Terry stop in Illinois

2026The motion also -2- asserted that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop (see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)) and, regardless, the actions of the officers did not conform with the limitations on a Terry-style investigative stop and search. ¶6 On June 3, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to suppress.

2026Defendant disputes the trial court’s finding that the encounter between him and the police constituted a Terry stop (see Terry, 392 U.S. 1 ) because he was not merely detained for an investigatory stop but was taken to the ground and put into handcuffs before any illegal activity was reasonably suspected.

2024People v. Slaymaker, 2015 IL App (2d) 130528, ¶ 12 . ¶ 17 Relevant factors to consider when determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop an individual include whether: (1) the stop occurred in a high crime area; (2) it was late at night or early in the morning; (3) the person engaged in “unprovoked flight” (Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000)); and (4) the person’s behavior was consistent with the officer’s knowledge of criminal activity.

2021The United States Supreme Court held in Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000), that the fact that a stop occurred in a “high crime area” is among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis.

2026See People v. Holmes, 2019 IL App (1st) 160987, ¶ 20 (citing People v. Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d 103, 109 (2001)) (noting that the reasonableness of a Terry stop is based on the facts known to the officer at the moment the stop occurred).

2025People v. Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d 103, 110 (2001). ¶ 45 Because the underlying purpose of a Terry stop is to resolve the ambiguity in observed conduct, it follows that that the police are not required to rule out all innocent explanations for the conduct before initiating a stop.

2023(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Close, 238 Ill. 2d at 511 . ¶ 35 In conducting the Terry stop, the detectives exited the police vehicle and approached the parked Sebring on foot.

2021Although the purpose of a Terry stop is to quickly confirm or dispel an officer’s suspicions (People v. Close, 238 Ill. 2d 497, 512 , 939 N.E.2d 463, 471 (2010)), an officer does not need a method to conclusively establish a violation before deciding to initiate a stop.

2026People v. Arnold, 394 Ill. - 12 - App. 3d 63, 71 (2009); see also Colyar, 2013 IL 111835, ¶ 46 (stating that handcuffing does not automatically transform a Terry stop into an illegal arrest).

2026That is exactly what occurred in Colyar, where “[t]he contested conduct arose during an incident that both parties agree was initiated as a proper Terry stop.” Colyar, 2013 IL 111835, ¶ 1 . ¶ 50 The officers would have acted well within constitutional constraints by approaching Sanders or the other men to ask questions they had.

2024Id. ¶ 53 The Supreme Court held that the anonymous tip by itself was insufficient to justify the Terry stop.

2021And, given that the tipster had reported that defendant was armed and had just been engaging in threatening behavior toward two women, Luzadder had the requisite reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop. ¶ 29 Arguing against this conclusion, defendant claims that this case is similar to Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000).

2021United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1989) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 22 ). ¶ 65 I would find that the officers’ observations of defendant’s innocent, noncriminal acts and the uncorroborated information known to the officers at the time of the Terry stop would not warrant a reasonable and prudent officer to believe that a crime had been, was being, or was about to be committed or that their safety or that of others was in immediate danger.

2019As indicated in both Jones and Garcia, the observation of an item, which from a police officer’s training and experience can be associated with narcotics activity but which is also possibly innocuous, i.e., a small manila envelope or a knotted plastic bag, may be supportive of reasonable suspicion, warranting further investigation. ¶ 69 In Timmsen, 2016 IL 118181, ¶ 44 , the supreme court held that, “[w]here possibly innocent conduct also suggests criminal activity, *** an investigative stop is justified to resolve the ambiguity.” Further, police officers are “not required to rule out all poss

2024“In Terry, the United States Supreme Court held that ‘an officer may, within the parameters of the fourth amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop of a citizen when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity, and such suspicion amounts to more than a mere “hunch.” ’ ” Id. ¶ 32 (quoting People v. Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d 165, 177 (2003), citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 ). 15 No. 1-23-0645 ¶ 38 The Gallagher court concluded that the officer lacked a reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop, noting that the State failed to present any evidence of the gas station be

2024People v. Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d 165, 182 (2003) (in assessing a Terry stop, observation of a beer bottle, in conjunction with perceived age of defendant, would reasonably lead an officer to have a justifiable basis to assume that underage drinking may be going on).

2023Accordingly, we must assess whether the facts available to Rodriguez when he encountered defendant on the stairs provided the officer with “a reasonable suspicion based upon -9- specific and articulable facts that the person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime.” People v. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d 501, 518 (1999); see United States v. Street, 917 F.3d 586, 593 (7th Cir. 2019) (“To determine whether a Terry stop was reasonable, we ‘must consider the totality of circumstances known to the officer at the time of the stop.’ ” (quoting United States v. Quinn, 83 F.3d 917, 921 (7th Cir. 1996))

2003Relying upon this court’s decision in People v. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d 501 (1999), defendant concluded that her continued detention by the officers after the basis for the Terry stop was dispelled constituted an unlawful seizure.

2010People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220, 226 , 789 N.E.2d 260 (2003), abrogated on other grounds by People v. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d 530 , 857 N.E.2d 187 (2006) 2 (Terry analysis applies even though the vehicle stop was supported by probable cause).

2010People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220, 226 , 789 N.E.2d 260 (2003), abrogated on other grounds by People v. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d 530 , 857 N.E.2d 187 (2006) 2 (Terry analysis applies even though the vehicle stop was supported by probable cause).

2024We agree with the State that, when -7- No. 1-23-1387 considering those three factors and the totality of the circumstances, both the initial Terry stop and the subsequent pat-down were justified. ¶ 14 First, we consider the location of the encounter, as “[a] person's presence in a high crime area is a relevant factor in deciding whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the police have reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop.” People v. Harris, 2011 IL App (1st) 103382, ¶ 12 .

2024See People v. Harris, 2011 IL App (1st) 103382, ¶ 14 (“A conclusory and unsubstantiated statement that a location is a ‘high crime area’ is insufficient to establish that consideration for purposes of justifying a Terry stop.”).

2005In an oft-cited passage in People v. Murray, 137 Ill. 2d 382, 387-88 (1990), the supreme court divided warrantless police-citizen searches or seizures into three tiers: “One tier involves an arrest of a citizen, which action must be supported by probable cause; otherwise, the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable seizures is violated. [Citation.] The next tier involves a so-called ‘Terry’ stop, a brief seizure that must be supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to be within the acceptable fourth amendment boundaries. [Citation.] The last tier involves no coercion

2004The majority holds that the police-citizen encounter changed from a Terry stop to a community caretaking situation when the original traffic stop ended. "`[A] person has been "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.'" Murray, 137 Ill.2d at 389 , 148 Ill.Dec. 7 , 560 N.E.2d 309 , quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 , 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877 , 64 L.Ed.2d 497, 509 (1980).

2024When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we “accord great deference to the trial court's factual findings, and we will reverse those findings only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence; however, we will review de novo the ultimate question of the defendant's legal challenge to the denial of his motion to suppress.” People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 431 (2001) (citing In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 50 (2000)). ¶ 13 The defendant argues that Officers Prothro and Smith lacked reasonable suspicion to justify both the initial Terry stop and the resulting pat-dow

2021See People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 432 (2001) (“when an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or others, the officer may conduct a pat-down search to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon” (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 24 )); see also People v. Richardson, 2017 IL App (1st) 130203-B, ¶ 27 (finding that the defendant’s “furtive movements” supported the officer’s belief that the defendant was “ ‘most likely’ ” hiding a firearm and justified a pat-dow

2020While an individual’s mere presence in a “high crime area” is insufficient by itself to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime, the United States Supreme Court has held that “the fact that the stop occurred in a ‘high crime area’ [is] among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis.” Id. at 124 (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144, 147-148 (1972)).

2020While an individual’s mere presence in a “high crime area” is insufficient by itself to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime, the United States Supreme Court has held that “the fact that the stop occurred in a ‘high crime area’ [is] among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis.” Id. at 124 (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144, 147-148 (1972)).

2007A police officer must have a reasonable and articu-lable suspicion to make an investigatory “Terry stop.” People v. Ertl, 292 Ill.

2007A police officer must have a reasonable and articulable suspicion to make an investigatory “Terry stop.” People v. Ertl, 292 Ill.

2022The right to frisk does not automatically flow from a valid Terry stop (People v. Galvin, 127 Ill. 2d 153, 165 (1989)), and “[w]hether an investigatory stop is valid is a separate question from whether a search for weapons is valid” (Flowers, 179 Ill. 2d at 263 ). ¶ 22 Here, based on the evidence presented at the motion to suppress hearing and at trial, the officers’ decision to frisk Lockett was based on the following observations: Lockett looked in the direction of their unmarked vehicle; he adjusted his waistband once, while the officers were in the vehicle, causing them to suspect he was c

2019Having determined the point at which Johnson was seized, we consider whether, at that point, the police officers properly stopped him under the principles set forth in Terry. ¶ 15 A Terry stop must be justified at its inception, and “[v]iewed as a whole, the situation confronting the police officer must be so far from the ordinary that any competent officer would be expected to act quickly.” Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d at 110 . “ ‘[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together -6- 1-16-1104 with rational inferen

2021Ergo, vehicle stops are subject to the fourth amendment’s reasonableness requirement and a decision to stop an automobile will generally be reasonable where police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. 1 People v. Hackett, 2012 IL 111781, ¶ 20 (citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 810 and People v. McDonough, 239 Ill. 2d 260, 267 (2010)). 1 Although not relevant here, we must note that probable cause is not required to commence a traffic stop, as the less exacting standard of reasonable articulable suspicion that justifies a Terry stop will suffice for purposes of the four

2015“In a ‘Terry stop,’ an officer may conduct a brief, investigatory stop of a citizen when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity and such suspicion amounts to more than a mere ‘hunch.’ ” Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 ).

2026Notably, “[a] police officer can effect a lawful Terry stop without first considering whether the circumstances he or she observed would satisfy each element of a particular offense.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Hackett, 2012 IL 111781, ¶ 28 . ¶ 25 To evaluate a police officer’s conduct, courts use an objective standard, considering whether the facts available to the officer at the time of seizure would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe the actions taken by the officer were appropriate.

2025See People v. Hackett, 2012 IL 111781, ¶ 28 (an officer may conduct a lawful Terry stop when he observes possible infractions of traffic rules). ¶ 41 Defendant also does not dispute that the officers were entitled to search the Tahoe for proof of ownership if the driver was unable to provide such proof, as the license plate did not belong to that vehicle.

2024One common police-citizen encounter is the “brief investigative detention[ ], or ‘Terry stop[ ].’ ” People v. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d 530, 544 , 857 N.E.2d 187, 196 (2006).

2024One common police-citizen encounter is the “brief investigative detention[ ], or ‘Terry stop[ ].’ ” People v. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d 530, 544 , 857 N.E.2d 187, 196 (2006).

2021Whether an officer has reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop depends on “ ‘both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.’ ” Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014) (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)).

2021White, 496 U.S. at 329 (finding that an anonymous phone tip may form the basis of a Terry stop only where it provides information from which one may conclude that the caller is honest and his information reliable, often referred to as “indicia of reliability”). ¶ 69 The majority relies on Prado Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 399-400 (2014), for the proposition that factors that make anonymous tips more reliable include eyewitness knowledge, a contemporaneous report of criminal activity, and the use of the 911 system.

2023See id. at 263 (“The sole justification for the search allowed by the Terry exception is the protection of the police officer and others in the vicinity, not to gather evidence.”). ¶ 44 When the police violate a defendant’s constitutional rights by, for instance, conducting an unconstitutional search or seizure, the constitutional violation is termed a “ ‘poisonous tree.’ ” People v. Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d 335, 351 (1992).

2023See id. at 263 (“The sole justification for the search allowed by the Terry exception is the protection of the police officer and others in the vicinity, not to gather evidence.”). ¶ 44 When the police violate a defendant’s constitutional rights by, for instance, conducting an unconstitutional search or seizure, the constitutional violation is termed a “ ‘poisonous tree.’ ” People v. Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d 335, 351 (1992).

2024See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439 (“[T]he usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so- called ‘Terry stop’ [citation] than to a formal arrest.”); Timmsen, 2016 118181, ¶ 9 (“[A] routine traffic stop is a relatively brief encounter similar to a Terry stop rather than to a formal arrest.”) (citing Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998)).

2023Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439 (an officer “may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions”). ¶ 21 In coming to this conclusion, we note that defendant further argues that the extension of an investigation, alone, is enough to transform a valid Terry stop into a custodial situation for Miranda purposes.

2011“In determining whether an informant’s statements provide sufficient basis for a Terry stop, a reviewing court should consider the informant’s veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge.” People v. Sparks, 315 Ill.

2011App. 3d at 794 , 734 N.E.2d at 223 (concluding, since the informant had not been used as such before, the police officer effecting the Terry stop “could not accurately judge the informant’s veracity”).

2025See People v. Timmsen, 2016 IL 118181, ¶ 9 (“[A] routine traffic stop - 14 - is a relatively brief encounter similar to a Terry stop rather than to a formal arrest.”); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

2024The officer must have a “reasonable, articulable suspicion” that criminal activity is afoot, which is a less demanding standard than probable cause but “must amount to more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 31 Here, defendant concedes that his initial encounter with the officers was consensual and escalated into a Terry stop because the officers observed that defendant’s breath smelled like an alcoholic beverage, his eyes were bloodshot and glassy, and his speech was slurred and mumbled.

2010App. 3d 417, 422 , 506 N.E.2d 1037, 1040 (1987)), a Terry stop must be limited in scope and duration because it is an investigative detention, which must be temporary and last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop (Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)).

2010App. 3d 417, 422 , 506 N.E.2d 1037, 1040 (1987)), a Terry stop must be limited in scope and duration because it is an investigative detention, which must be temporary and last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop (Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)).

2016And, as this court has explained, the “ ‘purpose of a Terry stop is to allow a police officer to investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion and either confirm or dispel his suspicions.’ ” People v. Close, 238 Ill. 2d 497, 512 (2010) (quoting People v. Ross, 317 Ill.

2012The court observed that “ ‘[t]he purpose of a Terry stop is to allow a police officer to investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion and either confirm or dispel his suspicions.’ ” Id. at 512 (quoting People v. Ross, 317 Ill.

2008Lippert, 89 Ill. 2d at 182 (the need to dispel suspicion during a Terry stop “might require *** detention until witnesses could arrive who might provide positive identification”).

2008Lippert, 89 Ill. 2d at 182 (“The line of demarcation between a legitimate seizure of a suspect on less than probable cause in a Terry stop and an impermissible seizure, tantamount to a full-blown arrest ***, is not completely clear”).

2020“An officer may act on information provided by a third party in making a Terry stop, but only if the information provided is reliable and allows an officer to reasonably infer that a person was involved in criminal activity.” People v. Jackson, 348 Ill.

2020“An officer may act on information provided by a third party in making a Terry stop, but only if the information provided is reliable and allows an officer to reasonably infer that a person was involved in criminal activity.” People v. Jackson, 348 Ill.