Terry stop in Virginia

2026I write separately to show that the protective patdown authorized in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and extended to protective sweeps of passenger compartments of vehicles in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), encompasses the protective patdown of a backpack during a Terry stop, even when the suspect is handcuffed.

2025Such a detention, often referred to as a Terry stop, is an “informal encounter[].” See id. at 547-48 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-26 (1968)).

2026Likewise, even though “a suspect’s presence in a high crime area, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable particularized suspicion, it is a relevant contextual consideration in a Terry analysis.” Whitaker v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 268, 276 (2010).

2026Likewise, even though “a suspect’s presence in a high crime area, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable particularized suspicion, it is a relevant contextual consideration in a Terry analysis.” Whitaker v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 268, 276 (2010).

2020The purpose of a Terry stop is “to permit an officer with reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to quickly confirm or dispel that suspicion.” Davis v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. App. 533, 539 (2001) (citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 126 (2000)).

2015Further, these transactions occurred in the “high-crime” Lafayette area of Norfolk, described specifically as an open-air drug market where drugs could easily be purchased by anyone. “[W]hile a suspect’s presence in a high crime area, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable particularized suspicion, it is a relevant contextual consideration in a Terry analysis.” Whitaker v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 268, 276 , 687 S.E.2d 733, 737 (2010); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000).

2024We have recognized that “police procedures [during a Terry stop] can . . . be so intrusive . . . as to trigger the full protection of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.” DePriest v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 577, 586 (1987) (quoting Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 815-16 (1985)).

2013Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816 (1985) (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229, 232, 234 (1985)). “[A]n officer need not suspect an individual of a particular crime in order to justify a Terry stop.

2019The issue in this case is not, as Hill assumes, whether the officers (both experienced detectives) had reasonable suspicion to believe that Hill was a drug dealer and thus had the were not illegal.” (emphasis added)); id. (“In corroboration of Hunter’s testimony, [Detective] Whitson testified that when they said ‘Show me your hands’ to [Hill], he had not done anything illegal.” (emphasis added)); id. at 9 (“Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, [Hill’s] mere presence in a parked vehicle in a high crime area, coupled with the officers’ testimony that [Hill]

2019However, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a limited seizure during an investigatory stop, otherwise known as a “Terry stop,” when an officer has a “reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot.’” Shiflett v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 141, 146 (2005) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26-27, 30 (1968).

2026“A determination that reasonable suspicion exists . . . need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” Arvizu, 2 “In conducting a Terry stop, the police must diligently pursue a means of investigation likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 296, 307 (2000).

2025At the same time, the law recognizes that “a detention [pursuant to Terry] is, by its nature, a brief intrusion on an individual’s liberty.” Id. at 548 (emphasis added). “[I]n conducting a Terry stop, the police must diligently pursue a means of investigation likely to confirm or dispel their - 11 - suspicion[ of a crime] quickly.” Turay v. Commonwealth, 79 Va. App. 286 , 302 (2023) (en banc) (quoting Brown v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 296, 307 (2000)).

2009As the Supreme Court has held, "officers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further 10 investigation. . . . [T]he fact that the stop occurred in a 'high crime area' [is] among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis." Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144, 147-48 (1972)).

2009As the Supreme Court has held, "officers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further 10 investigation. . . . [T]he fact that the stop occurred in a 'high crime area' [is] among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis." Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144, 147-48 (1972)).

2024At the same time, “[t]o protect themselves during a valid Terry stop, police officers have a right to draw their weapons, to handcuff a suspect, or even to threaten to use force if the circumstances reasonably warrant it.” Jackson v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 624, 651 (2003) (citing Thomas v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 851, 857 (1993)).

2011Even “[b]rief, complete deprivations of a suspect’s liberty, including handcuffing, ‘do not convert [a Terry stop] into an arrest so long as the methods of restraint used are reasonable to the circumstances.’” Thomas v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 851, 857 , 434 -4- S.E.2d 319, 323 (1993) (quoting United States v. Crittendon, 883 F.2d 326, 329 (4th Cir. 1989)), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 18 Va. App. 454 , 444 S.E.2d 275 (1994).

2010To justify such action, *555 commonly referred to as a “Terry stop,” “a police officer must have a ‘reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity “may be afoot.” ’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989)); see Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 , 88 S.Ct. at 1884 (articulating standard); see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 , 122 S.Ct. 744, 750 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (“ ‘An investigatory stop must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in cr

2010To justify such action, *555 commonly referred to as a “Terry stop,” “a police officer must have a ‘reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity “may be afoot.” ’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989)); see Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 , 88 S.Ct. at 1884 (articulating standard); see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 , 122 S.Ct. 744, 750 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (“ ‘An investigatory stop must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in cr

2020See Hatcher v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 487, 490 (1992) (“[A]n officer need not suspect an individual of a particular crime in order to justify a Terry stop.”).

2007Ed. 2d 331 (1977). “[P]olice officers may also detain passengers beside an automobile until the completion of a lawful traffic stop.” Harris v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 554, 562 , 500 S.E.2d 257, 261 (1998) (citing Hatcher v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 487, 491-92 , 419 S.E.2d 256, 269 (1992)). 1 Thus, as long as the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the officers had reasonable suspicion or probable cause to detain appellant, we need not consider the testimony of the officers that appellant may have been free to leave during some or all portions of their encounter with him. -5-

2011Whether an officer has reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop is based on an assessment of the totality of the circumstances, “which includes ‘the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability,’ i.e.[,] ‘quantity and quality.’” Jackson, 267 Va. at 673 , 594 S.E.2d at 599 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2416 , 110 L.

2011Whether an officer has reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop is based on an assessment of the totality of the circumstances, “which includes ‘the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability,’ i.e.[,] ‘quantity and quality.’” Jackson, 267 Va. at 673 , 594 S.E.2d at 599 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2416 , 110 L.

2025See generally Hairston v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 552, 563 (2017) (noting that due to the standard of “objective . . . reasonableness, it is irrelevant whether the accused is prosecuted for, or even charged with, the offense that provided [reasonable suspicion or] probable cause for . . . [the] seizure in the first instance”). - 12 - 851, 857 (1993), adopted upon reh’g en banc, 18 Va. App. 454, 455 (1994)); Parady v. Commonwealth, 78 Va. App. 18 , 32-33 (2023) (recognizing officer safety as a permissible consideration in deciding to use handcuffs during a Terry stop).

2025See generally Hairston v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 552, 563 (2017) (noting that due to the standard of “objective . . . reasonableness, it is irrelevant whether the accused is prosecuted for, or even charged with, the offense that provided [reasonable suspicion or] probable cause for . . . [the] seizure in the first instance”). - 12 - 851, 857 (1993), adopted upon reh’g en banc, 18 Va. App. 454, 455 (1994)); Parady v. Commonwealth, 78 Va. App. 18 , 32-33 (2023) (recognizing officer safety as a permissible consideration in deciding to use handcuffs during a Terry stop).

2011Because no “hard-and-fast time limit [exists] for a permissible Terry stop,” United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985), we must rely on “common sense and ordinary human experience” in assessing whether the duration of a Terry stop violates the Fourth Amendment. -3- Id. at 685 .

2011Because no “hard-and-fast time limit [exists] for a permissible Terry stop,” United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985), we must rely on “common sense and ordinary human experience” in assessing whether the duration of a Terry stop violates the Fourth Amendment. -3- Id. at 685 .

2010“Such detention was neither unreasonable nor conducted under circumstances that constituted the functional equivalent of an arrest.” Thomas v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 851, 858 , 434 S.E.2d 319, 323 (1993) (placing suspect in handcuffs during Terry stop justified where violent crime had just occurred in immediate vicinity and accused, behaving suspiciously, matched description of suspect), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 18 Va. App. 454 , 444 S.E.2d 275 (1994).

2009See Thomas v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 851, 857 , 434 S.E.2d 319, 323 (1993), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 18 Va. App. 454 , 444 S.E.2d 275 (1994). -4- Whether an officer has reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop is based on an assessment of the totality of the circumstances, “which includes ‘the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability,’ i.e., ‘quantity and quality.’” Jackson, 267 Va. at 673 , 594 S.E.2d at 599 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2416 , 110 L.

2008We agree. *479 To justify a Terry stop, “a police officer ... must have ‘a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the [person] is involved in criminal activity.’ ” Ewell v. Commonwealth, 254 Va. 214, 217 , 491 S.E.2d 721, 722 (1997) (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 , 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2641 , 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979)). “[T]here are no bright line rules to follow when determining whether a reasonable and articulable suspicion exists to justify an investigatory stop.” Hoye v. Commonwealth, 18 Va.App. 132, 134-35 , 442 S.E.2d 404, 406 (1994). “ ‘Reasonable suspicion’ is more than a

2008We agree. *479 To justify a Terry stop, “a police officer ... must have ‘a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the [person] is involved in criminal activity.’ ” Ewell v. Commonwealth, 254 Va. 214, 217 , 491 S.E.2d 721, 722 (1997) (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 , 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2641 , 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979)). “[T]here are no bright line rules to follow when determining whether a reasonable and articulable suspicion exists to justify an investigatory stop.” Hoye v. Commonwealth, 18 Va.App. 132, 134-35 , 442 S.E.2d 404, 406 (1994). “ ‘Reasonable suspicion’ is more than a

2011Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984) (footnotes omitted); see also Bosworth v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 567, 572 , 375 S.E.2d 756, 759 (1989) (“Although an accused in -5- custody must be advised of certain constitutional rights prior to being questioned, a Terry stop of a person to investigate a suspicion is not necessarily subject to the requirements of Miranda.” (citation omitted)).

2008See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 , 439 n. 29, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (“We of course do not suggest that a traffic stop supported by probable cause may not exceed the bounds set by the Fourth Amendment on the scope of a Terry stop.”).

2025Once an investigatory stop, or a Terry stop, has been initiated, there is no “litmus-paper test for distinguishing . . . when a seizure exceeds the bounds of an investigative stop.” Harris v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 554, 566 (1998) (quoting DePriest v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 577, 586 (1987)).

2024We have recognized that “police procedures [during a Terry stop] can . . . be so intrusive . . . as to trigger the full protection of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.” DePriest v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 577, 586 (1987) (quoting Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 815-16 (1985)).

2022However, an officer “may frisk the driver and passengers for weapons if he develops reasonable suspicion during the traffic or Terry stop to believe the particular person to be frisked is armed and dangerous.” McCain v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 546, 554 (2008).

2022See, e.g., Whitaker v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 268, 276 (2010) (“[W]hile a suspect’s presence in a high crime area, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable articulable suspicion, it is a relevant contextual consideration in a Terry analysis.”); McArthur, 72 Va. App. at 361 (“Even though this traffic stop did occur in a ‘high crime area,’ the Virginia Supreme Court has held that a ‘person’s Fourth Amendment rights are not lessened simply because he or she happens to live or travel in a ‘high crime’ area.’” (quoting McCain, 275 Va. at 553 )).

1998While it is true that police procedures during a Terry stop can be so intrusive as to trigger the full protection of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 815-16 (1985), there is no "litmus-paper test for distinguishing . . . when a seizure exceeds the bounds of an investigative stop." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 506 (1983).

1993Although we recognize that "`police procedures [during a Terry stop] can ... be so intrusive ... as to trigger the full protection of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments,'" DePriest v. Commonwealth, 4 *323 Va.App. 577, 586, 359 S.E.2d 540, 544 (1987) (quoting Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 815-16 , 105 S.Ct. 1643, 1646 , 84 L.Ed.2d 705 (1985)), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 985 , 109 S.Ct. 541 , 102 L.Ed.2d 571 (1988), there is no "`litmus-paper test for distinguishing... when a seizure exceeds the bounds of an investigative stop.'" Id. (quoting Royer, 460 U.S. at 506 , 103 S.Ct. at 1329 ).

2022In applying the doctrine, “[c]ourts look to whether there is a temporal proximity between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of is insufficient to justify a Terry stop.” Our resolution of Hill was based in part upon an analysis of two additional cases which the trial court also relied upon: Smith v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1100 (1991), and Riley v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 494 (1992).

2012The disagreement arises as to whether Officer Dean had the requisite reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop. -3- Jones v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 171, 177 , 670 S.E.2d 31, 34 (2008) (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1100, 1103 , 407 S.E.2d 49, 51-52 (1991)). “[I]n determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 .

1999In Williams v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 53, 65 , 354 S.E.2d 79, 85-86 (1987), we held that officers had reasonable articulable facts upon which to base a Terry stop of the defendant as he drove away from a residence which was the subject of a search warrant.

1999In Williams v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 53, 65 , 354 S.E.2d 79, 85-86 (1987), we held that officers had reasonable articulable facts upon which to base a Terry stop of the defendant as he drove away from a residence which was the subject of a search warrant.

2003In such cases, the “imminent public danger” may provide ample justification for an “immediate investigation.” Beckner, 15 Va. App. at 538 , 425 S.E.2d at 534 ; cf. Giles v. Commonwealth, 32 Va.App. 519, 524-25 , 529 S.E.2d 327, 330 (2000) (considering the “imminence of serious and perhaps lethal danger” as a factor in Terry stop analysis).

2003In such cases, the “imminent public danger” may provide ample justification for an “immediate investigation.” Beckner, 15 Va. App. at 538 , 425 S.E.2d at 534 ; cf. Giles v. Commonwealth, 32 Va.App. 519, 524-25 , 529 S.E.2d 327, 330 (2000) (considering the “imminence of serious and perhaps lethal danger” as a factor in Terry stop analysis).

2011Whether an officer has reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop is based on an assessment of the totality of the circumstances, “which includes ‘the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability,’ i.e.[,] ‘quantity and quality.’” Jackson, 267 Va. at 673 , 594 S.E.2d at 599 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2416 , 110 L.

2011Whether an officer has reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop is based on an assessment of the totality of the circumstances, “which includes ‘the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability,’ i.e.[,] ‘quantity and quality.’” Jackson, 267 Va. at 673 , 594 S.E.2d at 599 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2416 , 110 L.

2026A Terry stop is authorized where circumstances give rise to a reasonable suspicion that an individual “is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.” Hill, 297 Va. at 813 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).

2010To justify such action, *555 commonly referred to as a “Terry stop,” “a police officer must have a ‘reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity “may be afoot.” ’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989)); see Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 , 88 S.Ct. at 1884 (articulating standard); see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 , 122 S.Ct. 744, 750 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (“ ‘An investigatory stop must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in cr

2008A Terry stop, on the other hand, must be based upon “reasonable, articulable suspicion that a person is engaging in, or is about to engage in, criminal activity....” McGee, 25 Va.App. at 202 , 487 S.E.2d at 263 .

2008A Terry stop, on the other hand, must be based upon “reasonable, articulable suspicion that a person is engaging in, or is about to engage in, criminal activity....” McGee, 25 Va.App. at 202 , 487 S.E.2d at 263 .

2011See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (officer may make investigatory stop if he has reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that criminal activity is “afoot”); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (officer having reasonable suspicion may make Terry stop of automobile).

2004An investigatory stop (sometimes referred to as a “Terry stop”), such as the traffic stop at issue in this case, constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments “even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief.” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); see United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726, 729 (4th Cir. 1993).

2009The corroboration may be from innocent behavior or details, Gates, 462 U.S. at 243 n.13, but innocent information must be sufficiently predictive so as to establish “the informer’s knowledge or credibility,” J.L., 529 U.S. at 271 ; see Jackson, 267 Va. at 677-80 , 594 S.E.2d at 601-03 . “[W]hen an informant reports open and obvious criminal conduct,” a lesser degree of corroborative information may be required to provide the tip with “sufficient indicia of reliability” to justify a Terry stop.

2008The corroboration may be from innocent behavior or details, Gates, 462 U.S. at 243 n.13, but innocent information must be sufficiently predictive so as to establish “the informer’s knowledge or credibility,” J.L., 529 U.S. at 271 ; see Jackson, 267 Va. at 677-80 , 594 S.E.2d at 601-03 . “[W]hen an informant reports open and obvious criminal conduct,” a lesser degree of corroborative information may be required to provide the tip with “sufficient indicia of reliability” to justify a Terry stop.