Terry stop in Georgia

2009Ellington and Mikell, JJ, concur. 1 Teal v. State, 291 Ga. App. 488, 489 ( 662 SE2d 268 ) (2008). 2 Id. at 488 . 3 Id. 4 State v. Dukes, 279 Ga. App. 247, 248 ( 630 SE2d 847 ) (2006). 5 Id. at 248-249 . 6 Id. at 249 . 7 Id. 8 State v. Sapp, 214 Ga. App. 428, 431 (3) ( 448 SE2d 3 ) (1994). 9 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (88 SC 1868, 20 LE2d 889) (1968); see State v. Banks, 223 Ga. App. 838 ( 479 SE2d 168 ) (1996). 10 See Holmes v. State, 252 Ga. App. 286, 289 ( 556 SE2d 189 ) (2001). 11 See id. at 288-289 (Terry stop improper where defendant walked away, in a known drug area, and seemed nervous);

2001Thomas argues that the arresting constable did not have reason *160 able suspicion to detain her as required under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (88 SC 1868, 20 LE2d 889) (1968), that her case is similar to Hughes v. State, 269 Ga. 258 ( 497 SE2d 790 ) (1998), in that it also involved detention based on pattern evidence, and that assuming the constable did have reasonable suspicion to initially detain her, the length and nature of the stop exceeded the scope allowed for a Terry stop.

2009Ellington and Mikell, JJ, concur. 1 Teal v. State, 291 Ga. App. 488, 489 ( 662 SE2d 268 ) (2008). 2 Id. at 488 . 3 Id. 4 State v. Dukes, 279 Ga. App. 247, 248 ( 630 SE2d 847 ) (2006). 5 Id. at 248-249 . 6 Id. at 249 . 7 Id. 8 State v. Sapp, 214 Ga. App. 428, 431 (3) ( 448 SE2d 3 ) (1994). 9 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (88 SC 1868, 20 LE2d 889) (1968); see State v. Banks, 223 Ga. App. 838 ( 479 SE2d 168 ) (1996). 10 See Holmes v. State, 252 Ga. App. 286, 289 ( 556 SE2d 189 ) (2001). 11 See id. at 288-289 (Terry stop improper where defendant walked away, in a known drug area, and seemed nervous);

2009Ellington and Mikell, JJ, concur. 1 Teal v. State, 291 Ga. App. 488, 489 ( 662 SE2d 268 ) (2008). 2 Id. at 488 . 3 Id. 4 State v. Dukes, 279 Ga. App. 247, 248 ( 630 SE2d 847 ) (2006). 5 Id. at 248-249 . 6 Id. at 249 . 7 Id. 8 State v. Sapp, 214 Ga. App. 428, 431 (3) ( 448 SE2d 3 ) (1994). 9 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (88 SC 1868, 20 LE2d 889) (1968); see State v. Banks, 223 Ga. App. 838 ( 479 SE2d 168 ) (1996). 10 See Holmes v. State, 252 Ga. App. 286, 289 ( 556 SE2d 189 ) (2001). 11 See id. at 288-289 (Terry stop improper where defendant walked away, in a known drug area, and seemed nervous);

1998The `narrow scope' of the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked, even though that person happens to be on premises where an authorized narcotics search is taking place." [4] United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-418 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). [5] Ybarra, supra, 444 U.S. at 92-93 , 100 S.Ct. 338 . [6] See McGugan v. State, 215 Ga.App. 535, 536 , 451 S.E.2d 460 (1994), and cases cited therein.

1998The `narrow scope' of the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked, even though that person happens to be on premises where an authorized narcotics search is taking place." [4] United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-418 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). [5] Ybarra, supra, 444 U.S. at 92-93 , 100 S.Ct. 338 . [6] See McGugan v. State, 215 Ga.App. 535, 536 , 451 S.E.2d 460 (1994), and cases cited therein.

1999While a general tip to be on the lookout for a vehicle such as “a white van” may not create sufficient articulable suspicion, Vansant v. State, 264 Ga. 319, 321 (2) ( 443 SE2d 474 ) (1994), a more particularized description of a suspect vehicle may provide a reasonable suspicion sufficient to warrant a Terry stop.

1999While a general tip to be on the lookout for a vehicle such as “a white van” may not create sufficient articulable suspicion, Vansant v. State, 264 Ga. 319, 321 (2) ( 443 SE2d 474 ) (1994), a more particularized description of a suspect vehicle may provide a reasonable suspicion sufficient to warrant a Terry stop.

2022For example, in State v. Dukes, 279 Ga. App. 247, 249 ( 630 SE2d 847 ) (2006), we applied the Terry analysis for two purposes: to determine whether the officers were engaged in lawful duties and also to determine whether their initial encounter with the defendant was a second-tier or first-tier encounter from which the defendant could lawfully flee.

2022For example, in State v. Dukes, 279 Ga. App. 247, 249 ( 630 SE2d 847 ) (2006), we applied the Terry analysis for two purposes: to determine whether the officers were engaged in lawful duties and also to determine whether their initial encounter with the defendant was a second-tier or first-tier encounter from which the defendant could lawfully flee.

2009Compare State v. McKinney, 265 Ga. App. 322, 324 ( 593 SE2d 865 ) (2004) (Terry stop lawful where defendant was in dark remote area of private property with “no loitering” sign posted, and defendant’s responses to officer’s questions were suspicious). 12 See Banks, supra at 842 . 13 See Black v. State, 281 Ga. App. 40, 48 (1) ( 635 SE2d 568 ) (2006). 14 See State v. Gibbons, 248 Ga. App. 859, 864 (2) ( 547 SE2d 679 ) (2001). 15 See Foster v. State, 285 Ga. App. 441, 442 ( 646 SE2d 302 ) (2007). 16 Springsteen v. State, 206 Ga. App. 150, 152 ( 424 SE2d 832 ) (1992). 17 See Foster, supra at 443-

2009Compare State v. McKinney, 265 Ga. App. 322, 324 ( 593 SE2d 865 ) (2004) (Terry stop lawful where defendant was in dark remote area of private property with “no loitering” sign posted, and defendant’s responses to officer’s questions were suspicious). 12 See Banks, supra at 842 . 13 See Black v. State, 281 Ga. App. 40, 48 (1) ( 635 SE2d 568 ) (2006). 14 See State v. Gibbons, 248 Ga. App. 859, 864 (2) ( 547 SE2d 679 ) (2001). 15 See Foster v. State, 285 Ga. App. 441, 442 ( 646 SE2d 302 ) (2007). 16 Springsteen v. State, 206 Ga. App. 150, 152 ( 424 SE2d 832 ) (1992). 17 See Foster, supra at 443-

1998A Terry stop must be justified by specific, articulable facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Fritzius v. State, 225 Ga. App. 642, 643-644 ( 484 SE2d 743 ) (1997); Buffington v. State, 228 Ga. App. 810, 811 ( 492 SE2d 762 ) (1997).

1998A Terry stop must be justified by specific, articulable facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Fritzius v. State, 225 Ga. App. 642, 643-644 ( 484 SE2d 743 ) (1997); Buffington v. State, 228 Ga. App. 810, 811 ( 492 SE2d 762 ) (1997).

2019See Barnes v. State , 228 Ga.App. 44 , 46, 491 S.E.2d 116 (1997) ("An investigatory stop must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity." Thus, the officers' testimony that the suspect looked "suspicious" or "acted suspiciously," that the suspect looked like he was about to run from the officers, or that the suspect was standing in an area known for drug activity was insufficiently specific to justify a Terry stop.) (citations and punctuation omitted). 32 Preston , 348 Ga.App. at 664 , 824 S.E.2d 582 (citations and

2019See Barnes v. State , 228 Ga.App. 44 , 46, 491 S.E.2d 116 (1997) ("An investigatory stop must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity." Thus, the officers' testimony that the suspect looked "suspicious" or "acted suspiciously," that the suspect looked like he was about to run from the officers, or that the suspect was standing in an area known for drug activity was insufficiently specific to justify a Terry stop.) (citations and punctuation omitted). 32 Preston , 348 Ga.App. at 664 , 824 S.E.2d 582 (citations and

2010See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) ( Terry stop analysis is based on objective criteria, not on subjective motive of police).

2010See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) ( Terry stop analysis is based on objective criteria, not on subjective motive of police).

2009Ellington and Mikell, JJ, concur. 1 Teal v. State, 291 Ga. App. 488, 489 ( 662 SE2d 268 ) (2008). 2 Id. at 488 . 3 Id. 4 State v. Dukes, 279 Ga. App. 247, 248 ( 630 SE2d 847 ) (2006). 5 Id. at 248-249 . 6 Id. at 249 . 7 Id. 8 State v. Sapp, 214 Ga. App. 428, 431 (3) ( 448 SE2d 3 ) (1994). 9 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (88 SC 1868, 20 LE2d 889) (1968); see State v. Banks, 223 Ga. App. 838 ( 479 SE2d 168 ) (1996). 10 See Holmes v. State, 252 Ga. App. 286, 289 ( 556 SE2d 189 ) (2001). 11 See id. at 288-289 (Terry stop improper where defendant walked away, in a known drug area, and seemed nervous);

2009Ellington and Mikell, JJ, concur. 1 Teal v. State, 291 Ga. App. 488, 489 ( 662 SE2d 268 ) (2008). 2 Id. at 488 . 3 Id. 4 State v. Dukes, 279 Ga. App. 247, 248 ( 630 SE2d 847 ) (2006). 5 Id. at 248-249 . 6 Id. at 249 . 7 Id. 8 State v. Sapp, 214 Ga. App. 428, 431 (3) ( 448 SE2d 3 ) (1994). 9 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (88 SC 1868, 20 LE2d 889) (1968); see State v. Banks, 223 Ga. App. 838 ( 479 SE2d 168 ) (1996). 10 See Holmes v. State, 252 Ga. App. 286, 289 ( 556 SE2d 189 ) (2001). 11 See id. at 288-289 (Terry stop improper where defendant walked away, in a known drug area, and seemed nervous);

2001The facts in Smith clearly established that the original traffic detention had ended and Smith was improperly held further in order for the officer to summon a K-9 unit. [22] See, e.g., State v. Sims, 248 Ga.App. 277 , 546 S.E.2d 47 (2001); Almond v. State, 242 Ga.App. 650, 652 , 530 S.E.2d 750 (2000); Lyons v. State, 244 Ga.App. 658, 660 , 535 S.E.2d 841 (2000); see also State v. Milsap, 243 Ga.App. 519, 521 , 528 S.E.2d 865 (2000) (Ruffin, J., dissenting). [23] (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1279-1280 (11th Cir.2001). [24] Rad

2001Thomas also noted that “[i]n United States v. Sharpe, [ 470 U. S. 675 (105 SC 1568, 84 LE2d 605) (1985),] the Supreme Court determined that a 20-minute detention of an automobile driver did not exceed the bounds of an investigative stop.” (Punctuation omitted.) Accordingly, the brief detention of Pines and Lane for purposes of identification was not an arrest but an authorized Terry stop.

2013Hernandez-Lopez, supra; see United States v. Hensley, 469 U. S. 221, 229-230 ( 105 SCt 675 , 83 LE2d 604) (1985) (reasonable suspicion of past criminal conduct justifies Terry stop; promotes public interest in identifying and promptly detaining suspects).

2013Hernandez-Lopez, supra; see United States v. Hensley, 469 U. S. 221, 229-230 (105 SC 675, 83 LE2d 604) (1985) (reasonable suspicion of past criminal conduct justifies Terry stop; promotes public interest in identifying and promptly detaining suspects).

1998A Terry stop must be justified by specific, articulable facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Fritzius v. State, 225 Ga. App. 642, 643-644 ( 484 SE2d 743 ) (1997); Buffington v. State, 228 Ga. App. 810, 811 ( 492 SE2d 762 ) (1997).

1998A Terry stop must be justified by specific, articulable facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Fritzius v. State, 225 Ga. App. 642, 643-644 ( 484 SE2d 743 ) (1997); Buffington v. State, 228 Ga. App. 810, 811 ( 492 SE2d 762 ) (1997).

1998The validity of an officer’s investigative or protective conduct upon making a ‘Terry stop’ is determined in each case by balancing the extent of the intrusion against the immediacy and importance of the interest in crime prevention or law enforcement which is sought to be advanced.” (Citations omitted.) Golden, supra at 30 .

1986“The validity of an officer’s investigative or protective conduct upon making a ‘Terry stop’ is determined in each case by balancing the extent of the intrusion against the immediacy and importance of the interest in crime prevention or law enforcement which is sought to be advanced.” State v. Golden, 171 Ga. App. 27 ( 318 SE2d 693 ) (1984).

2001The facts in Smith clearly established that the original traffic detention had ended and Smith was improperly held further in order for the officer to summon a K-9 unit. [22] See, e.g., State v. Sims, 248 Ga.App. 277 , 546 S.E.2d 47 (2001); Almond v. State, 242 Ga.App. 650, 652 , 530 S.E.2d 750 (2000); Lyons v. State, 244 Ga.App. 658, 660 , 535 S.E.2d 841 (2000); see also State v. Milsap, 243 Ga.App. 519, 521 , 528 S.E.2d 865 (2000) (Ruffin, J., dissenting). [23] (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1279-1280 (11th Cir.2001). [24] Rad

2001The facts in Smith clearly established that the original traffic detention had ended and Smith was improperly held further in order for the officer to summon a K-9 unit. [22] See, e.g., State v. Sims, 248 Ga.App. 277 , 546 S.E.2d 47 (2001); Almond v. State, 242 Ga.App. 650, 652 , 530 S.E.2d 750 (2000); Lyons v. State, 244 Ga.App. 658, 660 , 535 S.E.2d 841 (2000); see also State v. Milsap, 243 Ga.App. 519, 521 , 528 S.E.2d 865 (2000) (Ruffin, J., dissenting). [23] (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1279-1280 (11th Cir.2001). [24] Rad

1997A Terry stop `"must be justified by specific, articulable facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. [Cits.]'" Tarwid v. State, 184 Ga.App. 853, 854 (1), 363 S.E.2d 63 .

1997A Terry stop `"must be justified by specific, articulable facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. [Cits.]'" Tarwid v. State, 184 Ga.App. 853, 854 (1), 363 S.E.2d 63 .

2011In a second-tier encounter, *595 known as a Terry stop, “a police officer, even in the absence of probable cause, may stop persons and detain them briefly, when the officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the persons are involved in criminal activity.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id.

1998See McClain v. State, 226 Ga.App. 714 (1), 487 S.E.2d 471 (1997). "[A]lthough a neighborhood's reputation [is] a factor supporting articulable suspicion, the fact that [Lewis] was in a place which the officer characterized as [an area known for criminal activity] does not alone constitute an articulable suspicion justifying a Terry stop.... [Cit.]" Barnes v. State, 228 Ga.App. 44, 46 , 491 S.E.2d 116 (1997).

1998The Terry standard being one of objective reasonableness, we are not limited to what the stopping officer says or to evidence of his subjective rationale; rather, we look to the record as a whole to determine what facts were known to the officer and then consider whether a reasonable officer in those circumstances would have been suspicious. [Cit.]" [7] Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); Johnson v. State, 230 Ga.App. 535, 537 (1), 496 S.E.2d 785 (1998); United States v. McKie, supra.

1998The Terry standard being one of objective reasonableness, we are not limited to what the stopping officer says or to evidence of his subjective rationale; rather, we look to the record as a whole to determine what facts were known to the officer and then consider whether a reasonable officer in those circumstances would have been suspicious. [Cit.]" [7] Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); Johnson v. State, 230 Ga.App. 535, 537 (1), 496 S.E.2d 785 (1998); United States v. McKie, supra.

1988As articulated by the decision cited by the majority, State v. Smith, 164 Ga. App. 142 (2) ( 296 SE2d 141 ) (1982), a Terry stop requires only articulated suspicion.

1988As articulated by the decision cited by the majority, State v. Smith, 164 Ga. App. 142 (2) ( 296 SE2d 141 ) (1982), a Terry stop requires only articulated suspicion.

2025Such a stop has been described by this court as a brief stop, limited in time to that minimally necessary to investigate the allegation invoking suspicion, and limited in scope to identification and limited questioning reasonably related to the circumstances that justified the initiation of the momentary stop.” (punctuation and citation omitted)); see also Carter v. State, 287 Ga. App. 597, 598 ( 651 SE2d 759 ) (2007) (describing a temporary seizure and pat-down for weapons as a “Terry-type” encounter). 49 Ewumi v. State, 315 Ga. App. 656, 658 (1) ( 727 SE2d 257 ) (2012) (punctuation omitted);

2008See Carter v. State, supra, 287 Ga. App. at 599 (“[a]n anonymous tip may be paired with the surrounding circumstances when evaluating an officer’s basis for a Terry stop”).

2018Articulable suspicion is ‘less than probable cause, but greater than mere caprice.’” (Citations omitted.) Stafford v. State, 284 Ga. 773, 774 ( 671 SE2d 484 ) (2008).

2018Articulable suspicion is ‘less than probable cause, but greater than mere caprice.’” (Citations omitted.) Stafford v. State, 284 Ga. 773, 774 ( 671 SE2d 484 ) (2008).

2017See Tyner v. State, 289 Ga. 592, 594 (3), n. 1 ( 714 SE2d 577 ) (2011), overruled on other grounds, Lejeune v. McLaughlin, 296 Ga. 291 ( 766 SE2d 803 ) (2014).

2017See Tyner v. State, 289 Ga. 592, 594 (3), n. 1 ( 714 SE2d 577 ) (2011), overruled on other grounds, Lejeune v. McLaughlin, 296 Ga. 291 ( 766 SE2d 803 ) (2014).

2017It is unclear from Terry’s brief what he means by his “first appeal.” In any event, the record reveals no notice of direct appeal or attempt to file a direct appeal for which Terry would have been entitled to counsel. 4 “An indigent defendant is entitled to representation by counsel only for trial and for the direct appeal from the judgment of conviction and sentence.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Pierce v. State, 289 Ga. 893, 894 (1) ( 717 SE2d 202 ) (2011).

2017It is unclear from Terry’s brief what he means by his “first appeal.” In any event, the record reveals no notice of direct appeal or attempt to file a direct appeal for which Terry would have been entitled to counsel. 4 “An indigent defendant is entitled to representation by counsel only for trial and for the direct appeal from the judgment of conviction and sentence.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Pierce v. State, 289 Ga. 893, 894 (1) ( 717 SE2d 202 ) (2011).

2017See Tyner v. State, 289 Ga. 592, 594 (3), n. 1 ( 714 SE2d 577 ) (2011), overruled on other grounds, Lejeune v. McLaughlin, 296 Ga. 291 ( 766 SE2d 803 ) (2014).

2017See Tyner v. State, 289 Ga. 592, 594 (3), n. 1 ( 714 SE2d 577 ) (2011), overruled on other grounds, Lejeune v. McLaughlin, 296 Ga. 291 ( 766 SE2d 803 ) (2014).