Terry stop in Colorado

2021Therefore, the court h eld, officers were justified in conducting a Terry stop of the def endant’s vehicle, see 392 U.S. 1 , to look for evidence of the activity.

2019In particular, she argued that these actions elevated the initial encounter to a “Terry stop” that was unsupported by reasonable suspicion. 4 4“Under Terry, a police officer can briefly stop a suspicious person and make reasonable inquiries to confirm or dispel his suspicions.” People v. Corpany, 859 P.2d 865, 868 (Colo. 1993) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968)).

2012See United States v. Davis, 530 F.3d 1069, 1082 (9th Cir.2008) (holding that questions consistent with a Terry stop during execution of search warrant, including those intended to obtain the identity of the suspect and confirm or dispel officer's suspicions that suspect was involved in marijuana grow operation on the property, did not require Mirando warnings).

2010Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has held that "[wlhere an individual has been detained incident to a search warrant, and officers' questioning stays within the bounds of questioning permitted during a Terry stop, Miranda [warnings] are not required." United States v. Davis, 530 F.3d 1069, 1081 (9th Cir.2008) (citing prior case relying on Berkemer ).

2012Ratcliff, 778 P.2d at 1376-77 .

2012Ratcliff, 778 P.2d at 1376-77 .

1999See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235 , 105 S.Ct. 675 , 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985) (noting that in the course of an investigatory stop, police officers "were authorized to take such steps as were reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo during the course of the stop"); Tilmon, 19 F.3d at 1225 ("When effecting a Terry stop, which is always a stop made at `close range,' police officers must make a quick decision about how to protect themselves and others from possible danger.").

1999See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235 , 105 S.Ct. 675 , 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985) (noting that in the course of an investigatory stop, police officers "were authorized to take such steps as were reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo during the course of the stop"); Tilmon, 19 F.3d at 1225 ("When effecting a Terry stop, which is always a stop made at `close range,' police officers must make a quick decision about how to protect themselves and others from possible danger.").

2019In particular, she argued that these actions elevated the initial encounter to a “Terry stop” that was unsupported by reasonable suspicion. 4 4“Under Terry, a police officer can briefly stop a suspicious person and make reasonable inquiries to confirm or dispel his suspicions.” People v. Corpany, 859 P.2d 865, 868 (Colo. 1993) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968)).

2018See United States v. Sharpe , 470 U.S. 675 , 685, 105 S.Ct. 1568 , 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (distinguishing cases where intrusiveness transformed lawful Terry stop into unlawful de facto arrest).

2018See United States v. Sharpe , 470 U.S. 675 , 685, 105 S.Ct. 1568 , 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (distinguishing cases where intrusiveness transformed lawful Terry stop into unlawful de facto arrest).

2017Cf. State v. Miller, 207 P.3d 541, 545 (Alaska 2009) (finding reasonable suspicion 'of domestic violence where couple was involved in verbal dispute and officer testified that in his experience a verbal dispute always precedes a physical one). ¶14 The minimally intrusive investigative methods employed by the officer during the several minutes between the initial contact and the defendant’s admission to possessing contraband fell well within the range of techniques associated with diligently pursuing a limited investigatory, stop..

2017See People v. Archuleta, 980 P.2d 509, 516 (Colo. 1999).

2016See Rodriguez v. United States, - U.S, --, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1614 , 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015) ("'[A] relatively brief encounter] a routine traffic stop is 'more analogous to a so-called "Terry stop" [4] ,.. than to a formal arrest.!" (alterations in original) (quoting Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 , 119 S.Ct. 484 , 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998))); Cervantes-Arredondo, 17 P.8d at 147 ("Traffic stops are usually investigatory stops....").

2016See Rodriguez v. United States, - U.S, --, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1614 , 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015) ("'[A] relatively brief encounter] a routine traffic stop is 'more analogous to a so-called "Terry stop" [4] ,.. than to a formal arrest.!" (alterations in original) (quoting Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 , 119 S.Ct. 484 , 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998))); Cervantes-Arredondo, 17 P.8d at 147 ("Traffic stops are usually investigatory stops....").

2016Id. at 1050 (Beam, J., concurring in the result). ¶ 24 The Berdahl division also relied on State v. Brockel, 746 N.W. 2d 423 (N.D. 2008).

2016Id. at 1050 (Beam, J., concurring in the result). ¶ 24 The Berdahl division also relied on State v. Brockel, 746 N.W. 2d 423 (N.D. 2008).

2016See Rodriguez v. United States, - U.S, --, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1614 , 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015) ("'[A] relatively brief encounter] a routine traffic stop is 'more analogous to a so-called "Terry stop" [4] ,.. than to a formal arrest.!" (alterations in original) (quoting Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 , 119 S.Ct. 484 , 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998))); Cervantes-Arredondo, 17 P.8d at 147 ("Traffic stops are usually investigatory stops....").

2016See Rodriguez v. United States, - U.S, --, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1614 , 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015) ("'[A] relatively brief encounter] a routine traffic stop is 'more analogous to a so-called "Terry stop" [4] ,.. than to a formal arrest.!" (alterations in original) (quoting Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 , 119 S.Ct. 484 , 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998))); Cervantes-Arredondo, 17 P.8d at 147 ("Traffic stops are usually investigatory stops....").

2010Maj. op. at 1046 (citing People v. Martinez, 200 P.3d 1053, 1057 (Colo.2009), an investigatory stop case); see also People v. Chamberlain, No. 09SA124, 229 P.3d 1054, 1057 , 2010 WL 1840823 (Colo. May 10, 2010) (adopting Terry standard).

2010Maj. op. at 1046 (citing People v. Martinez, 200 P.3d 1053, 1057 (Colo.2009), an investigatory stop case); see also People v. Chamberlain, No. 09SA124, 229 P.3d 1054, 1057 , 2010 WL 1840823 (Colo. May 10, 2010) (adopting Terry standard).

2010Of course, that the mere fact of temporary detention is legally insufficient by itself to create custody "is not to say ... that Miranda rights can never be implicated during a valid investigatory stop." People v. Breidenbach, 875 P.2d 879, 886 (Colo.1994).

2010Maj. op. at 1046 (citing People v. Martinez, 200 P.3d 1053, 1057 (Colo.2009), an investigatory stop case); see also People v. Chamberlain, No. 09SA124, 229 P.3d 1054, 1057 , 2010 WL 1840823 (Colo. May 10, 2010) (adopting Terry standard).

2010Maj. op. at 1046 (citing People v. Martinez, 200 P.3d 1053, 1057 (Colo.2009), an investigatory stop case); see also People v. Chamberlain, No. 09SA124, 229 P.3d 1054, 1057 , 2010 WL 1840823 (Colo. May 10, 2010) (adopting Terry standard).

2001Unruh, 713 P.2d at 378 (analogizing to cases involving a Terry stop); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

2001Unruh, 713 P.2d at 378 (analogizing to cases involving a Terry stop); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

2000In United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir.1993), the court found that the suspect was in custody during a Terry stop when the police handcuffed him before questioning him. 4 In this case, the trial court found that Reddersen was in custody “[o]nce Officer Shaline confirmed his suspicion by observing the license plate, contacted the [defendant, obtained his driver’s license, and radioed in for a confirmation of status of the license.” Under those circumstances, the trial court concluded that “any reasonable person in the [defendant’s position would have considered himself deprived o

2000In United States v. Baron, 860 F.2d 911, 915 (Ith Cir.1988), the court held that moving a suspect from the street into the back of a police car did not make a Terry stop a de facto arrest.

1999See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235 , 105 S.Ct. 675 , 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985) (noting that in the course of an investigatory stop, police officers "were authorized to take such steps as were reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo during the course of the stop"); Tilmon, 19 F.3d at 1225 ("When effecting a Terry stop, which is always a stop made at `close range,' police officers must make a quick decision about how to protect themselves and others from possible danger.").

1999See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235 , 105 S.Ct. 675 , 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985) (noting that in the course of an investigatory stop, police officers “were authorized to take such steps as were reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo during the course of the stop”); Tilmon, 19 F.3d at 1225 (“When effecting a Terry stop, which is always a stop made at ‘close range,’ police officers must make a quick decision about how to protect themselves and others from possible danger.”).

1994See United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1463 (10th Cir.1998) (noting the recent trend allowing police to use handcuffs during a Terry stop and observing that nine United States courts of appeals have determined that such measures do not necessarily turn a lawful Terry stop into an arrest under the Fourth Amendment).

1994See United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1463 (10th Cir.1993) (noting the recent trend allowing police to use handcuffs during a Terry stop and observing that nine United States courts of appeals have determined that such measures do not necessarily turn a lawful Terry stop into an arrest under the Fourth Amendment).

1993As the Court stated, "[t]he `narrow scope' of the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked, even though that person happens to be on premises where an authorized narcotics search is taking place." Id. at 94 , 100 S.Ct. at 343 (emphasis added).

1993As the Court stated, "[t]he `narrow scope' of the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked, even though that person happens to be on premises where an authorized narcotics search is taking place." Id. at 94 , 100 S.Ct. at 343 (emphasis added).