Terry stop in New Jersey

2026A-1935-24 16 In contrast, an investigative detention or "Terry stop,"7 is a "temporary seizure" that occurs when "'an objectively reasonable person' would feel 'that his or her right to move has been restricted.'" Ibid. (quoting Rodriguez, 172 N.J. at 126 ).

2026In contrast, an investigative detention or "Terry stop," is a "temporary seizure" that occurs when "'an objectively reasonable person' would feel 'that his or her right to move has been restricted.'" Ibid. (quoting Rodriguez, 172 N.J. at 126 ).

2026A Terry stop and the frisk are analyzed under separate standards. 392 U.S. at 21-27 .

2026"The first component of the Terry rule concerns the level of reasonable suspicion that must exist before an 'investigatory stop' legitimately may be undertaken." State v. Thomas, 110 N.J. 673, 678 (1988); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 .

2020The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities." Second, a court must determine whether the evidence "raise[s] a suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing." A-4896-17T2 9 [Davis, 104 N.J. at 501 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418 .)] N.H. argues that, like the defendant in Tucker, his flight did not justify a Terry stop.

2018See State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 497-98 (1986) (finding a Terry stop where a police officer blocked defendant's vehicle with his car to prevent him from leaving).

2026"The first component of the Terry rule concerns the level of reasonable suspicion that must exist before an 'investigatory stop' legitimately may be undertaken." State v. Thomas, 110 N.J. 673, 678 (1988); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 .

2026"The first component of the Terry rule concerns the level of reasonable suspicion that must exist before an 'investigatory stop' legitimately may be undertaken." State v. Thomas, 110 N.J. 673, 678 (1988); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 .

2022Based upon these principles, we are satisfied police had sufficient probable cause to arrest defendant, and therefore to effectuate the vehicle stop in Andover.4 See O'Neal, 190 N.J. at 611-12 ("The standard for a Terry stop 'is lower than the standard of probable cause necessary to justify an arrest. '" (quoting Nishina, 175 N.J. at 511 )).

2022See State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 20 (2004) (holding "an investigatory stop, sometimes referred to as a Terry stop, is valid 'if it is based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.'" (quoting State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 510-11 (2003)) (footnote omitted)).

2024The Terry stop, or an investigative stop, "involves a relatively brief detention by police during which a person's movement is restricted." State v. A-2388-22 7 Goldsmith, 251 N.J. 384 , 399 (2022); see also State v. Rosario, 229 N.J. 263, 272 (2017).

2024One such exception is the investigative or Terry stop, "which is a procedure that involves a relatively brief detention by police during which a person's movement is restricted." State v. Goldsmith, 251 N.J. 384 , 399 (2022) (citing State v. Rosario, 229 N.J. 263, 272 (2017)).

2024The law has long been settled that "the investigative methods employed [in a Terry stop] should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time." State v. Privott, 203 N.J. 16, 31 (2010) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)).

2021Included among the "constitutionally permissible forms of police encounters that do not constitute searches or seizures for purposes of the warrant requirement" is "an investigatory stop, sometimes referred to as a 'Terry' stop or a 'stop and frisk.'" 4 State v. Privott, 203 N.J. 16, 24-25 (2010) (footnote omitted).

2026"A police officer may conduct an investigatory stop if, based on the totality of the circumstances, the officer had a reasonable and particularized suspicion to believe that an individual has just engaged in, or was about to engage in, criminal activity." State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 356 (2002) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 ).

2022A Terry stop "occurs during a police encounter when 'an objectively reasonable person' would feel 'that his or her right to move has been restricted.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 126 (2002); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (plurality opinion)).

2022See State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 20 (2004) (holding "an investigatory stop, sometimes referred to as a Terry stop, is valid 'if it is based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.'" (quoting State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 510-11 (2003)) (footnote omitted)).

2021See Pineiro, 181 N.J. at 26 ("the reputation or history of an area" as being a high-crime area "and an officer's experience with and knowledge of the suspected transfer of narcotics" are "relevant factors to determine the validity of a Terry stop").

2025A Terry stop implicates a constitutional requirement that there be "'specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,' give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 247 (2007) (quoting State v. Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 126 (2002)).

2025A Terry stop implicates a constitutional requirement there be "'specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,' give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 247 (2007) (quoting State v. Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 126 (2002)).

2020The suppression judge's reasoning is consistent with the analysis in State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 11 (1997), where our Supreme Court confirmed that "[p]olice officers should consider whether a defendant's actions are more consistent with innocence than guilt; however, simply because a defendant's actions might have some speculative innocent explanation does not mean that they cannot support articulable suspicions if a reasonable person would find the actions are consistent with guilt." We also recognize that a police officer is permitted to pat down a citizen's outer clothing incident to a Ter

2015However, we do not believe probable cause is necessary to justify accompanying a detainee in a Terry stop to prevent attack or escape. "'The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape.'" State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 8 (1997) (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145 , 92 S. Ct. 1921, 1923 , 32 L.

2021We answer that question — whether the officers' demands for defendant's identification were lawful — by employing the two-prong test adopted in Terry, which requires us to consider "whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." 392 U.S. at 20 ; Dickey, 152 N.J. at 476 (explaining courts employ the Terry standard to measure the reasonableness of a detention following a valid traffic stop).

2021We answer that question — whether the officers' demands for defendant's identification were lawful — by employing the two-prong test adopted in Terry, which requires us to consider "whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." 392 U.S. at 20 ; Dickey, 152 N.J. at 476 (explaining courts employ the Terry standard to measure the reasonableness of a detention following a valid traffic stop).

2019See Valentine, 134 N.J. at 547 ("Terry itself acknowledges that police officers must be permitted to use their knowledge and experience in deciding whether to frisk a suspect"); id. at 543 (explaining that although "the Terry standard is an objective one, . . . '[t]he process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities'") (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)).

2019See Valentine, 134 N.J. at 547 ("Terry itself acknowledges that police officers must be permitted to use their knowledge and experience in deciding whether to frisk a suspect"); id. at 543 (explaining that although "the Terry standard is an objective one, . . . '[t]he process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities'") (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)).

2024State v. Dangerfield, 171 N.J. 446, 457-58 (2002) (citing Tucker, 136 N.J. at 169 ).

1995Defendant's abandonment of the evidence transpired after defendant no longer was free to leave and after the police had unlawfully seized him; therefore, the Appellate Division properly excluded the evidence. [ Id. at 173, 642 A. 2d 401 .] We discern an underlying principle from the Supreme Court's analysis of the facts in Tucker as compared to those in Doss ; the holdings it articulated; and the rationale expressed that the mere act of leaving a police presence, even by running away, cannot, alone, without any other factor, legitimately produce the articulable suspicion required to validate a

2025The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities." Second, a court must determine whether the evidence "raise[s] a suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing." [Id. at 501 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)) (alterations in original).] Mohr conducted a Terry stop and pat down of defendant based on a report of criminal activity and a description of the suspect obtained from a 9-1-1 caller.

2020The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities." Second, a court must determine whether the evidence "raise[s] a suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing." A-4896-17T2 9 [Davis, 104 N.J. at 501 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418 .)] N.H. argues that, like the defendant in Tucker, his flight did not justify a Terry stop.

2000In State v. Zapata, 297 N.J.Super. 160, 173 , 687 A. 2d 1025 (App.Div.1997) certif. denied, 156 N.J. 405 , 719 A. 2d 637 (1998), we found that "an anonymous call may provide the factual predicate to justify an investigatory stop when there is corroboration of the information furnished." See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 , 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2415-16 , 110 L.Ed. 2d 301, 308 (1990) (finding that a telephone tip from an unknown informant does not provide the objectively reasonable suspicion required for a Terry stop and frisk unless it is corroborated by other evidence).

2000In State v. Zapata, 297 N.J.Super. 160, 173 , 687 A. 2d 1025 (App.Div.1997) certif. denied, 156 N.J. 405 , 719 A. 2d 637 (1998), we found that "an anonymous call may provide the factual predicate to justify an investigatory stop when there is corroboration of the information furnished." See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 , 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2415-16 , 110 L.Ed. 2d 301, 308 (1990) (finding that a telephone tip from an unknown informant does not provide the objectively reasonable suspicion required for a Terry stop and frisk unless it is corroborated by other evidence).

2025In each of these precedents, our Supreme Court found that the anonymous report of criminal activity by an ordinary citizen, when considered in context with other facts, was sufficient to give law enforcement personnel authority to enter a home under the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement, see A-3940-23 14 State v. Frankel, 179 N.J. 586, 598 (2004), effectuate an arrest based on probable cause, or conduct a Terry stop.

2025In each of these precedents, our Supreme Court found the report of criminal activity by an ordinary citizen, when considered in context with other facts, was sufficient to give law enforcement personnel authority to enter a home under the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement, see State v. Frankel, 179 N.J. 586, 598 (2004), effectuate an arrest based on probable cause, or conduct a Terry stop.

2008An "anonymous tip standing alone cannot justify a Terry stop." State v. Richards, 351 N.J.Super. 289, 303-04 , 798 A. 2d 136 (App.Div.2002); see also Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 , 120 S.Ct. 1375 , 146 L.Ed. 2d 254 (2000).

2008An "anonymous tip standing alone cannot justify a Terry stop." State v. Richards, 351 N.J.Super. 289, 303-04 , 798 A. 2d 136 (App.Div.2002); see also Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 , 120 S.Ct. 1375 , 146 L.Ed. 2d 254 (2000).

2022Based upon these principles, we are satisfied police had sufficient probable cause to arrest defendant, and therefore to effectuate the vehicle stop in Andover.4 See O'Neal, 190 N.J. at 611-12 ("The standard for a Terry stop 'is lower than the standard of probable cause necessary to justify an arrest. '" (quoting Nishina, 175 N.J. at 511 )).

2020See State v. O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 611-12 (2007) ("The standard for a Terry stop 'is lower than the standard of probable cause necessary to justify an arrest.'" (quoting Nishina, 175 N.J. at 511 )).

2022The judge found there was "no significant break in the causative chain between Pereira's attempt to conduct an unlawful Terry stop and defendant allegedly dropping a gun . . . . [T]he State has not shown that defendant was aware that he was fleeing from a police officer, or that defendant even heard the officer's command to stop." The judge found the situation lacked an "intervening act that marked 'the point at which the detrimental consequences' of the illegal police action became so 'attenuated that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost.'" (quoting State

2020An investigative detention, commonly referred to as a Terry stop, is a valid exception to the A-1059-18T2 6 warrant requirement "if it is based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with [the] rational inferences from those facts, give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." State v. Williams, 192 N.J. 1, 9 (2007) (quoting State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 20 (2004)).

2026A-1935-24 16 In contrast, an investigative detention or "Terry stop,"7 is a "temporary seizure" that occurs when "'an objectively reasonable person' would feel 'that his or her right to move has been restricted.'" Ibid. (quoting Rodriguez, 172 N.J. at 126 ).

2026In contrast, an investigative detention or "Terry stop," is a "temporary seizure" that occurs when "'an objectively reasonable person' would feel 'that his or her right to move has been restricted.'" Ibid. (quoting Rodriguez, 172 N.J. at 126 ).

2021But see Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984) (stating an officer conducting a Terry stop "may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicions.

2005Miranda warnings are required only if the stop, due to its duration or other attendant circumstances, "is fairly characterized as the functional equivalent of an arrest." Berkemer, supra, 468 U.S. at 442 , 104 S.Ct. at 3150 , 82 L.Ed. 2d at 336 ; Toro, supra, 229 N.J.Super. at 221 , 551 A. 2d at 173 ; see State v. Dickey, 152 N.J. 468, 478 , 706 A.2d 180, 185 (1998) ( Terry stop becomes a de facto arrest when officer's conduct is unreasonably intrusive).

2024The law has long been settled that "the investigative methods employed [in a Terry stop] should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time." State v. Privott, 203 N.J. 16, 31 (2010) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)).

2018LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.2(d), at 403 & n.124 (5th ed. 2012).3 Defendant notes "the principle that 'the investigative methods employed [in a Terry stop] should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time." Privott, 203 N.J. at 31 (alteration in original) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 , 3 Defendant does not challenge the reasonableness of ordering defendant and his passengers to exit the car, see State v. Bacome, 228 N.J. 94, 104-08 (2017), lie down, or be handcuffed, see State v. Legette, 441 N.J.

2021Super. 21, 30 (App. Div. 1999) (holding an officer's question, "you do not have anything you shouldn't ," "converted [a] field inquiry into a Terry stop detention"); see also State v. Contreras, 326 N.J.

2002J.G., 320 N.J.Super. 21, 31 , 726 A. 2d 948 (App.Div.1999) (finding that asking questions such as whether you "do not have anything you shouldn't" converts an inquiry into a Terry stop); Costa, supra, 327 N.J.Super. at 31 , 742 A. 2d 599 (finding that questions such as "what are you doing" and "[a]re you doing something that you're not suppose to be doing out here" convert a benign field inquiry into a Terry stop); Contreras, supra, 326 N.J.Super. at 540 , 742 A. 2d 154 (concluding that asking the defendants whether they had contraband on them converted a field inquiry into an investigative de

1995Even in connection with the execution of a search warrant, which must be issued by an impartial magistrate upon a showing of probable cause, the Supreme Court has held that the police may not seek to control the site of the search by routinely conducting a patdown frisk for weapons of any person present on *116 the scene, because "[t]he `narrow scope' of the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked." Ybarra v. Illinois, supra, 444 U.S. at 95 , 100 S.Ct. at 343 , 62 L.Ed. 2d at 247 .

1995Even in connection with the execution of a search warrant, which must be issued by an impartial magistrate upon a showing of probable cause, the Supreme Court has held that the police may not seek to control the site of the search by routinely conducting a patdown frisk for weapons of any person present on *116 the scene, because "[t]he `narrow scope' of the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked." Ybarra v. Illinois, supra, 444 U.S. at 95 , 100 S.Ct. at 343 , 62 L.Ed. 2d at 247 .

1999See ibid.; see also State v. Smith, 155 N.J. 83 , 713 A. 2d 1033 (1998) (holding Terry standard exceeded by overly intrusive search of defendant's person); State v. Zutic, 155 N.J. 103 , 713 A. 2d 1043 (1998) (same).

1999See ibid.; see also State v. Smith, 155 N.J. 83 , 713 A. 2d 1033 (1998) (holding Terry standard exceeded by overly intrusive search of defendant's person); State v. Zutic, 155 N.J. 103 , 713 A. 2d 1043 (1998) (same).

2020In State v. Smith, 134 N.J. 599, 618 (1994), the Court explained "that an officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts that would warrant heightened caution to justify ordering the occupants to step out of a vehicle detained for a traffic violation." The standard is not as stringent as the Terry standard, and the officer need point only to some fact or facts in the totality of the circumstances that would create in a police officer a heightened awareness of danger that would warrant an objectively reasonable officer in A-5721-17T1 6 securing the scene in a more effective man

2020In State v. Smith, 134 N.J. 599, 618 (1994), the Court explained "that an officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts that would warrant heightened caution to justify ordering the occupants to step out of a vehicle detained for a traffic violation." The standard is not as stringent as the Terry standard, and the officer need point only to some fact or facts in the totality of the circumstances that would create in a police officer a heightened awareness of danger that would warrant an objectively reasonable officer in A-5721-17T1 6 securing the scene in a more effective man