Terry stop in Tennessee

2015Id. (citing State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tenn. 1992) (which applies the Terry doctrine to a vehicular stop)).

2015Id. (citing State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tenn. 1992) (which applies the Terry doctrine to a vehicular stop)).

2025State v. Berrios, 235 S.W.3d 99, 104 (Tenn. 2007).

2018State v. Berrios, 235 S.W.3d 99, 104 (Tenn. 2007).

2021Id. at 439-40 & n.29 (noting that a traffic stop supported by probable cause may exceed the scope of a Terry stop) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).

2010The second is known as a “Terry stop.” See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

2025Furthermore, we note that the complainant advised that the suspect was armed and had recently been “trying to shoot someone” and that “[t]he gravity of the perceived harm is a crucial element in addressing the reasonableness of an investigative Terry stop.” Pulley, 863 S.W.2d at 33 .

2008An officer’s reasonable suspicion must be supported by “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ; see also Pulley, 863 S.W.2d at 30 ; Coleman, 791 S.W.2d at 505 ; State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tenn.1992) (applying the Terry doctrine in context of vehicular stop).

2018Therefore, “[t]rial courts must examine the totality of the - 15 - circumstances when evaluating whether an officer has established the requisite level of suspicion to justify a Terry stop.” Moats, 403 S.W.3d at 178-79 (citing Binette, 33 S.W.3d at 218 ).

2018Those circumstances include “an officer’s observations, information from other law enforcement personnel or agencies, information for citizens, known patterns of criminal offenders, or deductions based upon experience.” Id. at 179 (citing State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tenn. 1992)).

2019State v. Cox, 171 S.W.3d 174, 179 (Tenn. 2005).

2016Id. (citing State v. Berrios, *185 235 S.W.3d 99, 104 (Tenn. 2007); State v. Cox, 171 S.W.3d 174, 179 (Tenn. 2005)).

2015Based on these facts, the court concluded that the officer “did not have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was occurring, and the Terry stop was therefore improper.” Id.

2013Id. at 315 (Gilman, J., concurring) (second alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

2015Id. (citing State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tenn. 1992) (which applies the Terry doctrine to a vehicular stop)).

2015Id. (citing State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tenn. 1992) (which applies the Terry doctrine to a vehicular stop)).

2013Put another way, “probable cause means a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found and the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than that for probable cause.” State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 632 (Tenn. 1997) (internal quotations and emphasis omitted).

2011Put another way, “probable cause means a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found and the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than that for probable cause.” State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 632 (Tenn. 1997) (internal quotations and emphasis omitted).

2021Id. at 439-40 & n.29 (noting that a traffic stop supported by probable cause may exceed the scope of a Terry stop) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).

2006See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 , 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3150 (1984) (“[T]he usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ . . . than to a formal arrest.”).

1996In Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 , 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that “[t]he officer [making a Terry stop] ... must be able to articulate something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” In accordance with this principle, the court of appeals of this state has observed that, “[ejvery vehicle that enters a ‘high crime area’ is not fair game to inquisitive officers.... ” Williams v. State Dept. of Safety, 854 S.W.2d 102, 106 (Tenn.App.1992), perm, to appeal denied, (Tenn.1993).

1996In Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 , 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that “[t]he officer [making a Terry stop] ... must be able to articulate something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” In accordance with this principle, the court of appeals of this state has observed that, “[ejvery vehicle that enters a ‘high crime area’ is not fair game to inquisitive officers.... ” Williams v. State Dept. of Safety, 854 S.W.2d 102, 106 (Tenn.App.1992), perm, to appeal denied, (Tenn.1993).

2012Second, the Court declined to adopt a “firearm exception” to the Terry standard, an argument advanced by the prosecution, which would have justified a stop and frisk based on “a tip alleging an illegal gun ... even if the accusation would fail standard pre-search reliability testing.” Id. (emphasis added).

2012Second, the Court declined to adopt a “firearm exception” to the Terry standard, an argument advanced by the prosecution, which would have justified a stop and frisk based on “a tip alleging an illegal gun ... even if the accusation would fail standard pre-search reliability testing.” Id. (emphasis added).

2003Probable cause means “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found and the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than that for probable cause.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1989).

1997It is well-settled that "the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than that for probable cause.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7-8 , 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989).

2012Conn. 2005) (Suspect not under arrest where officer handcuffed her and led her to police vehicle for security while awaiting backup); Bolden v. State, 278 Ga. 459 , 462 n.3 (2004) (Defendant transported to police station in handcuffs as safety measure was not under arrest); State v. Walsh, 495 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Minn. 1993) (Suspect, although handcuffed, was not under arrest); Turner v. State, 252 S.W.3d 571, 580 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008) (Defendant was not under arrest where officer told defendant before putting him in the vehicle he was going to handcuff him, for officer safety and not because he w

2012See United States v. Miller, 974 F.2d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1992) (“Numerous cases have held that a police officer’s use of handcuffs can be a reasonable precaution during a Terry stop.”); United States v. Hastamorir, 881 F.2d 1551, 1557 (11th Cir. 1989) (“The handcuffing of Hastamorir constituted a Terry stop, and was a reasonable action designed to provide for the safety of the agents”); United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1236 (9 th Cir. 1981) (Handcuffing a suspect does not necessarily dictate a finding of custody; strong but reasonable measures to insure the safety of the officers or the

2012See United States v. Miller, 974 F.2d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1992) (“Numerous cases have held that a police officer’s use of handcuffs can be a reasonable precaution during a Terry stop.”); United States v. Hastamorir, 881 F.2d 1551, 1557 (11th Cir. 1989) (“The handcuffing of Hastamorir constituted a Terry stop, and was a reasonable action designed to provide for the safety of the agents”); United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1236 (9 th Cir. 1981) (Handcuffing a suspect does not necessarily dictate a finding of custody; strong but reasonable measures to insure the safety of the officers or the

2012See United States v. Miller, 974 F.2d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1992) (“Numerous cases have held that a police officer’s use of handcuffs can be a reasonable precaution during a Terry stop.”); United States v. Hastamorir, 881 F.2d 1551, 1557 (11th Cir. 1989) (“The handcuffing of Hastamorir constituted a Terry stop, and was a reasonable action designed to provide for the safety of the agents”); United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1236 (9 th Cir. 1981) (Handcuffing a suspect does not necessarily dictate a finding of custody; strong but reasonable measures to insure the safety of the officers or the

2012See United States v. Miller, 974 F.2d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1992) (“Numerous cases have held that a police officer’s use of handcuffs can be a reasonable precaution during a Terry stop.”); United States v. Hastamorir, 881 F.2d 1551, 1557 (11th Cir. 1989) (“The handcuffing of Hastamorir constituted a Terry stop, and was a reasonable action designed to provide for the safety of the agents”); United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1236 (9 th Cir. 1981) (Handcuffing a suspect does not necessarily dictate a finding of custody; strong but reasonable measures to insure the safety of the officers or the

2012See United States v. Miller, 974 F.2d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1992) (“Numerous cases have held that a police officer’s use of handcuffs can be a reasonable precaution during a Terry stop.”); United States v. Hastamorir, 881 F.2d 1551, 1557 (11th Cir. 1989) (“The handcuffing of Hastamorir constituted a Terry stop, and was a reasonable action designed to provide for the safety of the agents”); United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1236 (9 th Cir. 1981) (Handcuffing a suspect does not necessarily dictate a finding of custody; strong but reasonable measures to insure the safety of the officers or the

2012See United States v. Miller, 974 F.2d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1992) (“Numerous cases have held that a police officer’s use of handcuffs can be a reasonable precaution during a Terry stop.”); United States v. Hastamorir, 881 F.2d 1551, 1557 (11th Cir. 1989) (“The handcuffing of Hastamorir constituted a Terry stop, and was a reasonable action designed to provide for the safety of the agents”); United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1236 (9 th Cir. 1981) (Handcuffing a suspect does not necessarily dictate a finding of custody; strong but reasonable measures to insure the safety of the officers or the

2012Conn. 2005) (Suspect not under arrest where officer handcuffed her and led her to police vehicle for security while awaiting backup); Bolden v. State, 278 Ga. 459 , 462 n.3 (2004) (Defendant transported to police station in handcuffs as safety measure was not under arrest); State v. Walsh, 495 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Minn. 1993) (Suspect, although handcuffed, was not under arrest); Turner v. State, 252 S.W.3d 571, 580 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008) (Defendant was not under arrest where officer told defendant before putting him in the vehicle he was going to handcuff him, for officer safety and not because he w

2012See United States v. Miller, 974 F.2d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1992) (“Numerous cases have held that a police officer’s use of handcuffs can be a reasonable precaution during a Terry stop.”); United States v. Hastamorir, 881 F.2d 1551, 1557 (11th Cir. 1989) (“The handcuffing of Hastamorir constituted a Terry stop, and was a reasonable action designed to provide for the safety of the agents”); United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1236 (9 th Cir. 1981) (Handcuffing a suspect does not necessarily dictate a finding of custody; strong but reasonable measures to insure the safety of the officers or the

2012See United States v. Miller, 974 F.2d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1992) (“Numerous cases have held that a police officer’s use of handcuffs can be a reasonable precaution during a Terry stop.”); United States v. Hastamorir, 881 F.2d 1551, 1557 (11th Cir. 1989) (“The handcuffing of Hastamorir constituted a Terry stop, and was a reasonable action designed to provide for the safety of the agents”); United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1236 (9 th Cir. 1981) (Handcuffing a suspect does not necessarily dictate a finding of custody; strong but reasonable measures to insure the safety of the officers or the

2010See State v. Lawson, 929 S.W.2d 406, 408 (Tenn. Crim.

2008See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 , 88 S. Ct. at 1880 ; State v. Keith, 978 S.W.2d 861, 865 (Tenn. 1998).