Terry stop in Alabama

2015The standard for allowing a Terry stop is whether there is a reasonable suspicion that “the person being stopped has engaged in some type of criminal activity.” Webb v. State, 500 So.2d 1280, 1281 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 500 So.2d 1282 (Ala.1986).’ ” Muse v. State, 42 So.3d 789, 791 (Ala.Crim.App.2009) (quoting Ex parte Carpenter, 592 So.2d 627, 629 (Ala.1991)); see also Gaskin v. State, 565 So.2d 675, 677 (Ala.Crim.App.1990) (“The United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), held that a police officer may make a brief investigatory d

2009The standard for allowing a Terry stop is whether there is a reasonable suspicion that `the person being stopped has engaged in some type of criminal activity.' Webb v. State, 500 So.2d 1280, 1281 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert, denied, 500 So.2d 1282 (Ala.1986)." Ex parte Carpenter, 592 So.2d 627, 629 (Ala.1991). "`"The officer [making a Terry stop]... must be able to articulate something more than an `inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch."' [ Terry, 392 U.S.] at 27.

2015The standard for allowing a Terry stop is whether there is a reasonable suspicion that “the person being stopped has engaged in some type of criminal activity.” Webb v. State, 500 So.2d 1280, 1281 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 500 So.2d 1282 (Ala.1986).’ ” Muse v. State, 42 So.3d 789, 791 (Ala.Crim.App.2009) (quoting Ex parte Carpenter, 592 So.2d 627, 629 (Ala.1991)); see also Gaskin v. State, 565 So.2d 675, 677 (Ala.Crim.App.1990) (“The United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), held that a police officer may make a brief investigatory d

2009The standard for allowing a Terry stop is whether there is a reasonable suspicion that `the person being stopped has engaged in some type of criminal activity.' Webb v. State, 500 So.2d 1280, 1281 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert, denied, 500 So.2d 1282 (Ala.1986)." Ex parte Carpenter, 592 So.2d 627, 629 (Ala.1991). "`"The officer [making a Terry stop]... must be able to articulate something more than an `inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch."' [ Terry, 392 U.S.] at 27.

2015The standard for allowing a Terry stop is whether there is a reasonable suspicion that “the person being stopped has engaged in some type of criminal activity.” Webb v. State, 500 So.2d 1280, 1281 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 500 So.2d 1282 (Ala.1986).’ ” Muse v. State, 42 So.3d 789, 791 (Ala.Crim.App.2009) (quoting Ex parte Carpenter, 592 So.2d 627, 629 (Ala.1991)); see also Gaskin v. State, 565 So.2d 675, 677 (Ala.Crim.App.1990) (“The United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), held that a police officer may make a brief investigatory d

2015Because a Terry stop is “a carefully limited search of the outer clothing ... in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault” the officer, id, at 30, that .search is “not justified by any need to prevent the disappearance or destruction of evidence of crime.” Id. at 29 .

2010We have held that probable cause means “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found,” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983), and the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than that for probable cause, see United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541, 544 (1985).’ ” 992 So.2d at 84 .

2010We have held that probable cause means “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found,” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983), and the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than that for probable cause, see United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541, 544 (1985).’ ” 992 So.2d at 83-84 .

2010We have held that probable cause means “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found,” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983), and the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than that for probable cause, see United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541, 544 (1985).’ ” 992 So.2d at 84 .

2010We have held that probable cause means “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found,” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983), and the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than that for probable cause, see United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541, 544 (1985).’ ” 992 So.2d at 83-84 .

2002This court held that the trial court had erred by using the Terry standard when it should have used the standard established in Ex parte McLendon, 455 So.2d 863 (Ala.1984).

2002This court held that the trial court had erred by using the Terry standard when it should have used the standard established in Ex parte McLendon, 455 So.2d 863 (Ala.1984).

2009We have held that probable cause means `a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found,' [ Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983),] and the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than for probable cause."'" State v. White, 854 So.2d 636, 640 (Ala. Crim.App.2003), quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329-30 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990), quoting in turn United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989).

2009We have held that probable cause means `a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found,' [ Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983),] and the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than for probable cause."'" State v. White, 854 So.2d 636, 640 (Ala. Crim.App.2003), quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329-30 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990), quoting in turn United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989).

2010Here, Jemison relies on B.J.C. v. State, 992 So.2d 90 (Ala.Crim.App.2008), in arguing that whatever tip the police received regarding the drug activity at the house Officer Clackley was watching lacked the “indicia of reliability critical to allow the officer to infringe on the Fourth Amendment rights of Jemison.” (Jemison’s brief, at 12.) In B.J.C., this Court held that a Terry stop was constitutionally impermissible pursuant to Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 , 120 S.Ct. 1375 , 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000), when the initial detention was based solely upon an anonymous tip and the tip lacked any “ ‘i

2005We there assumed that the unverified tip from the known informant might not have been reliable enough to establish probable cause, but nevertheless found it sufficiently reliable to justify a Terry stop. 407 U.S., at 147 .

2005We reject R.W.’s argument that the “roach” could not be considered in determining whether there was reasonable suspicion to justify the Terry stop and frisk, and we find his reliance on, among other cases, United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 , 105 S.Ct. 675 , 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985), to be inapposite.

2005We reject R.W.’s argument that the “roach” could not be considered in determining whether there was reasonable suspicion to justify the Terry stop and frisk, and we find his reliance on, among other cases, United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 , 105 S.Ct. 675 , 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985), to be inapposite.

2015The standard for allowing a Terry stop is whether there is a reasonable suspicion that “the person being stopped has engaged in some type of criminal activity.” Webb v. State, 500 So.2d 1280, 1281 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 500 So.2d 1282 (Ala.1986).’ ” Muse v. State, 42 So.3d 789, 791 (Ala.Crim.App.2009) (quoting Ex parte Carpenter, 592 So.2d 627, 629 (Ala.1991)); see also Gaskin v. State, 565 So.2d 675, 677 (Ala.Crim.App.1990) (“The United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), held that a police officer may make a brief investigatory d

2009The standard for allowing a Terry stop is whether there is a reasonable suspicion that ‘the person being stopped has engaged in some type of criminal activity.’ Webb v. State, 500 So.2d 1280, 1281 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 500 So.2d 1282 (Ala.1986).” Muse v. State, [Ms. CR-08-0699, Aug. 28, 2009] -So.3d -, - (Ala.Crim.App.2009) (quoting Ex parte Carpenter, 592 So.2d 627, 629 (Ala.1991)); see also Gaskin v. State, 565 So.2d 675, 677 (Ala.Crim.App.1990) (“The United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), held that a police officer may make

2009We have held that probable cause means ‘a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found,’ [Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983),] and the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than for probable cause.” ’ ” State v. White, 854 So.2d 636, 640 (Ala.Crim.App.2003), quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329-30 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990), quoting in turn United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989).

2009We have held that probable cause means `a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found,' [ Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983),] and the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than for probable cause."'" State v. White, 854 So.2d 636, 640 (Ala. Crim.App.2003), quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329-30 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990), quoting in turn United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989).

2005Compare State v. Bergerson, 659 N.W.2d 791 (Minn.Ct.App. 2003) (distinguishing Vereb and holding that a telephone call from an employee of a hardware store where the appellant had purchased rubber tubing and acetone, without more, was not sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop of the appellant's vehicle). "`Similarly, in State v. Bulington, 783 N.E.2d 338 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003), the evidence indicated that Cassie Oakley, an employee at a Meijer Superstore who had been advised by Meijer's loss-prevention personnel to be aware of activity involving decongestants or other precu

2004Compare State v. Bergerson , 659 N.W.2d 791 (Minn.Ct.App. 2003) (distinguishing Vereb and holding that a telephone call from an employee of a hardware store where the appellant had purchased rubber tubing and acetone, without more, was not sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop of the appellant's vehicle).

1998Based upon that whole picture the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activty.' United States v. Cortez , 449 U.S. 411 , 417-18 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 695 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)." 473 So.2d at 636-37 .

1994State v. Richardson , 616 So.2d 400 (Ala.Cr.App. 1993); Richardson v. City of Trussville , 492 So.2d 625 (Ala.Cr.App. 1985); Worthy , supra. Therefore, the trial court did not err in holding that the officers conducted a valid Terry stop and pat down for weapons.

2025In 2005, in Ex parte G.C., 924 So. 2d 651, 657 (Ala. 2005), our supreme court interpreted its holding in D.J., writing: "In Ex parte D.J., 645 So. 2d 303 (Ala. 1994), this Court determined that an examination of whether a father of a child born to unmarried parents relinquished his right to custody of the child must begin at the point in time when the father was legally declared by a court to be the father of the child." 13 CL-2025-0032 (Emphasis added.) 1 Additionally, in R.K. v. R.J., 843 So. 2d 774, 782 (Ala. Civ.

2010See, e.g., R.K. v. R.J., 843 So.2d 774 (Ala.Civ.App.2002) (Terry standard applied to a custody dispute between the maternal grandparents and the father in juvenile court; juvenile court had “retained jurisdiction” from an earlier paternity proceeding).

2009He didn’t want me to pat him down, that’s fine.” (R. 12.) During a Terry stop, the search conducted by a police officer “ ‘ “ ‘is limited in scope to a “pat-down” of the suspects’ outer clothing and to seizure of hard objects whose size and shape give the officer probable cause to believe they are weapons.’ ” ’ ” Hails, 814 So.2d at 987, quoting Martin v. State, 695 So.2d 141, 143 (Ala.Crim.App.1996), quoting in turn Smith v. State, 292 Ala. 120 , 289 So.2d 816, 818 (Ala.1974).

2009He didn’t want me to pat him down, that’s fine.” (R. 12.) During a Terry stop, the search conducted by a police officer “ ‘ “ ‘is limited in scope to a “pat-down” of the suspects’ outer clothing and to seizure of hard objects whose size and shape give the officer probable cause to believe they are weapons.’ ” ’ ” Hails, 814 So.2d at 987, quoting Martin v. State, 695 So.2d 141, 143 (Ala.Crim.App.1996), quoting in turn Smith v. State, 292 Ala. 120 , 289 So.2d 816, 818 (Ala.1974).

2022Factors commonly considered in assessing the reasonableness of a Terry stop include: whether the stopped individual matches the description of a suspected criminal, United States v. Gibson, 64 F.3d 617, 622 (11th Cir. 1995); whether the area where the stop occurred was a high-crime area or one "of expected criminal activity," Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000); whether the suspicious activity occurred "late at night or early in the morning," United States v. McHugh, 639 F.3d 1250, 1257 (10th Cir. 2011), accord, United States v. Davis, 710 F. App'x 805, 806 (11th Cir. 2017); whether

2005This Court discussed such indicia in Ex parte Kelley, 870 So.2d 711 (Ala. 2003), where we concluded that an experienced narcotics officer who observed a `furtive' transaction between the defendant and a known drug dealer at a bar that was known to be a place where drug transactions were common established sufficient reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop of the defendant.

2022Factors commonly considered in assessing the reasonableness of a Terry stop include: whether the stopped individual matches the description of a suspected criminal, United States v. Gibson, 64 F.3d 617, 622 (11th Cir. 1995); whether the area where the stop occurred was a high-crime area or one "of expected criminal activity," Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000); whether the suspicious activity occurred "late at night or early in the morning," United States v. McHugh, 639 F.3d 1250, 1257 (10th Cir. 2011), accord, United States v. Davis, 710 F. App'x 805, 806 (11th Cir. 2017); whether

2022Factors commonly considered in assessing the reasonableness of a Terry stop include: whether the stopped individual matches the description of a suspected criminal, United States v. Gibson, 64 F.3d 617, 622 (11th Cir. 1995); whether the area where the stop occurred was a high-crime area or one "of expected criminal activity," Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000); whether the suspicious activity occurred "late at night or early in the morning," United States v. McHugh, 639 F.3d 1250, 1257 (10th Cir. 2011), accord, United States v. Davis, 710 F. App'x 805, 806 (11th Cir. 2017); whether

2005Compare State v. Bergerson, 659 N.W.2d 791 (Minn.Ct.App. 2003) (distinguishing Vereb and holding that a telephone call from an employee of a hardware store where the appellant had purchased rubber tubing and acetone, without more, was not sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop of the appellant's vehicle). "`Similarly, in State v. Bulington, 783 N.E.2d 338 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003), the evidence indicated that Cassie Oakley, an employee at a Meijer Superstore who had been advised by Meijer's loss-prevention personnel to be aware of activity involving decongestants or other precu

2005Compare State v. Bergerson, 659 N.W.2d 791 (Minn.Ct.App. 2003) (distinguishing Vereb and holding that a telephone call from an employee of a hardware store where the appellant had purchased rubber tubing and acetone, without more, was not sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop of the appellant's vehicle). "`Similarly, in State v. Bulington, 783 N.E.2d 338 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003), the evidence indicated that Cassie Oakley, an employee at a Meijer Superstore who had been advised by Meijer's loss-prevention personnel to be aware of activity involving decongestants or other precu

1994In Berkemer , the Supreme Court observed that "the atmosphere surrounding an ordinary traffic stop is substantially less 'police dominated' than that surrounding the kinds of interrogation at issue in Miranda itself," and determined that "the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called ' Terry stop,' see Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), than to a formal arrest." Berkemer , 468 U.S. at 438 -39 , 104 S.Ct. at 3149 -50 .

1994In Berkemer , the Supreme Court observed that "the atmosphere surrounding an ordinary traffic stop is substantially less 'police dominated' than that surrounding the kinds of interrogation at issue in Miranda itself," and determined that "the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called ' Terry stop,' see Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), than to a formal arrest." Berkemer , 468 U.S. at 438 -39 , 104 S.Ct. at 3149 -50 .

2011As Alabama caselaw clearly holds, the Terry presumption dissolves upon a finding of dependency, see O.L.D. v. J.C. , 769 So. 2d 299 , 302 (Ala. Civ.

2011As Alabama caselaw clearly holds, the Terry presumption dissolves upon a finding of dependency, see O.L.D. v. J.C. , 769 So. 2d 299 , 302 (Ala. Civ.