Terry stop in Florida

2025As the Florida Supreme Court has stated, “a stop for the violation of motor vehicle laws is similar to the investigative detention in [a Terry stop] and may be made when there is founded suspicion.” See State v. Frierson, 926 So. 2d 1139, 1142 (Fla. 2006) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).

2025Id. * Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 2 Given the facts are undisputed, the only question we must answer today is whether law enforcement had reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop and the subsequent search of Milton’s vehicle.

2024However, "the fact that the stop occurred in a 'high crime area' [is] among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis." Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 .

2024However, "the fact that the stop occurred in a 'high crime area' [is] among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis." Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 .

2016However, that stop is a consensual encounter, Rodriguez v. State, 29 So.3d 310, 311 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), that does not become an unauthorized detention under the Fourth Amendment unless the officer “hinder[s] or restrict[s] the person’s freedom to leave or freedom to refuse to answer inquiries,” Popple v. State, 626 So.2d 185, 187 (Fla.1993); see also A.L. v. State, 133 So.3d 1239, 1241 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (“A consensual encounter becomes a Terry stop ‘when an officer makes an official show of authority from which a reasonable person would conclude that he or she is not free to end the encounte

2016However, that stop is a consensual encounter, Rodriguez v. State, 29 So. 3d 310, 311 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), that does not become an unauthorized detention under the Fourth Amendment unless the officer "hinder[s] or restrict[s] the person's freedom to leave or freedom to refuse to answer inquiries," Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185, 187 (Fla. 1993); see also A.L. v. State, 133 So. 3d 1239, 1241 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) ("A consensual encounter becomes a Terry stop 'when an officer makes an official show of authority from which a reasonable person would conclude that he or she is not free to end the enco

2012In Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 , 120 S.Ct. 1375 , 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000), the United States Supreme Court provided an analysis for determining whether an anonymous tip was sufficiently reliable to support a Terry stop.

2012In Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 , 120 S.Ct. 1375 , 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000), the United States Supreme Court provided an analysis for determining whether an anonymous tip was sufficiently reliable to support a Terry stop.

2019See Reynolds v. State, 592 So. 2d 1082, 1084 (Fla. 1992) (“Courts have generally upheld the use of handcuffs in the context of a Terry stop where it was reasonably necessary to protect the officers’ safety or to thwart a suspect’s attempt to flee.”); State v. Leach, 2 170 So. 3d 56, 61 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (finding it was reasonable for officers to draw their weapons where defendant was a felony suspect, hiding at night, and officers could not determine whether he was armed, and noting that “[l]eaving their weapons holstered . . . would have put the officers at an unnecessary risk”).

2018First, Terry established that, in order to conduct an investigatory stop consistent with the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement must have a reasonable suspicion that “criminal activity may be afoot.” Id. at 30 ; see also Saturnino-Boudet v. State, 682 So. 2d 188, 191 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (“A Terry stop is permissible if the detention is temporary and reasonable under the circumstances and only if the police officer has a wellfounded suspicion that the individual detained has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.” (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 ; Reynolds v. State, 592 So. 2d 108

2003See, e.g., J.L., 727 So.2d at 205-06 (finding that the anonymous tip stating that several young black males were standing at a specified bus stop, and that one was wearing a plaid shirt and carrying a gun, was insufficient to justify a Terry stop, absent indication that police independently observed suspicious or illegal conduct).

2000Verification by the police of the suspicious details clearly provides the police with the requisite reasonable suspicion to make a Terry stop." 727 So.2d at 206 (emphasis added).

2010See Slydell v. State, 792 So.2d 667, 672-73 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); see also Rodriguez v. State, 29 So.3d 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (“Accordingly, we conclude that a stop merely to issue a trespass warning is not a Terry stop, but rather a consensual encounter.” (footnote omitted)).

2007Slydell, 792 So.2d at 672 ; see also In the Interest of B.M., 553 So.2d 714 , 715 n. 2 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (A stop to inform trespassers of an order to leave is more akin to a “mere encounter” than a “stop” for constitutional analysis.).

2011See Reynolds v. State, 592 So.2d 1082, 1088 (Fla.1992) (Barkett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (observing "handcuffing substantially aggravates the intrusiveness of an otherwise routine investigatory detention and is not part of a typical Terry stop” (quoting United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1289 (9th Cir.1982))). .Courts in several other states have held that the need to transport a non-arrestee in a police vehicle justifies a limited pat-down search for weapons, even in the absence of a reasonable suspicion to believe the individual is armed.

2011See Reynolds v. State, 592 So.2d 1082, 1088 (Fla.1992) (Barkett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (observing "handcuffing substantially aggravates the intrusiveness of an otherwise routine investigatory detention and is not part of a typical Terry stop" (quoting United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1289 (9th Cir.1982))). [7] Courts in several other states have held that the need to transport a non-arrestee in a police vehicle justifies a limited pat-down search for weapons, even in the absence of a reasonable suspicion to believe the individual is armed.

2024As noted in State v. Maynard, 783 So. 2d 226, 228 (Fla. 2001), “[I]f the caller qualifies as a citizen informant, then the information from the tip in this case would be considered at the high end of the reliability scale, sufficient by itself to justify a Terry stop.” In a specially concurring opinion in Maynard, Justice Wells opined: “I write to add that, for me, a factor to be considered regarding the motion to suppress was that the caller who described the person also described the weapon the person possessed ... a [deadly weapon].

2014Therefore, “[a] tip from a citizen informant is sufficient by itself to provide law enforcement with reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop.” Berry, 86 So.3d at 599 (citing State v. Maynard, 783 So.2d 226, 228 (Fla. 2001)).

2013See Baptiste v. State, 995 So.2d 285, 292 (Fla.2008) (confirming that an anonymous tip unsupported by independent observation or other enhancement is insufficient to satisfy the Terry standard of reasonable suspicion); contra D.G., 961 So.2d at 1064 (finding that a tip given to an assistant principal by a known informant “as opposed to ... a simple anonymous tipster ... is widely regarded as itself providing the reasonable suspicion necessary to meet [the] constitutional test” under Terry and T.L.O.).

2013See Baptiste v. State, 995 So.2d 285, 292 (Fla.2008) (confirming that an anonymous tip unsupported by independent observation or other enhancement is insufficient to satisfy the Terry standard of reasonable suspicion); contra D.G., 961 So.2d at 1064 (finding that a tip given to an assistant principal by a known informant “as opposed to ... a simple anonymous tipster ... is widely regarded as itself providing the reasonable suspicion necessary to meet [the] constitutional test” under Terry and T.L.O.).

2009The court explained that when an individual flees from police in a high-crime area, Wardlow’s holding only provides a justification for the police to conduct nothing more than a Terry stop, or a “minimal intrusion, simply allowing the officer to briefly investigate further.” Id. (quoting Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 126 , 120 S.Ct. 673 ).

2009The court explained that when an individual flees from police in a high-crime area, Wardlow 's holding only provides a justification for the police to conduct nothing more than a Terry stop, or a "minimal intrusion, simply allowing the officer to briefly investigate further." Id. (quoting Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 126 , 120 S.Ct. 673 ).

2007Once the deputy ordered the appellant to return to his location and the appellant complied, this encounter became a valid investigatory stop that then ripened into probable cause to believe that the appellant committed the crime of Resisting an Officer without Violence. § 843.02, Fla. Stat. (2005); see also California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 , 111 S.Ct. 1547 , 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) (seizure occurs when the suspect submits to the officer’s show of authority); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Parsons v. State, 825 So.2d 406 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (An or

2007Once the deputy ordered the appellant to return to his location and the appellant complied, this encounter became a valid investigatory stop that then ripened into probable cause to believe that the appellant committed the crime of Resisting an Officer without Violence. § 843.02, Fla. Stat. (2005); see also California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 , 111 S.Ct. 1547 , 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) (seizure occurs when the suspect submits to the officer’s show of authority); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Parsons v. State, 825 So.2d 406 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (An or

2018First, Terry established that, in order to conduct an investigatory stop consistent with the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement must have a reasonable suspicion that “criminal activity may be afoot.” Id. at 30 ; see also Saturnino-Boudet v. State, 682 So. 2d 188, 191 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (“A Terry stop is permissible if the detention is temporary and reasonable under the circumstances and only if the police officer has a wellfounded suspicion that the individual detained has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.” (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 ; Reynolds v. State, 592 So. 2d 108

2011In Saturnino-Boudet v. State, 682 So.2d 188 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), this Court explained that a temporary investigative “stop and frisk,” which is commonly referred to as a Terry stop, is “permissible if the detention is temporary and reasonable under the circumstances [but] only if the police officer has a wellfounded suspicion that the individual detained has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.” Id. at 191 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).

2007See Carroll v. State, 636 So.2d 1316 (Fla.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 973 , 115 S.Ct. 447 , 130 L.Ed.2d 357 (1994); State v. Ruiz, 526 So.2d 170 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), review denied, 534 So.2d 401 (Fla.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1044 , 109 S.Ct. 872 , 102 L.Ed.2d 995 (1989).

2002Cf. Carroll v. State, 636 So.2d 1316 (Fla.)(stop not converted into arrest where officer took actions reasonable in stopping person who may have recently committed a murder), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 973 , 115 S.Ct. 447 , 130 L.Ed.2d 357 (1994).

2018While “headlong flight” from an officer in a high crime area may warrant founded suspicion to justify a Terry stop, see Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000), this was not “headlong flight.” See also Lee v. State, 868 So. 2d 577, 581-82 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (finding no evidence of “headlong flight” where man walked quickly away from other suspects when police arrived, but there was no other suspicious activity).

2012See Lee v. State, 868 So.2d 577, 581-82 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); see, e.g., U.S. v. Jones, 609 F.Supp.2d 113 (D.Mass.2009).

2009Defendant Can Challenge Whether the Incident Occurred Within a “High Crime Area” Finally, an individual can challenge whether the area where his or her alleged violation occurred was actually within a “high-crime area.” In Wardlow , the United States Supreme Court held that “officers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation ... [under] a Terry analysis.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 , 120 S.Ct. 673 (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144 , 92 S.Ct. 1921 , 32 L.Ed.

2009Defendant Can Challenge Whether the Incident Occurred Within a “High Crime Area” Finally, an individual can challenge whether the area where his or her alleged violation occurred was actually within a “high-crime area.” In Wardlow , the United States Supreme Court held that “officers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation ... [under] a Terry analysis.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 , 120 S.Ct. 673 (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144 , 92 S.Ct. 1921 , 32 L.Ed.

2017To establish the lawfulness of a Terry stop, “it is necessary for the State to prove that the officer had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that would support the detention.” Davis v. State, 973 So.2d 1277, 1279 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).

2017To establish the lawfulness of a Terry stop, "it is necessary for the State to prove that the officer had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that would support the detention." Davis v. State, 973 So. 2d 1277, 1279 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).

2016Under the Terry exception, a law enforcement officer, for his own protection or the safety of others, may conduct a pat down to find weapons that he reasonably believes or suspects are then in possession of the person whom he has stopped.” State v. Webb, 398 So.2d 820, 822 (Fla.1981); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (“[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous

2016Under the Terry exception, a law enforcement officer, for his own protection or the safety of others, may conduct a pat down to find weapons that he reasonably believes or suspects are then in possession of the person whom he has stopped.” State v. Webb, 398 So.2d 820, 822 (Fla.1981); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (“[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous

1996Carroll v. State, 636 So.2d 1316, 1318 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 447 , 130 L.Ed.2d 357 (1994); Harper v. State, 532 So.2d 1091, 1093 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), rev. denied, 541 So.2d 1172 (Fla. 1989); State v. Lewis, 518 So.2d 406, 407-08 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988).

1996Carroll v. State, 636 So.2d 1316,1318 (Fla.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 447 , 130 L.Ed.2d 357 (1994); Harper v. State, 532 So.2d 1091, 1093 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), rev. denied, 541 So.2d 1172 (Fla.1989); State v. Lewis, 518 So.2d 406, 407-08 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988).

2021As our sister court explained in Rodriguez v. State, 29 So. 3d 310 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2009), while “the misdemeanor had not occurred in his presence and he could not effect an immediate arrest of [the suspect], we conclude that under these circumstances the officer did have authority to conduct a Terry stop pursuant to section 901.151, Florida Statutes (2006), to investigate the offense.” Id. at 311 & n.2 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 11 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).

2021As our sister court explained in Rodriguez v. State, 29 So. 3d 310 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2009), while “the misdemeanor had not occurred in his presence and he could not effect an immediate arrest of [the suspect], we conclude that under these circumstances the officer did have authority to conduct a Terry stop pursuant to section 901.151, Florida Statutes (2006), to investigate the offense.” Id. at 311 & n.2 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 11 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).

2015See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93 , 100 S.Ct. 338 , 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979) (“[A] law enforcement officer, for his own protection and safety, may conduct a patdown to find weapons that he reasonably believes or suspects are then in the possession of the person he has accosted.”); see also United States v. McCargo, 464 F.3d 192, 202 (2d Cir.2006) (stating that while “police are [not] entitled to pat down a person, absent reasonable suspicion that he is armed, simply because they have stopped that person pursuant to a lawful Terry stop ... in cases where the police may lawfully transport a s

2012See, e.g., United States v. McCargo, 464 F.3d 192, 198 (2d Cir.2006) (finding that transportation of a matter of “blocks” did not exceed the scope of a Terry stop and was reasonable, allowing the court to conclude that “in some circumstances, police may transport a suspect short distances in aid of a Terry stop”); accord, United States v. Vanichromanee, 742 F.2d 340, 345 (7th Cir.1984) (concluding that moving defendant from a parking garage to an apartment did not turn the investigatory detention into an arrest because “[t]he ultimate question [was] not why the detainees were moved, but whethe

2024In support of this argument, Appellant relies on 1) Kilburn v. State, 297 So. 3d 671 , 675 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020), which held that a “law enforcement officer may not use the presence of a concealed weapon as the sole basis for seizing an individual”; 2) Burnett v. State, 246 So. 3d 516, 518 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018), which held that “carrying a concealed firearm is not sufficient, without more, to justify a Terry stop”; and 3) Regalado v. State, 25 So. 3d 600 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), which held that there was no reasonable suspicion for a temporary detention based solely on the observation of a concealed f

2024With respect to concealed handguns, "carrying a concealed firearm is not sufficient, without more, to justify a Terry stop." Burnett v. State, 246 So. 3d 516, 518 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) (citing Slydell v. State, 240 So. 3d 134 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018); Regalado v. State, 25 So. 3d 600 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)); see also Kilburn v. State, 297 So. 3d 671 , 675 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) ("[A] law enforcement officer may not use the presence of a concealed weapon as the sole basis for seizing an individual."); Taylor v. State, 326 So. 3d 115 , 119 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (following Kilburn).

2023Under the circumstances, Baxter placing a backpack in the backseat is equally consistent with the actions of a person who is preparing to drive away. 15 not establish grounds for a Terry stop.”); Jaudon v. State, 749 So. 2d 548 , 549–50 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (finding that evidence should have been suppressed where officers stopped the defendant in a parking lot to “dispel their suspicions about his conduct”); Jordan v. State, 707 So. 2d 338, 339 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (finding that law enforcement did not have reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant where his pickup truck was parked in a dark ar

2014The Terry rule recognizes that “[t]he Fourth Amendment requires ‘some minimal level of objective justification’ for making the stop.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 (1984)).