Terry stop in North Carolina

2020To justify a Terry stop, a law enforcement officer must act upon “specific and articulable facts” giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that an individual “was, or was about to be, engaged in criminal activity and . . . was armed and presently dangerous.” State v. Butler, 331 N.C. 227, 233 , 415 S.E.2d 719, 722 (1992) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 , 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 , 20 L.

2020To justify a Terry stop, a law enforcement officer must act upon “specific and articulable facts” giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that an individual “was, or was about to be, engaged in criminal activity and . . . was armed and presently dangerous.” State v. Butler, 331 N.C. 227, 233 , 415 S.E.2d 719, 722 (1992) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 , 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 , 20 L.

2016A Terry stop is justified when the detaining officer has reasonable suspicion, that is, "a particularized and objective basis[,] for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity." United States v. Cortez , 449 U.S. 411 , 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690 , 694-95, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 , 629 (1981). 2.

2016A Terry stop is justified when the detaining officer has reasonable suspicion, that is, "a particularized and objective basis[,] for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity." United States v. Cortez , 449 U.S. 411 , 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690 , 694-95, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 , 629 (1981). 2.

2021Presence in a “high crime area” late at night ¶ 32 At the suppression hearing, Officer Whitley described the area in which he apprehended Johnson as a “very high crime area, where we have a lot of narcotic sales.” A defendant’s presence in a “high crime area” can sometimes be “among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) However, a defendant’s presence in a “high crime area” is only probative when it is paired with conduct suggesting the defendant’s presence is in some way connected to the criminal conduct known to occur in th

2021Presence in a “high crime area” late at night ¶ 32 At the suppression hearing, Officer Whitley described the area in which he apprehended Johnson as a “very high crime area, where we have a lot of narcotic sales.” A defendant’s presence in a “high crime area” can sometimes be “among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) However, a defendant’s presence in a “high crime area” is only probative when it is paired with conduct suggesting the defendant’s presence is in some way connected to the criminal conduct known to occur in th

2020Second, as discussed below, Defendant’s criminal history, standing alone, does not support a Terry stop, which, like a Summers detention, is concerned with officer safety.3 See State v. Rinck, 303 N.C. 551, 559 , 280 S.E.2d 912, 919 (1981) (“If upon 3 This is not to say the Terry and Summers tests are the same; it is merely to show that the dissent’s arguments could not even serve to clear the relatively low bar of reasonable suspicion.

2020Second, as discussed below, Defendant’s criminal history, standing alone, does not support a Terry stop, which, like a Summers detention, is concerned with officer safety.3 See State v. Rinck, 303 N.C. 551, 559 , 280 S.E.2d 912, 919 (1981) (“If upon 3 This is not to say the Terry and Summers tests are the same; it is merely to show that the dissent’s arguments could not even serve to clear the relatively low bar of reasonable suspicion.

1991The “critical threshold issue” of whether the seizure qualifies as a Terry stop or instead amounts to a defacto arrest is the “intrusiveness of the seizure.” Id. at 722, 77 L.Ed.2d at 131 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

1991The "critical threshold issue" of whether the seizure qualifies as a Terry stop or instead amounts to a defacto arrest is the "intrusiveness of the seizure." Id. at 722, 103 S.Ct. at 2652, 77 L.Ed.2d at 131 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

2009When reviewing the facts and information presented to an officer leading to a Terry stop, we must examine the "totality of the circumstances." United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 , 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1, 10 (1989).

2009When reviewing the facts and information presented to an officer leading to a Terry stop, we must examine the "totality of the circumstances." United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 , 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1, 10 (1989).

2014Nevertheless, a State "stop and identify" statute "requiring a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a valid Terry stop is consistent with Fourth Amendment prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures." Id. at 188 , 159 L.

2014Nevertheless, a State “stop and identify” statute “requiring a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a valid Terry stop is consistent with Fourth Amendment prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Id. at 188 , 159 L.

2010In determining the reasonableness of a weapons frisk, we are guided by the Terry standard, adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Peck, 305 N.C. 734 , 291 S.E.2d 637 (1982), and must resolve “ ‘whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.’ ” Sanders, 112 N.C.

2010In determining the reasonableness of a weapons frisk, we are guided by the Terry standard, adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Peck, 305 N.C. 734 , 291 S.E.2d 637 (1982), and must resolve “ ‘whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.’ ” Sanders, 112 N.C.

2020App. 462, 471 , 559 S.E.2d 814, 821 (2002) (Greene, J. concurring) (recognizing that a “traffic stop based on an officer’s mere suspicion that a traffic violation is being committed, but which can only be verified by stopping the vehicle, such as drunk driving or driving with a revoked license, is classified as an investigatory stop, also known as a Terry stop.”) (citations omitted).

2020App. 462, 471 , 559 S.E.2d 814, 821 (2002) (Greene, J. concurring) (recognizing that a “traffic stop based on an officer’s mere suspicion that a traffic violation is being committed, but which can only be verified by stopping the vehicle, such as drunk driving or driving with a revoked license, is classified as an investigatory stop, also known as a Terry stop.”) (citations omitted).

2011On remand, the trial court addressed the second scenario, known as the “Terry stop,” where a law enforcement officer is permitted to “initiate a brief stop and frisk of an individual if there are ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’ ” State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 249 , 658 S.E.2d 643, 646 (2008) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 , 20 L.

2011On remand, the trial court addressed the second scenario, known as the “Terry stop,” where a law enforcement officer is permitted to “initiate a brief stop and frisk of an individual if there are ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’ ” State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 249 , 658 S.E.2d 643, 646 (2008) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 , 20 L.

2011App. at 709 , 656 S.E.2d at 727 (quoting Longshore v. State, 924 A.2d 1129, 1142 (Md. 2007)); see also United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1502 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[U]se of firearms, handcuffs, and other forceful techniques does not necessarily transform a Terry detention into a full custodial arrest — for which probable cause is required — when the circumstances reasonably warrant such measures.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

2008Longshore v. State, 924 A.2d 1129, 1142 (Md. 2007); see, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 462 F.3d 903, 907 (8th Cir. 2006) (listing examples from the Eighth Circuit when handcuffs were permitted in investigative detentions), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1272 , 167 L.

2010Ed. 2d 301, 309 , 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2416 (1990) (observing that “reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause” and noting that, in Adams , the Court had reasoned that “the unverified tip from the known informant might not have been reliable enough to establish probable cause, but nevertheless found it sufficiently reliable to justify a Terry stop”); State v. Morton, 363 N.C. 737, 738 , 686 S.E.2d 510, 510 , adopting per curiam, 198 N.C.

2001See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328 , 110 L.

2022Ultimately, “[i]n determining whether the Terry standard is met,” to justify a frisk for weapons, this Court considers the law enforcement officer’s actions “in light of the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 233, 415 S.E.2d at 722 .

2022Ultimately, “[i]n determining whether the Terry standard is met,” to justify a frisk for weapons, this Court considers the law enforcement officer’s actions “in light of the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 233, 415 S.E.2d at 722 .

2014In reviewing the validity of a Terry stop, the Court must consider “the totality of the circumstances.” Id. (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).

2009Watkins, 337 N.C. at 442 , 446 S.E.2d at 70 .

2014During a Terry stop, police can use “measures of force such as placing handcuffs on suspects, placing the suspect in the back of police cruisers, drawing weapons, and other forms of force typically used during an arrest.” State v. Campbell, 188 N.C.

2011App. 701 , 656 S.E.2d 721 (2008), “the permissible scope of a Terry stop has expanded in the past few decades, allowing police officers to neutralize dangerous suspects during an investigative detention using measures of force such as placing handcuffs on suspects, placing the suspect in the back of police cruisers, drawing weapons, and other forms of force typically used during an arrest.” Campbell, 188 N.C.

2018App. 677 , 686, 783 S.E.2d 753 , 760 (2016) ("[I]n order to conduct an investigatory detention-a ' Terry stop'-in the first place, the police must have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot." (Citation and quotation marks omitted) ).

2017App. ----, 783 S.E.2d 753 (2016) ("[I]f sufficient objective evidence exists to demonstrate reasonable suspicion, a Terry stop is justified regardless of a police officer's subjective intent." (citation and quotation marks omitted)).

2014In Mbacke, the Court cited Gant for the proposition that “[a] defendant's car can be searched ‘only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search’ or ‘when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’” Id. at 407–08, 721 S.E.2d at 221 (quoting Gant, 556 U.S. at 343–44) (emphasis added). [W]e conclude that the “reasonable to believe” standard set out in Gant parallels the objective “reasonable suspicion” standard sufficient to justify a Terry stop.

2012The North Carolina Supreme Court recently applied the holding of Gant in State v. Mbacke,_N.C. __,_, 721 S.E.2d 218, 222 (2012), and concluded that the “reasonable to believe” standard set forth in Gant “parallels” the reasonable suspicion standard necessary to justify a Terry stop.

2012In Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439-40 , 104 S.Ct. at 3150 , 82 L.Ed.2d at 334-35 , the United States Supreme Court provided a rationale for not applying Miranda warnings to traffic stops, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called "Terry stop," ... than to a formal arrest....

2012In Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439-40 , 104 S.Ct. at 3150 , 82 L.Ed.2d at 334-35 , the United States Supreme Court provided a rationale for not applying Miranda warnings to traffic stops, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called "Terry stop," ... than to a formal arrest....

2011In Martinez , the Eighth Circuit held “that use of handcuffs can be a reasonable precaution during a Terry stop to protect [officers’] safety and maintain the status quo” and noted the Court’s earlier conclusion in United States v. Miller, 974 F.2d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1992), “that cuffing of suspects during [a] Terry stop where suspects outnumbered officers and where officers were concerned for safety was reasonably necessary to achieve purposes of Terry stop.” Martinez, 462 F.3d at 907 .

2008Longshore v. State, 924 A.2d 1129, 1142 (Md. 2007); see, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 462 F.3d 903, 907 (8th Cir. 2006) (listing examples from the Eighth Circuit when handcuffs were permitted in investigative detentions), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1272 , 167 L.

2009See, e.g., *560 State v. Rinck, 303 N.C. 551, 560 , 280 S.E.2d 912, 920 (1981) (upholding trial court’s determination that officer had reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct Terry stop where officer spotted defendants walking down street within a few hundred feet of where homicide occurred within past half hour); In re Whitley, 122 N.C.

1996This Court upheld the subsequent Terry stop because "the telephone call, later corroborated once the officers arrived at the scene, coupled with the nervous body reflexes of respondent are articulable facts which gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that respondent might be armed, dangerous and involved in criminal activity and justified the officer's search of respondent." Id.

2007This rule also applies to investigatory traffic stops where the officer does not have probable cause to stop the vehicle. "[A]n investigatory-type traffic stop is justified if the totality of [the] circumstances affords an officer reasonable grounds to believe that criminal activity may be afoot." State v. Wilson, 155 N.C.App. 89, 95 , 574 S.E.2d 93, 98 (2002).

2007This rule also applies to investigatory traffic stops where the officer does not have probable cause to stop the vehicle. "[A]n investigatory-type traffic stop is justified if the totality of [the] circumstances affords an officer reasonable grounds to believe that criminal activity may be afoot." State v. Wilson, 155 N.C.App. 89, 95 , 574 S.E.2d 93, 98 (2002).

2024A Terry stop is appropriate “when a law enforcement officer has ‘a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.’” Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393 , 396–97, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 , 188 L.

2024A Terry stop is appropriate “when a law enforcement officer has ‘a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.’” Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393 , 396–97, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 , 188 L.

2024A Terry stop’s duration is governed by the “mission” of the stop and the “related safety concerns.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 , 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 , 191 L.

2024A Terry stop’s duration is governed by the “mission” of the stop and the “related safety concerns.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 , 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 , 191 L.

2023See State v. Maready, 362 N.C. 614, 619 , 669 - 14 - STATE V.

2020See State v. Smathers, 232 N.C.