11 Hawaii opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Hawaii courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Juan M. Felicianogreen2 sentences2007See United States v. Feliciano, 45 F.3d 1070, 1074 (7th Cir.1995) (emphasizing that "[k]nowledge of . . . recent relevant criminal conduct, while of doubtful evidentiary value in view of the strictures against proving guilt by association or by a predisposition based on past criminal acts, is a permissible component of the articulable suspicion required for a Terry stop." (Emphasis in the original.)). 2007See United States v. Feliciano, 45 F.3d 1070, 1074 (7th Cir.1995) (emphasizing that “[k]nowledge of ... recent relevant criminal conduct, while of doubtful evidentiary value in view of the strictures against proving guilt by association or by a predisposition based on past criminal acts, is a permissible component of the articulable suspicion required for a Terry stop.” (Emphasis in the original.)). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Kaleohanogreen2 sentences2019Penitentiary v. Hayden , 387 U.S. 294 , 310, 87 S.Ct. 1642 , 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring))); Kaleohano , 99 Hawai'i at 378 -79 , 56 P.3d at 146-47 ("Because temporary investigative stops involve an exception to the general rule requiring that searches and seizures be supported by probable cause, the scope of such detentions must be narrow."). *109 These strict limitations on the constitutionally permissible scope of a Terry stop govern both its initiation and its duration. 2019Penitentiary v. Hayden , 387 U.S. 294 , 310, 87 S.Ct. 1642 , 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring))); Kaleohano , 99 Hawai'i at 378 -79 , 56 P.3d at 146-47 ("Because temporary investigative stops involve an exception to the general rule requiring that searches and seizures be supported by probable cause, the scope of such detentions must be narrow."). *109 These strict limitations on the constitutionally permissible scope of a Terry stop govern both its initiation and its duration. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Iona.green1 sentence2022A Terry stop is a "temporary investigative detention of an individual by the police without a warrant," which is "strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." State v. Iona, 144 Hawai#i 412, 416, 443 P.3d 104, 108 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Heapygreen2 sentences2019The initiation of a temporary investigative detention by police is valid only "if they have a reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts that criminal activity is afoot." State v. Spillner , 116 Hawai'i 351 , 357, 173 P.3d 498 , 504 (2007) (quoting State v. Kearns , 75 Haw. 558 , 569, 867 P.2d 903 , 908 (1994) ); State v. Heapy , 113 Hawai'i 283 , 285, 151 P.3d 764 , 766 (2007) ("It is axiomatic that reasonable suspicion to justify a stop must relate to criminal activity."); State v. Barnes , 58 Haw. 333 , 337, 568 P.2d 1207 , 1211 (1977) (explaining that "such an intrusion u 2019The initiation of a temporary investigative detention by police is valid only "if they have a reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts that criminal activity is afoot." State v. Spillner , 116 Hawai'i 351 , 357, 173 P.3d 498 , 504 (2007) (quoting State v. Kearns , 75 Haw. 558 , 569, 867 P.2d 903 , 908 (1994) ); State v. Heapy , 113 Hawai'i 283 , 285, 151 P.3d 764 , 766 (2007) ("It is axiomatic that reasonable suspicion to justify a stop must relate to criminal activity."); State v. Barnes , 58 Haw. 333 , 337, 568 P.2d 1207 , 1211 (1977) (explaining that "such an intrusion u | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Miguel Sandovalgreen2 sentences2007See also United States v. Davis, 94 F.3d 1465, 1469 (10th Cir.1996) (holding that knowledge of the defendant's criminal record alone did not justify a Terry stop as such knowledge was insufficient to create reasonable suspicion); United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 542 (10th Cir.1994) (holding that "knowledge of a person's prior criminal involvement . . . is alone insufficient to give rise to the requisite reasonable suspicion" for continued detention after a traffic stop); Collier v. Commonwealth, 713 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Ky.Ct.App.1986) (stating that "the prior record of a suspect, standing 2007See also United States v. Davis, 94 F.3d 1465, 1469 (10th Cir.1996) (holding that knowledge of the defendant’s criminal record alone did not justify a Terry stop as such knowledge was insufficient to create reasonable suspicion); United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 542 (10th Cir.1994) (holding that “knowledge of a person’s prior criminal involvement ... is alone insufficient to give rise to the requisite reasonable suspicion” for continued detention after a traffic stop); Collier v. Commonwealth, 713 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Ky.Ct.App.1986) (stating that “the prior record of a suspect, standing al | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Davisgreen2 sentences2007See also United States v. Davis, 94 F.3d 1465, 1469 (10th Cir.1996) (holding that knowledge of the defendant's criminal record alone did not justify a Terry stop as such knowledge was insufficient to create reasonable suspicion); United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 542 (10th Cir.1994) (holding that "knowledge of a person's prior criminal involvement . . . is alone insufficient to give rise to the requisite reasonable suspicion" for continued detention after a traffic stop); Collier v. Commonwealth, 713 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Ky.Ct.App.1986) (stating that "the prior record of a suspect, standing 2007See also United States v. Davis, 94 F.3d 1465, 1469 (10th Cir.1996) (holding that knowledge of the defendant’s criminal record alone did not justify a Terry stop as such knowledge was insufficient to create reasonable suspicion); United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 542 (10th Cir.1994) (holding that “knowledge of a person’s prior criminal involvement ... is alone insufficient to give rise to the requisite reasonable suspicion” for continued detention after a traffic stop); Collier v. Commonwealth, 713 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Ky.Ct.App.1986) (stating that “the prior record of a suspect, standing al | 1 | 1 |
People v. Foxgreen2 sentences2007App.3d 58 , 52 Ill.Dec. 219 , 421 N.E.2d 1082, 1086 (1981) (stating that "the mere fact that the vehicle drove away at the approach of a squad car does not serve as a justifiable basis for conducting a Terry stop"); State v. Hathaway, 411 So.2d 1074, 1079 (La.1982) (ruling that "[e]ven where flight . . . reasonably appear[s] designed to avoid apprehension, reasonable cause will not arise unless flight" is coupled with other indicia of criminality); People v. Shabaz, 424 Mich. 42 , 378 N.W.2d 451, 460 (1985) (determining that flight "does not alone supply the particularized, reasoned, articulab 2007App.3d 58 , 52 Ill.Dec. 219 , 421 N.E.2d 1082, 1086 (1981) (stating that "the mere fact that the vehicle drove away at the approach of a squad car does not serve as a justifiable basis for conducting a Terry stop"); State v. Hathaway, 411 So.2d 1074, 1079 (La.1982) (ruling that "[e]ven where flight . . . reasonably appear[s] designed to avoid apprehension, reasonable cause will not arise unless flight" is coupled with other indicia of criminality); People v. Shabaz, 424 Mich. 42 , 378 N.W.2d 451, 460 (1985) (determining that flight "does not alone supply the particularized, reasoned, articulab | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hathawaygreen1 sentence2007App.3d 58 , 52 Ill.Dec. 219 , 421 N.E.2d 1082, 1086 (1981) (stating that "the mere fact that the vehicle drove away at the approach of a squad car does not serve as a justifiable basis for conducting a Terry stop"); State v. Hathaway, 411 So.2d 1074, 1079 (La.1982) (ruling that "[e]ven where flight . . . reasonably appear[s] designed to avoid apprehension, reasonable cause will not arise unless flight" is coupled with other indicia of criminality); People v. Shabaz, 424 Mich. 42 , 378 N.W.2d 451, 460 (1985) (determining that flight "does not alone supply the particularized, reasoned, articulab | 1 | 1 |
Collier v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2007See also United States v. Davis, 94 F.3d 1465, 1469 (10th Cir.1996) (holding that knowledge of the defendant's criminal record alone did not justify a Terry stop as such knowledge was insufficient to create reasonable suspicion); United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 542 (10th Cir.1994) (holding that "knowledge of a person's prior criminal involvement . . . is alone insufficient to give rise to the requisite reasonable suspicion" for continued detention after a traffic stop); Collier v. Commonwealth, 713 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Ky.Ct.App.1986) (stating that "the prior record of a suspect, standing 2007See also United States v. Davis, 94 F.3d 1465, 1469 (10th Cir.1996) (holding that knowledge of the defendant’s criminal record alone did not justify a Terry stop as such knowledge was insufficient to create reasonable suspicion); United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 542 (10th Cir.1994) (holding that “knowledge of a person’s prior criminal involvement ... is alone insufficient to give rise to the requisite reasonable suspicion” for continued detention after a traffic stop); Collier v. Commonwealth, 713 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Ky.Ct.App.1986) (stating that “the prior record of a suspect, standing al | 1 | 1 |
Little v. Stategreen2 sentences2007See also Little v. State, 300 Md. 485 , 479 A.2d 903, 906 (1984) (noting that pursuant to Maryland's policy regarding intoxication checkpoints, "[a] motorist wishing to avoid a sobriety checkpoint may make a U-turn or turn onto a side road prior to reaching the roadblock" and that "[n]o action is taken against a driver doing so unless the motorist drives erratically"); State v. McCleery, 251 Neb. 940 , 560 N.W.2d 789, 793 (1997) (concluding that the police officers did not have a reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant's car solely because she appeared to be evading an intoxication checkpoi 2007See also Little v. State, 300 Md. 485 , 479 A.2d 903, 906 (1984) (noting that pursuant to Maryland's policy regarding intoxication checkpoints, "[a] motorist wishing to avoid a sobriety checkpoint may make a U-turn or turn onto a side road prior to reaching the roadblock" and that "[n]o action is taken against a driver doing so unless the motorist drives erratically"); State v. McCleery, 251 Neb. 940 , 560 N.W.2d 789, 793 (1997) (concluding that the police officers did not have a reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant's car solely because she appeared to be evading an intoxication checkpoi | 1 | 1 |
State v. McCleerygreen2 sentences2007See also Little v. State, 300 Md. 485 , 479 A.2d 903, 906 (1984) (noting that pursuant to Maryland's policy regarding intoxication checkpoints, "[a] motorist wishing to avoid a sobriety checkpoint may make a U-turn or turn onto a side road prior to reaching the roadblock" and that "[n]o action is taken against a driver doing so unless the motorist drives erratically"); State v. McCleery, 251 Neb. 940 , 560 N.W.2d 789, 793 (1997) (concluding that the police officers did not have a reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant's car solely because she appeared to be evading an intoxication checkpoi 2007See also Little v. State, 300 Md. 485 , 479 A.2d 903, 906 (1984) (noting that pursuant to Maryland's policy regarding intoxication checkpoints, "[a] motorist wishing to avoid a sobriety checkpoint may make a U-turn or turn onto a side road prior to reaching the roadblock" and that "[n]o action is taken against a driver doing so unless the motorist drives erratically"); State v. McCleery, 251 Neb. 940 , 560 N.W.2d 789, 793 (1997) (concluding that the police officers did not have a reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant's car solely because she appeared to be evading an intoxication checkpoi | 1 | 1 |
People v. Shabazgreen2 sentences2007App.3d 58 , 52 Ill.Dec. 219 , 421 N.E.2d 1082, 1086 (1981) (stating that "the mere fact that the vehicle drove away at the approach of a squad car does not serve as a justifiable basis for conducting a Terry stop"); State v. Hathaway, 411 So.2d 1074, 1079 (La.1982) (ruling that "[e]ven where flight . . . reasonably appear[s] designed to avoid apprehension, reasonable cause will not arise unless flight" is coupled with other indicia of criminality); People v. Shabaz, 424 Mich. 42 , 378 N.W.2d 451, 460 (1985) (determining that flight "does not alone supply the particularized, reasoned, articulab 2007App.3d 58 , 52 Ill.Dec. 219 , 421 N.E.2d 1082, 1086 (1981) (stating that "the mere fact that the vehicle drove away at the approach of a squad car does not serve as a justifiable basis for conducting a Terry stop"); State v. Hathaway, 411 So.2d 1074, 1079 (La.1982) (ruling that "[e]ven where flight . . . reasonably appear[s] designed to avoid apprehension, reasonable cause will not arise unless flight" is coupled with other indicia of criminality); People v. Shabaz, 424 Mich. 42 , 378 N.W.2d 451, 460 (1985) (determining that flight "does not alone supply the particularized, reasoned, articulab | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ortizgreen2 sentences2004This suggested expansion of the Terry rule "stretches the narrowly defined exception [to the warrant requirement] to cover the situation." State v. Ortiz, 67 Haw. 181, 193 , 683 P.2d 822, 830 (1984) (Nakamura, J., dissenting, Wakatsuki, J., joining); see also id. at 191 , 683 P.2d at 829 (explaining that the ICA "strained to place the search and seizure [of a defendant's knapsack] beyond the reach of the constitutional protections by fashioning a novel `plain feel' rule from `the limitations and rationale of the plain view rule'"). 2004This suggested expansion of the Terry rule "stretches the narrowly defined exception [to the warrant requirement] to cover the situation." State v. Ortiz, 67 Haw. 181, 193 , 683 P.2d 822, 830 (1984) (Nakamura, J., dissenting, Wakatsuki, J., joining); see also id. at 191 , 683 P.2d at 829 (explaining that the ICA "strained to place the search and seizure [of a defendant's knapsack] beyond the reach of the constitutional protections by fashioning a novel `plain feel' rule from `the limitations and rationale of the plain view rule'"). | 1 | 1 |
Washington v. Stategreen2 sentences2004The court held that the investigative stop was unlawful because “an anonymous telephone tip, absent any independent indicia of reliability or any officer-observed confirmation of the caller’s prediction of the defendant’s future behavior, is not enough to permit police to detain a citizen and subject him or her to a Terry stop and the attendant interruption of liberty required to accomplish it.” Id. at 1246. 2004The court held that the investigative stop was unlawful because "an anonymous telephone tip, absent any independent indicia of reliability or any officer-observed confirmation of the caller's prediction of the defendant's future behavior, is not enough to permit police to detain a citizen and subject him or her to a Terry stop and the attendant interruption of liberty required to accomplish it." Id. at 1246. | 1 | 1 |
| Biggers v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. in the Interest of H.J.green | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ellisgreen2 sentences1999J., 931 P.2d 1177, 1182 (Colo.1997) (since officers had reasonable suspicion that car was stolen, they had basis for stopping and questioning car’s occupants and detaining them in order to check for outstanding arrest warrants; “[sjuch detention is brief and minimally intrusive”); State v. Bell, 382 So.2d 119, 120 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) (during lawful Terry stop, police officers were authorized to ascertain if there was an outstanding warrant for defendant’s arrest); Biggers v. State, 162 Ga.App. 163 , 290 S.E.2d 159, 160 (1982) (Terry stop of two men in car parked in church parking lot was pr 1999J., 931 P.2d 1177, 1182 (Colo.1997) (since officers had reasonable suspicion that car was stolen, they had basis for stopping and questioning car’s occupants and detaining them in order to check for outstanding arrest warrants; “[sjuch detention is brief and minimally intrusive”); State v. Bell, 382 So.2d 119, 120 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) (during lawful Terry stop, police officers were authorized to ascertain if there was an outstanding warrant for defendant’s arrest); Biggers v. State, 162 Ga.App. 163 , 290 S.E.2d 159, 160 (1982) (Terry stop of two men in car parked in church parking lot was pr | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Madrigalgreen | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bellgreen2 sentences1999J., 931 P.2d 1177, 1182 (Colo.1997) (since officers had reasonable suspicion that car was stolen, they had basis for stopping and questioning car's occupants and detaining them in order to check for outstanding arrest warrants; "[s]uch detention is brief and minimally intrusive"); State v. Bell, 382 So.2d 119, 120 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) (during lawful Terry stop, police officers were authorized to ascertain if there was an outstanding warrant for defendant's arrest); Biggers v. State, 162 Ga.App. 163 , 290 S.E.2d 159, 160 (1982) ( Terry stop of two men in car parked in church parking lot was p 1999J., 931 P.2d 1177, 1182 (Colo.1997) (since officers had reasonable suspicion that car was stolen, they had basis for stopping and questioning car’s occupants and detaining them in order to check for outstanding arrest warrants; “[sjuch detention is brief and minimally intrusive”); State v. Bell, 382 So.2d 119, 120 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) (during lawful Terry stop, police officers were authorized to ascertain if there was an outstanding warrant for defendant’s arrest); Biggers v. State, 162 Ga.App. 163 , 290 S.E.2d 159, 160 (1982) (Terry stop of two men in car parked in church parking lot was pr | 1 | 1 |
| State v. DeMasigreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Quinogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Hawaii. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Davis v. Kansas Department of Revenue
green
1 sentence2022Davis v. Kansas Dep't of Revenue, 843 P.2d 260 (Kan. 1992), provides a helpful explanation of this distinction: Sitz recognized a distinction between a Terry stop and a systematic roadside checkpoint stop. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Goudy
green
2 sentences2019The initiation of a temporary investigative detention by police is valid only "if they have a reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts that criminal activity is afoot." State v. Spillner , 116 Hawai'i 351 , 357, 173 P.3d 498 , 504 (2007) (quoting State v. Kearns , 75 Haw. 558 , 569, 867 P.2d 903 , 908 (1994) ); State v. Heapy , 113 Hawai'i 283 , 285, 151 P.3d 764 , 766 (2007) ("It is axiomatic that reasonable suspicion to justify a stop must relate to criminal activity."); State v. Barnes , 58 Haw. 333 , 337, 568 P.2d 1207 , 1211 (1977) (explaining that "such an intrusion u 2019The initiation of a temporary investigative detention by police is valid only "if they have a reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts that criminal activity is afoot." State v. Spillner , 116 Hawai'i 351 , 357, 173 P.3d 498 , 504 (2007) (quoting State v. Kearns , 75 Haw. 558 , 569, 867 P.2d 903 , 908 (1994) ); State v. Heapy , 113 Hawai'i 283 , 285, 151 P.3d 764 , 766 (2007) ("It is axiomatic that reasonable suspicion to justify a stop must relate to criminal activity."); State v. Barnes , 58 Haw. 333 , 337, 568 P.2d 1207 , 1211 (1977) (explaining that "such an intrusion u | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden
green
2 sentences2019Penitentiary v. Hayden , 387 U.S. 294 , 310, 87 S.Ct. 1642 , 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring))); Kaleohano , 99 Hawai'i at 378 -79 , 56 P.3d at 146-47 ("Because temporary investigative stops involve an exception to the general rule requiring that searches and seizures be supported by probable cause, the scope of such detentions must be narrow."). *109 These strict limitations on the constitutionally permissible scope of a Terry stop govern both its initiation and its duration. 2019Penitentiary v. Hayden , 387 U.S. 294 , 310, 87 S.Ct. 1642 , 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring))); Kaleohano , 99 Hawai'i at 378 -79 , 56 P.3d at 146-47 ("Because temporary investigative stops involve an exception to the general rule requiring that searches and seizures be supported by probable cause, the scope of such detentions must be narrow."). *109 These strict limitations on the constitutionally permissible scope of a Terry stop govern both its initiation and its duration. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Barnes
green
2 sentences2019The initiation of a temporary investigative detention by police is valid only "if they have a reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts that criminal activity is afoot." State v. Spillner , 116 Hawai'i 351 , 357, 173 P.3d 498 , 504 (2007) (quoting State v. Kearns , 75 Haw. 558 , 569, 867 P.2d 903 , 908 (1994) ); State v. Heapy , 113 Hawai'i 283 , 285, 151 P.3d 764 , 766 (2007) ("It is axiomatic that reasonable suspicion to justify a stop must relate to criminal activity."); State v. Barnes , 58 Haw. 333 , 337, 568 P.2d 1207 , 1211 (1977) (explaining that "such an intrusion u 2019The initiation of a temporary investigative detention by police is valid only "if they have a reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts that criminal activity is afoot." State v. Spillner , 116 Hawai'i 351 , 357, 173 P.3d 498 , 504 (2007) (quoting State v. Kearns , 75 Haw. 558 , 569, 867 P.2d 903 , 908 (1994) ); State v. Heapy , 113 Hawai'i 283 , 285, 151 P.3d 764 , 766 (2007) ("It is axiomatic that reasonable suspicion to justify a stop must relate to criminal activity."); State v. Barnes , 58 Haw. 333 , 337, 568 P.2d 1207 , 1211 (1977) (explaining that "such an intrusion u | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Estabillio
green
2 sentences2019State v. Estabillio , 121 Hawai'i 261 , 271, 218 P.3d 749 , 759 (2009) ("In order to pass constitutional muster, the length of time the officer could permissibly detain the defendant must have been 'no greater in intensity than absolutely necessary under the circumstances .' " (emphasis added) (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Barros , 98 Hawai'i 337 , 342-43, 48 P.3d 584 , 589-90 (2002) )). 2019State v. Estabillio , 121 Hawai'i 261 , 271, 218 P.3d 749 , 759 (2009) ("In order to pass constitutional muster, the length of time the officer could permissibly detain the defendant must have been 'no greater in intensity than absolutely necessary under the circumstances .' " (emphasis added) (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Barros , 98 Hawai'i 337 , 342-43, 48 P.3d 584 , 589-90 (2002) )). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Barros
green
2 sentences2019State v. Estabillio , 121 Hawai'i 261 , 271, 218 P.3d 749 , 759 (2009) ("In order to pass constitutional muster, the length of time the officer could permissibly detain the defendant must have been 'no greater in intensity than absolutely necessary under the circumstances .' " (emphasis added) (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Barros , 98 Hawai'i 337 , 342-43, 48 P.3d 584 , 589-90 (2002) )). 2019State v. Estabillio , 121 Hawai'i 261 , 271, 218 P.3d 749 , 759 (2009) ("In order to pass constitutional muster, the length of time the officer could permissibly detain the defendant must have been 'no greater in intensity than absolutely necessary under the circumstances .' " (emphasis added) (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Barros , 98 Hawai'i 337 , 342-43, 48 P.3d 584 , 589-90 (2002) )). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Kearns
green
2 sentences2019The initiation of a temporary investigative detention by police is valid only "if they have a reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts that criminal activity is afoot." State v. Spillner , 116 Hawai'i 351 , 357, 173 P.3d 498 , 504 (2007) (quoting State v. Kearns , 75 Haw. 558 , 569, 867 P.2d 903 , 908 (1994) ); State v. Heapy , 113 Hawai'i 283 , 285, 151 P.3d 764 , 766 (2007) ("It is axiomatic that reasonable suspicion to justify a stop must relate to criminal activity."); State v. Barnes , 58 Haw. 333 , 337, 568 P.2d 1207 , 1211 (1977) (explaining that "such an intrusion u 2019The initiation of a temporary investigative detention by police is valid only "if they have a reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts that criminal activity is afoot." State v. Spillner , 116 Hawai'i 351 , 357, 173 P.3d 498 , 504 (2007) (quoting State v. Kearns , 75 Haw. 558 , 569, 867 P.2d 903 , 908 (1994) ); State v. Heapy , 113 Hawai'i 283 , 285, 151 P.3d 764 , 766 (2007) ("It is axiomatic that reasonable suspicion to justify a stop must relate to criminal activity."); State v. Barnes , 58 Haw. 333 , 337, 568 P.2d 1207 , 1211 (1977) (explaining that "such an intrusion u | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Spillner
green
2 sentences2019The initiation of a temporary investigative detention by police is valid only "if they have a reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts that criminal activity is afoot." State v. Spillner , 116 Hawai'i 351 , 357, 173 P.3d 498 , 504 (2007) (quoting State v. Kearns , 75 Haw. 558 , 569, 867 P.2d 903 , 908 (1994) ); State v. Heapy , 113 Hawai'i 283 , 285, 151 P.3d 764 , 766 (2007) ("It is axiomatic that reasonable suspicion to justify a stop must relate to criminal activity."); State v. Barnes , 58 Haw. 333 , 337, 568 P.2d 1207 , 1211 (1977) (explaining that "such an intrusion u 2019The initiation of a temporary investigative detention by police is valid only "if they have a reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts that criminal activity is afoot." State v. Spillner , 116 Hawai'i 351 , 357, 173 P.3d 498 , 504 (2007) (quoting State v. Kearns , 75 Haw. 558 , 569, 867 P.2d 903 , 908 (1994) ); State v. Heapy , 113 Hawai'i 283 , 285, 151 P.3d 764 , 766 (2007) ("It is axiomatic that reasonable suspicion to justify a stop must relate to criminal activity."); State v. Barnes , 58 Haw. 333 , 337, 568 P.2d 1207 , 1211 (1977) (explaining that "such an intrusion u | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Ah Loo
green
2 sentences2015Conversely, Wheeler is dissimilar from a case like Loo , which merely applied the well-settled rule that during a Terry stop, Miranda warnings are not required until the point of arrest or accusation has been reached. 94 Hawai'i at 210 , 10 P.3d at 731 . 2015Conversely, Wheeler is dissimilar from a case like Loo , which merely applied the well-settled rule that during a Terry stop, Miranda warnings are not required until the point of arrest or accusation has been reached. 94 Hawai'i at 210 , 10 P.3d at 731 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Commonwealth v. Lubiejewski
green
2 sentences2004Additionally, in Commonwealth v. Lubiejewski, 49 Mass.App.Ct. 212 , 729 N.E.2d 288 (2000), the court held that an anonymous tip was insufficient to justify an investigatory stop. 2004Additionally, in Commonwealth v. Lubiejewski, 49 Mass.App.Ct. 212 , 729 N.E.2d 288 (2000), the court held that an anonymous tip was insufficient to justify an investigatory stop. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Colgrove
green
2 sentences2004The Supreme Court of Nebraska in State v. Colgrove, 198 Neb. 319 , 253 N.W.2d 20 (1977), decided a case with strikingly similar facts to the one before us. 2004The Supreme Court of Nebraska in State v. Colgrove, 198 Neb. 319 , 253 N.W.2d 20 (1977), decided a case with strikingly similar facts to the one before us. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
United States v. Hensley
green
2 sentences2004In striking Terry's balance of interests in the government's favor, Hensley confirmed that a Terry stop was a legitimate police tactic to investigate an officer's "reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person [the officer] encounter[ed] was involved in or [was] wanted in connection with a completed felony." Id. 2004In striking Terry’s balance of interests in the government’s favor, Hensley confirmed that a Terry stop was a legitimate police tactic to investigate an officer’s “reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person [the officer] encountered] was involved in or [was] wanted in connection with a completed felony.” Id. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2002The United States Supreme Court, in Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984), analogized a traffic stop to a "Terry stop," which, because of its "comparatively nonthreatening character," had never been considered by the Court to be "subject to the dictates of Miranda." Id. at 439 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 (referencing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). 2002The United States Supreme Court, in Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984), analogized a traffic stop to a "Terry stop," which, because of its "comparatively nonthreatening character," had never been considered by the Court to be "subject to the dictates of Miranda." Id. at 439 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 (referencing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Berkemer v. McCarty
green
2 sentences2002The United States Supreme Court, in Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984), analogized a traffic stop to a "Terry stop," which, because of its "comparatively nonthreatening character," had never been considered by the Court to be "subject to the dictates of Miranda." Id. at 439 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 (referencing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). 2002The United States Supreme Court, in Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984), analogized a traffic stop to a "Terry stop," which, because of its "comparatively nonthreatening character," had never been considered by the Court to be "subject to the dictates of Miranda." Id. at 439 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 (referencing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| State v. Madamba green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.