Terry stop in Maryland

2026There are two types of seizures that implicate the Fourth Amendment: (1) an arrest, which must be supported by probable cause; and (2) an investigatory stop, or a Terry stop, named after the Supreme Court’s decision in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), which must be supported by reasonable suspicion.

2025Id. (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). 27 The Court stated that “the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop,’ see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , . . . (1968), than to a formal arrest.” Id. at 439.12 It noted that, due to the “comparatively nonthreatening character” of Terry stops, the Court had not issued any opinions holding that such stops were “subject to the dictates of Miranda.” Id. at 440.

2016See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 , 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1573 , 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 489 , 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 , 82 L,Ed.2d 317 (1984) (analogizing the degree of intrusiveness of the usual traffic stop to the degree of restraint imposed by the typical Terry stop).

2016See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 , 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1573 , 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 489 , 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 , 82 L,Ed.2d 317 (1984) (analogizing the degree of intrusiveness of the usual traffic stop to the degree of restraint imposed by the typical Terry stop).

2022An investigatory or Terry stop is authorized where a law enforcement “officer has reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, that criminal activity may be afoot.” In re David S., 367 Md. 523, 532 , 789 A.2d 607, 612 (2002).

2022An investigatory or Terry stop is authorized where a law enforcement “officer has reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, that criminal activity may be afoot.” In re David S., 367 Md. 523, 532 , 789 A.2d 607, 612 (2002).

2025One of the reasons that the court in Berkemer cited for holding that a traffic stop, like a Terry stop, generally did not constitute custody for Miranda purposes was because a reasonable person would understand that such a detention was likely to be “temporary and 35 brief.” 468 U.S. at 437 .

2025The Supreme Court of Maryland has made clear that a suspect “is not obligated to respond” to questions asked during a Terry stop, and “unless the detainee’s answers provide the officer with probable cause to arrest him, he must then be released.” Collins v. State, 376 Md. 359, 368 (2003) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984)).

2022In Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125 , in concluding that reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop existed, the Supreme Court explained that people may flee for a variety of reasons, including innocence, and that “the determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.” (Citation omitted); see also Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 132-35 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

2022In Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125 , in concluding that reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop existed, the Supreme Court explained that people may flee for a variety of reasons, including innocence, and that “the determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.” (Citation omitted); see also Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 132-35 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

2022If the other factors surrounding an officer’s stop weigh “weakly in support of reasonable suspicion,” as the Ninth Circuit observed in Brown, 925 F.3d at 1157 , a trial court may rightly be “hesitant to allow flight to carry the day in authorizing a stop.” Our Fourth Amendment cases reveal that we do not shy away from tossing out “thin gruel” when the facts relied on by the State to justify a Terry stop “do not constitute ingredients that are sufficiently potent . . . to enrich the porridge to the constitutionally required consistency of reasonable suspicion.” Crosby, 408 Md. at 513 , 970 A.2d

2022If the other factors surrounding an officer’s stop weigh “weakly in support of reasonable suspicion,” as the Ninth Circuit observed in Brown, 925 F.3d at 1157 , a trial court may rightly be “hesitant to allow flight to carry the day in authorizing a stop.” Our Fourth Amendment cases reveal that we do not shy away from tossing out “thin gruel” when the facts relied on by the State to justify a Terry stop “do not constitute ingredients that are sufficiently potent . . . to enrich the porridge to the constitutionally required consistency of reasonable suspicion.” Crosby, 408 Md. at 513 , 970 A.2d

2021This case involves the application of the intermediate tier, known as the Terry stop,5 or investigatory stop, which is less intrusive than a more formal custodial arrest, and correspondingly, requires a less demanding level of suspicion than probable cause.6 See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).

2010See also United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7-8 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (stating that “the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than that for probable cause” and that the existence of a “reasonable suspicion” must be judged by “ ‘the totality of the circumstances — the whole picture.’ ” (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981))).

2025The Supreme Court of Maryland has made clear that a suspect “is not obligated to respond” to questions asked during a Terry stop, and “unless the detainee’s answers provide the officer with probable cause to arrest him, he must then be released.” Collins v. State, 376 Md. 359, 368 (2003) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984)).

2022See Collins v. State, 376 Md. 359, 368 , 829 A.2d 992, 997 (2003) (explaining an individual detained and questioned during a Terry stop “is not obligated to respond . . . and, “unless the detainee’s answers provide the officer with probable cause to arrest him, he must then be released.”).

2012We then concluded that the use of force was reasonable under the circumstances, relying, in part, on United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 , 105 S.Ct. 675 , 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985), in which the Supreme Court expressly approved threatening a suspect with force, in that case deadly force, when performing a Terry stop involving a suspect the officer reasonably believed to be armed and dangerous.

2012We then concluded that the use of force was reasonable under the circumstances, relying, in part, on United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 , 105 S.Ct. 675 , 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985), in which the Supreme Court expressly approved threatening a suspect with force, in that case deadly force, when performing a Terry stop involving a suspect the officer reasonably believed to be armed and dangerous.

2025A Terry stop “permits an officer to stop and briefly detain an individual” when the officer has “reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime.” Bailey v. State, 412 Md. 349, 363 (2010) (quoting Swift v. State, 393 Md. 139, 150 (2006)).

2020He argued first that, pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the police did not possess the requisite reasonable suspicion to “stop” Petitioner at the outset of the encounter.3 Independent of that argument, Petitioner contended that the full search of Petitioner and the bag he carried was unlawful because at the time the search was undertaken, the police lacked probable cause to believe he had committed a felony or was committing a felony or misdemeanor in their presence. 2 The search also disclosed a number of empty plastic baggies and $367. 3 Law enforcement officers may conduct “an i

2026A Terry stop is “less intrusive than a formal custodial arrest and must be supported by reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime and permits an officer to stop and briefly detain an individual.” Swift v. State, 393 Md. 139, 150 , 899 A.2d 867, 873 (2006) (citations omitted).

2026A Terry stop is “less intrusive than a formal custodial arrest and must be supported by reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime and permits an officer to stop and briefly detain an individual.” Swift v. State, 393 Md. 139, 150 , 899 A.2d 867, 873 (2006) (citations omitted).

2026See Ransome v. State, 373 Md. 99, 113 n.1 (2003) (Raker, J., concurring) (“[T]he police may use information gathered during a consensual encounter to justify a Terry stop if they gather sufficient information to develop reasonable suspicion . . . .”).

2025The Court held that while unprovoked flight in a high crime area does not automatically equal reasonable articulable suspicion for a Terry stop, under a totality of circumstances analysis, such flight can be a factor in concluding that there was criminal activity or a factor consistent with innocence, “[j]ust as a bulge in a person’s clothing has different implications for a reasonable suspicion analysis depending on ‘where it is, what it looks like, or the circumstances surrounding its observation.’” Id. at 449–50 (quoting Ransome v. State, 373 Md. 99, 107 (2003)).

2015“Accordingly, the officer’s assessment of the likelihood that there will be relevant evidence inside the car must be based on more than ‘a mere hunch,’ but ‘falls considerably short of [needing to] satisfy! ] a preponderance of the evidence standard.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002)); see Quince v. State, 319 Md. 430, 433 , 572 A.2d 1086 (1990) (Quotation omitted.) (“[T]he level of suspicion for a Terry stop and frisk ‘is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence’ ... [and] ‘the level of susp

2015“Accordingly, the officer’s assessment of the likelihood that there will be relevant evidence inside the car must be based on more than ‘a mere hunch,’ but ‘falls considerably short of [needing to] satisfy[ ] a preponderance of the evidence standard.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 74 (2002)); see Quince v. State, 319 Md. 430, 433 (1990) (Quotation omitted.)) (“[T]he level of suspicion for a Terry stop and frisk ‘is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence’ . . . [and] ‘the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less

2016In United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002), the Supreme Court commented on the same easily satisfied quantitative standard for a constitutional Terry stop: “Although an officer’s reliance on a mere ‘hunch’ is insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard[.]” (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted).

2016In United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002), the Supreme Court commented on the same easily satisfied quantitative standard for a constitutional Terry stop: “Although an officer’s reliance on a mere ‘hunch’ is insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard[.]” (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted).

2022In the context of a Terry stop, an officer must have reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is engaged in criminal activity, while in the context of a Terry frisk, the officer must have reasonable suspicion that the suspect is “armed and dangerous[.]” Smith, 345 Md. at 465 , 693 A.2d at 751 .

2022In the context of a Terry stop, an officer must have reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is engaged in criminal activity, while in the context of a Terry frisk, the officer must have reasonable suspicion that the suspect is “armed and dangerous[.]” Smith, 345 Md. at 465 , 693 A.2d at 751 .

2026See, e.g., Quince v. State, 319 Md. 430, 434 (1990) (upholding Terry stop based only on reliable tip that a person was 17 Although the frisk here was authorized, its scope exceeded that authority.

2016We have explored the level of particularization needed to justify a Terry stop when based on officer and public safety on a number of occasions, most notably in Quince v. State, 319 Md. 430 , 572 A.2d 1086 (1990); Derricott v. State, 327 Md. 582 , 611 A.2d 592 (1992); State v. Smith, 345 Md. 460 , 693 A.2d 749 (1997); Dashiell v. State, 374 Md. 85 , 821 A.2d 372 (2003); Ransome v. State, 373 Md. 99 , 816 A.2d 901 (2003); Cotton v. State, 386 Md. 249 , 872 A.2d 87 (2005); Williamson v. State, 398 Md. 489 , 921 A.2d 221 (2007); and Longshore v. State, 399 Md. 486 , 924 A.2d 1129 (2007).

2016We have explored the level of particularization needed to justify a Terry stop when based on officer and public safety on a number of occasions, most notably in Quince v. State, 319 Md. 430 , 572 A.2d 1086 (1990); Derricott v. State, 327 Md. 582 , 611 A.2d 592 (1992); State v. Smith, 345 Md. 460 , 693 A.2d 749 (1997); Dashiell v. State, 374 Md. 85 , 821 A.2d 372 (2003); Ransome v. State, 373 Md. 99 , 816 A.2d 901 (2003); Cotton v. State, 386 Md. 249 , 872 A.2d 87 (2005); Williamson v. State, 398 Md. 489 , 921 A.2d 221 (2007); and Longshore v. State, 399 Md. 486 , 924 A.2d 1129 (2007).

2016We have explored the level of particularization needed to justify a Terry stop when based on officer and public safety on a number of occasions, most notably in Quince v. State, 319 Md. 430 , 572 A.2d 1086 (1990); Derricott v. State, 327 Md. 582 , 611 A.2d 592 (1992); State v. Smith, 345 Md. 460 , 693 A.2d 749 (1997); Dashiell v. State, 374 Md. 85 , 821 A.2d 372 (2003); Ransome v. State, 373 Md. 99 , 816 A.2d 901 (2003); Cotton v. State, 386 Md. 249 , 872 A.2d 87 (2005); Williamson v. State, 398 Md. 489 , 921 A.2d 221 (2007); and Longshore v. State, 399 Md. 486 , 924 A.2d 1129 (2007).

2021Given the State’s concession that Mr. Trott was “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the encounter was not consensual and is governed by the reasonable suspicion standard applicable to a Terry stop. 7 v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984)); Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356 , 374 n.5 (1999).

2015Id. at 297 , 839 A.2d 769 (parallel citations omitted); see also Harrod v. State, 192 Md.App. 85, 103 , 993 A.2d 1113 (2010) (“[T]here is no bright line marking the point at which a Terry stop and frisk rises to the level of an arrest”), rev’d on other grounds, 423 Md. 24 , 31 A.3d 173 (2011).

2018Standing alone, the Court does not find that the tip itself justifies the Terry stop per Alabama v. White , 496 U.S. 325 [ 110 S.Ct. 2412 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990) ].

2018Standing alone, the Court does not find that the tip itself justifies the Terry stop per Alabama v. White , 496 U.S. 325 [ 110 S.Ct. 2412 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990) ].

2015Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996), described the reasonable suspicion standard that must be satisfied to justify such restraint: “We have described reasonable suspicion simply as ‘a particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity!.]” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981), was emphatic not only about the Terry standard but about the fact that it applies to all seizures of the person, including those involved in brief investigatory stops.

2015Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996), described the reasonable suspicion standard that must be satisfied to justify such restraint: “We have described reasonable suspicion simply as ‘a particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity!.]” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981), was emphatic not only about the Terry standard but about the fact that it applies to all seizures of the person, including those involved in brief investigatory stops.

2022Just as the totality of the circumstances can place otherwise innocent conduct in a different light, sometimes the circumstances are insufficient to justify a Terry stop, as in Cartnail, 359 Md. at 289 , 753 A.2d at 528-29 .

2022Just as the totality of the circumstances can place otherwise innocent conduct in a different light, sometimes the circumstances are insufficient to justify a Terry stop, as in Cartnail, 359 Md. at 289 , 753 A.2d at 528-29 .

2003A person temporarily detained in a Terry stop may validly consent to a search of his person, papers, or effects, see Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501 , 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1326 , 75 *373 L.Ed.2d 229, 238-39 (1983) and cf. Miles v. State, 365 Md. 488, 530 , 781 A.2d 787, 811 (2001) (“a person in custody may still give valid consent to a search”), and that presupposes that it is permissible for an officer to seek such consent.

2003A person temporarily detained in a Terry stop may validly consent to a search of his person, papers, or effects, see Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501 , 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1326 , 75 *373 L.Ed.2d 229, 238-39 (1983) and cf. Miles v. State, 365 Md. 488, 530 , 781 A.2d 787, 811 (2001) (“a person in custody may still give valid consent to a search”), and that presupposes that it is permissible for an officer to seek such consent.

2015See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 , 120 S.Ct. 673 , 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (investigatory stop in area known for heavy narcotics trafficking; “that the stop occurred in a ‘high crime area’ among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis” (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144 , 92 S.Ct. 1921 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972))); U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 , 95 S.Ct. 2574 , 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975) (law enforcement officers may consider an area’s characteristics in deciding whether to make an investigatory stop); accord Holt v. State, 435 Md. 443, 466 , 7

2015See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 , 120 S.Ct. 673 , 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (investigatory stop in area known for heavy narcotics trafficking; “that the stop occurred in a ‘high crime area’ among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis” (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144 , 92 S.Ct. 1921 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972))); U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 , 95 S.Ct. 2574 , 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975) (law enforcement officers may consider an area’s characteristics in deciding whether to make an investigatory stop); accord Holt v. State, 435 Md. 443, 466 , 7

2026Appellant notes that the record shows that he was compliant with the officers’ orders, never reached for his gun, did not act suspiciously, and offered to show the officers his permit. 41 The State contends that the “same reasonable suspicion that justified the investigatory stop also justified the frisk.” It argues that the “absence of affirmative testimony about the officers’ subjective concern for their safety [did not] invalidate the frisk” because the “‘armed and dangerous’ standard is unitary,” and “reasonable suspicion that a person is armed is per se a reasonable suspicion that the per

2022We have explained that “[t]he purpose of the Terry frisk, by diametric contrast [to the purpose of a Terry stop], is not directly crime-related at all but is exclusively concerned with officer safety, with safeguarding the life and limb of the officer[.]” Norman, 452 Md. at 424 , 156 A.3d at 970 (quoting Ames v. State, 231 Md.

2022This lesser standard is justified by the fact that a Terry 6 stop is less intrusive than a formal custodial arrest.1 See Wilson v. State, 409 Md. 415 , 439–40, 975 A.2d 877 , 891–92 (2009) (holding that an assessment of the reasonableness of an officer’s actions is dependent on the level of the intrusion, and that a Terry stop is less intrusive than a formal custodial arrest).

2022This brief investigatory detention, commonly known as a Terry stop,19 is “considered less intrusive than a formal custodial arrest,” Wilson v. State, 409 Md. 415, 440 (2009), and, thus, “requires a less demanding level of suspicion than probable cause,” Trott v. State, 473 Md. 245, 255 (2021).

2015In re David S., 367 Md. 523, 539-40 [ 789 A.2d 607 ] (2002) (holding that a “hard take down” in which officers forced the individual to the ground and handcuffed him was a limited Terry stop, not an arrest, when the “conduct was not unreasonable because the officers reasonably could have suspected that the respondent posed a threat to their safety”); Trott v. State, 138 Md.App. 89, 118 [ 770 A.2d 1045 ] (2001) (holding that “the handcuffing of appellant was justifiable as a protective and flight preventive measure pursuant to a lawful stop and did not necessarily transform that stop into an ar

2015In re David S., 367 Md. 523, 539-40 [ 789 A.2d 607 ] (2002) (holding that a “hard take down” in which officers forced the individual to the ground and handcuffed him was a limited Terry stop, not an arrest, when the “conduct was not unreasonable because the officers reasonably could have suspected that the respondent posed a threat to their safety”); Trott v. State, 138 Md.App. 89, 118 [ 770 A.2d 1045 ] (2001) (holding that “the handcuffing of appellant was justifiable as a protective and flight preventive measure pursuant to a lawful stop and did not necessarily transform that stop into an ar

2008In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 1053 , 103 S.Ct. 3469 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), the Supreme Court extended the reach of the Terry stop and frisk, holding that, in the context of a roadside encounter, a police officer may conduct a protective search for weapons not only of an individual, but also of the passenger compartment of a motor vehicle.

2008In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 1053 , 103 S.Ct. 3469 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), the Supreme Court extended the reach of the Terry stop and frisk, holding that, in the context of a roadside encounter, a police officer may conduct a protective search for weapons not only of an individual, but also of the passenger compartment of a motor vehicle.