Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
10 West Virginia opinions name it 1 courts 1991–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Johnson Obasagreen2 sentences2020See United States v. Obasa, 15 F.3d 603 (6th Cir. 1994) (Miranda warnings are necessary only prior to custodial interrogation; the issuance of Miranda warnings may transform a legal Terry stop into an illegal arrest). 2012See United States v. Obasa, 15 F.3d 603 (6th Cir.1994) (Miranda warnings are necessary only prior to custodial interrogation; the issuance of Miranda warnings may transform a legal Terry stop into an illegal arrest). | 3 | 4 |
State v. Stuartgreen2 sentences1995However, probable cause is not necessary for a pointed, brief investigative or Terry stop. 3 Syl. pt. 1, State v. Stuart, 192 W.Va. 428 , 452 S.E.2d 886 (1994) states: Police officers may stop a vehicle to investigate if they have an articulable reasonable suspicion that the vehicle is subject to seizure or a person in the vehicle has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. 1995However, probable cause is not necessary for a pointed, brief investigative or Terry stop. 3 Syl. pt. 1, State v. Stuart, 192 W.Va. 428 , 452 S.E.2d 886 (1994) states: Police officers may stop a vehicle to investigate if they have an articulable reasonable suspicion that the vehicle is subject to seizure or a person in the vehicle has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. | 1 | 2 |
Clower v. West Virginia Department of Motor Vehiclesred2 sentences2014Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 223 W.Va. 535, 541 , 678 S.E.2d 41, 47 (2009). [T]he usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called “Terry stop,” see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), than to a formal arrest. 2014Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 223 W.Va. 535, 541 , 678 S.E.2d 41, 47 (2009). [T]he usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called “Terry stop,” see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), than to a formal arrest. | 1 | 1 |
Kolender v. Lawsongreen2 sentences2000See 461 U.S. at 353, 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 . 2000See 461 U.S. at 353, 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 . | 1 | 1 |
Florida v. Royergreen2 sentences1995The rule in Dunaway was reaffirmed in Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499 , 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1326 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229, 237 (1983), *384 when the Supreme Court stated “reasonable suspicion of crime is insufficient to justify custodial interrogation even though the interrogation is investigative.” The demarcating line between “investigative stops” not requiring probable cause and detentions for which probable cause is required is indistinct. 10 The Supreme Court said in Royer : “The scope of the intrusion permitted will vary to some extent with the particular facts and circumstances of each case. 1995The rule in Dunaway was reaffirmed in Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499 , 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1326 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229, 237 (1983), *384 when the Supreme Court stated “reasonable suspicion of crime is insufficient to justify custodial interrogation even though the interrogation is investigative.” The demarcating line between “investigative stops” not requiring probable cause and detentions for which probable cause is required is indistinct. 10 The Supreme Court said in Royer : “The scope of the intrusion permitted will vary to some extent with the particular facts and circumstances of each case. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Boswellgreen2 sentences1995We noted that because a Terry stop “involves less intrusion on the individual’s privacy, the seizure’s validity is ordinarily tested by less severe standards than the probable cause standard that is necessary to effect an arrest.” State v. Jones, 193 W.Va. at 383 , 456 S.E.2d at 464 , quoting, State v. Boswell, 170 W.Va. 433, 438 , 294 S.E.2d 287, 292 (1982). 1995We noted that because a Terry stop “involves less intrusion on the individual’s privacy, the seizure’s validity is ordinarily tested by less severe standards than the probable cause standard that is necessary to effect an arrest.” State v. Jones, 193 W.Va. at 383 , 456 S.E.2d at 464 , quoting, State v. Boswell, 170 W.Va. 433, 438 , 294 S.E.2d 287, 292 (1982). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Farleygreen2 sentences1995See State v. Farley, 192 W.Va. 247 , 254 n. 10, 452 S.E.2d 50 , 57 n. 10 (1994); United States v. Obasa, 15 F.3d 603 (6th Cir.1994). 4 . 1995See State v. Farley, 192 W.Va. 247 , 254 n. 10, 452 S.E.2d 50 , 57 n. 10 (1994); United States v. Obasa, 15 F.3d 603 (6th Cir.1994). 4 . | 1 | 1 |
Alabama v. Whitegreen2 sentences1991More recently, in Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 , -, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2417 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301, 310 (1990), the Court addressed the issue in the context of a tip from an anonymous phone caller. 1991More recently, in Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 , -, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2417 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301, 310 (1990), the Court addressed the issue in the context of a tip from an anonymous phone caller. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in West Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dunaway v. New York
green
2 sentences1995However, the Supreme Court added that for any type of detention more intrusive than a Terry stop, the “requisite balancing has been performed in centuries of precedent and is embodied in the principle that seizures are reasonable only if supported by probable cause.” 442 U.S. at 213 , 99 S.Ct. at 2267 , 60 L.Ed.2d at 837 . 1995However, the Supreme Court added that for any type of detention more intrusive than a Terry stop, the “requisite balancing has been performed in centuries of precedent and is embodied in the principle that seizures are reasonable only if supported by probable cause.” 442 U.S. at 213 , 99 S.Ct. at 2267 , 60 L.Ed.2d at 837 . | 2 | 1995–1995 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2014Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 223 W.Va. 535, 541 , 678 S.E.2d 41, 47 (2009). [T]he usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called “Terry stop,” see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), than to a formal arrest. 2014Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 223 W.Va. 535, 541 , 678 S.E.2d 41, 47 (2009). [T]he usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called “Terry stop,” see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), than to a formal arrest. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce
green
2 sentences2014Under the Fourth Amendment, we have held, a policeman who lacks probable cause but whose “observations lead him reasonably to suspect” that a particular person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime, may detain that person briefly in order to “investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion.” United States v. Brignoni–Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 , 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2580 , 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). 2014Under the Fourth Amendment, we have held, a policeman who lacks probable cause but whose “observations lead him reasonably to suspect” that a particular person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime, may detain that person briefly in order to “investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion.” United States v. Brignoni–Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 , 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2580 , 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Berkemer v. McCarty
green
2 sentences2012In Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984), the Supreme Court reiterated the standard and held that “a policeman ... whose observations lead him to reasonably suspect that a particular person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime, may detain that person briefly in order to investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion.” Therefore, based on the Terry investigatory traffic stop standard, the missing mirror provoked the officer’s reasonable suspicion that the driver was in violation of W.Va.Code, 17C-15-l(a). 2012In Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984), the Supreme Court reiterated the standard and held that “a policeman ... whose observations lead him to reasonably suspect that a particular person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime, may detain that person briefly in order to investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion.” Therefore, based on the Terry investigatory traffic stop standard, the missing mirror provoked the officer’s reasonable suspicion that the driver was in violation of W.Va.Code, 17C-15-l(a). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Reid v. Georgia
green
2 sentences2000The law in Kolender , by contrast, required credible and reliable identification only when peace officers had already made a justifiable Terry stop, that is, after they had temporarily detained a suspect because of “a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person seized [wa]s engaged in criminal activity,” Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440 , 100 S.Ct. 2752 , 65 L.Ed.2d 890 (1980) (per curiam) (following Terry). 2000The law in Kolender , by contrast, required credible and reliable identification only when peace officers had already made a justifiable Terry stop, that is, after they had temporarily detained a suspect because of “a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person seized [wa]s engaged in criminal activity,” Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440 , 100 S.Ct. 2752 , 65 L.Ed.2d 890 (1980) (per curiam) (following Terry). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Jones
green
2 sentences1995We noted that because a Terry stop “involves less intrusion on the individual’s privacy, the seizure’s validity is ordinarily tested by less severe standards than the probable cause standard that is necessary to effect an arrest.” State v. Jones, 193 W.Va. at 383 , 456 S.E.2d at 464 , quoting, State v. Boswell, 170 W.Va. 433, 438 , 294 S.E.2d 287, 292 (1982). 1995We noted that because a Terry stop “involves less intrusion on the individual’s privacy, the seizure’s validity is ordinarily tested by less severe standards than the probable cause standard that is necessary to effect an arrest.” State v. Jones, 193 W.Va. at 383 , 456 S.E.2d at 464 , quoting, State v. Boswell, 170 W.Va. 433, 438 , 294 S.E.2d 287, 292 (1982). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
State v. Meadows
green
2 sentences1995To the extent State v. Meadows, 170 W.Va. 191 , 292 S.E.2d 50 (1982), holds otherwise, it is overruled. 1995To the extent State v. Meadows, 170 W.Va. 191 , 292 S.E.2d 50 (1982), holds otherwise, it is overruled. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Adams v. Williams
green
2 sentences1991In Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 , 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1924 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972), the United States Supreme Court stated that a known informant’s tip may contain sufficient "indicia of reliability" to justify a Terry stop even though it may not be sufficient to support the issuance of an arrest or search warrant. 1991In Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 , 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1924 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972), the United States Supreme Court stated that a known informant’s tip may contain sufficient "indicia of reliability" to justify a Terry stop even though it may not be sufficient to support the issuance of an arrest or search warrant. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.