 Conn. 610, 625 , 778 A.2d 108 (2001) (relying on United States v. Gray, 213 F.3d 998, 1001 [8th Cir. 2000], for proposition that standing on street in high crime area before 10 p.m. in cold weather insufficient to justify Terry stop); see also United States v. Blair, 524 F.3d 740, 751 (6th Cir. 2008) (10:30 p.m. is ‘‘not late e 2016See State v. Santos, 267 Conn. 495 , 508–509, 838 A.2d 981 (2004) (presence of individual in high crime area at night not sufficient to justify seizure), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Burroughs, 288 Conn. 836 , 844 n.5, 955 A.2d 43 (2008); State v. Hammond, 257 Conn. 610, 625 , 778 A.2d 108 (2001) (relying on United States v. Gray, 213 F.3d 998, 1001 [8th Cir. 2000], for proposition that standing on street in high crime area before 10 p.m. in cold weather insufficient to justify Terry stop); see also United States v. Blair, 524 F.3d 740, 751 (6th Cir. 2008) (10:30 p.m. is ‘‘not late e | 2 | 3 |
State v. Burroughsgreen2 sentences2016See State v. Santos, 267 Conn. 495 , 508–509, 838 A.2d 981 (2004) (presence of individual in high crime area at night not sufficient to justify seizure), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Burroughs, 288 Conn. 836 , 844 n.5, 955 A.2d 43 (2008); State v. Hammond, 257 Conn. 610, 625 , 778 A.2d 108 (2001) (relying on United States v. Gray, 213 F.3d 998, 1001 [8th Cir. 2000], for proposition that standing on street in high crime area before 10 p.m. in cold weather insufficient to justify Terry stop); see also United States v. Blair, 524 F.3d 740, 751 (6th Cir. 2008) (10:30 p.m. is ‘‘not late e 2016See State v. Santos, 267 Conn. 495 , 508–509, 838 A.2d 981 (2004) (presence of individual in high crime area at night not sufficient to justify seizure), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Burroughs, 288 Conn. 836 , 844 n.5, 955 A.2d 43 (2008); State v. Hammond, 257 Conn. 610, 625 , 778 A.2d 108 (2001) (relying on United States v. Gray, 213 F.3d 998, 1001 [8th Cir. 2000], for proposition that standing on street in high crime area before 10 p.m. in cold weather insufficient to justify Terry stop); see also United States v. Blair, 524 F.3d 740, 751 (6th Cir. 2008) (10:30 p.m. is ‘‘not late e | 2 | 3 |
United States of America v. Eric Graygreen2 sentences2016See State v. Santos, 267 Conn. 495 , 508–509, 838 A.2d 981 (2004) (presence of individual in high crime area at night not sufficient to justify seizure), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Burroughs, 288 Conn. 836 , 844 n.5, 955 A.2d 43 (2008); State v. Hammond, 257 Conn. 610, 625 , 778 A.2d 108 (2001) (relying on United States v. Gray, 213 F.3d 998, 1001 [8th Cir. 2000], for proposition that standing on street in high crime area before 10 p.m. in cold weather insufficient to justify Terry stop); see also United States v. Blair, 524 F.3d 740, 751 (6th Cir. 2008) (10:30 p.m. is ‘‘not late e 2016See State v. Santos, 267 Conn. 495 , 508-509, 838 A.2d 981 (2004) (presence of individual in high crime area at night not sufficient to justify seizure), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Burroughs, 288 Conn. 836 , 844 n. 5, 955 A.2d 43 (2008) ; State v. Hammond, 257 Conn. 610 , 625, 778 A.2d 108 (2001) (relying on United States v. Gray, 213 F.3d 998 , 1001 [ (8th Cir.2000) ], for proposition that standing on street in high crime area before 10 p.m. in cold weather insufficient to justify Terry stop); see also United States v. Blair, 524 F.3d 740 , 751 (6th Cir.2008) (10:30 p.m. is "not l | 2 | 3 |
| Harris v. Crosby, Secretary, Florida Department of Correctionsgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Gray v. Woodford, Director, California Department of Correctionsgreen | 2 | 2 |
| United States v. Blairgreen | 2 | 2 |
| United States v. Sewn Newtongreen | 2 | 2 |
| Pinnock v. City of New Havengreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Donahuegreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Drurygreen | 2 | 2 |
Michigan v. Longgreen2 sentences1997See Michigan v. Long , 463 U.S. 1032 , 1049-52 and n. 16 (1983) (permitting vehicle "frisks," pursuant to an objective test for reasonableness, under the Terry doctrine. 1997See Michigan v. Long , 463 U.S. 1032 , 1049-52 and n. 16 (1983) (permitting vehicle "frisks," pursuant to an objective test for reasonableness, under the Terry doctrine. | 1 | 8 |
State v. Edwardsgreen2 sentences2010See State v. Wilkins, supra, 240 Conn. at 507 , 692 A.2d 1233 ("[a]rticle first, §§ 7 and 9, of our state constitution permit a police officer in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner to detain an individual for investigative purposes even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest" [emphasis added]); State v. Lamme, 216 Conn. 172, 184 , 579 A.2d 484 (1990) ("circumscribed nature" of Terry stop minimizes risk of due process violation under Connecticut constitution); State v. Edwards, 214 Conn. 57, 72 , 570 A.2d 193 (1990) ("[a] Terry stop that is justified at its ince 2010See State v. Wilkins, supra, 240 Conn. at 507 , 692 A.2d 1233 ("[a]rticle first, §§ 7 and 9, of our state constitution permit a police officer in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner to detain an individual for investigative purposes even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest" [emphasis added]); State v. Lamme, 216 Conn. 172, 184 , 579 A.2d 484 (1990) ("circumscribed nature" of Terry stop minimizes risk of due process violation under Connecticut constitution); State v. Edwards, 214 Conn. 57, 72 , 570 A.2d 193 (1990) ("[a] Terry stop that is justified at its ince | 1 | 7 |
State v. Dukesgreen2 sentences2016See also State v. Dukes, 209 Conn. 98, 122 [ 547 A.2d 10 ] (1988) ([a]ny intrusion upon an occupant’s personal liberty by asking the occupant to exit a vehicle during a motor vehicle infraction stop is de minimis because it serves to protect the officer).’’ (Citation omitted.) The defendant attempts to counter this logic by claim- ing that the trial court misapplied Mimms and Dukes because those cases are limited to stops for motor vehi- cle offenses committed by drivers and this was a Terry stop. 2016See also State v. Dukes, 209 Conn. 98, 122 [ 547 A.2d 10 ] (1988) ([a]ny intrusion upon an occupant’s personal liberty by asking the occupant to exit a vehicle during a motor vehicle infraction stop is de minimis because it serves to protect the officer).’’ (Citation omitted.) The defendant attempts to counter this logic by claim- ing that the trial court misapplied Mimms and Dukes because those cases are limited to stops for motor vehi- cle offenses committed by drivers and this was a Terry stop. | 1 | 5 |
State v. Cyrusgreen2 sentences2016It is well settled that a Terry stop is constitutionally permissible only if three conditions are met: ‘‘(1) the officer[s] must have a reasonable suspicion that a crime has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur; (2) the purpose of the stop must be reasonable; and (3) the scope and character of the detention must be reasonable when considered in light of its purpose.’’ State v. Cyrus, 297 Conn. 829, 837 , 1 A.3d 59 (2010); see also United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 , 417–18, 101 S. Ct. 690 , 66 L. 2016It is well settled that a Terry stop is constitutionally permissible only if three conditions are met: ‘‘(1) the officer[s] must have a reasonable suspicion that a crime has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur; (2) the purpose of the stop must be reasonable; and (3) the scope and character of the detention must be reasonable when considered in light of its purpose.’’ State v. Cyrus, 297 Conn. 829, 837 , 1 A.3d 59 (2010); see also United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 , 417–18, 101 S. Ct. 690 , 66 L. | 1 | 3 |
Florida v. Royergreen2 sentences2010See also State v. Lawrence, 282 Conn. 141, 177 , 920 A.2d 236 (2007) (state constitution requires "the state to prove the voluntariness of a confession by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than by proof beyond a reasonable doubt"). [41] In their dissents, neither Justice Katz nor Justice Palmer disputes our conclusion under Arizona v. Johnson, supra, 129 S.Ct. 781 , and Muehler v. Mena, supra, 544 U.S. 93 , 125 S.Ct. 1465 , "that recent federal precedent suggests that the permissibility of a consent search following a routine traffic stop is dictated by the duration of the stop." Justice 2010See also State v. Lawrence, 282 Conn. 141, 177 , 920 A.2d 236 (2007) (state constitution requires "the state to prove the voluntariness of a confession by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than by proof beyond a reasonable doubt"). [41] In their dissents, neither Justice Katz nor Justice Palmer disputes our conclusion under Arizona v. Johnson, supra, 129 S.Ct. 781 , and Muehler v. Mena, supra, 544 U.S. 93 , 125 S.Ct. 1465 , "that recent federal precedent suggests that the permissibility of a consent search following a routine traffic stop is dictated by the duration of the stop." Justice | 1 | 3 |
State v. Lizottegreen2 sentences2002United States v. Nargi, 732 F.2d 1102 , 1106 (2d Cir. 1984); State v. Wylie, 10 Conn. App. 683 , 687-88 , 525 A.2d 528 , cert. denied, 204 Conn. 807 , 528 A.2d 1154 (1987)." There is no hard and fast rule concerning the display of weapons in investigative stops, it depends on the crime under suspicion and the degree of suspicion as well as other factors. 1997See State v. Wylie, 10 Conn. App. 683, 687-88 , 525 A.2d 528 , cert. denied, 204 Conn. 807 , 528 A.2d 1154 (1987) (mere fact that officers removed defendant and other suspects from vehicle at gunpoint does not automatically convert Terry stop into arrest); State v. Holloman, 20 Conn. App. 521, 526 , 568 A.2d 1052 , cert. denied, 214 Conn. 805 , 573 A.2d 317 (1990) (permissible in course of Terry stop for officers to have revolvers drawn when ordering occupants out of car where report of occupants involved in armed robbery in which handgun stolen); State v. Williams, 157 Conn. 114, 118 , 249 A. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Robinsongreen2 sentences2002United States v. Nargi, 732 F.2d 1102 , 1106 (2d Cir. 1984); State v. Wylie, 10 Conn. App. 683 , 687-88 , 525 A.2d 528 , cert. denied, 204 Conn. 807 , 528 A.2d 1154 (1987)." There is no hard and fast rule concerning the display of weapons in investigative stops, it depends on the crime under suspicion and the degree of suspicion as well as other factors. 1997See State v. Wylie, 10 Conn. App. 683, 687-88 , 525 A.2d 528 , cert. denied, 204 Conn. 807 , 528 A.2d 1154 (1987) (mere fact that officers removed defendant and other suspects from vehicle at gunpoint does not automatically convert Terry stop into arrest); State v. Holloman, 20 Conn. App. 521, 526 , 568 A.2d 1052 , cert. denied, 214 Conn. 805 , 573 A.2d 317 (1990) (permissible in course of Terry stop for officers to have revolvers drawn when ordering occupants out of car where report of occupants involved in armed robbery in which handgun stolen); State v. Williams, 157 Conn. 114, 118 , 249 A. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Wyliegreen2 sentences1997See State v. Wylie, 10 Conn. App. 683, 687-88 , 525 A.2d 528 , cert. denied, 204 Conn. 807 , 528 A.2d 1154 (1987) (mere fact that officers removed defendant and other suspects from vehicle at gunpoint does not automatically convert Terry stop into arrest); State v. Holloman, 20 Conn. App. 521, 526 , 568 A.2d 1052 , cert. denied, 214 Conn. 805 , 573 A.2d 317 (1990) (permissible in course of Terry stop for officers to have revolvers drawn when ordering occupants out of car where report of occupants involved in armed robbery in which handgun stolen); State v. Williams, 157 Conn. 114, 118 , 249 A. 1997See State v. Wylie, 10 Conn. App. 683, 687-88 , 525 A.2d 528 , cert. denied, 204 Conn. 807 , 528 A.2d 1154 (1987) (mere fact that officers removed defendant and other suspects from vehicle at gunpoint does not automatically convert Terry stop into arrest); State v. Holloman, 20 Conn. App. 521, 526 , 568 A.2d 1052 , cert. denied, 214 Conn. 805 , 573 A.2d 317 (1990) (permissible in course of Terry stop for officers to have revolvers drawn when ordering occupants out of car where report of occupants involved in armed robbery in which handgun stolen); State v. Williams, 157 Conn. 114, 118 , 249 A. | 1 | 3 |
| Arizona v. Johnsongreen | 1 | 2 |
| Commonwealth v. Helmegreen | 1 | 2 |
| In re Jeremy P.green | 1 | 2 |
| Giglio v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Curto v. Cornell University College of Veterinary Medicinegreen | 1 | 2 |
| United States v. Maddoxgreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Colvingreen | 1 | 2 |
| United States v. Paul Nargigreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Torresgreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Grahamgreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Williamsgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Traylor v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Hargergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Braxton
green
2 sentences1997State v. Braxton, 196 Conn. 685, 689 , 495 A.2d 273 (1985). 1997State v. Braxton, 196 Conn. 685, 689 , 495 A.2d 273 (1985). | 7 | 1988–1997 |
State v. Mitchell
green
2 sentences1997Ed. 2d 604 (1985) (if police have reasonable suspicion grounded in specific and articulable facts that person encountered involved in or wanted in connection with completed felony, then Terry stop permitted to investigate suspicion); State v. Mitchell, 204 Conn. 187, 195-96 , 527 A.2d 1168 , cert denied, 484 U.S. 927 , 108 S. Ct. 293 , 98 L. 1997Ed. 2d 604 (1985) (if police have reasonable suspicion grounded in specific and articulable facts that person encountered involved in or wanted in connection with completed felony, then Terry stop permitted to investigate suspicion); State v. Mitchell, 204 Conn. 187, 195-96 , 527 A.2d 1168 , cert denied, 484 U.S. 927 , 108 S. Ct. 293 , 98 L. | 5 | 1988–2010 |
Illinois v. Wardlow
green
2 sentences2006With respect to the trial court’s reliance on testimony that a stop took place around dusk in a high crime area and that a crowd gathered during the stop, the United States Supreme Court has “noted the fact that the stop occurred in a ‘high crime area’ among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 , 120 S. Ct. 673 , 145 L. 2006With respect to the trial court’s reliance on testimony that a stop took place around dusk in a high crime area and that a crowd gathered during the stop, the United States Supreme Court has “noted the fact that the stop occurred in a ‘high crime area’ among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 , 120 S. Ct. 673 , 145 L. | 4 | 2001–2016 |
Dunster v. Metropolitan Dade County
green
2 sentences1997Ed. 2d 604 (1985) (if police have reasonable suspicion grounded in specific and articulable facts that person encountered involved in or wanted in connection with completed felony, then Terry stop permitted to investigate suspicion); State v. Mitchell, 204 Conn. 187, 195-96 , 527 A.2d 1168 , cert denied, 484 U.S. 927 , 108 S. Ct. 293 , 98 L. 1997“A Terry stop that is justified at its inception can become constitutionally infirm if it lasts longer or becomes more intrusive than necessary to complete the investigation for which that stop was made.” State v. Mitchell, 204 Conn. 187, 197 , 527 A.2d 1168 , cert. denied, 484 U.S. 927 , 108 S. Ct. 293 , 98 L. | 4 | 1988–1997 |
Adolf v. Wichita Falls General Hospital
green
2 sentences1997Ed. 2d 604 (1985) (if police have reasonable suspicion grounded in specific and articulable facts that person encountered involved in or wanted in connection with completed felony, then Terry stop permitted to investigate suspicion); State v. Mitchell, 204 Conn. 187, 195-96 , 527 A.2d 1168 , cert denied, 484 U.S. 927 , 108 S. Ct. 293 , 98 L. 1997“A Terry stop that is justified at its inception can become constitutionally infirm if it lasts longer or becomes more intrusive than necessary to complete the investigation for which that stop was made.” State v. Mitchell, 204 Conn. 187, 197 , 527 A.2d 1168 , cert. denied, 484 U.S. 927 , 108 S. Ct. 293 , 98 L. | 4 | 1988–1997 |
State v. Trine
green
2 sentences2006Ed. 2d 244 (1969).” (Citations omitted.) State v. Trine, 236 Conn. 216, 223-24 , 673 A.2d 1098 (1996); see also id., 245 (Berdon, J., dissenting) (“Simply because a Terry stop is permitted, however, does not necessarily mean that there is a justification for a patdown. 2006Ed. 2d 244 (1969).” (Citations omitted.) State v. Trine, 236 Conn. 216, 223-24 , 673 A.2d 1098 (1996); see also id., 245 (Berdon, J., dissenting) (“Simply because a Terry stop is permitted, however, does not necessarily mean that there is a justification for a patdown. | 3 | 1997–2006 |
Brown v. Texas
green
2 sentences2004When considering the impact of a defendant’s presence in a high crime area as afactor in a Terry stop analysis, this court previously has relied on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 , 99 S. Ct. 2637 , 61 L. 2004When considering the impact of a defendant’s presence in a high crime area as afactor in a Terry stop analysis, this court previously has relied on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 , 99 S. Ct. 2637 , 61 L. | 3 | 1991–2004 |
State v. Cofield
green
2 sentences1998Our Supreme Court has also recognized the pervasive societal interest in the apprehension and punishment of drunken drivers and has found that ‘balancing the circumscribed nature of a Terry stop intrusion against the serious risks of criminal behavior, especially in the context of the risks associated with driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor . . . [brief detention] does not violate due process.’ State v. Lamme, supra [184], “In justifying the intrusion, ‘the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inference 1998Our Supreme Court has also recognized the pervasive societal interest in the apprehension and punishment of drunken drivers and has found that ‘balancing the circumscribed nature of a Terry stop intrusion against the serious risks of criminal behavior, especially in the context of the risks associated with driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor . . . [brief detention] does not violate due process.’ State v. Lamme, supra [184], “In justifying the intrusion, ‘the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inference | 3 | 1993–1998 |
State v. Whitfield
green
2 sentences1998Our Supreme Court has also recognized the pervasive societal interest in the apprehension and punishment of drunken drivers and has found that ‘balancing the circumscribed nature of a Terry stop intrusion against the serious risks of criminal behavior, especially in the context of the risks associated with driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor . . . [brief detention] does not violate due process.’ State v. Lamme, supra [184], “In justifying the intrusion, ‘the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inference 1998Our Supreme Court has also recognized the pervasive societal interest in the apprehension and punishment of drunken drivers and has found that ‘balancing the circumscribed nature of a Terry stop intrusion against the serious risks of criminal behavior, especially in the context of the risks associated with driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor . . . [brief detention] does not violate due process.’ State v. Lamme, supra [184], “In justifying the intrusion, ‘the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inference | 3 | 1993–1998 |
McArdle v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.
green
2 sentences1997Ed. 2d 604 (1985) (if police have reasonable suspicion grounded in specific and articulable facts that person encountered involved in or wanted in connection with completed felony, then Terry stop permitted to investigate suspicion); State v. Mitchell, 204 Conn. 187, 195-96 , 527 A.2d 1168 , cert denied, 484 U.S. 927 , 108 S. Ct. 293 , 98 L. 1997“A Terry stop that is justified at its inception can become constitutionally infirm if it lasts longer or becomes more intrusive than necessary to complete the investigation for which that stop was made.” State v. Mitchell, 204 Conn. 187, 197 , 527 A.2d 1168 , cert. denied, 484 U.S. 927 , 108 S. Ct. 293 , 98 L. | 3 | 1995–1997 |
| New York v. Quarles green | 2 | 1990–2016 |
| State v. Betances green | 2 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Milotte green | 2 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Hicks green | 2 | 2016–2016 |
| People v. Bower green | 2 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Milotte green | 2 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Sparr green | 2 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Cyrus green | 2 | 2009–2010 |
| State v. Bolanos green | 2 | 2001–2007 |
| State v. Oquendo green | 2 | 2004–2006 |
| State v. Harrison green | 2 | 1998–2001 |
| State v. Holloman green | 2 | 1995–1997 |
| Burchett v. Kiefer green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Bailey v. United States green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| United States v. Jennings green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Florida v. JL green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Bishop green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Prado Navarette v. California green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Lewis green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| United States v. Shawn Lowe green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Aloi green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Sabato green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Johnson green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Virginia Department of State Police v. Washington Post green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Benton green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.