Terry stop in Michigan

2025An established exception to the warrant requirement is a Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1 ; 88 S Ct 1868 ; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968), investigatory stop (Terry stop).

2025An established exception to the warrant requirement is a Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1 ; 88 S Ct 1868 ; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968), investigatory stop (Terry stop).

2024A relatively brief encounter, a routine traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ than to a formal arrest.” Rodriguez v United States, 575 US 354 ; 135 S Ct 1609 ; 191 L Ed 2d 492 (2015) (quotation marks, citation and alteration omitted).

2024A relatively brief encounter, a routine traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ than to a formal arrest.” Rodriguez v United States, 575 US 354 ; 135 S Ct 1609 ; 191 L Ed 2d 492 (2015) (quotation marks, citation and alteration omitted).

2026See also Berkemer v McCarty, 468 US 420, 440 ; 104 S Ct 3138 ; 82 L Ed 2d 317 (1984) (stating that “[i]f a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop [or a Terry stop] thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him ‘in custody’ for practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda.”).

2026See also Berkemer v McCarty, 468 US 420, 440 ; 104 S Ct 3138 ; 82 L Ed 2d 317 (1984) (stating that “[i]f a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop [or a Terry stop] thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him ‘in custody’ for practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda.”).

2019See People v. Shabaz , 424 Mich. 42 , 65, 378 N.W.2d 451 (1985) ("Because the seizure of the defendant was unreasonable, in not meeting the requirements of a Terry stop, any evidence derived from that seizure must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.").

2019See People v. Shabaz , 424 Mich. 42 , 65, 378 N.W.2d 451 (1985) ("Because the seizure of the defendant was unreasonable, in not meeting the requirements of a Terry stop, any evidence derived from that seizure must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.").

2019Thus, when determining whether a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights have been violated in the context of a Terry stop, we consider the circumstances “in light of commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior, . . . and should be careful not to apply overly technical reviews of a police officer’s assessment of whether criminal activity is afoot.” Barbarich, 291 Mich App at 474 (citations omitted).

2015See also Barbarich, 291 Mich App at 473 (an investigatory stop, also known as a Terry stop, is permissible “if a police officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe a person has committed or is committing a crime given the totality of the circumstances . . . .”).

2025If it did, why would we ever start by considering the lesser standard? 14 People v Jenkins, 472 Mich 26, 32 ; 691 NW2d 759 (2005), citing Terry, 392 US at 22 . 15 Id. 16 People v Champion, 452 Mich 92, 98 ; 549 NW2d 849 (1996). 7 who is in a motor vehicle if the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person is engaged in criminal activity.” 17 The trial court and the Court of Appeals both erred by failing to consider whether the police officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that justified an investigatory Terry stop, during which they discovered the illegal ha

2025If it did, why would we ever start by considering the lesser standard? 14 People v Jenkins, 472 Mich 26, 32 ; 691 NW2d 759 (2005), citing Terry, 392 US at 22 . 15 Id. 16 People v Champion, 452 Mich 92, 98 ; 549 NW2d 849 (1996). 7 who is in a motor vehicle if the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person is engaged in criminal activity.” 17 The trial court and the Court of Appeals both erred by failing to consider whether the police officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that justified an investigatory Terry stop, during which they discovered the illegal ha

2019See id.; see also Adams v Williams, 407 US 143, 146 ; 92 S Ct 1921 ; 32 L Ed 2d 612 (1972) (during a Terry stop an officer may “conduct a limited protective search for concealed weapons”).

2019See id.; see also Adams v Williams, 407 US 143, 146 ; 92 S Ct 1921 ; 32 L Ed 2d 612 (1972) (during a Terry stop an officer may “conduct a limited protective search for concealed weapons”).

2022See Griffin v Wisconsin, 483 US 868, 873 ; 107 S Ct 3164 ; 97 L Ed 2d 709 (1987). 10 Regarding the permissible scope of a Terry stop, the Supreme Court noted that “a search which is reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope.

2022See Griffin v Wisconsin, 483 US 868, 873 ; 107 S Ct 3164 ; 97 L Ed 2d 709 (1987). 10 Regarding the permissible scope of a Terry stop, the Supreme Court noted that “a search which is reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope.

2022But the Supreme Court also held in Hiibel that the Fourth Amendment does not require an individual to answer such questions, id. at 187 , and to the extent that a state statute can require an individual to disclose their name in the course of a Terry stop, a request for identification must still be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop, id. at 188-189 . 9 9 Hiibel notes that past caselaw suggests that “Terry may permit an officer to determine a suspect’s identity by compelling the suspect to submit to fingerprinting only if there is ‘a reasonable basis for be

2022But the Supreme Court also held in Hiibel that the Fourth Amendment does not require an individual to answer such questions, id. at 187 , and to the extent that a state statute can require an individual to disclose their name in the course of a Terry stop, a request for identification must still be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop, id. at 188-189 . 9 9 Hiibel notes that past caselaw suggests that “Terry may permit an officer to determine a suspect’s identity by compelling the suspect to submit to fingerprinting only if there is ‘a reasonable basis for be

2025If it did, why would we ever start by considering the lesser standard? 14 People v Jenkins, 472 Mich 26, 32 ; 691 NW2d 759 (2005), citing Terry, 392 US at 22 . 15 Id. 16 People v Champion, 452 Mich 92, 98 ; 549 NW2d 849 (1996). 7 who is in a motor vehicle if the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person is engaged in criminal activity.” 17 The trial court and the Court of Appeals both erred by failing to consider whether the police officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that justified an investigatory Terry stop, during which they discovered the illegal ha

2025If it did, why would we ever start by considering the lesser standard? 14 People v Jenkins, 472 Mich 26, 32 ; 691 NW2d 759 (2005), citing Terry, 392 US at 22 . 15 Id. 16 People v Champion, 452 Mich 92, 98 ; 549 NW2d 849 (1996). 7 who is in a motor vehicle if the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person is engaged in criminal activity.” 17 The trial court and the Court of Appeals both erred by failing to consider whether the police officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that justified an investigatory Terry stop, during which they discovered the illegal ha

2017Whren v United States, 517 US 806, 813 ; 116 S Ct 1769 ; 135 L Ed 2d 89 (1996) (explaining that the reasonableness of a Terry stop does not depend upon the actual motivations of the officer involved).

2017Whren v United States, 517 US 806, 813 ; 116 S Ct 1769 ; 135 L Ed 2d 89 (1996) (explaining that the reasonableness of a Terry stop does not depend upon the actual motivations of the officer involved).

2017See People v Daniels, 160 Mich App 614, 619 ; 408 NW2d 398 (1987) (“[A] police approach for questioning on the street amounts to a consensual encounter, not a Terry stop, unless there exist intimidating circumstances leading the person to reasonably believe he was not free to leave. . . .”).

2017See People v Daniels, 160 Mich App 614, 619 ; 408 NW2d 398 (1987) (“[A] police approach for questioning on the street amounts to a consensual encounter, not a Terry stop, unless there exist intimidating circumstances leading the person to reasonably believe he was not free to leave. . . .”).

2025This is legally erroneous because that finding grows out of the trial court’s incorrect application of the law. 13 applies to searches conducted in good-faith reliance upon Kazmierczak, see Davis v United States, 564 US 229, 241 (2011); (3) alternatively, if the holding of Kazmierczak has been superseded by the MRTMA, whether the smell of marijuana alone may establish reasonable suspicion to perform an investigatory stop pursuant to Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968); and (4) if so, whether the trial court clearly erred in concluding that the firearm recovered in this case was not in plain view dur

2025This is legally erroneous because that finding grows out of the trial court’s incorrect application of the law. 13 applies to searches conducted in good-faith reliance upon Kazmierczak, see Davis v United States, 564 US 229, 241 (2011); (3) alternatively, if the holding of Kazmierczak has been superseded by the MRTMA, whether the smell of marijuana alone may establish reasonable suspicion to perform an investigatory stop pursuant to Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968); and (4) if so, whether the trial court clearly erred in concluding that the firearm recovered in this case was not in plain view dur

2025Notably, the MRTMA expressly does not authorize smoking marijuana in the passenger area of a vehicle on a public street 44 or consuming marijuana in a public place. 45 Accordingly, these acts are at least civil infractions. 46 41 As the majority opinion notes, we have never addressed whether reasonable suspicion of a civil infraction can justify a Terry stop. 42 See People v Davis, 250 Mich App 357, 363 ; 649 NW2d 94 (2002) (“Because Officer Hopkins had probable cause to believe defendant was in violation of three traffic laws, the stop was permissible.”).

2025Notably, the MRTMA expressly does not authorize smoking marijuana in the passenger area of a vehicle on a public street 44 or consuming marijuana in a public place. 45 Accordingly, these acts are at least civil infractions. 46 41 As the majority opinion notes, we have never addressed whether reasonable suspicion of a civil infraction can justify a Terry stop. 42 See People v Davis, 250 Mich App 357, 363 ; 649 NW2d 94 (2002) (“Because Officer Hopkins had probable cause to believe defendant was in violation of three traffic laws, the stop was permissible.”).

2017See Davis v Mississippi, 394 US 721, 722 ; 89 S Ct 1394, 1395 ; 22 L Ed 2d 676 (1969).

1987Because a person cannot be compelled to answer questions posed by a police officer, Davis, supra, Burrell, supra, that person cannot be prosecuted for obstructing a police officer should he refuse to answer questions during a Terry stop.

2022TERRY STOP A Terry stop is “ ‘[a] brief, on-the-scene detention of an individual [that] is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment as long as the officer can articulate a reasonable suspicion for the detention.’ ” People v Pagano, 507 Mich 26 , 32; 967 NW2d 590 (2021), quoting People v Custer, 465 Mich 319, 327 ; 630 NW2d 870 (2001).

2022TERRY STOP A Terry stop is “ ‘[a] brief, on-the-scene detention of an individual [that] is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment as long as the officer can articulate a reasonable suspicion for the detention.’ ” People v Pagano, 507 Mich 26 , 32; 967 NW2d 590 (2021), quoting People v Custer, 465 Mich 319, 327 ; 630 NW2d 870 (2001).

2025Plain-view discovery “allows police officers to seize, 17 People v Steele, 292 Mich App 308, 314 ; 806 NW2d 753 (2011), citing People v Oliver, 464 Mich 184, 192 ; 627 NW2d 297 (2001). 18 People v Perry, 338 Mich App 363 , 379; 980 NW2d 92 (2021), citing MCL 257.625(8). 19 MCL 257.625(1). 20 See Jenkins, 472 Mich at 32 . 21 Maryland v Wilson, 519 US 408, 414-415 ; 117 S Ct 882 ; 137 L Ed 2d 41 (1997) (holding “that an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to get out of the car pending completion of the stop”).

2025Plain-view discovery “allows police officers to seize, 17 People v Steele, 292 Mich App 308, 314 ; 806 NW2d 753 (2011), citing People v Oliver, 464 Mich 184, 192 ; 627 NW2d 297 (2001). 18 People v Perry, 338 Mich App 363 , 379; 980 NW2d 92 (2021), citing MCL 257.625(8). 19 MCL 257.625(1). 20 See Jenkins, 472 Mich at 32 . 21 Maryland v Wilson, 519 US 408, 414-415 ; 117 S Ct 882 ; 137 L Ed 2d 41 (1997) (holding “that an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to get out of the car pending completion of the stop”).

2022First, with respect to the officers’ actions in making the traffic stop, defendant states in his brief on appeal that “in the lower court here, [defendant] made no complaint about the stop of his vehicle.” Defendant then moves on with his appellate argument; however, he later appears to return to the matter when he discusses the decision by the United States Supreme Court in Florida v JL, 529 US 266, 268 ; 120 S Ct 1375 ; 146 L Ed 2d 254 (2000), wherein the Court held that an anonymous tip that a person was carrying a gun was, without more, insufficient to justify a police officer’s Terry stop

2022First, with respect to the officers’ actions in making the traffic stop, defendant states in his brief on appeal that “in the lower court here, [defendant] made no complaint about the stop of his vehicle.” Defendant then moves on with his appellate argument; however, he later appears to return to the matter when he discusses the decision by the United States Supreme Court in Florida v JL, 529 US 266, 268 ; 120 S Ct 1375 ; 146 L Ed 2d 254 (2000), wherein the Court held that an anonymous tip that a person was carrying a gun was, without more, insufficient to justify a police officer’s Terry stop

1989Although it is uncontroverted that flight may be a factor to be considered in ascertaining whether there is reasonable suspicion to warrant a Terry stop, United States v Sharpe [ 470 US 675 ; 105 S Ct 1568 ; 84 L Ed 2d 605 (1985)]; United States v Brignoni-Ponce [ 422 US 873 ; 95 S Ct 2574 ; 45 L Ed 2d 607 (1975)], flight alone is not a reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances to make its import less ambiguous.

1989Although it is uncontroverted that flight may be a factor to be considered in ascertaining whether there is reasonable suspicion to warrant a Terry stop, United States v Sharpe [ 470 US 675 ; 105 S Ct 1568 ; 84 L Ed 2d 605 (1985)]; United States v Brignoni-Ponce [ 422 US 873 ; 95 S Ct 2574 ; 45 L Ed 2d 607 (1975)], flight alone is not a reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances to make its import less ambiguous.