Terry stop in Missouri

2024State v. Carrawell, 481 S.W.3d 833, 837 (Mo. banc 2016). 2 We do not address Boehmer’s argument that the search of the small canister in Boehmer’s pocket exceeded the proper scope of a protective pat-down, known as a Terry stop, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), because we hold the search was performed incident to Boehmer’s arrest and was not a Terry stop. 4 “Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, unless an established and well-delineated exception applies.” Id. at 838 (citation and internal quotation marks removed).

2020Johnson then stopped, turned around, and at the officer's direction walked back to Deputy Richardson, thereby submitting to Deputy Richardson’s show of authority. 8 Under Terry v. Ohio, law enforcement may make an investigatory stop if an officer can point to “’specific and articulable facts’ that, taken together with rational inferences from those facts and the officer’s own knowledge and experience, support a ‘reasonable suspicion’ that illegal activity has occurred or is occurring.” State v. Smith, 448 S.W.3d 835, 840 (Mo. App. 2014) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 ). “[T]he fact that [a] st

2000State v. Fernandez, 691 S.W.2d 267, 269 (Mo. banc 1985); State v. Thompson, 826 S.W.2d 17, 19 (Mo.App.1992).

1998State v. Fernandez, 691 S.W.2d 267, 269 (Mo.banc 1985).

2021“The [reasonable suspicion] that will justify the minimally intrusive Terry stop is present when a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” State v. Waldrup, 331 S.W.3d 668, 673 (Mo. banc 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 5 Morrison refers us to State v. Redifer, 215 S.W.3d 725 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006), a case that interpreted a prior version of section 575.150.

2015State v. Waldrup, 331 S.W.3d 668, 674 (Mo. banc 2011) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984)) (during Terry stop police may ask- “a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain information, confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicion”).

2014“The Fourth Amendment allows, however, a so-called Terry stop, which is a minimally intrusive form of seizure or ‘semi-arrest’ that is lawful if the police officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that those stopped are engaged in criminal activity.” Miller, 894 S.W.2d at 651 ; see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

2014“The Fourth Amendment allows, however, a so-called Terry stop, which is a minimally intrusive form of seizure or ‘semi-arrest’ that is lawful if the police officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that those stopped are engaged in criminal activity.” Miller, 894 S.W.2d at 651 ; see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

2016See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) ("[TJhe level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than that for probable cause.”). 3 .

2016See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) ("[TJhe level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than that for probable cause.”). 3 .

2015See Carr, 441 S.W.3d at 169 (officer’s request to speak with defendant was not a Terry stop, therefore no.need to determine whether anonymous tip alone provided reasonable suspicion); see also Deck, 994 S.W.2d at 535-36 (finding no seizure when officer first approached car; seizure occurred only when officer ordered ■driver to sit up .and display his hands and driver complied).

2014A Terry stop must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop; it “remains valid only so long as it is ‘based on reasonable suspicion.’ ” Id. at 143, 145 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , quoting State v. Deck, 994 S.W.2d 527, 534 (Mo. banc 1999). 4 A Terry stop is proper when: (1) the circumstances support a finding of reasonable suspicion justifying the initial stop and (2) the officer’s actions were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference.

2010Under the Terry stop exception, a police officer acts reasonably, and therefore does not violate the Fourth Amendment, when he or she “briefly stops or detains an individual ... to investigate when the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by specific and articulable facts that criminal activity is afoot.” Martin, 79 S.W.3d at 916 (citing State v. Slavin, 944 S.W.2d 314, 317 (Mo.App.

2002One recognized exception is that the Fourth Amendment is not violated when a law enforcement officer briefly stops or detains an individual or a moving vehicle to investigate when the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by specific and articulable facts that criminal activity is afoot; the so-called Terry stop. 1 State v. Slavin, 944 S.W.2d 314, 317 (Mo.App.

2021See also Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439 (stating usual traffic stop more analogous to so-called “Terry stop” than to formal arrest).

2020“Miranda warnings are not necessary during questioning pursuant to a routine traffic stop because traffic stops are analogous to a ‘Terry stop. 1’” State v. Schroeder, 330 S.W.3d 468, 473 (Mo. banc 2011) (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984)).

2017The purpose of a Terry stop is to permit the officer to “briefly stop the suspicious person and make reasonable inquiries aimed at confirming or dispelling these suspicions.” State v. Lovelady, 432 S.W.3d 187, 191 (Mo. banc 2014) (emphasis added).

2015One common exception is the “Terry stop.” Id.

2021State v. Lanear, 805 S.W.2d 713, 716 (Mo. App. W.D. 1991); see also State v. Pike, 162 S.W.3d at 473 (stating traffic violation not required to create reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop); State v. Crabtree, 398 S.W.3d 57, 60 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013) (holding that nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop); State v. Kelly, 119 S.W.3d 587, 595 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003) (explaining that even where conduct justifying a Terry stop is ambiguous and reasonably susceptible of innocent explanation, if it also suggests criminal activity

2011While this standard does not rise to that of the traditionally required probable cause, a proper Terry stop must be supported by “some minimal level of objective justification.” State v. Johnson, 316 S.W.3d 390, 395 (Mo.App.2010) (quoting State v. Lanear, 805 S.W.2d 713, 716 (Mo.App.1991)).

2020In its first point, the State asserts the trial court erred in granting Alford’s motion to suppress because Sergeant Berry was justified in contacting Alford because Alford’s vehicle was in violation of section 300.440.1(2), which makes it illegal to “[s]tand or park a vehicle, whether occupied or not, except momentarily to pick up or discharge a passenger or passengers: (a) In 4 front of a public or private driveway”; other than “when necessary to avoid conflict with other traffic, or in compliance with law or the directions of a police officer or official traffic control device[.]” During an

2014United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235 , 105 S.Ct. 675 , 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985); State v. Pfleiderer, 8 S.W.3d 249, 255 (Mo.App.W.D.1999); see also United States v. Miller, 974 F.2d 953, 957 (8th Cir.1992) (use of handcuffs can function within proper scope of Terry stop if employed as reasonable precaution relevant to totality of the circumstances).

2020Instead, a show of authority is sufficient, id., with a traffic stop being analogous to a Terry stop,2 State v. Schroeder, 330 S.W.3d 468, 473 (Mo. banc 2011).

2020“Miranda warnings are not necessary during questioning pursuant to a routine traffic stop because traffic stops are analogous to a ‘Terry stop. 1’” State v. Schroeder, 330 S.W.3d 468, 473 (Mo. banc 2011) (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984)).

2016In the context of a Terry stop, the evidence derived from the stop "is inadmissible if an officer makes the stop on the basis of information provided by another officer or police department if the requesting officer or department lacked reasonable suspicion to make the stop." Id. at 642 .

2016Compare Franklin, 841 S.W.2d at 644-45 (finding a Terry stop unsupported by reasonable suspicion where the record was silent about the source of information relayed to the arresting officer) with State v. Monath, 42 S.W.3d 644, 649-51 (Mo. App. W.D. 2001) (finding reasonable suspicion where the 13 dispatcher, an intermediary officer, and the seizing officer all testified at the suppression hearing).

2015State v. Weddle, 18 S.W.3d 389, 393 (Mo.App.E.D.2000).

2014Generally, “[a]n anonymous tip by itself seldom, if ever, provides reasonable suspicion that a person has committed a crime warranting a Terry-stop.” State v. Weddle, 18 S.W.3d 389, 393 (Mo.App.2000).

2018"Assuming the police make a Terry stop in objective reliance on a flyer or bulletin, we hold that the evidence uncovered in the course of the stop is admissible if the police who issued the flyer or bulletin possessed a reasonable suspicion justifying a stop[.]" Id. at 233 , 105 S.Ct. at 682 .

2018"Assuming the police make a Terry stop in objective reliance on a flyer or bulletin, we hold that the evidence uncovered in the course of the stop is admissible if the police who issued the flyer or bulletin possessed a reasonable suspicion justifying a stop[.]" Id. at 233 , 105 S.Ct. at 682 .

2021The “reasonable suspicion” standard contemplated in a Terry stop is a less stringent standard than “probable cause.” State v. Pike, 162 S.W.3d 464, 473 (Mo. banc 2005).

2021State v. Lanear, 805 S.W.2d 713, 716 (Mo. App. W.D. 1991); see also State v. Pike, 162 S.W.3d at 473 (stating traffic violation not required to create reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop); State v. Crabtree, 398 S.W.3d 57, 60 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013) (holding that nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop); State v. Kelly, 119 S.W.3d 587, 595 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003) (explaining that even where conduct justifying a Terry stop is ambiguous and reasonably susceptible of innocent explanation, if it also suggests criminal activity

2018State v. Daniels , 221 S.W.3d 438 , 442 (Mo. App. S.D. 2007) (citing United States v. Mendenhall , 446 U.S. 544 , 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870 , 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) ; *666 Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 , 19 n.16, 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ).

2014State v. Daniels, 221 S.W.3d 438, 442 (Mo. App. S.D. 2007) (citing Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 ), A Terry stop permits an officer to perform a minimally invasive investigatory stop if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by “specific articulable facts” that those stopped are engaged in criminal activity.

2020See State v. Johnson, 427 S.W.3d 867, 874 (Mo. App. 2014) (holding a Terry stop was justified when the 5 See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 847 F.3d 1257 (10th Cir. 2017) (finding no reasonable suspicion where defendant “was walking next to a construction site which had been the previous target of construction material thefts,” in a high-crime area, and both he and his companion were wearing backpacks); United States v. Slocumb, 804 F.3d 677, 682-83 (4th Cir. 2015) (finding no reasonable suspicion despite defendant’s presence in high-crime area late at night, “in the parking lot of a comme

2015See Johnson, 427 S.W.3d at 873-74 (discussing permissible actions of officers during Terry stop).

2014“A Terry stop must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop; it ‘remains valid only so long as it is based on reasonable suspicion.’ ” Lovelady, 432 S.W.3d at 191 (quoting Grayson, 336 S.W.3d at 143 ).

2014“When evaluating the validity of a Terry stop, the trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances.” Lovelady, 432 S.W.3d at 191 (citing Grayson, 336 S.W.3d at 143 ).

2010Under the Terry stop exception, a police officer acts reasonably, and therefore does not violate the Fourth Amendment, when he or she “briefly stops or detains an individual ... to investigate when the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by specific and articulable facts that criminal activity is afoot.” Martin, 79 S.W.3d at 916 (citing State v. Slavin, 944 S.W.2d 314, 317 (Mo.App.

2010One exception to the warrant requirement is known as a “Terry stop.” Id. 4 Pursuant to this exception, police can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, that criminal activity may be afoot.

2005“If an officer has an articulable suspicion that the driver of a vehicle is committing, or has committed, a traffic violation, then there is sufficient basis for a Terry stop of the vehicle.” State v. Taber, 73 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Mo.App.2002).

2004One such exception is the so-called Terry stop, a minimally intrusive seizure for investigative purposes. 3 State v. Taber, 73 S.W.3d 699, 704-05 [10] (Mo.App.2002).

2020Johnson then stopped, turned around, and at the officer's direction walked back to Deputy Richardson, thereby submitting to Deputy Richardson’s show of authority. 8 Under Terry v. Ohio, law enforcement may make an investigatory stop if an officer can point to “’specific and articulable facts’ that, taken together with rational inferences from those facts and the officer’s own knowledge and experience, support a ‘reasonable suspicion’ that illegal activity has occurred or is occurring.” State v. Smith, 448 S.W.3d 835, 840 (Mo. App. 2014) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 ). “[T]he fact that [a] st

2020Johnson then stopped, turned around, and at the officer's direction walked back to Deputy Richardson, thereby submitting to Deputy Richardson’s show of authority. 8 Under Terry v. Ohio, law enforcement may make an investigatory stop if an officer can point to “’specific and articulable facts’ that, taken together with rational inferences from those facts and the officer’s own knowledge and experience, support a ‘reasonable suspicion’ that illegal activity has occurred or is occurring.” State v. Smith, 448 S.W.3d 835, 840 (Mo. App. 2014) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 ). “[T]he fact that [a] st

2014S.D.2014) (internal quotation omitted); see also J.L., 529 U.S. at 268, 120 S.Ct. 1375 . 4 Here, though, the State contends — and we agree — that the Officer’s request to speak with Carr was not a Terry stop, and thus, we need not reach the issue of whether the anonymous tip alone would have provided the Officer with reasonable suspicion to effectuate an investigatory stop. 5 “[T]he correctness of the legal characterization of the facts appearing in the record is a matter for [the appellate] [cjourt to determine.” Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 552 n. 5, 100 S.Ct. 1870 .

2014State v. Daniels, 221 S.W.3d 438, 442 (Mo. App. S.D. 2007) (citing Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 ), A Terry stop permits an officer to perform a minimally invasive investigatory stop if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by “specific articulable facts” that those stopped are engaged in criminal activity.

2002In Adams, 407 U.S. at 146-47 , 92 S.Ct. at 1923-24 , the Supreme Court held that the police officer’s Terry stop of the defendant based upon information the officer obtained from a known and rehable informant was lawful because the information carried sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the stop.

2002In Adams, 407 U.S. at 146-47 , 92 S.Ct. at 1923-24 , the Supreme Court held that the police officer’s Terry stop of the defendant based upon information the officer obtained from a known and rehable informant was lawful because the information carried sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the stop.

2010This standard requires less certainty than that sufficient to establish “probable cause”; however, a justified Terry stop must still be supported by “ ‘some minimal level of objective justi- *396 fieation.’ ” Id. (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 , 104 S.Ct. 1758 , 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984)).

2010This standard requires less certainty than that sufficient to establish “probable cause”; however, a justified Terry stop must still be supported by “ ‘some minimal level of objective justi- *396 fieation.’ ” Id. (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 , 104 S.Ct. 1758 , 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984)).

2018One common exception is the " Terry stop," which permits an officer to make a brief investigatory stop of an individual if the officer "observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot[.]" Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 , 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ; Goff , 129 S.W.3d at 862 .

2018Once a lawful Terry stop is made, the police officer may conduct a "pat down" search of the defendant if the officer has a reasonable and particularized suspicion that the defendant "may be armed and presently dangerous[.]" Terry , 392 U.S. at 30 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ; Goff , 129 S.W.3d at 864 -65 .