Terry stop in Pennsylvania

2026We begin with a discussion of the three types of police-citizen interactions: The law recognizes three distinct levels of interaction between police officers and citizens: (1) a mere encounter; (2) an investigative detention, often described as a Terry stop, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 [](1968); and (3) a custodial detention. ____________________________________________ 3 We note that while J.W.’s statement of the question involved indicates he is challenging both the lack of reasonable suspicion to support his detention as well as the lack of probable cause to support his arrest, the argume

2026We begin with a discussion of the three types of police-citizen interactions: -6- J-E02005-25 The law recognizes three distinct levels of interaction between police officers and citizens: (1) a mere encounter; (2) an investigative detention, often described as a Terry stop, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 [](1968); and (3) a custodial detention.

2025Id.9 9 “Following [Wardlow],” this Court has explained, “it is evident that unprovoked flight in a high crime area is sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop under the Fourth Amendment.” D.M., 781 A.2d at 1164 .

2025I respectfully disagree, however, that (1) Nolan fled, unprovoked, from Officer McCauley and (2) that Officer McCauley possessed reasonable suspicion to stop and detain Nolan when the officer shouted “come here!” While our Supreme Court has held “that unprovoked flight in a high crime area is sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop under the -5- J-A10023-25 Fourth Amendment[,]” In re D.M., 781 A.2d 1161, 1164 (Pa. 2001), my review of the bodycam footage clearly shows that Nolan’s flight did not occur until Officer McCauley issued that command.

2026The Jackson Court held that “a Terry stop may be made on the basis of an anonymous tip, provided the tip is sufficiently corroborated by independent police work to give rise to a reasonable belief that the tip was correct.” Id.

2025See White, 496 U.S. at 332 (holding that under totality of circumstances, anonymous caller’s tip predicting future behavior “demonstrated inside information” and “special familiarity with [White’s] affairs,” as corroborated by police, was reliable enough to presume that caller was correct about other allegations); Jackson, 698 A.2d at 573–75 (holding that “a Terry stop may be made on the basis of an anonymous tip, provided the tip is sufficiently corroborated by independent police work to give rise to a reasonable belief that the tip was correct”).

2025Some officers tend to intone the mantra “high-crime area” simply as a matter of routine, seemingly motivated by the knowledge that the term has occasionally “tip[ped] the scales toward reasonable suspicion[.]” Jackson, 302 A.3d at 762 (opinion in support of reversal) (Donohue, J.); compare Cook, 735 A.2d at 677 (“flight alone does not constitute reasonable suspicion”) (citation omitted), with In re D.M., 781 A.2d at 1164 (“unprovoked flight in a high crime area is sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop”); see LaFave, supra, §9.5(g) (“[I]t is quite common in a varie

2021The Terry stop reasonable suspicion standard is “less stringent than probable cause.” Commonwealth v. Cook, 558 Pa. 50, 57 , 735 A.2d 673, 676 (1999).

2021See Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 116 (Pa. Super. 2005).

2012"To determine if an interaction rises to the level of an investigative detention, i.e., a Terry stop, the court must examine all the circumstances and determine whether police action would have made a reasonable person believe he was not free to go and was subject to the officer's orders." Jones, supra .

2025Dismissing that concern, the Wardlow Court declared: “In allowing such detentions, Terry accepts the risk that officers may stop innocent people.”42 Innocent people may 37 Id. at 125 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983)). 38 Id. (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991)). 39 Id. 40 Id. 41 Id. 42 Id. at 126. [J-5-2025] [MO: Dougherty, J.] - 9 also be arrested at times, the Wardlow Court stated, and a “Terry stop is a far more minimal intrusion.”43 This analysis did not satisfy Justice Stevens, who dissented in part in Wardlow, finding that the suspect’s flight in a hig

2024First, no objective standards exist for courts to apply when deciding whether an area warrants the designation, nor are there any burdens of proof or persuasion that 78 See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144 (1972) (noting that the fact that a traffic stop occurred in a high-crime area was a relevant contextual consideration in a Terry analysis). 79 See, e.g., D.M., 781 A.2d at 1164 (holding that unprovoked flight in a high-crime area was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion); Commonwealth v. Thompson, 985 A.2d 928, 936 (Pa. 2009) (considering the constitutionality of an arrest of an

2026We recognized that [in] Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 , 120 S.Ct. 673 , 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000), the United States Supreme Court held that although mere presence in a high crime area is insufficient to support a Terry stop, the additional factor of unprovoked flight was indeed relevant.

2026We recognized that [in] Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 , 120 S.Ct. 673 , 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000), the United States Supreme Court held that although mere presence in a high crime area is insufficient to support a Terry stop, the additional factor of unprovoked flight was indeed relevant.

2026An “investigative detention” is interchangeably labeled as a “stop and frisk” or a “Terry stop.”5 Commonwealth v. Brame, 239 A.3d 1119 (Pa.Super. 2020), appeal denied, 666 Pa. 240 , 251 A.3d 771 (2021).

2025An “investigative detention” is interchangeably labeled as a “stop and frisk” or a “Terry stop.”4 Commonwealth v. Brame, 239 A.3d 1119 (Pa.Super. 2020), appeal denied, 666 Pa. 240 , 251 A.3d 771 (2021).

2005Commonwealth v. Phinn, 761 A.2d 176, 181 (Pa.Super.2000) (citation omitted). ¶ 10 Presently, the Commonwealth argues that the stopping of Appellee was an investigative detention, otherwise known as a “Terry stop.” Our Supreme Court summarized an appellate court’s duty in reviewing the propriety of a Terry stop in Commonwealth v. Zhahir, 561 Pa. 545 , 751 A.2d 1153 (2000), as follows: [An appellate court’s] inquiry is a dual one — whether the officer[’s] action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in

2005Commonwealth v. Phinn, 761 A.2d 176, 181 (Pa.Super.2000) (citation omitted). ¶ 10 Presently, the Commonwealth argues that the stopping of Appellee was an investigative detention, otherwise known as a “Terry stop.” Our Supreme Court summarized an appellate court’s duty in reviewing the propriety of a Terry stop in Commonwealth v. Zhahir, 561 Pa. 545 , 751 A.2d 1153 (2000), as follows: [An appellate court’s] inquiry is a dual one — whether the officer[’s] action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in

2023As this Court explained, a “Terry stop” is “[a]n investigative detention [that] occurs when a police officer temporarily detains an individual by means of physical force or a show of authority for investigative purposes.” Commonwealth v. Barber, 889 A.2d 587 , 592 (Pa. Super. 2005) (emphasis added).

2023As this Court explained, a “Terry stop” is “[a]n investigative detention [that] occurs when a police officer temporarily detains an individual by means of physical force or a show of authority for investigative purposes.” Commonwealth v. Barber, 889 A.2d 587, 592 (Pa. Super. 2005) (emphasis added).

2021See Commonwealth v. Jones, 378 A.2d 835 (Pa. 1977) (“While we do not approve of the use of excessive restraints upon a person subjected to investigative detentions, we note that every Terry stop involves both a stop and a period of detention during which the suspect is not free to leave but is subject to the control of the police officer.”).

2009See also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 474 Pa. 364, 372-73 , 378 A.2d 835 , 840 (1977) (force constituting initiation of a Terry stop); Haggart v. Cho, 703 A.2d 522, 528 (Pa.Super. 1997) (exercise of diligence in ascertaining grounds for tort claim); Commonwealth v. Yedinak, 450 Pa.Super. 352 , 676 A.2d 1217, 1220 (1996) (scope of suspect's consent under Fourth Amendment); Ellis v. Chicago Bridge & Iron, Co., 376 Pa.Super. 220 , 545 A.2d 906, 911 (1988) (duty to warn); Berman v. Radnor Rolls, Inc., 374 Pa.Super. 118 , 542 A.2d 525, 532 (1988) (duty of care to a business invitee). 8 .

2025See Chase, 960 A.2d at 117, 120-21 ; see also Hicks, 208 A.3d at 940 (“the Terry doctrine unequivocally requires something suggestive of criminal activity before an investigative detention may occur”) (emphasis omitted).

2025See Chase, 960 A.2d at 117, 120-21 ; see also Hicks, 208 A.3d at 940 (“the Terry doctrine unequivocally requires something suggestive of criminal activity before an investigative detention may occur”) (emphasis omitted).

2026See also Commonwealth v. Rosas, 875 A.2d 341, 348 (Pa.Super. 2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Guillespie, 745 A.2d 654 , 660–661 (Pa.Super. 2000) (act of handcuffing suspects during an investigatory detention “was merely part and parcel of ensuring the safe detaining of the individuals during the lawful Terry stop” and did not constitute an arrest).

2025Thus, we are constrained to conclude that the officer’s search of Appellant’s pocket “was not reasonably limited in scope to the ____________________________________________ an investigative detention”); Commonwealth v. Rosas, 875 A.2d 341 , 347– 48 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal denied, 897 A.2d 455 (Pa. 2006) (same); Commonwealth v. Guillespie, 745 A.2d 654, 660-61 (Pa. Super. 2000) (handcuffing suspect “was merely part and parcel of ensuring the safe detaining of individuals during the lawful Terry stop” and did not constitute an arrest). - 15 - J-S28005-24 accomplishment of the only goal which

2017The Matos court elaborated: In [Commonwealth v. Hicks, 434 Pa. 153 , 253 A.2d 276 (1969)], this Court *363 adopted the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 , [ ] (1968), which permits a police officer to effect a precautionary seizure where the police have a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, Terry , and by analogy Hicks , recognized that there are some instances in which an individual may not be arrested, but will still be considered to be “seized.” In Jones , this Court adopted an objective standard[ 8 ] for d

2017The Matos court elaborated: In [Commonwealth v. Hicks, 434 Pa. 153 , 253 A.2d 276 (1969)], this Court *363 adopted the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 , [ ] (1968), which permits a police officer to effect a precautionary seizure where the police have a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, Terry , and by analogy Hicks , recognized that there are some instances in which an individual may not be arrested, but will still be considered to be “seized.” In Jones , this Court adopted an objective standard[ 8 ] for d

2026Conversely, we reject as inapposite Appellant’s reliance on Hicks, supra. As noted, in that case, we held that the Terry stop, based solely on law enforcement’s knowledge of a firearm concealed on the defendant’s person, was unlawful.

2025See Chase, 960 A.2d at 117, 120-21 ; see also Hicks, 208 A.3d at 940 (“the Terry doctrine unequivocally requires something suggestive of criminal activity before an investigative detention may occur”) (emphasis omitted).

2026See also Commonwealth v. Rosas, 875 A.2d 341, 348 (Pa.Super. 2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Guillespie, 745 A.2d 654 , 660–661 (Pa.Super. 2000) (act of handcuffing suspects during an investigatory detention “was merely part and parcel of ensuring the safe detaining of the individuals during the lawful Terry stop” and did not constitute an arrest).

2025Thus, we are constrained to conclude that the officer’s search of Appellant’s pocket “was not reasonably limited in scope to the ____________________________________________ an investigative detention”); Commonwealth v. Rosas, 875 A.2d 341 , 347– 48 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal denied, 897 A.2d 455 (Pa. 2006) (same); Commonwealth v. Guillespie, 745 A.2d 654, 660-61 (Pa. Super. 2000) (handcuffing suspect “was merely part and parcel of ensuring the safe detaining of individuals during the lawful Terry stop” and did not constitute an arrest). - 15 - J-S28005-24 accomplishment of the only goal which

2025Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the 24 Id. at 417-18 (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975)). 25 Id. at 418. 26 Id. 27 Id. 28 Id. [J-5-2025] [MO: Dougherty, J.] - 6 Court in Terry v. Ohio, supra, said that, “[t]his demand for specificity in the information upon which police action is predicated is the central teaching of this Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.”29 As the “central teaching” of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the need for “particularized” and “individualized” suspicion of wrongdoing has, unsurprisingly, be

2025Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the 24 Id. at 417-18 (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975)). 25 Id. at 418. 26 Id. 27 Id. 28 Id. [J-5-2025] [MO: Dougherty, J.] - 6 Court in Terry v. Ohio, supra, said that, “[t]his demand for specificity in the information upon which police action is predicated is the central teaching of this Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.”29 As the “central teaching” of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the need for “particularized” and “individualized” suspicion of wrongdoing has, unsurprisingly, be

2019Such a "limited search" is commonly referred to as an investigatory detention or a Terry stop. -4 J -A14021-19 For an investigatory detention to be legal under Terry, the officer's reasonable suspicion of criminal activity must be supported by specific and articulable observations "of suspicious or irregular behavior on behalf of the particular [individual] stopped." Commonwealth v. Martinez, 588 A.2d 513, 515 (Pa. Super. 1991) (citations omitted).

1999Commonwealth v. Days, 718 A.2d 797, 801 (Pa.Super.1998), quoting Commonwealth v. Marinelli, 547 Pa. 294, 315-316 , 690 A.2d 203, 214 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1024 , 118 S.Ct. 1309 , 140 L.Ed.2d 473 (1998) (citation omitted). ¶ 4 We review the facts of this case to determine whether police had reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop pursuant to Commonwealth v. Hicks, 434 Pa. 153 , 253 A.2d 276 (1969), and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). ¶ 5 “It is well-established that a police officer, relying on specific and artic-ulable facts which, if taken together w

2020The Commonwealth maintained “that the per se approach of Robinson is a justifiable application of the Terry doctrine,” and it emphasized that, “under the totality of the circumstances, ‘wholly lawful conduct might justify the suspicion that criminal activity [is] afoot.’” Id. at 928–29 (quoting Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980)). - 31 - J-A13005-20 After a thorough review of 4th Amendment case law from this and other jurisdictions, the Hicks Court found “no justification for the notion that a police officer may infer criminal activity merely from an individual’s possession of a conceal

2020The Commonwealth maintained “that the per se approach of Robinson is a justifiable application of the Terry doctrine,” and it emphasized that, “under the totality of the circumstances, ‘wholly lawful conduct might justify the suspicion that criminal activity [is] afoot.’” Id. at 928–29 (quoting Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980)). - 31 - J-A13005-20 After a thorough review of 4th Amendment case law from this and other jurisdictions, the Hicks Court found “no justification for the notion that a police officer may infer criminal activity merely from an individual’s possession of a conceal

2025See White, 496 U.S. at 332 (holding that under totality of circumstances, anonymous caller’s tip predicting future behavior “demonstrated inside information” and “special familiarity with [White’s] affairs,” as corroborated by police, was reliable enough to presume that caller was correct about other allegations); Jackson, 698 A.2d at 573–75 (holding that “a Terry stop may be made on the basis of an anonymous tip, provided the tip is sufficiently corroborated by independent police work to give rise to a reasonable belief that the tip was correct”).

2021See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 548 Pa. 484, 490 , 698 A.2d 571, 574 (1997) (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990) (emphasizing that even an anonymous tip can justify a Terry stop “provided the tip is sufficiently corroborated by independent police work to give rise to a reasonable belief that the tip was correct”); White, 496 U.S. at - 18 - J-A16036-21 332, 110 S.Ct. at 2417 (finding anonymous tip reliable when the suspect matched the tip’s description of the alleged criminal, left her house at a predicted time in a vehicle matching the tip’s description

2026This Court has reiterated that reasonable suspicion exists where a police officer observes a defendant’s unprovoked flight in a high-crime area: In [Commonwealth v.] Jefferson[, 853 A.2d 404 (Pa.Super. 2004)], this Court addressed whether the observation of the appellant in a high crime area and his flight from police combine to establish the familiar Terry standard of reasonable suspicion.

2026This Court has reiterated that reasonable suspicion exists where a police officer observes a defendant’s unprovoked flight in a high-crime area: In [Commonwealth v.] Jefferson[, 853 A.2d 404 (Pa.Super. 2004)], this Court addressed whether the observation of the appellant in a high crime area and his flight from police combine to establish the familiar Terry standard of reasonable suspicion.

2022See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (U.S. 1984) (explaining that “the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ . . . than to a formal arrest,” and the questions posed are investigative rather than custodial, which does not trigger Miranda protections); Malloy, 257 A.3d at 150 ; Chase, 960 A.2d at 117 .

2021Ed. 2d 492 (2015), the Supreme Court discussed the permissible scope of an officer’s investigation during a traffic stop: A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that violation. “[A] relatively brief encounter,” a routine traffic stop is “more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ ... than to a formal arrest.” Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 , 119 S.Ct. 484 , 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984), in turn citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).

2016See Com. v. Hawkins, 692 A.2d 1068, 1070-71 (Pa. 1997). (“[S]ince there is no gun exception to the Terry requirement for reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, in the typical anonymous caller situation, the police will need an independent basis to establish the requisite reasonable suspicion.”) Mr. McPherson was observed walking down the block and not engaged in any activity that could be described as suspicious.

2001"There is no gun exception to the Terry requirement for reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." Id., quoting Hawkins, supra, at 657 , 692 A.2d at 1070 .

2017Johnson asserts that “[t]he fact that [he] was merely present in a ‘high crime area’ … in no way establishes his involvement in criminal activity.” Id. at 18 (citing Commonwealth v. Kearney, 601 A.2d 346, 348 (Pa. Super. 1992) (stating that “[m]ere presence near a high crime area or in the vicinity of a recently reported crime, is not enough to warrant a Terry stop.”)).

2016It is well-settled that “[m]ere presence near a high crime area or in the vicinity of a recently reported crime, is not enough to warrant a Terry stop.” Id.

2025Dismissing that concern, the Wardlow Court declared: “In allowing such detentions, Terry accepts the risk that officers may stop innocent people.”42 Innocent people may 37 Id. at 125 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983)). 38 Id. (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991)). 39 Id. 40 Id. 41 Id. 42 Id. at 126. [J-5-2025] [MO: Dougherty, J.] - 9 also be arrested at times, the Wardlow Court stated, and a “Terry stop is a far more minimal intrusion.”43 This analysis did not satisfy Justice Stevens, who dissented in part in Wardlow, finding that the suspect’s flight in a hig

2025Dismissing that concern, the Wardlow Court declared: “In allowing such detentions, Terry accepts the risk that officers may stop innocent people.”42 Innocent people may 37 Id. at 125 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983)). 38 Id. (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991)). 39 Id. 40 Id. 41 Id. 42 Id. at 126. [J-5-2025] [MO: Dougherty, J.] - 9 also be arrested at times, the Wardlow Court stated, and a “Terry stop is a far more minimal intrusion.”43 This analysis did not satisfy Justice Stevens, who dissented in part in Wardlow, finding that the suspect’s flight in a hig

2020Id.

2018Id. at 429 .

2025“The ‘narrow scope’ of the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked, even though that person happens to be on premises where an authorized narcotics search is taking place.” Id. at 94 .

2025“The ‘narrow scope’ of the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked, even though that person happens to be on premises where an authorized narcotics search is taking place.” Id. at 94 .

2020Commonwealth v. Arch, 654 A.2d 1141, 1143 (Pa. Super. 1995) (while officer is prohibited from relying on unparticularized suspicion or “hunch” as basis for Terry stop, he or she may rely on police radio broadcast if suspect matches specific description given by individual who reported crime).

2016"A police officer need not personally observe the suspicious conduct leading to the reasonable belief needed for a Terry stop and may rely upon information received over the police radio to justify the initial stop." Commonwealth v. Arch, 654 A.2d 1141, 1144 (Pa. Super. 1995).