Terry stop in Arizona

2020See Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 24-25, ¶¶ 27-29 . ¶21 A routine traffic stop is “more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ . . . than to a formal arrest.” See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).

2018Whether the officers' initial contact was an unconstitutional Terry stop. ¶16 Last, Garcia argues that the superior court erred by denying his motion to suppress and finding the officers' initial contact with him was not an illegal investigatory stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

2024Foster’s suggestion that a Terry stop is permissible only to investigate current or ongoing criminal activity is contrary to the United States Supreme Court’s holding that “if police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable 21 STATE v. FOSTER Opinion of the Court facts, that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony, then a Terry stop may be made to investigate that suspicion.” United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985) (emphasis added). ¶75 In State v. Winegar, the defendant argued that her murder conviction res

2016Such a stop is constitutional at its inception “ ‘if supported by reasonable suspicion’ that criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Rogers, 186 Ariz. 508, 510 , 924 P.2d 1027, 1029 (1996), quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 693 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996); see also State v. Winegar, 147 Ariz. 440, 446 , 711 P.2d 579, 585 (1985) (“‘[I]f police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony, then a Terry stop may be made to investigate that suspicion

2024Foster’s suggestion that a Terry stop is permissible only to investigate current or ongoing criminal activity is contrary to the United States Supreme Court’s holding that “if police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable 21 STATE v. FOSTER Opinion of the Court facts, that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony, then a Terry stop may be made to investigate that suspicion.” United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985) (emphasis added). ¶75 In State v. Winegar, the defendant argued that her murder conviction res

2024Winegar, 147 Ariz. at 446 ; see also State v. Dixon, 153 Ariz. 151, 152-53 (1987) (holding that a police officer conducted “a reasonable investigatory stop” when, upon seeing a hitchhiker who fit the description of the suspect in a recent sexual assault, the officer stopped and talked to him before arresting him). ¶77 In Winegar, the court held that after the initially valid Terry stop, the officers impermissibly expanded the detention into a de facto arrest when they required the defendant to accompany them across the street to a municipal building for further questioning. 147 Ariz. at 446 .

2021United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985) (noting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) “expressly rejected the suggestion that we adopt a hard-and-fast time limit for a permissible Terry stop.”).

2021The superior court’s reasonableness determinations, turning as they did on an assessment of witness credibility and weighing evidence, are supported by the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing. ¶21 Citing United States v. Sharpe, the State correctly asserts that “[t]here is no hard and fast limit for gauging the reasonableness of length of the detention.” 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985) (noting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) “expressly rejected the suggestion that we adopt a hard-and- fast time limit for a permissible Terry stop”).

2012Although “[t]here is no bright line that distinguishes a valid Terry stop” from a de facto arrest, “Terry stops must be tailored to fit the exigencies of particular situations.” United States v. Pontoo, 666 F.3d 20, 30 (1st Cir.2011). “[W]hether the scope of an investigatory stop is reasonable demands careful consideration of the totality of the circumstances.” † Id. “[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (plurality opinion). ¶ 15 Un

2012Although “[t]here is no bright line that distinguishes a valid Terry stop” from a de facto arrest, “Terry stops must be tailored to fit the exigencies of particular situations.” United States v. Pontoo, 666 F.3d 20, 30 (1st Cir.2011). “[W]hether the scope of an investigatory stop is reasonable demands careful consideration of the totality of the circumstances.” † Id. “[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (plurality opinion). ¶ 15 Un

2012Although the use of handcuffs does not automatically transform a Terry stop into an arrest, see Blackmore, 186 Ariz. at 633-34 , 925 P.2d at 1350-51 , their continued use when no ongoing threat exists suggests the detainee is under arrest.

2012Although the use of handcuffs does not automatically transform a Terry stop into an arrest, see Blackmore, 186 Ariz. at 633-34 , 925 P.2d at 1350-51 , their continued use when no ongoing threat exists suggests the detainee is under arrest.

2021“Like a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop, and attend to related safety concerns.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015).

2018There is no rigid time limit for an investigative stop—“the appropriate inquiry is whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.” Id. (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985); see also Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015) (stating a Terry stop’s length “is determined by the seizure’s ‘mission,’ which is to address the . . . violation that warranted the stop.”). ¶14 Sufficient evidence supports the conclusion that Briss

2000See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 , 99 S.Ct. 2637 , 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979). ¶ 7 Police may, however, approach and question people without impheating the Fourth Amendment, provided that the interaction is consensual.

2000See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 , 99 S.Ct. 2637 , 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979). ¶ 7 Police may, however, approach and question people without impheating the Fourth Amendment, provided that the interaction is consensual.

2016Such a stop is constitutional at its inception “ ‘if supported by reasonable suspicion’ that criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Rogers, 186 Ariz. 508, 510 , 924 P.2d 1027, 1029 (1996), quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 693 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996); see also State v. Winegar, 147 Ariz. 440, 446 , 711 P.2d 579, 585 (1985) (“‘[I]f police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony, then a Terry stop may be made to investigate that suspicion

2016Such a stop is constitutional at its inception “ ‘if supported by reasonable suspicion’ that criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Rogers, 186 Ariz. 508, 510 , 924 P.2d 1027, 1029 (1996), quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 693 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996); see also State v. Winegar, 147 Ariz. 440, 446 , 711 P.2d 579, 585 (1985) (“‘[I]f police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony, then a Terry stop may be made to investigate that suspicion

2005Moreover, Ilono was not only wearing gang colors and loose-fitting clothes within which a gun could be easily hidden from view, he was also associating with E. ¶ 11 Assuming, without deciding, that those circumstances gave the officers reasonable grounds to believe Ilono was then armed and dangerous, but see Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 94 , 100 S.Ct. 338, 343 , 62 L.Ed.2d 238, 247 (1979) (“The ‘narrow scope’ of the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked____”) (emphasis added), quoting Dunaway v.

2005Moreover, Ilono was not only wearing gang colors and loose-fitting clothes within which a gun could be easily hidden from view, he was also associating with E. ¶ 11 Assuming, without deciding, that those circumstances gave the officers reasonable grounds to believe Ilono was then armed and dangerous, but see Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 94 , 100 S.Ct. 338, 343 , 62 L.Ed.2d 238, 247 (1979) (“The ‘narrow scope’ of the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked____”) (emphasis added), quoting Dunaway v.

2020See Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 24-25, ¶¶ 27-29 . ¶21 A routine traffic stop is “more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ . . . than to a formal arrest.” See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).

2009Arizona v. Johnson, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 781, 784 , 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009) (permitting a traffic stop “when the police officer reasonably suspects” a traffic violation); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (holding that “the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop,’ [Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)]” and applying a “reasonable suspicion” standard); United States v. Choudhry, 461 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir.2006) (analyzing Whren and concluding that “under Whren , so long as Officers Silver and Cha

2020See Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 24-25, ¶¶ 27-29 . ¶21 A routine traffic stop is “more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ . . . than to a formal arrest.” See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).

2016Such a stop is constitutional at its inception “ ‘if supported by reasonable suspicion’ that criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Rogers, 186 Ariz. 508, 510 , 924 P.2d 1027, 1029 (1996), quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 693 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996); see also State v. Winegar, 147 Ariz. 440, 446 , 711 P.2d 579, 585 (1985) (“‘[I]f police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony, then a Terry stop may be made to investigate that suspicion

2016A Terry stop is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment where the officer “restrains [the person’s] freedom to walk away.” Id. at 16 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ; see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 , 100 S.Ct. 1870 , 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (person seized if, under totality of circumstances, reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave).

2016A Terry stop is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment where the officer “restrains [the person’s] freedom to walk away.” Id. at 16 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ; see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 , 100 S.Ct. 1870 , 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (person seized if, under totality of circumstances, reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave).

2005Moreover, Ilono was not only wearing gang colors and loose-fitting clothes within which a gun could be easily hidden from view, he was also associating with E. ¶ 11 Assuming, without deciding, that those circumstances gave the officers reasonable grounds to believe Ilono was then armed and dangerous, but see Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 94 , 100 S.Ct. 338, 343 , 62 L.Ed.2d 238, 247 (1979) (“The ‘narrow scope’ of the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked____”) (emphasis added), quoting Dunaway v.

2005Moreover, Ilono was not only wearing gang colors and loose-fitting clothes within which a gun could be easily hidden from view, he was also associating with E. ¶ 11 Assuming, without deciding, that those circumstances gave the officers reasonable grounds to believe Ilono was then armed and dangerous, but see Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 94 , 100 S.Ct. 338, 343 , 62 L.Ed.2d 238, 247 (1979) (“The ‘narrow scope’ of the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked____”) (emphasis added), quoting Dunaway v.

2014See State v. Rogers, 186 Ariz. 508, 509-10 , 924 P.2d 1027, 1028-29 (1996) (finding that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave when the officer held out his badge and stated, “police officers, we need to talk to you”); see also Gentry v. Sevier, 597 F.3d 838, 844-45 (7th Cir.2010) (concluding that a Terry stop occurred when the “officer exited the [patrol] ear and told Gentry to ‘keep [his] hands up’ ” (second alteration in original)).

2013Id. at 16 , 88 S.Ct. at 1877 (“It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has ‘seized’ that person.”); see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 , 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877 , 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (examples of circumstances that “might indicate” seizure under Fourth Amendment include “physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled.”); Gentry v. Sevier, 597 F.3d 838, 844-45 (7th Cir.2010) (“[wjhen th

2014See, e.g., United States v. Ellis, 501 F.3d 958, 962 (8th Cir.2007) (finding “there was reasonable suspicion [of criminal activity] to justify a pat-down search”); United States v. Romain, 393 F.3d 63, 71-72 (1st Cir.2004) (evaluating whether pat-down was appropriate “following a valid Terry stop” and determining that defendant’s behavior “gave rise to a reasonable suspicion ... [of] criminal wrongdoing”); United States v. Davis, 202 F.3d 1060, 1062 (8th Cir.2000) (stating that “[t]o be constitutionally reasonable, a protective frisk must also be based upon reasonable suspicion that criminal a

2013Although a Terry frisk more often than not occurs during a Terry stop, nevertheless, the “two types of seizures are analytically distinct.” United States v. Davis, 202 F.3d 1060, 1062 (8th Cir.2000); United States v. Orman, 486 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir.2007) (Terry stop- and-frisk “constitutes two independent actions, each requiring separate justifications”) (quoting United States v. Flippin, 924 F.2d 163 , 165 n. 2 (9th Cir.1991)). ¶ 12 The third type of police-citizen encounter is an arrest — a classic seizure under the Fourth Amendment that must be based on probable cause. ¶ 13 We consider

2013As recognized by the Supreme Court, although a stop in a “high crime area” is a relevant “contextual consideration” under Terry , a person’s presence in “an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, partieu- larized suspicion that the person is committing a crime.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 , 120 S.Ct. 673, 676 , 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000); see also In re Ilono H., 210 Ariz. at 475, ¶ 6 , 113 P.3d at 698 (mere presence “in the wrong part of town” does not give officers reasonable cause to conduct investigative stop). 16 ¶ 58 Considering

2013Quoting from Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Terry , the Ilono H. court explained: “[I]f the frisk is justified in order to protect the officer during an encounter with a citizen, the officer must first have constitutional grounds to insist on an encounter, to make a forcible stop.” Id. at 476, ¶ 11, 113 P.3d at 699 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 32 , 88 S.Ct. at 1885 (Harlan, J., concurring)). ¶36 The majority rejects Ilono H. and, relying on a ease decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, United States v. Orman, 486 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir.2007), justifies its rejecti

2021United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985) (noting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) “expressly rejected the suggestion that we adopt a hard-and-fast time limit for a permissible Terry stop.”).

2021The superior court’s reasonableness determinations, turning as they did on an assessment of witness credibility and weighing evidence, are supported by the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing. ¶21 Citing United States v. Sharpe, the State correctly asserts that “[t]here is no hard and fast limit for gauging the reasonableness of length of the detention.” 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985) (noting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) “expressly rejected the suggestion that we adopt a hard-and- fast time limit for a permissible Terry stop”).

2013In Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 , 129 S.Ct. 781 , 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009), the Court reaffirmed that for a Terry stop and frisk to be constitutionally permissible, two conditions must be met: First, the investigatory stop must be lawful.

2013In Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 , 129 S.Ct. 781 , 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009), the Court reaffirmed that for a Terry stop and frisk to be constitutionally permissible, two conditions must be met: First, the investigatory stop must be lawful.

2005Thus, “[a] pat down is unquestionably a search covered by the Fourth Amendment.” Leveto v. Lapina, 258 F.3d 156, 163 (3d Cir.2001). ¶ 10 Relying on Terry , the state argues the frisk was nonetheless proper because the officers had possessed “an articulable reason to fear for their safety.” See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 , 88 S.Ct. at 1883 , 20 L.Ed.2d at 909 (officer may frisk person during brief detention only if “a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger”); see also Adams, 407 U.S. at 146 , 92 S.Ct. at 1923 , 32

2005Thus, “[a] pat down is unquestionably a search covered by the Fourth Amendment.” Leveto v. Lapina, 258 F.3d 156, 163 (3d Cir.2001). ¶ 10 Relying on Terry , the state argues the frisk was nonetheless proper because the officers had possessed “an articulable reason to fear for their safety.” See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 , 88 S.Ct. at 1883 , 20 L.Ed.2d at 909 (officer may frisk person during brief detention only if “a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger”); see also Adams, 407 U.S. at 146 , 92 S.Ct. at 1923 , 32

2024“Whether an illegal arrest occurred is a mixed question of fact and law that [this Court] review[s] de novo.” State v. Boteo-Flores, 230 Ariz. 105, 107, ¶ 11 (2012) (internal quotations and citation omitted). ¶30 An officer must have probable cause to make an arrest.

2016Cf. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685–86; Boteo-Flores, 230 Ariz. at 108 ¶ 14, 280 P.3d at 1242 .

2014See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 276 , 122 S.Ct. 744 (noting trial court’s “superior access to the evidence and the well-recognized inability of reviewing courts to reconstruct what happened in the courtroom”; appellate court “should not have casually rejected” testimony about and demonstration of conduct officer found suspicious). ¶9 Evans is correct that, in reviewing a Fourth Amendment claim involving a Terry stop, a court must consider whether, given the “ ‘totality of the circumstances,’ ” the officer had “a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at

2014See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 276 , 122 S.Ct. 744 (noting trial court’s “superior access to the evidence and the well-recognized inability of reviewing courts to reconstruct what happened in the courtroom”; appellate court “should not have casually rejected” testimony about and demonstration of conduct officer found suspicious). ¶9 Evans is correct that, in reviewing a Fourth Amendment claim involving a Terry stop, a court must consider whether, given the “ ‘totality of the circumstances,’ ” the officer had “a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at

2016Such a stop is constitutional at its inception “ ‘if supported by reasonable suspicion’ that criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Rogers, 186 Ariz. 508, 510 , 924 P.2d 1027, 1029 (1996), quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 693 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996); see also State v. Winegar, 147 Ariz. 440, 446 , 711 P.2d 579, 585 (1985) (“‘[I]f police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony, then a Terry stop may be made to investigate that suspicion

2016Such a stop is constitutional at its inception “ ‘if supported by reasonable suspicion’ that criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Rogers, 186 Ariz. 508, 510 , 924 P.2d 1027, 1029 (1996), quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 693 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996); see also State v. Winegar, 147 Ariz. 440, 446 , 711 P.2d 579, 585 (1985) (“‘[I]f police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony, then a Terry stop may be made to investigate that suspicion

2014See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 276 , 122 S.Ct. 744 (noting trial court’s “superior access to the evidence and the well-recognized inability of reviewing courts to reconstruct what happened in the courtroom”; appellate court “should not have casually rejected” testimony about and demonstration of conduct officer found suspicious). ¶9 Evans is correct that, in reviewing a Fourth Amendment claim involving a Terry stop, a court must consider whether, given the “ ‘totality of the circumstances,’ ” the officer had “a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at

2014See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 276 , 122 S.Ct. 744 (noting trial court’s “superior access to the evidence and the well-recognized inability of reviewing courts to reconstruct what happened in the courtroom”; appellate court “should not have casually rejected” testimony about and demonstration of conduct officer found suspicious). ¶9 Evans is correct that, in reviewing a Fourth Amendment claim involving a Terry stop, a court must consider whether, given the “ ‘totality of the circumstances,’ ” the officer had “a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at

2016“If the purpose underlying a Terry stop—investigating possible criminal activity—is to be served, the police must under certain circumstances be able to detain the individual for longer than the brief time period involved in Terry.” Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685-86 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 , 101 S.Ct. 2587 , 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981)).

2016“If the purpose underlying a Terry stop – investigating possible criminal activity – is to be served, the police must under certain circumstances be able to detain the individual for longer than the brief time period involved in Terry.” Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685–86 (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 (1981)).

2014The Ninth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that “a Terry stop-and-frisk ‘constitutes two independent actions.’ ” Id. at 1174 (quoting United States v. Flippin, 924 F.2d 163 , 165 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1991)).

2013Although a Terry frisk more often than not occurs during a Terry stop, nevertheless, the “two types of seizures are analytically distinct.” United States v. Davis, 202 F.3d 1060, 1062 (8th Cir.2000); United States v. Orman, 486 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir.2007) (Terry stop- and-frisk “constitutes two independent actions, each requiring separate justifications”) (quoting United States v. Flippin, 924 F.2d 163 , 165 n. 2 (9th Cir.1991)). ¶ 12 The third type of police-citizen encounter is an arrest — a classic seizure under the Fourth Amendment that must be based on probable cause. ¶ 13 We consider