Terry stop in Utah

2021A level two encounter, otherwise known as a Terry stop, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 26–27 (1968), is reasonable only if the “officer’s action was justified at its inception,” and “the detention following the stop was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place,” Jervis, 2017 UT App 207, ¶ 15 (cleaned up).

2021So long as the facts known to the officer support an objectively reasonable belief “that criminal activity may be afoot,” Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 , the officers are permitted to conduct a Terry stop to “resolve the ambiguity,” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125 .

2021See, e.g., Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273 ; Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 358 (2015). ¶33 Requiring officers to observe evidence of each element of a particular crime before making a Terry stop is also incompatible with the rule allowing officers to conduct a brief investigative detention based on reasonable suspicion that the suspect “is about to be engaged in criminal activity.” See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702 (1983).

2017In Rodriguez v. United States, the Supreme Court explained, Like a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s “mission”—to [1] address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and [2] attend to related safety concerns. 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015) (citations omitted).

2021So long as the facts known to the officer support an objectively reasonable belief “that criminal activity may be afoot,” Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 , the officers are permitted to conduct a Terry stop to “resolve the ambiguity,” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125 .

2018While officers may not stop pedestrians for merely being present in a high-crime area, see State v. Trujillo , 739 P.2d 85 , 89 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), the United States Supreme Court has noted that "the fact that the stop occurred in a 'high-crime area' [is] among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis," Illinois v. Wardlow , 528 U.S. 119 , 124, 120 S.Ct. 673 , 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) ; see also Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

2019When an officer initiates a Terry stop, courts apply a two-step inquiry to determine whether the stop is constitutional: (1) whether the stop was justified at its inception, and (2) whether the resulting investigation was "carried out in a manner reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place." State v. McLeod , 2018 UT App 51 , ¶ 16, 420 P.3d 122 (quotation simplified); see also United States v. Sharpe , 470 U.S. 675 , 682, 105 S.Ct. 1568 , 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985).

2019When an officer initiates a Terry stop, courts apply a two-step inquiry to determine whether the stop is constitutional: (1) whether the stop was justified at its inception, and (2) whether the resulting investigation was "carried out in a manner reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place." State v. McLeod , 2018 UT App 51 , ¶ 16, 420 P.3d 122 (quotation simplified); see also United States v. Sharpe , 470 U.S. 675 , 682, 105 S.Ct. 1568 , 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985).

1997A Terry stop made in objective reliance upon a flyer or bulletin is proper “if the police who issued the flyer or bulletin possessed a reasonable suspicion justifying a stop.” United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 233 , 105 S.Ct. 675, 682 , 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985).

1997A Terry stop made in objective reliance upon a flyer or bulletin is proper “if the police who issued the flyer or bulletin possessed a reasonable suspicion justifying a stop.” United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 233 , 105 S.Ct. 675, 682 , 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985).

2021“In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called Terry stop.” Id. at 439 (cleaned up).

2021“The safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspect’s freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest.” Id. (cleaned up); see also Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1147 (“[T]he standard is whether a defendant’s freedom of action is curtailed to an extent associated with a formal arrest.”). 20190740-CA 24 2021 UT App 124 State v. Goddard ¶48 Only one prior Utah case has analyzed a Terry stop to determine whether the detention escalated to a de facto arrest for purposes of Miranda.

2017The Court reiterated that "the government's officer safety interest stems from the mission of the stop itself," because "[t]raffic stops are 'especially fraught with danger to police officers.' " Id . at 1616 (citation omitted); see also Maryland v. Wilson , 519 U.S. 408 , 413, 117 S.Ct. 882 , 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) ("Regrettably, traffic stops may be dangerous encounters.").

2017The Court reiterated that “the government’s officer safety interest stems from the mission of the stop itself,” because “[t]raffic stops are ‘especially fraught with danger to police officers.’” Id. at 1616 (citation omitted); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413 (1997) (“Regrettably, traffic stops may be dangerous encounters.”).

2012See, e.g., United States v. Briasco, 640 F.3d 857 , 859–60 (8th Cir. 2011) (rejecting defendant’s claim that police “lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him [for forty‐two minutes] after he refused consent to search the car”); United States v. Whitney, 391 F. App’x 277 , 281‐82 (4th Cir. 2010) (rejecting defendant’s claim that “once he refused consent to search his car, [police] lacked reasonable suspicion to detain [him for several minutes] until a drug dog arrived on the scene”), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 954 (2011); Leal, 235 F. App’x at 942 (holding that defendant’s eighty‐minute detention

2012See, eg., United States v. Briasco, 640 F.3d 857, 859-60 (8th Cir.2011) (rejecting defendant's claim that police "lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him [for forty-two minutes] after he refused consent to search the car"); United States v. Whitney, 391 Fed.Appx. 277, 281-82 (4th Cir.2010) (rejecting defendant's claim that "onee he refused consent to search his car, [police] lacked reasonable suspicion to detain [him for several minutes] until a drug dog arrived on the scene"), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 954 , 178 L.Ed.2d 787 (2011); Leal, 235 Fed.Appx. at 942 (holding that defendant'

2012See, e.g., United States v. Briasco, 640 F.3d 857 , 859–60 (8th Cir. 2011) (rejecting defendant’s claim that police “lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him [for forty‐two minutes] after he refused consent to search the car”); United States v. Whitney, 391 F. App’x 277 , 281‐82 (4th Cir. 2010) (rejecting defendant’s claim that “once he refused consent to search his car, [police] lacked reasonable suspicion to detain [him for several minutes] until a drug dog arrived on the scene”), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 954 (2011); Leal, 235 F. App’x at 942 (holding that defendant’s eighty‐minute detention

2012See, eg., United States v. Briasco, 640 F.3d 857, 859-60 (8th Cir.2011) (rejecting defendant's claim that police "lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him [for forty-two minutes] after he refused consent to search the car"); United States v. Whitney, 391 Fed.Appx. 277, 281-82 (4th Cir.2010) (rejecting defendant's claim that "onee he refused consent to search his car, [police] lacked reasonable suspicion to detain [him for several minutes] until a drug dog arrived on the scene"), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 954 , 178 L.Ed.2d 787 (2011); Leal, 235 Fed.Appx. at 942 (holding that defendant'

2021Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277 .

2021See, e.g., Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273 ; Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 358 (2015). ¶33 Requiring officers to observe evidence of each element of a particular crime before making a Terry stop is also incompatible with the rule allowing officers to conduct a brief investigative detention based on reasonable suspicion that the suspect “is about to be engaged in criminal activity.” See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702 (1983).

2021But “the freedom-of-movement test identifies only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for Miranda custody.” Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 112 (2010).

2017But these “temporary and relatively nonthreatening” detentions “do[ ] not constitute Miranda custody.” Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 113 , 130 S.Ct. 1213 , 175 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2010); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436-40 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984).

2021See Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 101 (2005); see also Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009) (“An officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop . . . do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.”).

2019A Terry frisk is “constitutionally permissible” if two conditions are satisfied: (1) “the investigatory stop must be lawful,” and (2) “the police officer must reasonably suspect that the person stopped is armed and dangerous.” Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 , 326–27 (2009). ¶14 “The reasonableness of both the stop and the frisk are evaluated objectively according to the totality of the circumstances.” Warren, 2003 UT 36, ¶ 14 .

2018A Terry stop survives Fourth Amendment scrutiny if it is (1) "lawful at its inception" and (2) "otherwise executed in a reasonable manner." Illinois v. Caballes , 543 U.S. 405 , 408, 125 S.Ct. 834 , 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005). ¶15 Binks concedes that the stop was lawful at its inception because an officer has reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle after observing a traffic violation.

2018A Terry stop survives Fourth Amendment scrutiny if it is (1) "lawful at its inception" and (2) "otherwise executed in a reasonable manner." Illinois v. Caballes , 543 U.S. 405 , 408, 125 S.Ct. 834 , 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005). ¶15 Binks concedes that the stop was lawful at its inception because an officer has reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle after observing a traffic violation.

2012See, e.g., United States v. Briasco, 640 F.3d 857 , 859–60 (8th Cir. 2011) (rejecting defendant’s claim that police “lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him [for forty‐two minutes] after he refused consent to search the car”); United States v. Whitney, 391 F. App’x 277 , 281‐82 (4th Cir. 2010) (rejecting defendant’s claim that “once he refused consent to search his car, [police] lacked reasonable suspicion to detain [him for several minutes] until a drug dog arrived on the scene”), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 954 (2011); Leal, 235 F. App’x at 942 (holding that defendant’s eighty‐minute detention

2012See, eg., United States v. Briasco, 640 F.3d 857, 859-60 (8th Cir.2011) (rejecting defendant's claim that police "lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him [for forty-two minutes] after he refused consent to search the car"); United States v. Whitney, 391 Fed.Appx. 277, 281-82 (4th Cir.2010) (rejecting defendant's claim that "onee he refused consent to search his car, [police] lacked reasonable suspicion to detain [him for several minutes] until a drug dog arrived on the scene"), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 954 , 178 L.Ed.2d 787 (2011); Leal, 235 Fed.Appx. at 942 (holding that defendant'

2012See, e.g., United States v. Briasco, 640 F.3d 857 , 859–60 (8th Cir. 2011) (rejecting defendant’s claim that police “lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him [for forty‐two minutes] after he refused consent to search the car”); United States v. Whitney, 391 F. App’x 277 , 281‐82 (4th Cir. 2010) (rejecting defendant’s claim that “once he refused consent to search his car, [police] lacked reasonable suspicion to detain [him for several minutes] until a drug dog arrived on the scene”), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 954 (2011); Leal, 235 F. App’x at 942 (holding that defendant’s eighty‐minute detention

2012See, eg., United States v. Briasco, 640 F.3d 857, 859-60 (8th Cir.2011) (rejecting defendant's claim that police "lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him [for forty-two minutes] after he refused consent to search the car"); United States v. Whitney, 391 Fed.Appx. 277, 281-82 (4th Cir.2010) (rejecting defendant's claim that "onee he refused consent to search his car, [police] lacked reasonable suspicion to detain [him for several minutes] until a drug dog arrived on the scene"), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 954 , 178 L.Ed.2d 787 (2011); Leal, 235 Fed.Appx. at 942 (holding that defendant'

2012See, e.g., United States v. Briasco, 640 F.3d 857 , 859–60 (8th Cir. 2011) (rejecting defendant’s claim that police “lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him [for forty‐two minutes] after he refused consent to search the car”); United States v. Whitney, 391 F. App’x 277 , 281‐82 (4th Cir. 2010) (rejecting defendant’s claim that “once he refused consent to search his car, [police] lacked reasonable suspicion to detain [him for several minutes] until a drug dog arrived on the scene”), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 954 (2011); Leal, 235 F. App’x at 942 (holding that defendant’s eighty‐minute detention

2012See, eg., United States v. Briasco, 640 F.3d 857, 859-60 (8th Cir.2011) (rejecting defendant's claim that police "lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him [for forty-two minutes] after he refused consent to search the car"); United States v. Whitney, 391 Fed.Appx. 277, 281-82 (4th Cir.2010) (rejecting defendant's claim that "onee he refused consent to search his car, [police] lacked reasonable suspicion to detain [him for several minutes] until a drug dog arrived on the scene"), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 954 , 178 L.Ed.2d 787 (2011); Leal, 235 Fed.Appx. at 942 (holding that defendant'

2012See, e.g., United States v. Briasco, 640 F.3d 857 , 859–60 (8th Cir. 2011) (rejecting defendant’s claim that police “lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him [for forty‐two minutes] after he refused consent to search the car”); United States v. Whitney, 391 F. App’x 277 , 281‐82 (4th Cir. 2010) (rejecting defendant’s claim that “once he refused consent to search his car, [police] lacked reasonable suspicion to detain [him for several minutes] until a drug dog arrived on the scene”), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 954 (2011); Leal, 235 F. App’x at 942 (holding that defendant’s eighty‐minute detention

2012See, eg., United States v. Briasco, 640 F.3d 857, 859-60 (8th Cir.2011) (rejecting defendant's claim that police "lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him [for forty-two minutes] after he refused consent to search the car"); United States v. Whitney, 391 Fed.Appx. 277, 281-82 (4th Cir.2010) (rejecting defendant's claim that "onee he refused consent to search his car, [police] lacked reasonable suspicion to detain [him for several minutes] until a drug dog arrived on the scene"), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 954 , 178 L.Ed.2d 787 (2011); Leal, 235 Fed.Appx. at 942 (holding that defendant'

1981This Court held the stop to be proper because these facts gave the officer objective, credible reasons sufficient to meet the Terry standard. 9 . 407 U.S. 143, 145 , 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1922 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). 10 . 422 U.S. 873 , 95 S.Ct. 2574 , 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). 11 . 443 U.S. 47 , 99 S.Ct. 2637 , 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979). 12 .See State v. Whittenback, supra, footnote 8, and cases cited therein. 13 .

1981This Court held the stop to be proper because these facts gave the officer objective, credible reasons sufficient to meet the Terry standard. 9 . 407 U.S. 143, 145 , 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1922 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). 10 . 422 U.S. 873 , 95 S.Ct. 2574 , 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). 11 . 443 U.S. 47 , 99 S.Ct. 2637 , 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979). 12 .See State v. Whittenback, supra, footnote 8, and cases cited therein. 13 .

2021“The comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort explains the absence of any suggestion in [Supreme Court] opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda.” Id. at 440 ; see also State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah 1996) (“In the context of a routine traffic stop, the driver and the passengers, even though they have been stopped and, at least momentarily, are not free to leave, are not in custody for Miranda purposes.” (cleaned up)). ¶47 Although Terry stops are presumptively non-custodial, the encounter may “evolve[] into a state of detention tan