Terry stop in Kentucky

2023Whatever the legal reason for a stop: “an investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 5 An investigative stop or temporary detention is often called a “Terry stop” after Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S .Ct. 1868, 20 L.

2023Whatever the legal reason for a stop: “an investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 5 An investigative stop or temporary detention is often called a “Terry stop” after Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S .Ct. 1868, 20 L.

2020In Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990), the United States Supreme Court found an anonymous tip was sufficient to justify a Terry stop when the tip accurately predicted the future behavior of the person to be searched.

2005All would agree that Officer Koenig’s statement in his traffic citation that “officer went to above location and subject matching description was just leaving that location after meeting up with another subject,” would be sufficient “predictive behavior” to justify the Terry stop in this case, even under Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 , 120 S.Ct. 1375 , 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000); see also, Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990).

2014See Joshua v. DeWitt, 341 F.3d 430, 443-444 (6th Cir.2003) (concluding that simply characterizing conduct of a suspect as a “furtive gesture” was mere opinion, insufficient to justify a Terry stop without specific, articulable facts in the record to explain it).

2008See Joshua v. DeWitt, 341 F.3d 430, 443-444 (6th Cir.2003) (concluding that simply characterizing conduct of a suspect as a “furtive gesture” was mere opinion, insufficient to justify a Terry stop without specific, articulable facts in the record to explain it).

2021“No ‘Terry’ stop occurs when police officers engage a person . . . in conversation by asking questions.” Id. at 850 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 , 103 S. Ct. 1319 , 75 L.

2021“No ‘Terry’ stop occurs when police officers engage a person . . . in conversation by asking questions.” Id. at 850 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 , 103 S. Ct. 1319 , 75 L.

2020Commonwealth v. Crowder, 884 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Ky. 1994).

2015Where the “the police officer had sufficient facts to form a reasonable belief that [the detained suspect] was armed ... she was entitled to conduct a protective pat down search.” Commonwealth v. Whitmore, 92 S.W.3d 76, 79 (Ky.2002) (citing Terry , and Commonwealth v. Crowder, 884 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Ky.1994) (“Since the nature of the non-threatening contraband was not immediately apparent to [the police officer] when conducting the patdown, his further exploration of Crowder’s pocket ‘was not authorized by Terry ’ ”[.])).

2025Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Morgan, 248 S.W.3d 538, 540 (Ky. 2008). -8- A Terry stop may ripen into an arrest requiring probable cause if the detention is unreasonably in its use of force.

2023When an officer detains a person for an -5- investigative or Terry stop,5 which is distinguished from an arrest, the officer “must have a reasonable suspicion, based on objective and articulable facts, that criminal activity has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur.” Commonwealth v. Morgan, 248 S.W.3d 538, 540 (Ky. 2008).

2025The court further explained that “reasonable suspicion can[not] be ‘predicated upon an unidentified person's accurate description of [another individual], coupled with the bare assertion that [the individual] had engaged in what might be considered offensive -- though not criminal -- conduct.’” Collins v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 113, 117 (Ky. 2004).

2020See Collins v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 113, 116 (Ky. 2004).

2010See U.S. v. Foster, 376 F.3d 577, 588 (6th Cir.2004) ("[T]he use of handcuffs [does not] exceed the bounds of a Terry stop, so long as the circumstances warrant that precaution”).

2006See also United States v. Foster, 376 F.3d 577 (6th Cir.2004), which held that the use of handcuffs does not exceed the bounds of a Terry stop, so long as the circumstances warrant that precaution.

2015The ‘narrow scope’ of the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be friskedf.]” Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94 , 100 S.Ct. 338, 343 , 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979).

2015The ‘narrow scope’ of the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be friskedf.]” Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94 , 100 S.Ct. 338, 343 , 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979).

2018However, "the prior record of a suspect, standi;ng alone, will never justify a Terry stop." Id. at 541 ..

2008Where there are other articulable factors, however, a prior record is a legitimate factor to be considered in determining *542 whether there is a sufficient quantum of suspicion to justify a stop.” Id.

2005All would agree that Officer Koenig’s statement in his traffic citation that “officer went to above location and subject matching description was just leaving that location after meeting up with another subject,” would be sufficient “predictive behavior” to justify the Terry stop in this case, even under Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 , 120 S.Ct. 1375 , 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000); see also, Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990).

2005All would agree that Officer Koenig’s statement in his traffic citation that “officer went to above location and subject matching description was just leaving that location after meeting up with another subject,” would be sufficient “predictive behavior” to justify the Terry stop in this case, even under Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 , 120 S.Ct. 1375 , 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000); see also, Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990).

2025Williams v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Ky. 2004) (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685-86 , 105 S. Ct. 1568 , 84 L.

2025Williams v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Ky. 2004) (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685-86 , 105 S. Ct. 1568 , 84 L.

2019Strange v. Commonwealth, 269 S.W.3d 847, 852 (Ky. 2008).

2014Strange, 269 S.W.3d at 851-52 .

2025The court explained as follows: [A]lthough an officer conducting a Terry stop “may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions . . . the detainee is not obliged to respond.” [quoting Kavanaugh v. Commonwealth, 427 S.W.3d 178, 180 (Ky. 2014).] . . .

2025Moreover, in states like Kentucky, where “possession of an unconcealed firearm is legal, the mere observation or report of an unconcealed firearm cannot, without more, -4- generate reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop[.]” Pulley v. Commonwealth, 481 S.W.3d 520, 526 (Ky. App. 2016).

2022Immediately thereafter, based on the body camera footage, Clay gave a contradictory answer indicating he was there to see Winn -8- whom he specifically referred to as “Capone.”1 See Williams v. Commonwealth, 364 S.W.3d 65, 70 (Ky. 2011) (citation omitted) (association “with a person who is independently engaged in criminal activity” is a factor that “can be considered in determining . . . whether reasonable, articulable suspicion exists for a Terry stop.”).

2021In deciding whether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop, “[t]he court must consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a police officer had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that a person stopped may be involved in criminal activity.” Bauder v. Commonwealth, 299 S.W.3d 588, 591 (Ky. 2009) (citing U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 , 101 S. Ct. 690, 695 , 66 L.

2019Id. at 528 (citations and international quotation marks omitted). 12 The question of whether a defendant was “in custody” is a mixed question of fact and law, and is thus reviewed de novo.

2019In order to detain Ward for investigative purposes, the officers needed reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot supported by articulable facts. “[A] person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).

2016Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dept., 785 F.3d 1128, 1131-33 (6th Cir.2015); United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 540 (4th Cir.2013); United States v. Lewis, 672 F.3d 232, 240 (3d Cir.2012); United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213, 217-18 (3d Cir.2000); State v. Williamson, 368 S.W.3d 468, 480-81 (Tenn.2012); St.