Terry stop in Kansas

1997Yet, in State v. McKeown, 249 Kan. at 509 , we reiterated: “An officer who does not have reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop may, however, approach an individual on the street for investigative purposes. . . .

1996Officer Benard testified that he always stopped persons walking in residential neighborhoods in the early morning hours, and he conceded that the stop was due at least in part to this “standard procedure.” In State v. McKeown, 249 Kan. 506, 509-10 , 819 P.2d 644 (1991), we said: “An officer who does not have reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop may, however', approach an individual on the street for investigative purposes.

2005We have held that probable cause means ‘a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found,’ [citation omitted] and the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than that for probable cause.” Moreover, quoting from Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 L.

2005We have held that probable cause means ‘a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found,’ [citation omitted] and the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than that for probable cause.” Moreover, quoting from Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 L.

1997We have held that probable cause means “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found,” [citation omitted] and the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than that for probable cause.’ 490 U.S. at 7 .

1994We have held that probable cause means “a fair prob ability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found,” [citation omitted] and the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than that for probable cause.’ 490 U.S. at 7 .

2019"We sought to make this clear in Michigan v. Summers, supra : 'If the purpose underlying a Terry stop-investigating possible criminal activity-is to be served, the police must under certain circumstances be able to detain the individual for longer than the brief time period involved in Terry and Adams [ v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 , 92 S. Ct. 1921 , 32 L.

2019"We sought to make this clear in Michigan v. Summers, supra : 'If the purpose underlying a Terry stop-investigating possible criminal activity-is to be served, the police must under certain circumstances be able to detain the individual for longer than the brief time period involved in Terry and Adams [ v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 , 92 S. Ct. 1921 , 32 L.

2019There, law enforcement agents stopped defendant after his arrival in an airport and seized his luggage for 90 minutes to take it to a narcotics detection dog for a "sniff test." The Court decided that an investigative seizure of personal property could be justified under the Terry doctrine, but that "[t]he length of the detention of respondent's luggage alone precludes the conclusion that the seizure was reasonable in the absence of probable cause." 462 U.S. at 709 , 103 S.Ct. 2637 .

2019There, law enforcement agents stopped defendant after his arrival in an airport and seized his luggage for 90 minutes to take it to a narcotics detection dog for a "sniff test." The Court decided that an investigative seizure of personal property could be justified under the Terry doctrine, but that "[t]he length of the detention of respondent's luggage alone precludes the conclusion that the seizure was reasonable in the absence of probable cause." 462 U.S. at 709 , 103 S.Ct. 2637 .

2019Ed. 2d 612 (1972) ].' 452 U.S. at 700, n. 12 [ 101 S.Ct. 2587 ].

2008One such circumstance is a Terry stop, where the Court “recognized the narrow authority of police officers who suspect criminal activity to make limited intrusions on an individual’s personal security based on less than probable cause.” (Emphasis added.) 452 U.S. at 698 .

2008A state law requiring a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a valid Terry stop is consistent with Fourth Amendment prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures.” (Emphasis added.) 542 U.S. at 188 .

2004The United States Supreme Court held that the Nevada statute’s requirement that a suspect must disclose his or her name in the course of a Terry stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. 542 U.S. at 186 .

2013A brief, investigatory detention, also known as a Terry stop, is constitutional and statutorily permitted if" ‘an objective officer would have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the detainee committed, is about to commit, or is committing a crime.’ [Citations omitted.]” State v. Thomas, 291 Kan. 676, 687 , 246 P.3d 678 (2011) (quoting State v. Pollman, 286 Kan. 881, 889 , 190 P.3d. 234 [2008]); see also K.S.A. 22-2402(1) (“Without making an arrest, a law enforcement officer may stop any person in a public place whom such officer reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is a

2013A brief, investigatory detention, also known as a Terry stop, is constitutional and statutorily permitted if" ‘an objective officer would have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the detainee committed, is about to commit, or is committing a crime.’ [Citations omitted.]” State v. Thomas, 291 Kan. 676, 687 , 246 P.3d 678 (2011) (quoting State v. Pollman, 286 Kan. 881, 889 , 190 P.3d. 234 [2008]); see also K.S.A. 22-2402(1) (“Without making an arrest, a law enforcement officer may stop any person in a public place whom such officer reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is a

2013A brief, investigatory detention, also known as a Terry stop, is constitutional and statutorily permitted if" ‘an objective officer would have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the detainee committed, is about to commit, or is committing a crime.’ [Citations omitted.]” State v. Thomas, 291 Kan. 676, 687 , 246 P.3d 678 (2011) (quoting State v. Pollman, 286 Kan. 881, 889 , 190 P.3d. 234 [2008]); see also K.S.A. 22-2402(1) (“Without making an arrest, a law enforcement officer may stop any person in a public place whom such officer reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is a

2013A brief, investigatory detention, also known as a Terry stop, is constitutional and statutorily permitted if" ‘an objective officer would have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the detainee committed, is about to commit, or is committing a crime.’ [Citations omitted.]” State v. Thomas, 291 Kan. 676, 687 , 246 P.3d 678 (2011) (quoting State v. Pollman, 286 Kan. 881, 889 , 190 P.3d. 234 [2008]); see also K.S.A. 22-2402(1) (“Without making an arrest, a law enforcement officer may stop any person in a public place whom such officer reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is a

2009If the law enforcement officer finds a firearm or weapon, or other thing, the possession of which may be a crime or evidence of crime, such officer may take and keep it until the completion of the questioning, at which time such officer shall either return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest such person." See State v. Anderson, 281 Kan. 896, 902 , 136 P.3d 406 (2006).

2009Merely pointing to some facts that would cause a reasonable person to be suspicious is enough to conduct a Terry stop.” 281 Kan. at 904 .

2009Merely pointing to some facts that would cause a reasonable person to be suspicious is enough to conduct a Terry stop.” State v. Finley, 17 Kan.

2006Merely pointing to some facts that would cause a reasonable person to be suspicious is enough to conduct a Terry stop.’ State v. Finley, 17 Kan.

1996State v. Epperson, 237 Kan. 707, 713 , 703 P.2d 761 (1985); State v. Marks, 226 Kan. 704, 708-09 , 602 P.2d 1344 (1979).

1996State v. Epperson, 237 Kan. 707, 713 , 703 P.2d 761 (1985); State v. Marks, 226 Kan. 704, 708-09 , 602 P.2d 1344 (1979).

2004Ed. 2d 740 , 122 S. Ct. 744 (2002) (in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists to justify Terry stop, courts must look at totality of circumstances); and United States v. Saucedo-Munoz, 307 F.3d 344, 351 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied 537 U.S. 1178 (2003) (applying same principles to determination of whether probable cause exists for search).

2004Ed. 2d 740 , 122 S. Ct. 744 (2002) (in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists to justify Terry stop, courts must look at totality of circumstances); and United States v. Saucedo-Munoz, 307 F.3d 344, 351 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied 537 U.S. 1178 (2003) (applying same principles to determination of whether probable cause exists for search).

2020Johnson, 555 U.S. at 326-27 (investigatory Terry stop may entail frisk or pat-down search for weapons if officer reasonably suspects individual may be armed and dangerous); Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 29-30 ; State v. White, 44 Kan.

2013Johnson, 555 U.S. at 326-27 (investigatory Terry stop may entail frisk or pat-down search for weapons if officer reasonably suspects individual may be armed) Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 29-30 ; State v. White, 44 Kan.

2020App. 2d 554, 564 , 811 P.2d 890 (upholding Terry stop where officer ordered defendant out of the car at gunpoint and handcuffed him before searching him for weapons), rev. denied 249 Kan. 777 (1991).

2006App. 2d 554, 564 , 811 P.2d 890 (1991) (upholding Terry stop where officer ordered defendant out of the car at gunpoint and handcuffed him before searching him for weapons).

2019The district court particularly focused on one ruling in Smith and quoted the case during its oral pronouncement of its decision to grant the motion to suppress, stating: "To determine whether law enforcement officers have complied with the temporal limitation articulated for evaluating the propriety of a Terry stop, courts must 'take into account whether the police diligently pursue[d] their investigation.' " Smith , 286 Kan. at 410 , 184 P.3d 890 ; see Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 20 L.

2019The district court particularly focused on one ruling in Smith and quoted the case during its oral pronouncement of its decision to grant the motion to suppress, stating: "To determine whether law enforcement officers have complied with the temporal limitation articulated for evaluating the propriety of a Terry stop, courts must 'take into account whether the police diligently pursue[d] their investigation.' " Smith , 286 Kan. at 410 , 184 P.3d 890 ; see Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 20 L.

2019United States v. Williams , 271 F.3d 1262 , 1271 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding officer telling motorist he was free to leave did not affect determination of whether the officer had reasonable suspicion for later detention because '[a]lthough the record indicate[d] that the officer subjectively intended *409 that the [motorist] was free to go, the relevant inquiry ... is based on the objective facts known to the officer, not upon the officer's subjective state of mind'); see also United States v. McHugh , 639 F.3d 1250 , 1258 (10th Cir. 2011) (rejecting argument that officer lacked reasonable suspi

2019United States v. Williams , 271 F.3d 1262 , 1271 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding officer telling motorist he was free to leave did not affect determination of whether the officer had reasonable suspicion for later detention because '[a]lthough the record indicate[d] that the officer subjectively intended *409 that the [motorist] was free to go, the relevant inquiry ... is based on the objective facts known to the officer, not upon the officer's subjective state of mind'); see also United States v. McHugh , 639 F.3d 1250 , 1258 (10th Cir. 2011) (rejecting argument that officer lacked reasonable suspi

2018Thus, during a Terry stop, "if the officer reasonably suspects the person detained is armed and dangerous, the officer may perform a pat-down search, i.e. , frisk, of the person's outer clothing for weapons." State v. Dean , 42 Kan.

2018App. 2d 558 , 562, 214 P.3d 1190 (2009).