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12 Virgin Islands opinions name it 2 courts 2002–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virgin Islands courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Kareem Browngreen2 sentences2016Evidence obtained as a result of a “Terry stop” that does not meet this exception must be suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 , 83 S. Ct. 407 , 9 L. 2015Evidence obtained as the result of a “Terry stop” without the required level of reasonable suspicion must be suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 , 83 S. Ct. 407 , 9 L. | 2 | 2 |
Wong Sun v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2016Evidence obtained as a result of a “Terry stop” that does not meet this exception must be suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 , 83 S. Ct. 407 , 9 L. 2016Evidence obtained as a result of a “Terry stop” that does not meet this exception must be suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 , 83 S. Ct. 407 , 9 L. | 1 | 4 |
United States v. Kahli Ubilesgreen2 sentences2012Ubiles recognized that the possession of a firearm in the Virgin Islands, in and of itself, does not provide officers with reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop. 224 F.3d at 217 (“[A] mere allegation that a suspect possesses a firearm, as dangerous as firearms may be, [does not] justify an officer in stopping a suspect absent the reasonable suspicion.”). 2002The Third Circuit held that the gun found pursuant to the Terry stop and frisk conducted by the marshal and the officers should have been suppressed because those officials “had no reason to believe that Ubiles was ‘involved in criminal activity ...’” Ubiles, 224 F.3d at 217 quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 676 . | 1 | 2 |
Adams v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2008“The purpose of this limited search is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence . . .” Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-147 , 92 S. Ct. 1921 , 32 L. 2008“The purpose of this limited search is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence . . .” Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-147 , 92 S. Ct. 1921 , 32 L. | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Hensleygreen2 sentences2016See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235 , 83 L. 2016See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235 , 83 L. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Gatlingreen1 sentence2012Id. at 378-79. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Mathuringreen2 sentences2012See United States v. Mathurin, 561 F.3d 170, 174-75 , 51 V.I. 1196 (3d Cir.2009) (“We will examine the factors separately to address their individual significance, and then in the aggregate to assess the agents’ reasonable •suspicion under our totality of the circumstances inquiry.”). 2012See United States v. Mathurin, 561 F.3d 170, 174-75 , 51 V.I. 1196 (3d Cir.2009) (“We will examine the factors separately to address their individual significance, and then in the aggregate to assess the agents’ reasonable •suspicion under our totality of the circumstances inquiry.”). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Zachery Lee Wilsongreen1 sentence2010With this knowledge, the recovery of a firearm from Blyden, a person suspected of having recently committed a shooting, ripened Dowdye’s reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk Blyden into probable cause to arrest him as a suspect in the shooting. 7 See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 462 F.3d 903, 908 (8th Cir. 2006) (discovery of wad of money during Terry stop provided probable cause for arrest of person suspected of committing bank robbery); United States v. Wilson, 2 F.3d 226, 232 (7th Cir. 1993) (“The [marijuana] baggies [found during the initial Terry stop] supplied the probable cause t | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Cruz, Jose, United States of America v. Alverio, Julian Miguelgreen1 sentence2010“Probable cause exists where facts and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been . . . committed by the person to be arrested.” United States v. Cruz, 910 F.2d 1072, 1076 (3d Cir. 1990). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Edwin Martinez, Jr., Also Known as Edwin Martinez Franco, Jr.green1 sentence2010With this knowledge, the recovery of a firearm from Blyden, a person suspected of having recently committed a shooting, ripened Dowdye’s reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk Blyden into probable cause to arrest him as a suspect in the shooting. 7 See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 462 F.3d 903, 908 (8th Cir. 2006) (discovery of wad of money during Terry stop provided probable cause for arrest of person suspected of committing bank robbery); United States v. Wilson, 2 F.3d 226, 232 (7th Cir. 1993) (“The [marijuana] baggies [found during the initial Terry stop] supplied the probable cause t | 1 | 1 |
People v. Archibaldgreen1 sentence2010People v. Archibald, 50 V.I. 74, 92 (Super. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Thomasgreen1 sentence2010At this point, it is without question that the officer had probable cause to arrest Mr. Wilson.”); United States v. Thomas, 74 Fed. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Davisgreen1 sentence2008Id. at 1468-69. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Sokolowgreen2 sentences2008See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8-10 , 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585-87 , 104 L. 2008See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8-10 , 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585-87 , 104 L. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Lester Robersongreen1 sentence2006Ed. 2d 301 (1990), the Supreme Court “considered whether an anonymous informant’s tip would provide reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop” and adopted the “totality of the circumstances” test to make such a determination, “stressing] two factors: (1) an officer’s ability to corroborate significant aspects of the tip and (2) the tip’s ability to predict future events.” See, United States v. Roberson, 90 F.3d 75, 77 (3d Cir. 1996). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Larry Valentine, A/K/A Hassan Deloa Tch, A/K/A Hassan Deloach, A/K/A Shawn Valentinegreen2 sentences2005See Valentine, 232 F.3d at 356 . 2005See Valentine, 232 F.3d at 356 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Duncangreen1 sentence2016But see State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166 , 43 P.3d 513, 517 (2002) (declining “to extend the Terry stop exception under the Fourth Amendment... to nontraffic civil infractions.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Duncangreen1 sentence2016But see State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166 , 43 P.3d 513, 517 (2002) (declining “to extend the Terry stop exception under the Fourth Amendment... to nontraffic civil infractions.”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Illinois v. Wardlow
green
2 sentences2016Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 , 120 S.Ct.673, 676, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000). 2002The Third Circuit held that the gun found pursuant to the Terry stop and frisk conducted by the marshal and the officers should have been suppressed because those officials “had no reason to believe that Ubiles was ‘involved in criminal activity ...’” Ubiles, 224 F.3d at 217 quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 676 . | 2 | 2002–2016 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2016The United States Supreme Court allows for a narrow class of physical searches, or “frisks,” during a Terry stop; “there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 , 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1883 , 20 L. 2016The United States Supreme Court allows for a narrow class of physical searches, or “frisks,” during a Terry stop; “there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 , 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1883 , 20 L. | 2 | 2015–2016 |
Minnesota v. Dickerson
green
1 sentence2016Ed. 2d 604 (1985) as “upholding plain-view seizure in the context of a Terry stop.” 508 U.S. at 374-75 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Michigan v. Long
green
2 sentences2016In Michigan v. Long, the United States Supreme Court extended the Terry doctrine to allow law enforcement to search “the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, ... if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant’ the officer in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspéct may gain immediate control of weapons.” 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 , 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3481 , 77 L. 2016In Michigan v. Long, the United States Supreme Court extended the Terry doctrine to allow law enforcement to search “the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, ... if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant’ the officer in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspéct may gain immediate control of weapons.” 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 , 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3481 , 77 L. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Chimel v. California
red
2 sentences2010As the Supreme Court expressly held in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 , 89 S. Ct. 2034 , 23 L. 2010As the Supreme Court expressly held in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 , 89 S. Ct. 2034 , 23 L. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
United States v. Cortez
green
2 sentences2008United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 , 101 S. Ct. 690 , 66 L. 2008United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 , 101 S. Ct. 690 , 66 L. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Rodriguez
neutral
1 sentence2008Support for this conclusion is also provided by the decision in Rodriguez, supra, in which a former judge of this Court held that officers did not make a valid Terry stop of an individual who had fled from them the night before after they inquired whether he had a weapon. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Illinois v. Gates
green
2 sentences2002White, 496 U.S. at 328 quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 , 76 L. 2002White, 496 U.S. at 328 quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 , 76 L. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Alabama v. White
green
1 sentence2002White, 496 U.S. at 328 quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 , 76 L. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.