Terry stop in Texas

2023In Berkemer v. McCarty, the Supreme Court held that a typical traffic stop “is more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ . . . than to a formal arrest.” 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968)).

2023See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 , 709–10 (1983) (“Thus, although we decline to adopt any outside time limitation for a permissible Terry stop, we have never approved a seizure of the person for the prolonged 90-minute period involved here and cannot do so on the facts presented by this case.”) (applying Terry, 392 U.S. 1 ).

2015He then continued to search Hutchins’ vehicle while Hutchins remained under detention in the back seat of the patrol car and discovered contraband prescription pills in the trunk and wheel well. ■ > “An officer may conduct a brief investigative detention, or ‘Terry stop,’ when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe that an individual is involved in criminal activity.” Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)); Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 328 (Tex.2000).

2015See Balentine, 71 S.W.3d at 768 (stating that officer may conduct Terry stop when he has reasonable suspicion that individual is involved in criminal activity).

2006App. 2000) (applying Terry inquiry); Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 242-44 (Tex. Crim.

2006App. 2000) (applying Terry inquiry); Davis v. State , 947 S.W.2d 240, 242-44 (Tex. Crim.

2014See Rhodes v. State, 945 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tex. Crim.

2004See, e.g., Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327-28 (applying Terry inquiry); Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tex.Crim.App.1997) (holding that Terry applies in Texas); Rhodes v. State, 945 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tex.Crim.App.1997) (finding no reason to employ different inquiry under Texas Constitution).

2018The United States Supreme Court has rejected rigid time limitations on investigative detentions, instead asking "whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant." Kothe , 152 S.W.3d at 64 ; see United States v. Sharpe , 470 U.S. 675 , 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568 , 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (refusing to establish a bright-line rule that twenty minutes was too long for Terry stop).

2018The United States Supreme Court has rejected rigid time limitations on investigative detentions, instead asking “whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.” Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at 64 ; see United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985) (refusing to establish a bright-line rule that twenty minutes was too long for Terry stop).

2023In Berkemer v. McCarty, the Supreme Court held that a typical traffic stop “is more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ . . . than to a formal arrest.” 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968)).

2020A Terry stop must be brief enough to allow the officer to investigate the circumstances that provoked suspicion, which typically “means that the officer may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions.” Berkemer, 468 6 U.S. at 439, 104 S. Ct. at 3150 .

2019Compare Sims v. State, 98 S.W.3d 292, 294 , 296–97 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d) (no constitutional violation in investigative detention when canine unit arrived 20 minutes after officer issued warning citation), with United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 , 707–09 (1983) (90-minute detention of defendant’s luggage to await drug dog was prolonged seizure that exceeded limits of Terry stop); see also Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686–88 (declining to “establish a per se rule that a 20–minute detention is too long” under Terry).

2019Compare Sims v. State, 98 S.W.3d 292, 294 , 296–97 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d) (no constitutional violation in investigative detention when canine unit arrived 20 minutes after officer issued warning citation), with United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 , 707–09 (1983) (90-minute detention of defendant’s luggage to await drug dog was prolonged seizure that exceeded limits of Terry stop); see also Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686–88 (declining to “establish a per se rule that a 20–minute detention is too long” under Terry).

2015He then continued to search Hutchins’ vehicle while Hutchins remained under detention in the back seat of the patrol car and discovered contraband prescription pills in the trunk and wheel well. ■ > “An officer may conduct a brief investigative detention, or ‘Terry stop,’ when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe that an individual is involved in criminal activity.” Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)); Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 328 (Tex.2000).

2011See Carmouche , 10 S.W.3d at 330 ; Martinez v. State , 236 S.W.3d 361, 370 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. ref’d, untimely filed); see also Lemons v. State , 135 S.W.3d 878, 884 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (“We find that the Terry stop and search were proper. [Officer] McGann testified that, as a result of his experience and training, when he is involved in narcotics situations, he conducts pat-downs to check for weapons because there is a greater chance of weapons being present.”).

2016See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 , 120 S. Ct. 673 , 676–77 (2000) (“[W]e have previously noted the fact that the stop occurred in a ‘high crime area’ among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis.”).

2016See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 , 120 S. Ct. 673 , 676–77 (2000) (“[W]e have previously noted the fact that the stop occurred in a ‘high crime area’ among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis.”).

2025Davis v. State, 829 S.W.2d 218 , 220– 21 (Tex. Crim.

2011Davis v. State , 829 S.W.2d 218, 219 (Tex. Crim.

2003An exception to the requirement of probable cause allows the police to make a “Terry stop” and “briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’ even if the officer lacks probable cause.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ).

2003An exception to the requirement of probable cause allows the police to make a “Terry stop” and “briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’ even if the officer lacks probable cause.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ).

2015Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 503 (1983); see also Howes v. Fields, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 1190 (2012) (“[T]he ‘temporary and relatively nonthreatening detention involved in a traffic stop or a Terry stop does not constitute Miranda custody.’”) (quoting Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1224 (2010) (citation omitted)).

2015Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 503 (1983); see also Howes v. Fields, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 1190 (2012) (“[T]he ‘temporary and relatively nonthreatening detention involved in a traffic stop or a Terry stop does not constitute Miranda custody.’”) (quoting Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1224 (2010) (citation omitted)).

2009The provisions of article 14.03 also apply when an officer, outside of his jurisdiction, makes an investigative detention or Terry stop based on reasonable suspicion. [4] See Brother v. State , 166 S.W.3d 255 , 259 B 60 (Tex. Crim.

2009The provisions of article 14.03 also apply when an officer, outside of his jurisdiction, makes an investigative detention or Terry stop based on reasonable suspicion. 4 See Brother v. State, 166 S.W.3d 255, 259-60 (Tex.Crim.App.2005).

2003I, § 9; see also United States v. Sokolow , 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (police officer may make " Terry stop" and "briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity 'may be afoot,' even if the officer lacks probable cause") (quoting Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)); Woods v. State , 956 S.W.2d 33, 38 (Tex. Crim.

2003I, § 9; see also United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (police officer may make “Terry stop” and “briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’ even if the officer lacks probable cause”) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)); Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 38 (Tex. Crim.

2010See Amores, 816 S.W.2d at 412 .

1991Since granting review in this cause, we have decided the case of Amores v. State, 816 S.W.2d 407 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), in which, under the facts of that case, we held that handcuffing and placing a suspect on the ground amounted to an arrest and not a mere Terry stop.

2000The Supreme Court has emphasized that whatever terms are used to describe the “elusive concept” of what cause is sufficient to authorize a Terry stop, “the essence of all that has been written is that the totality of the circumstances — the whole picture — must be taken into account.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S.Ct. 690, 695 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); see also Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328-29 , 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2415 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990) (using “totality of the circumstances” test to determine whether informant’s anonymous tip supplied reasonable suspicion for stop

2000The Supreme Court has emphasized that whatever terms are used to describe the “elusive concept” of what cause is sufficient to authorize a Terry stop, “the essence of all that has been written is that the totality of the circumstances — the whole picture — must be taken into account.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S.Ct. 690, 695 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); see also Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328-29 , 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2415 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990) (using “totality of the circumstances” test to determine whether informant’s anonymous tip supplied reasonable suspicion for stop

2016Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 693 (1996); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex. Crim.

2016Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 693 (1996); Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 ; Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex. Crim.

2015Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 503 (1983); see also Howes v. Fields, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 1190 (2012) (“[T]he ‘temporary and relatively nonthreatening detention involved in a traffic stop or a Terry stop does not constitute Miranda custody.’”) (quoting Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1224 (2010) (citation omitted)).

2015Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 503 (1983); see also Howes v. Fields, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 1190 (2012) (“[T]he ‘temporary and relatively nonthreatening detention involved in a traffic stop or a Terry stop does not constitute Miranda custody.’”) (quoting Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1224 (2010) (citation omitted)).

2006See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (stating that stop occurring in “high crime area” is relevant consideration in Terry analysis); Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 494 (law enforcement training or experience may factor into reasonable-suspicion analysis); Delk v. State, 855 S.W.2d 700, 710 (Tex. Crim.

2006See Illinois v. Wardlow , 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (stating that stop occurring in "high crime area" is relevant consideration in Terry analysis); Ford , 158 S.W.3d at 494 (law enforcement training or experience may factor into reasonable-suspicion analysis); Delk v. State , 855 S.W.2d 700, 710 (Tex. Crim.

2009Court, 542 U.S. 177, 187 , 124 S.Ct. 2451 , 159 L.Ed.2d 292 (2004)("The principles of Terry permit a State to require a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a Terry stop."). [17] See Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 631 , 123 S.Ct. 1843 , 155 L.Ed.2d 814 (2003)(Suspect's "okay" in response to officer's statement that "we need to go and talk" was a "mere submission to a claim of lawful authority" rather than consent to accompany the officer.). [1] But see Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 99 , 125 S.Ct. 1465 , 161 L.Ed.2d 299 (2005) ("The imposition of correctly applied handcuffs to Mena, who

2009Court, 542 U.S. 177, 187 , 124 S.Ct. 2451 , 159 L.Ed.2d 292 (2004)("The principles of Terry permit a State to require a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a Terry stop."). [17] See Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 631 , 123 S.Ct. 1843 , 155 L.Ed.2d 814 (2003)(Suspect's "okay" in response to officer's statement that "we need to go and talk" was a "mere submission to a claim of lawful authority" rather than consent to accompany the officer.). [1] But see Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 99 , 125 S.Ct. 1465 , 161 L.Ed.2d 299 (2005) ("The imposition of correctly applied handcuffs to Mena, who

2023Applicable Law The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures, and its constitutional protections extend to routine traffic stops, which are “more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ . . . than to a formal arrest.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015) (citing Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998)).

2018The Supreme Court held that a routine traffic stop, such as that in which Knowles was detained for speeding, is "a relatively brief encounter and 'is more analogous to a so-called " Terry stop" ... than to a formal arrest.' " Id. at 117 , 119 S.Ct. at 488 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty , 468 U.S. 420 , 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 3150, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) ).

2021By definition, protective 12 sweeps within the meaning of Buie cannot be based on general policy.”) (citing Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 , 272-73 (2000) (declining to adopt a firearm exception to stop-and-frisk Terry analysis); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390-91 (1978) (rejecting an exception to the warrant requirement for searches of homicide scenes); and United States v. Hauk, 412 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2005)); United States v. Schultz, 818 F. Supp. 1271, 1274 (E.D.

2002See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 , 120 S.Ct. 1375 , 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000) (holding anonymous tip alleging illegal possession of a firearm, but lacking proper indicia of reliability, does not justify Terry stop).

2015The search was justified by probable cause and by the Terry doctrine, which was expanded to include the passenger area of a subject’s vehicle in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at 1049 .

2015The search was justified by probable cause and by the Terry doctrine, which was expanded to include the passenger area of a subject’s vehicle in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at 1049 .

2018See id. at 527–28; see also Woods v. State, 970 S.W.2d 770 , 774–75 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet. ref’d) (holding that in temporarily detaining appellant, private security guard employed by sheriff’s department was agent of the State and had reasonable suspicion to make the detention, and stating further that even if the guard was not a state agent, “[a] temporary detention by a private individual does not violate” the Fourth Amendment.); Garner v. State, 779 S.W.2d 498, 501 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1989) (“[A] private citizen does not have the authority to make a Terry stop.”), pet. ref’d, 785 S.

1998Appellant’s argument echoes the reasoning of the court of appeals in Garner v. State, 779 S.W.2d 498, 501 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1989) (“a private citizen does not have the authority to make a Terry stop”), pet. ref'd 785 S.W.2d 158 (Tex.Crim.App.1990).

1999Johnson , 658 S.W.2d at 626 .

1996Johnson, 658 S.W.2d at 626 .

2014“A ‘high-crime area’ [is] among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 , 120 S. Ct. 673, 676 (2000) (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144 , 147–48, 92 S. Ct. 1921 , 1922–24 (1972)); see also Gregory v. State, 175 S.W.3d 800 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d) (high crime area was relevant in holding reasonable suspicion where officer performed pat-down search of three individuals standing behind illegally parked car).

2014“A ‘high-crime area’ [is] among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 , 120 S. Ct. 673, 676 (2000) (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144 , 147–48, 92 S. Ct. 1921 , 1922–24 (1972)); see also Gregory v. State, 175 S.W.3d 800 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d) (high crime area was relevant in holding reasonable suspicion where officer performed pat-down search of three individuals standing behind illegally parked car).