Terry stop in New York

2021In opposition to the motion, defendants contended only that the officer, based on the information that he received from the employee, "had a reasonable suspicion that plaintiff was the suspected assailant in the fight" and "initiated a lawful ' Terry stop' of . . . plaintiff to temporarily detain him to question and investigate plaintiff's role in the fight" ( see generally Terry v Ohio , 392 US 1, 20-27 [1968]).

2014Just as reliable hearsay can supply the police with probable cause, such hearsay can give rise to reasonable suspicion, which is the lesser level of suspicion required to authorize an investigatory stop of a person or a moving car under the four-tiered framework of People v De Bour ( 40 NY2d 210 [1976]) — also sometimes called a level-three stop under De Bour or, in federal constitutional parlance, a Terry stop (see Navarette v California, 572 US —, —, 134 S Ct 1683, 1687-1688 [2014]; Adams v Williams, 407 US 143, 147 [1972]; Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 20-27 [1968]; People v Landy, 59 NY2d 369, 3

1987Under the holding in Hicks , the transportation, which did not unduly prolong the detention, was reasonable and was "within the bounds of a lawful investigatory stop.” (68 NY2d, supra, at 240.) " 'If the purpose underlying a Terry stop — investigating possible criminal activity — is to be served, the police must under certain circumstances be able to detain the individual for longer than the brief time period involved in Terry and Adams. ’ ” (68 NY2d, supra, at 241, quoting Michigan v Summers, 452 US 692, 700, n 12 .) We have examined defendant’s remaining contentions and find them lacking in

1986However, as the Supreme Court itself has made clear, "the exception for limited intru sions that may be justified by special law enforcement interests is not confined to the momentary, on-the-street detention accompanied by a frisk for weapons involved in Terry and Adams.” (Michigan v Summers, 452 US 692, 700 .) "If the purpose underlying a Terry stop — investigating possible criminal activity — is to be served, the police must under certain circumstances be able to detain the individual for longer than the brief time period involved in Terry and Adams. ” (Michigan v Summers, 452 US, at p 700,

2024The parties are in stark disagreement as to whether the defendant was subject to an arrest, which of course would have required probable cause, Id. at 223 (commonly known as a "Level 4" encounter), or a Terry stop [FN2] (commonly known as a "Level 3" encounter), which requires only reasonable suspicion.

2014Just as reliable hearsay can supply the police with probable cause, such hearsay can give rise to reasonable suspicion, which is the lesser level of suspicion required to authorize an investigatory stop of a person or a moving car under the four-tiered framework of People v De Bour ( 40 NY2d 210 [1976]) — also sometimes called a level-three stop under De Bour or, in federal constitutional parlance, a Terry stop (see Navarette v California, 572 US —, —, 134 S Ct 1683, 1687-1688 [2014]; Adams v Williams, 407 US 143, 147 [1972]; Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 20-27 [1968]; People v Landy, 59 NY2d 369, 3

1986However, as the Supreme Court itself has made clear, "the exception for limited intru sions that may be justified by special law enforcement interests is not confined to the momentary, on-the-street detention accompanied by a frisk for weapons involved in Terry and Adams.” (Michigan v Summers, 452 US 692, 700 .) "If the purpose underlying a Terry stop — investigating possible criminal activity — is to be served, the police must under certain circumstances be able to detain the individual for longer than the brief time period involved in Terry and Adams. ” (Michigan v Summers, 452 US, at p 700,

1982Thus, it is clear that the Terry court was not insensitive to the qualitative, even if not quantitative, nature of the intrusion wrought by a stop-and-frisk when, eschewing a “rigid all-or-nothing model of justification”, it held that, in “particular” circumstances, reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause could suffice to support such an event ( 392 US, at p 17 ). 2 It therefore has been “careful” to continue to confine the “narrow scope” of the Terry exception (Dunaway v New York, 442 US 200, 210 ), which, from the beginning, was cautiously conditioned on no less than the existence of

1993Likewise, questioning of a suspect during a "Terry stop” (Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1 ) does not per se constitute custodial interrogation (Berkemer v McCarty, supra, at 439-440; United States v Brignoni-Ponce, 422 US 873, 880-881 ).

1993Also, it was pointed out in Berkemer v McCarty (supra) that questioning in a "Terry stop” (Terry v Ohio, supra) is not deemed custodial interrogation because "[tjypically, this means that the officer may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions * * * And, unless the detainee’s answers provide the officer with probable cause to arrest him, he must then be released” (Berkemer v McCarty, supra, at 439-440 [emphasis supplied]).

2024In Florida v. J.L. , 529 U.S. 266, 275 (2000), the Supreme Court invalidated a Terry stop that arose from an anonymous tip because the tip lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to give rise to reasonable suspicion: An accurate description of a subject's readily observable location and appearance is of course reliable in this limited sense: it will help the police correctly identify the person whom the tipster means to accuse.

2004Cf. Florida v. J.L. , 529 U.S. 266 (2000) (invalid Terry stop required suppression of firearm disclosed by frisk); People v. Hogencamp , 295 A.D.2d 808 (3rd Dept. 2002) (even if initial stop justified, subsequent detention was not; suppression granted).

2024A traffic stop is "[l]ike a Terry stop" ( Rodriguez v United States , 575 US 348 , 354 [2015]), where "an investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop" and "the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time" ( Florida v Royer , 460 US 491, 500 [1983]).

2005In discussing police conduct in Royer ( 460 US at 501 ), the Supreme Court observed that by retaining the suspect’s driver’s license and airline ticket and asking him to accompany them “without indicating in any way that he was free to depart, Royer was effectively seized for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment.” .

2014Just as reliable hearsay can supply the police with probable cause, such hearsay can give rise to reasonable suspicion, which is the lesser level of suspicion required to authorize an investigatory stop of a person or a moving car under the four-tiered framework of People v DeBour -- also sometimes called a level-three stop under DeBour or, in federal - 14 - - 15 - No. 198, 199, 210 constitutional parlance, a Terry stop (see Navarette v California, __US__, 134 S Ct 1683, 1687-1688 [2014]; Adams v Williams, 407 US 143, 147 [1972]; Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 20-27 [1968]; People v Landy, 59 NY2d 36

2014Just as reliable hearsay can supply the police with probable cause, such hearsay can give rise to reasonable suspicion, which is the lesser level of suspicion required to authorize an investigatory stop of a person or a moving car under the four-tiered framework of People v De Bour ( 40 NY2d 210 [1976]) — also sometimes called a level-three stop under De Bour or, in federal constitutional parlance, a Terry stop (see Navarette v California, 572 US —, —, 134 S Ct 1683, 1687-1688 [2014]; Adams v Williams, 407 US 143, 147 [1972]; Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 20-27 [1968]; People v Landy, 59 NY2d 369, 3

2014In the past, we interpreted the State Constitution to permit a level-three stop based on a hearsay report that did not meet both prongs of the Aguilar-Spinelli standard for reliability (see People v Salaman, 71 NY2d 869, 870 [1988]; Landy, 59 NY2d at 376 ).

2002In People v Benjamin ( 51 NY2d 267 [1980]) and People v Salaman ( 71 NY2d 869 [1988]), the Court of Appeals held that an anonymous description of particularity and accuracy was sufficient to permit a Terry stop.

2024Thus, "[f]or a traffic stop to pass constitutional muster, the officer's action in stopping the vehicle must be justified at its inception and the seizure must be reasonably related in scope, including its length, to the circumstances which justified the detention in the first instance," and a "continued involuntary detention of [a] defendant . . . constitute[s] a seizure in violation of their constitutional rights, unless circumstances coming to [the officer's] attention following the initial stop furnished . . . reasonable suspicion that they were engaged in criminal activity" ( People v Ban

2024A Terry stop is a seizure, but must be brief and truly investigatory in nature, People v. Ryan , 12 NY3d 28, 30 (2009), allowing, of course, for the additional intrusion of a pat down if the officer has the specific reasonable suspicion to believe that the person stopped might be armed and dangerous.

2024See generally Matter of Ronald C., 107 AD2d 1053, 1053-54 (4th Dept. 1985) (juveniles are entitled to the same due process of law as adults thus the police may not seize a suspect, transport him to a police station and detain him for custodial interrogation without probable cause). (citations omitted). [FN4] And, finally, it bears noting that both Lleras himself and his supervising sergeant believed that the detention of the defendant was an arrest, not a Terry stop.

2024Thus, "[f]or a traffic stop to pass constitutional muster, the officer's action in stopping the vehicle must be justified at its inception and the seizure must be reasonably related in scope, including its length, to the circumstances which justified the detention in the first instance," and a "continued involuntary detention of [a] defendant . . . constitute[s] a seizure in violation of their constitutional rights, unless circumstances coming to [the officer's] attention following the initial stop furnished . . . reasonable suspicion that they were engaged in criminal activity" ( People v Ban

2024People v. Russ , 61 NY2d 693, 695 (1984).

2024A traffic stop is "[l]ike a Terry stop" ( Rodriguez v United States , 575 US 348 , 354 [2015]), where "an investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop" and "the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time" ( Florida v Royer , 460 US 491, 500 [1983]).

2024Thus, "[f]or a traffic stop to pass constitutional muster, the officer's action in stopping the vehicle must be justified at its inception and the seizure must be reasonably related in scope, including its length, to the circumstances which justified the detention in the first instance," and a "continued involuntary detention of [a] defendant . . . constitute[s] a seizure in violation of their constitutional rights, unless circumstances coming to [the officer's] attention following the initial stop furnished . . . reasonable suspicion that they were engaged in criminal activity" ( People v Ban

2014Just as reliable hearsay can supply the police with probable cause, such hearsay can give rise to reasonable suspicion, which is the lesser level of suspicion required to authorize an investigatory stop of a person or a moving car under the four-tiered framework of People v DeBour -- also sometimes called a level-three stop under DeBour or, in federal - 14 - - 15 - No. 198, 199, 210 constitutional parlance, a Terry stop (see Navarette v California, __US__, 134 S Ct 1683, 1687-1688 [2014]; Adams v Williams, 407 US 143, 147 [1972]; Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 20-27 [1968]; People v Landy, 59 NY2d 36

2014Just as reliable hearsay can supply the police with probable cause, such hearsay can give rise to reasonable suspicion, which is the lesser level of suspicion required to authorize an investigatory stop of a person or a moving car under the four-tiered framework of People v De Bour ( 40 NY2d 210 [1976]) — also sometimes called a level-three stop under De Bour or, in federal constitutional parlance, a Terry stop (see Navarette v California, 572 US —, —, 134 S Ct 1683, 1687-1688 [2014]; Adams v Williams, 407 US 143, 147 [1972]; Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 20-27 [1968]; People v Landy, 59 NY2d 369, 3

2014Just as reliable hearsay can supply the police with probable cause, such hearsay can give rise to reasonable suspicion, which is the lesser level of suspicion required to authorize an investigatory stop of a person or a moving car under the four-tiered framework of People v DeBour -- also sometimes called a level-three stop under DeBour or, in federal - 14 - - 15 - No. 198, 199, 210 constitutional parlance, a Terry stop (see Navarette v California, __US__, 134 S Ct 1683, 1687-1688 [2014]; Adams v Williams, 407 US 143, 147 [1972]; Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 20-27 [1968]; People v Landy, 59 NY2d 36

2014Just as reliable hearsay can supply the police with probable cause, such hearsay can give rise to reasonable suspicion, which is the lesser level of suspicion required to authorize an investigatory stop of a person or a moving car under the four-tiered framework of People v De Bour ( 40 NY2d 210 [1976]) — also sometimes called a level-three stop under De Bour or, in federal constitutional parlance, a Terry stop (see Navarette v California, 572 US —, —, 134 S Ct 1683, 1687-1688 [2014]; Adams v Williams, 407 US 143, 147 [1972]; Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 20-27 [1968]; People v Landy, 59 NY2d 369, 3

2005Although the majority accords no significance to the demand for defendant’s driver’s license, retention of a license has been held to be the very definition of the Terry stop: “if the officer retains the driver’s license, he or she must have reasonable and articulable suspicion to question the driver about drugs or weapons” (United States v Turner, 928 F2d 956, 959 [10th Cir 1991], cert denied 502 US 881 [1991]) and “an officer must return a driver’s documentation before the detention can end” (United States v Mendez, 118 F3d 1426, 1430 [10th Cir 1997]).

2005Although the officers did not physically stop defendant’s vehicle, which was already stationary at a fire hydrant, they immediately prevented its free movement by placing their van directly in front of defendant’s par, concededly blocking it and thereby effecting a Terry stop (see People v Sobotker, 43 NY2d 559 [1978]; People v Morrison, 161 AD2d 608 [1990]; People v Brown, 112 AD2d 945, 946 [1985]).