Terry stop in Idaho

2010The quantity and quality of information necessary to create reasonable suspicion for such a “Terry stop” is less than that necessary to establish probable cause, Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301, 308-09 (1990) and State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811 , 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009), but must be more than a mere hunch or unparticularized suspicion.

2010The quantity and quality of information necessary to create reasonable suspicion for such a “Terry stop” is less than that necessary to establish probable cause, Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301, 308-09 (1990) and State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811 , 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009), but must be more than a mere hunch or unparticularized suspicion.

2022The Supreme Court, in ruling in favor of Rodriguez, explained that a traffic stop is more analogous to a Terry stop than a formal arrest and that the constitutionally permissible duration of the stop is determined by the seizure’s “mission”: A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that violation. “[A] relatively brief encounter,” a routine traffic stop is “more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ . . . than to a formal arrest.” Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984), in turn citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.

2022A Terry stop constitutes “a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and [] is not to be undertaken lightly.” Id. at 17 .

2022Bishop, 146 Idaho at 813 , 203 P.3d at 1212 (analyzing a Terry stop and concluding that an anonymous tip would not have given rise to reasonable suspicion without further corroboration or independent investigation); Chandler, 140 Idaho at 763 , 101 P.3d at 707 .

2022Bishop, 146 Idaho at 813 , 203 P.3d at 1212 (analyzing a Terry stop and concluding that an anonymous tip would not have given rise to reasonable suspicion without further corroboration or independent investigation); Chandler, 140 Idaho at 763 , 101 P.3d at 707 .

2022The Supreme Court, in ruling in favor of Rodriguez, explained that a traffic stop is more analogous to a Terry stop than a formal arrest and that the constitutionally permissible duration of the stop is determined by the seizure’s “mission”: A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that violation. “[A] relatively brief encounter,” a routine traffic stop is “more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ . . . than to a formal arrest.” Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984), in turn citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.

2022The Supreme Court, in ruling in favor of Rodriguez, explained that a traffic stop is more analogous to a Terry stop than a formal arrest and that the constitutionally permissible duration of the stop is determined by the seizure’s “mission”: A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that violation. “[A] relatively brief encounter,” a routine traffic stop is “more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ . . . than to a formal arrest.” Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984), in turn citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.

1987Once Officer Hamilton made a valid Terry stop of Johns, he was entitled "to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information." Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 , 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972).

1987Once Officer Hamilton made a valid Terry stop of Johns, he was entitled "to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information." Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 , 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972).

2022Like a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s “mission”—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop, [Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)], and attend to related safety concerns.

2022Like a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s “mission”—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop, [Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)], and attend to related safety concerns.

2004See State v. Zubizareta, 122 Idaho 823, 827 , 839 P.2d 1237, 1241 (Ct.App.1992) (“In a Terry stop, the officer communicates to the detainee, either orally or through a show of force or authority, that he is not free to go about his business.”).

2004See State v. Zubizareta, 122 Idaho 823, 827 , 839 P.2d 1237, 1241 (Ct.App.1992) (“In a Terry stop, the officer communicates to the detainee, either orally or through a show of force or authority, that he is not free to go about his business.”).

1997State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 932 , 829 P.2d 520, 522 (1992); State v. Fry, 122 Idaho 100, 103 , 831 P.2d 942, 945 (Ct.App.1991); State v. Knapp, 120 Idaho 343, 347 , 815 P.2d 1083, 1087 (Ct.App. 1991).

1997State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 932 , 829 P.2d 520, 522 (1992); State v. Fry, 122 Idaho 100, 103 , 831 P.2d 942, 945 (Ct.App.1991); State v. Knapp, 120 Idaho 343, 347 , 815 P.2d 1083, 1087 (Ct.App. 1991).

1990The permissible limits of a Terry stop were more clearly delineated by the Supreme Court in Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983).

1990The permissible limits of a Terry stop were more clearly delineated by the Supreme Court in Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983).

2004Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Santana , this Court in State v. Manthei, 130 Idaho 237 , 939 P.2d 556 (1997), held that an officer’s warrantless entry into a defendant’s residence in order to complete the Terry stop did not violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.

2004Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Santana , this Court in State v. Manthei, 130 Idaho 237 , 939 P.2d 556 (1997), held that an officer’s warrantless entry into a defendant’s residence in order to complete the Terry stop did not violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.

2022See also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion) (“The scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.”).

2022See also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion) (“The scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.”).

2021Thus, like a Terry stop, the “tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context” is measured in reference to the stop’s “mission.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354 (citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding that law enforcement officers may conduct a brief investigatory detention and search for weapons with reasonable suspicion, so long as the scope of the search is limited to the purpose for which it was initiated).

2018In Rodriguez , the Court explained, "Like a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure's 'mission'-to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns." Rodriguez , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. at 1614 (citations omitted). "[A]n officer may need to take certain negligibly burdensome precautions," such as checking for outstanding warrants, "in order to complete the mission safely," however, unless new reasonable suspicion arises, the authority for the seizure ends "when tasks tied to the

2022See also Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009).

2022See also Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009).

2022The Supreme Court, in ruling in favor of Rodriguez, explained that a traffic stop is more analogous to a Terry stop than a formal arrest and that the constitutionally permissible duration of the stop is determined by the seizure’s “mission”: A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that violation. “[A] relatively brief encounter,” a routine traffic stop is “more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ . . . than to a formal arrest.” Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984), in turn citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.

2022The Supreme Court, in ruling in favor of Rodriguez, explained that a traffic stop is more analogous to a Terry stop than a formal arrest and that the constitutionally permissible duration of the stop is determined by the seizure’s “mission”: A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that violation. “[A] relatively brief encounter,” a routine traffic stop is “more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ . . . than to a formal arrest.” Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984), in turn citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.

1999See DuValt, 131 Idaho at 554 , 961 P.2d at 645 (finding use of handcuffs during investigatory stop appropriate where suspects’ apparent attempt to elude officers and lack of cooperation once stopped justified belief that they posed a danger to officer safety); compare State v. Pannell, 127 Idaho 420, 424 , 901 P.2d 1321, 1325 (1995) (holding use of handcuffs exceeded the reasonable bounds of a Terry stop when suspect had been “fully compliant”); Buti, 131 Idaho at 797 , 964 P.2d at 664 (holding use of handcuffs partially responsible for converting valid' Tert'y stop of over one hour, in which

1999See DuValt, 131 Idaho at 554 , 961 P.2d at 645 (finding use of handcuffs during investigatory stop appropriate where suspects’ apparent attempt to elude officers and lack of cooperation once stopped justified belief that they posed a danger to officer safety); compare State v. Pannell, 127 Idaho 420, 424 , 901 P.2d 1321, 1325 (1995) (holding use of handcuffs exceeded the reasonable bounds of a Terry stop when suspect had been “fully compliant”); Buti, 131 Idaho at 797 , 964 P.2d at 664 (holding use of handcuffs partially responsible for converting valid' Tert'y stop of over one hour, in which

1999State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873, 877 , 736 P.2d 1327, 1331 (1987) (Under Terry and Idaho law, limited stops can be made for investigative purposes.).

1999State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873, 877 , 736 P.2d 1327, 1331 (1987) (Under Terry and Idaho law, limited stops can be made for investigative purposes.).

1997State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 932 , 829 P.2d 520, 522 (1992); State v. Fry, 122 Idaho 100, 103 , 831 P.2d 942, 945 (Ct.App.1991); State v. Knapp, 120 Idaho 343, 347 , 815 P.2d 1083, 1087 (Ct.App. 1991).

1997State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 932 , 829 P.2d 520, 522 (1992); State v. Fry, 122 Idaho 100, 103 , 831 P.2d 942, 945 (Ct.App.1991); State v. Knapp, 120 Idaho 343, 347 , 815 P.2d 1083, 1087 (Ct.App. 1991).

1997State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 932 , 829 P.2d 520, 522 (1992); State v. Fry, 122 Idaho 100, 103 , 831 P.2d 942, 945 (Ct.App.1991); State v. Knapp, 120 Idaho 343, 347 , 815 P.2d 1083, 1087 (Ct.App. 1991).

1997State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 932 , 829 P.2d 520, 522 (1992); State v. Fry, 122 Idaho 100, 103 , 831 P.2d 942, 945 (Ct.App.1991); State v. Knapp, 120 Idaho 343, 347 , 815 P.2d 1083, 1087 (Ct.App. 1991).

2014The investigatory stop (also known as the investigative detention, investigatory seizure, or Terry stop) “is permissible if it is based upon specific articulable facts which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.” State v. Moran-Soto, 150 Idaho 175, 181 , 244 P.3d 1261, 1267 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983 , 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003)); accord Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 .

2014The investigatory stop (also known as the investigative detention, investigatory seizure, or Terry stop) “is permissible if it is based upon specific articulable facts which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.” State v. Moran-Soto, 150 Idaho 175, 181 , 244 P.3d 1261, 1267 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983 , 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003)); accord Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 .

2005Id. at 810-11 , 718 P.2d at 1248-49 . *546 In the present case, based upon the allegations of the young victim and her mother, officers possessed probable cause to execute a valid warrantless arrest of Piro for attempted lewd conduct.

2005Id. at 810-11 , 718 P.2d at 1248-49 . *546 In the present case, based upon the allegations of the young victim and her mother, officers possessed probable cause to execute a valid warrantless arrest of Piro for attempted lewd conduct.

2005Terry, 392 U.S at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884, 20 L.Ed.2d at 911; State v. Wright, 134 Idaho 73, 76 , 996 P.2d 292, 295 (2000).

2005Terry, 392 U.S at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884, 20 L.Ed.2d at 911; State v. Wright, 134 Idaho 73, 76 , 996 P.2d 292, 295 (2000).

1999See DuValt, 131 Idaho at 554 , 961 P.2d at 645 (finding use of handcuffs during investigatory stop appropriate where suspects’ apparent attempt to elude officers and lack of cooperation once stopped justified belief that they posed a danger to officer safety); compare State v. Pannell, 127 Idaho 420, 424 , 901 P.2d 1321, 1325 (1995) (holding use of handcuffs exceeded the reasonable bounds of a Terry stop when suspect had been “fully compliant”); Buti, 131 Idaho at 797 , 964 P.2d at 664 (holding use of handcuffs partially responsible for converting valid' Tert'y stop of over one hour, in which

1999See DuValt, 131 Idaho at 554 , 961 P.2d at 645 (finding use of handcuffs during investigatory stop appropriate where suspects’ apparent attempt to elude officers and lack of cooperation once stopped justified belief that they posed a danger to officer safety); compare State v. Pannell, 127 Idaho 420, 424 , 901 P.2d 1321, 1325 (1995) (holding use of handcuffs exceeded the reasonable bounds of a Terry stop when suspect had been “fully compliant”); Buti, 131 Idaho at 797 , 964 P.2d at 664 (holding use of handcuffs partially responsible for converting valid' Tert'y stop of over one hour, in which

1999In Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 , 100 S.Ct. 338 , 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979), a case wherein the police had no reason to believe Ybarra was involved in criminal activity, the Supreme Court held that the narrow scope of the Terry exception "does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked." Id. at 94 , 100 S.Ct. at 343 , 62 L.Ed.2d at 247 .

1999In Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 , 100 S.Ct. 338 , 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979), a case wherein the police had no reason to believe Ybarra was involved in criminal activity, the Supreme Court held that the narrow scope of the Terry exception "does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked." Id. at 94 , 100 S.Ct. at 343 , 62 L.Ed.2d at 247 .

2022See State v. Downing, 163 Idaho 26 , 32, 407 P.3d 1285 , 1291 (2017) (“The [inevitable discovery] doctrine ‘is not intended to swallow the exclusionary rule whole by substituting what the police should have done for what they really did.’ ” (quoting State v. Holman, 109 Idaho 382, 392 , 707 P.2d 493, 503 (Ct. App. 1985)).

2022See State v. Downing, 163 Idaho 26 , 32, 407 P.3d 1285 , 1291 (2017) (“The [inevitable discovery] doctrine ‘is not intended to swallow the exclusionary rule whole by substituting what the police should have done for what they really did.’ ” (quoting State v. Holman, 109 Idaho 382, 392 , 707 P.2d 493, 503 (Ct. App. 1985)).

2017See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (noting that a defendant’s presence in a high-crime area was among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry stop analysis).