32 Montana opinions name it 1 courts 1981–2025 17 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Montana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Gophergreen2 sentences2024Hoover, ¶ 17 (citations and original emphasis omitted); Gopher, 193 Mont. at 192-94 , 631 P.2d at 295-96 (citations omitted); Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417 -18 and 421-22, 101 S. Ct. at 694 -95 and 697; Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-19 , 88 S. Ct. at 1877-79 .19 Upon a lawful investigative stop, the officer may 18 See also State v. Farabee, 2000 MT 265, ¶ 14 , 302 Mont. 29 , 22 P.3d 175 (applying Terry stop exception with express reference to Mont. 2024Hoover, ¶ 17 (citations and original emphasis omitted); Gopher, 193 Mont. at 192-94 , 631 P.2d at 295-96 (citations omitted); Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417 -18 and 421-22, 101 S. Ct. at 694 -95 and 697; Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-19 , 88 S. Ct. at 1877-79 .19 Upon a lawful investigative stop, the officer may 18 See also State v. Farabee, 2000 MT 265, ¶ 14 , 302 Mont. 29 , 22 P.3d 175 (applying Terry stop exception with express reference to Mont. | 8 | 10 |
Terry v. Ohiogreen2 sentences2024Hoover, ¶ 15; State v. Massey, 2016 MT 316, ¶ 9 , 385 Mont. 460 , 385 P.3d 544 ; State v. Jarman, 1998 MT 277, ¶ 9 , 291 Mont. 391 , 967 P.2d 1099 ; State v. Martinez, 2003 MT 65, ¶ 20 , 314 Mont. 434 , 67 P.3d 207 ; State v. Reynolds, 272 Mont. 46, 49 , 899 P.2d 540, 542 (1995); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S. Ct. 690, 694-95 (1981); Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-17 , 88 S. Ct. at 1877 . ¶20 Implicit, a fortiori, in the threshold Mendenhall/Terry standard for determining when a constitutional “seizure” of a person occurs is that not every police-citizen encounter or interaction ne 2024Hoover, ¶ 15; State v. Massey, 2016 MT 316, ¶ 9 , 385 Mont. 460 , 385 P.3d 544 ; State v. Jarman, 1998 MT 277, ¶ 9 , 291 Mont. 391 , 967 P.2d 1099 ; State v. Martinez, 2003 MT 65, ¶ 20 , 314 Mont. 434 , 67 P.3d 207 ; State v. Reynolds, 272 Mont. 46, 49 , 899 P.2d 540, 542 (1995); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S. Ct. 690, 694-95 (1981); Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-17 , 88 S. Ct. at 1877 . ¶20 Implicit, a fortiori, in the threshold Mendenhall/Terry standard for determining when a constitutional “seizure” of a person occurs is that not every police-citizen encounter or interaction ne | 6 | 15 |
United States v. Cortezgreen2 sentences2024Hoover, ¶ 15; State v. Massey, 2016 MT 316, ¶ 9 , 385 Mont. 460 , 385 P.3d 544 ; State v. Jarman, 1998 MT 277, ¶ 9 , 291 Mont. 391 , 967 P.2d 1099 ; State v. Martinez, 2003 MT 65, ¶ 20 , 314 Mont. 434 , 67 P.3d 207 ; State v. Reynolds, 272 Mont. 46, 49 , 899 P.2d 540, 542 (1995); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S. Ct. 690, 694-95 (1981); Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-17 , 88 S. Ct. at 1877 . ¶20 Implicit, a fortiori, in the threshold Mendenhall/Terry standard for determining when a constitutional “seizure” of a person occurs is that not every police-citizen encounter or interaction ne 2024Hoover, ¶ 15; State v. Massey, 2016 MT 316, ¶ 9 , 385 Mont. 460 , 385 P.3d 544 ; State v. Jarman, 1998 MT 277, ¶ 9 , 291 Mont. 391 , 967 P.2d 1099 ; State v. Martinez, 2003 MT 65, ¶ 20 , 314 Mont. 434 , 67 P.3d 207 ; State v. Reynolds, 272 Mont. 46, 49 , 899 P.2d 540, 542 (1995); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S. Ct. 690, 694-95 (1981); Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-17 , 88 S. Ct. at 1877 . ¶20 Implicit, a fortiori, in the threshold Mendenhall/Terry standard for determining when a constitutional “seizure” of a person occurs is that not every police-citizen encounter or interaction ne | 2 | 5 |
United States v. Sharpegreen2 sentences2022United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 , 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1575 (1985) (whether an officer unreasonably continued or expanded the duration of an initially lawful investigative stop depends on whether the officer “diligently pursued a means of investigation . . . likely to confirm or dispel” the particularized suspicion justifying the stop); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 , 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325-26 (1983) (Terry stop exception warrants only a “limited intrusion on the personal security of the 36 subject” and the officer must “employ[] . . . the least intrusive means reasonably available 2022United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 , 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1575 (1985) (whether an officer unreasonably continued or expanded the duration of an initially lawful investigative stop depends on whether the officer “diligently pursued a means of investigation . . . likely to confirm or dispel” the particularized suspicion justifying the stop); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 , 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325-26 (1983) (Terry stop exception warrants only a “limited intrusion on the personal security of the 36 subject” and the officer must “employ[] . . . the least intrusive means reasonably available | 2 | 2 |
Rodriguez v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2024However, the constitutional justification and “authority for” a warrantless investigative Terry stop without probable cause “ends when tasks” reasonably related to the purpose that justified the stop are “or reasonably should have been completed.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 , 354, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015) (emphasis added). ¶27 Within that analytical framework, routine requests for identity or proof of identity are generally reasonably related to the purpose of an otherwise lawful investigative stop. 2024However, the constitutional justification and “authority for” a warrantless investigative Terry stop without probable cause “ends when tasks” reasonably related to the purpose that justified the stop are “or reasonably should have been completed.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 , 354, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015) (emphasis added). ¶27 Within that analytical framework, routine requests for identity or proof of identity are generally reasonably related to the purpose of an otherwise lawful investigative stop. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Reynoldsgreen2 sentences2024Hoover, ¶ 15; State v. Massey, 2016 MT 316, ¶ 9 , 385 Mont. 460 , 385 P.3d 544 ; State v. Jarman, 1998 MT 277, ¶ 9 , 291 Mont. 391 , 967 P.2d 1099 ; State v. Martinez, 2003 MT 65, ¶ 20 , 314 Mont. 434 , 67 P.3d 207 ; State v. Reynolds, 272 Mont. 46, 49 , 899 P.2d 540, 542 (1995); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S. Ct. 690, 694-95 (1981); Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-17 , 88 S. Ct. at 1877 . ¶20 Implicit, a fortiori, in the threshold Mendenhall/Terry standard for determining when a constitutional “seizure” of a person occurs is that not every police-citizen encounter or interaction ne 2024Hoover, ¶ 15; State v. Massey, 2016 MT 316, ¶ 9 , 385 Mont. 460 , 385 P.3d 544 ; State v. Jarman, 1998 MT 277, ¶ 9 , 291 Mont. 391 , 967 P.2d 1099 ; State v. Martinez, 2003 MT 65, ¶ 20 , 314 Mont. 434 , 67 P.3d 207 ; State v. Reynolds, 272 Mont. 46, 49 , 899 P.2d 540, 542 (1995); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S. Ct. 690, 694-95 (1981); Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-17 , 88 S. Ct. at 1877 . ¶20 Implicit, a fortiori, in the threshold Mendenhall/Terry standard for determining when a constitutional “seizure” of a person occurs is that not every police-citizen encounter or interaction ne | 1 | 3 |
State v. Lovegrengreen2 sentences2024Hoover, ¶ 15; State v. Massey, 2016 MT 316, ¶ 9 , 385 Mont. 460 , 385 P.3d 544 ; State v. Jarman, 1998 MT 277, ¶ 9 , 291 Mont. 391 , 967 P.2d 1099 ; State v. Martinez, 2003 MT 65, ¶ 20 , 314 Mont. 434 , 67 P.3d 207 ; State v. Reynolds, 272 Mont. 46, 49 , 899 P.2d 540, 542 (1995); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S. Ct. 690, 694-95 (1981); Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-17 , 88 S. Ct. at 1877 . ¶20 Implicit, a fortiori, in the threshold Mendenhall/Terry standard for determining when a constitutional “seizure” of a person occurs is that not every police-citizen encounter or interaction ne 2024Hoover, ¶ 15; State v. Massey, 2016 MT 316, ¶ 9 , 385 Mont. 460 , 385 P.3d 544 ; State v. Jarman, 1998 MT 277, ¶ 9 , 291 Mont. 391 , 967 P.2d 1099 ; State v. Martinez, 2003 MT 65, ¶ 20 , 314 Mont. 434 , 67 P.3d 207 ; State v. Reynolds, 272 Mont. 46, 49 , 899 P.2d 540, 542 (1995); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S. Ct. 690, 694-95 (1981); Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-17 , 88 S. Ct. at 1877 . ¶20 Implicit, a fortiori, in the threshold Mendenhall/Terry standard for determining when a constitutional “seizure” of a person occurs is that not every police-citizen encounter or interaction ne | 1 | 3 |
Berkemer v. McCartygreen2 sentences2017We first note that a FWP check station, where hunters are required to “stop and report,” is closely akin to a traffic stop which is, in turn, “more analogous to a so-called Terry stop, than to a formal arrest.” Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439 , 104 S. Ct. at 3150 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968)). 2017We first note that a FWP check station, where hunters are required to “stop and report,” is closely akin to a traffic stop which is, in turn, “more analogous to a so-called Terry stop, than to a formal arrest.” Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439 , 104 S. Ct. at 3150 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968)). | 1 | 3 |
United States v. Mendenhallgreen2 sentences2024Hoover, ¶ 15; State v. Massey, 2016 MT 316, ¶ 9 , 385 Mont. 460 , 385 P.3d 544 ; State v. Jarman, 1998 MT 277, ¶ 9 , 291 Mont. 391 , 967 P.2d 1099 ; State v. Martinez, 2003 MT 65, ¶ 20 , 314 Mont. 434 , 67 P.3d 207 ; State v. Reynolds, 272 Mont. 46, 49 , 899 P.2d 540, 542 (1995); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S. Ct. 690, 694-95 (1981); Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-17 , 88 S. Ct. at 1877 . ¶20 Implicit, a fortiori, in the threshold Mendenhall/Terry standard for determining when a constitutional “seizure” of a person occurs is that not every police-citizen encounter or interaction ne 2024Hoover, ¶ 15; State v. Massey, 2016 MT 316, ¶ 9 , 385 Mont. 460 , 385 P.3d 544 ; State v. Jarman, 1998 MT 277, ¶ 9 , 291 Mont. 391 , 967 P.2d 1099 ; State v. Martinez, 2003 MT 65, ¶ 20 , 314 Mont. 434 , 67 P.3d 207 ; State v. Reynolds, 272 Mont. 46, 49 , 899 P.2d 540, 542 (1995); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S. Ct. 690, 694-95 (1981); Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-17 , 88 S. Ct. at 1877 . ¶20 Implicit, a fortiori, in the threshold Mendenhall/Terry standard for determining when a constitutional “seizure” of a person occurs is that not every police-citizen encounter or interaction ne | 1 | 2 |
State v. Wrightgreen1 sentence2025Because the search of Hall’s person and the evidence Hall sought to suppress below were downstream of this seizure, we begin by considering whether Delraso had reasonable suspicion to seize Hall at the moment he grabbed for him. {¶15} A Terry stop is reasonable “when the officer has a reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts,” taken together with any rational inferences from those facts, “that criminal behavior has occurred or is imminent.” Hairston at ¶ 9 , citing Terry at 30 ; accord State v. Wright, 2022-Ohio-2161, ¶ 14 (1st Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Andrewsgreen1 sentence2025We 6 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS judge reasonable suspicion “based on the totality of circumstances ‘viewed through the eyes of the reasonable and prudent police officer on the scene who must react to events as they unfold.’” Hairston at ¶ 10 , quoting State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87-88 (1991). {¶16} Under the totality of the circumstances in this case, and especially in light of the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Hairston, we conclude that Delraso had reasonable suspicion to effect a limited, investigative seizure of Hall’s person under Terry. {¶17} The facts of Hairston clo | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sharpgreen2 sentences2024Zeimer, ¶ 29 (citing State v. Sharp, 217 Mont. 40, 47 , 702 P.2d 959, 963 (1985), and State v. Seaman, 2005 MT 307, ¶ 29 , 329 Mont. 429 , 124 P.3d 1137 (citing Sharp in community caretaker context)); Delgado, 466 U.S. at 226 , 104 S. Ct. at 1768 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). 2024Zeimer, ¶ 29 (citing State v. Sharp, 217 Mont. 40, 47 , 702 P.2d 959, 963 (1985), and State v. Seaman, 2005 MT 307, ¶ 29 , 329 Mont. 429 , 124 P.3d 1137 (citing Sharp in community caretaker context)); Delgado, 466 U.S. at 226 , 104 S. Ct. at 1768 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Prattgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Carlsongreen | 1 | 1 |
State v. Martinezgreen2 sentences2024Hoover, ¶ 15; State v. Massey, 2016 MT 316, ¶ 9 , 385 Mont. 460 , 385 P.3d 544 ; State v. Jarman, 1998 MT 277, ¶ 9 , 291 Mont. 391 , 967 P.2d 1099 ; State v. Martinez, 2003 MT 65, ¶ 20 , 314 Mont. 434 , 67 P.3d 207 ; State v. Reynolds, 272 Mont. 46, 49 , 899 P.2d 540, 542 (1995); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S. Ct. 690, 694-95 (1981); Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-17 , 88 S. Ct. at 1877 . ¶20 Implicit, a fortiori, in the threshold Mendenhall/Terry standard for determining when a constitutional “seizure” of a person occurs is that not every police-citizen encounter or interaction ne 2024Hoover, ¶ 15; State v. Massey, 2016 MT 316, ¶ 9 , 385 Mont. 460 , 385 P.3d 544 ; State v. Jarman, 1998 MT 277, ¶ 9 , 291 Mont. 391 , 967 P.2d 1099 ; State v. Martinez, 2003 MT 65, ¶ 20 , 314 Mont. 434 , 67 P.3d 207 ; State v. Reynolds, 272 Mont. 46, 49 , 899 P.2d 540, 542 (1995); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S. Ct. 690, 694-95 (1981); Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-17 , 88 S. Ct. at 1877 . ¶20 Implicit, a fortiori, in the threshold Mendenhall/Terry standard for determining when a constitutional “seizure” of a person occurs is that not every police-citizen encounter or interaction ne | 1 | 1 |
State v. J. Carrywatergreen2 sentences2024Cleveland, ¶ 19 (citing State v. Carrywater, 2022 MT 131, ¶¶ 15, 17 , 409 Mont. 194 , 512 P.3d 1180 ). ¶17 There is no dispute McClellan appeared to be in peril the morning of December 5, 2020. 2024Cleveland, ¶ 19 (citing State v. Carrywater, 2022 MT 131, ¶¶ 15, 17 , 409 Mont. 194 , 512 P.3d 1180 ). ¶17 There is no dispute McClellan appeared to be in peril the morning of December 5, 2020. | 1 | 1 |
Illinois v. Wardlowgreen1 sentence2024Contrary to our statements in Dupree, ¶¶ 11-13 and 17, we thus prospectively clarify that the so-called Pratt test is not narrowly limited to circumstances that “parallel a DUI stop,” but rather, is narrowly limited in the Terry stop context to cases where the asserted particularized police suspicion is based on an informant tip rather than first-hand police observation or knowledge. 25 U.S. 119, 123-24 , 120 S. Ct. 673, 676 (2000); Terry, 392 U.S. at 22 and 27, 88 S. Ct. at 1880 and 1883.23 ¶26 Even upon sufficient particularized suspicion of criminal activity, the investigative stop exceptio | 1 | 1 |
| Hayes v. Floridagreen | 1 | 1 |
Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Delgadogreen2 sentences2024Zeimer, ¶ 29 (citing State v. Sharp, 217 Mont. 40, 47 , 702 P.2d 959, 963 (1985), and State v. Seaman, 2005 MT 307, ¶ 29 , 329 Mont. 429 , 124 P.3d 1137 (citing Sharp in community caretaker context)); Delgado, 466 U.S. at 226 , 104 S. Ct. at 1768 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). 2024Zeimer, ¶ 29 (citing State v. Sharp, 217 Mont. 40, 47 , 702 P.2d 959, 963 (1985), and State v. Seaman, 2005 MT 307, ¶ 29 , 329 Mont. 429 , 124 P.3d 1137 (citing Sharp in community caretaker context)); Delgado, 466 U.S. at 226 , 104 S. Ct. at 1768 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Hensleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Illinois v. Caballesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Florida v. Royergreen2 sentences2024Section 46-5-403, MCA (1991-2019) (investigative “stop authorized by” § 46-5-401, MCA, “may not last longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop”), is similarly an essential codification of the related Terry stop scope and duration 27 Comments of Commission on Criminal Procedure §§ 20.01-.03 (Jan. 10, 1989), File No. 88-559, Montana Supreme Court. 30 limitations recognized in Royer, 460 U.S. at 500 , 103 S. Ct. at 1325-26 ; Terry, 392 U.S. at 17-20 , 88 S. Ct. at 1878-79 ; and progeny. 2024Section 46-5-403, MCA (1991-2019) (investigative “stop authorized by” § 46-5-401, MCA, “may not last longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop”), is similarly an essential codification of the related Terry stop scope and duration 27 Comments of Commission on Criminal Procedure §§ 20.01-.03 (Jan. 10, 1989), File No. 88-559, Montana Supreme Court. 30 limitations recognized in Royer, 460 U.S. at 500 , 103 S. Ct. at 1325-26 ; Terry, 392 U.S. at 17-20 , 88 S. Ct. at 1878-79 ; and progeny. | 2 | 3 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Noli
green
2 sentences2025However, I dissent from the Court’s conclusion that Detective Monaco possessed particularized suspicion to expand the scope of the initial traffic stop. ¶52 A Terry stop, as an exception to the general warrant requirement, allows law enforcement to “stop and temporarily detain a person for investigative purposes if they have specific and articulable objective facts, based on the totality of the circumstances and including reasonable inferences, that lead to an objectively reasonable particularized suspicion that the person is or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.” State v. Loberg, 20 2025However, I dissent from the Court’s conclusion that Detective Monaco possessed particularized suspicion to expand the scope of the initial traffic stop. ¶52 A Terry stop, as an exception to the general warrant requirement, allows law enforcement to “stop and temporarily detain a person for investigative purposes if they have specific and articulable objective facts, based on the totality of the circumstances and including reasonable inferences, that lead to an objectively reasonable particularized suspicion that the person is or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.” State v. Loberg, 20 | 3 | 2024–2025 |
Hulse v. State, Department of Justice
green
2 sentences2024State v. Case, 2007 MT 161, ¶ 34 , 338 Mont. 87 , 162 P.3d 849 ; Carlson, ¶ 21; Hulse v. State, 1998 MT 108, ¶¶ 40-42 , 289 Mont. 1 , 961 P.2d 75 ; Sharp, 217 Mont. at 46 , 702 P.2d at 963 . 2024State v. Case, 2007 MT 161, ¶ 34 , 338 Mont. 87 , 162 P.3d 849 ; Carlson, ¶ 21; Hulse v. State, 1998 MT 108, ¶¶ 40-42 , 289 Mont. 1 , 961 P.2d 75 ; Sharp, 217 Mont. at 46 , 702 P.2d at 963 . | 2 | 2022–2024 |
State v. Ballinger
green
2 sentences2019An exception to the warrant requirement is the "investigatory or 'Terry stop,' which allows 'a brief seizure of the individual that must be supported by a reasonable [or particularized] suspicion of criminal activity.' " State v. Ballinger , 2016 MT 30 , ¶ 16, 382 Mont. 193 , 366 P.3d 668 (quoting State v. Lovegren , 2002 MT 153 , ¶ 15, 310 Mont. 358 , 51 P.3d 471 ***451 (citing *405 Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) )). ¶13 Police did not initiate a stop of Questo's vehicle, and thus, as Questo correctly notes, we must first determine whether a seizure occurr 2019An exception to the warrant requirement is the "investigatory or 'Terry stop,' which allows 'a brief seizure of the individual that must be supported by a reasonable [or particularized] suspicion of criminal activity.' " State v. Ballinger , 2016 MT 30 , ¶ 16, 382 Mont. 193 , 366 P.3d 668 (quoting State v. Lovegren , 2002 MT 153 , ¶ 15, 310 Mont. 358 , 51 P.3d 471 ***451 (citing *405 Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) )). ¶13 Police did not initiate a stop of Questo's vehicle, and thus, as Questo correctly notes, we must first determine whether a seizure occurr | 2 | 2018–2019 |
State v. Elison
green
2 sentences2010The I State responds that the investigation was analogous to a Terry stop, and Miranda warnings were not required. ¶30 This Court recognizes that “ Taw enforcement officers need not administer Miranda warnings to suspects during brief investigative encounters even if those encounters are somewhat coercive.’ ” State v. Hurlbert, 2009 MT 221, ¶ 34 , 351 Mont. 316 , 211 P.3d 869 (quoting State v. Elison, 2000 MT 288, ¶ 27 , 302 Mont. 228 , 14 P.3d 456 ). 2010The I State responds that the investigation was analogous to a Terry stop, and Miranda warnings were not required. ¶30 This Court recognizes that “ Taw enforcement officers need not administer Miranda warnings to suspects during brief investigative encounters even if those encounters are somewhat coercive.’ ” State v. Hurlbert, 2009 MT 221, ¶ 34 , 351 Mont. 316 , 211 P.3d 869 (quoting State v. Elison, 2000 MT 288, ¶ 27 , 302 Mont. 228 , 14 P.3d 456 ). | 2 | 2010–2018 |
State v. McMaster
green
2 sentences2025Fisher, ¶ 19. ¶32 In State v. McMaster, an officer observed the defendant exchange a package at a gas station with a third party, and requested a second officer follow the defendant’s car. 2008 MT 294, ¶ 4 , 345 Mont. 408 , 191 P.3d 443 . 2025Fisher, ¶ 19. ¶32 In State v. McMaster, an officer observed the defendant exchange a package at a gas station with a third party, and requested a second officer follow the defendant’s car. 2008 MT 294, ¶ 4 , 345 Mont. 408 , 191 P.3d 443 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. J. McElroy
neutral
2 sentences2025Evidence obtained from an illegal search or seizure “must be suppressed.” State v. McElroy, 2024 MT 133, ¶ 15 , 417 Mont. 68 , 551 P.3d 282 . ¶10 A Terry stop is a recognized exception that allows police to briefly stop and detain someone (without a warrant or probable cause for an arrest) to “investigate a reasonable particularized suspicion that a person is immediately involved in, or about to be involved in, criminal activity.” Rymal, ¶ 12. ¶11 “[O]n a valid traffic stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiry is limited to the time necessary to address the traffic violation and any relat 2025Evidence obtained from an illegal search or seizure “must be suppressed.” State v. McElroy, 2024 MT 133, ¶ 15 , 417 Mont. 68 , 551 P.3d 282 . ¶10 A Terry stop is a recognized exception that allows police to briefly stop and detain someone (without a warrant or probable cause for an arrest) to “investigate a reasonable particularized suspicion that a person is immediately involved in, or about to be involved in, criminal activity.” Rymal, ¶ 12. ¶11 “[O]n a valid traffic stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiry is limited to the time necessary to address the traffic violation and any relat | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. B. Bailey
green
2 sentences2025It is not the function of these constitutional safeguards to “‘eliminate all contact between the police and citizenry’” but, instead “‘to prevent arbitrary and oppressive government interference with individual privacy and security.’” State v. Davis, 2024 MT 145 , ¶ 17, 417 Mont. 188 , 552 P.3d 33 (quoting State v. Bailey, 2021 MT 157, ¶ 20 , 404 Mont. 384 , 489 P.3d 889 ). ¶15 “A reasonably brief warrantless investigative stop, or Terry stop, is a recognized exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment and Mont. 2025It is not the function of these constitutional safeguards to “‘eliminate all contact between the police and citizenry’” but, instead “‘to prevent arbitrary and oppressive government interference with individual privacy and security.’” State v. Davis, 2024 MT 145 , ¶ 17, 417 Mont. 188 , 552 P.3d 33 (quoting State v. Bailey, 2021 MT 157, ¶ 20 , 404 Mont. 384 , 489 P.3d 889 ). ¶15 “A reasonably brief warrantless investigative stop, or Terry stop, is a recognized exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment and Mont. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. C. Loberg
neutral
2 sentences2025However, I dissent from the Court’s conclusion that Detective Monaco possessed particularized suspicion to expand the scope of the initial traffic stop. ¶52 A Terry stop, as an exception to the general warrant requirement, allows law enforcement to “stop and temporarily detain a person for investigative purposes if they have specific and articulable objective facts, based on the totality of the circumstances and including reasonable inferences, that lead to an objectively reasonable particularized suspicion that the person is or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.” State v. Loberg, 20 2025However, I dissent from the Court’s conclusion that Detective Monaco possessed particularized suspicion to expand the scope of the initial traffic stop. ¶52 A Terry stop, as an exception to the general warrant requirement, allows law enforcement to “stop and temporarily detain a person for investigative purposes if they have specific and articulable objective facts, based on the totality of the circumstances and including reasonable inferences, that lead to an objectively reasonable particularized suspicion that the person is or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.” State v. Loberg, 20 | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Marriage of L. Swift & M. Swift
neutral
2 sentences2025Roberts also argues that “[t]he officer has to have particularized suspicion to even approach Mr. Roberts,” and that merely speaking to Roberts about his prior sentencing conditions constituted an unconstitutional seizure. ¶17 In this regard, we have explained that “not all contacts between police officers and citizens are breaches of fundamental rights.” State v. McClellan, 2024 MT 276, ¶ 13 , 419 Mont. 132 , 559 P.3d 816 ; see State v. Rymal, 2024 MT 277 , ¶ 14, 419 Mont. 144 , 559 P.3d 839 (implicit within the Terry standard “is that not every police-citizen encounter or interaction necessa 2025Roberts also argues that “[t]he officer has to have particularized suspicion to even approach Mr. Roberts,” and that merely speaking to Roberts about his prior sentencing conditions constituted an unconstitutional seizure. ¶17 In this regard, we have explained that “not all contacts between police officers and citizens are breaches of fundamental rights.” State v. McClellan, 2024 MT 276, ¶ 13 , 419 Mont. 132 , 559 P.3d 816 ; see State v. Rymal, 2024 MT 277 , ¶ 14, 419 Mont. 144 , 559 P.3d 839 (implicit within the Terry standard “is that not every police-citizen encounter or interaction necessa | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. W. McClellan
neutral
2 sentences2025Roberts also argues that “[t]he officer has to have particularized suspicion to even approach Mr. Roberts,” and that merely speaking to Roberts about his prior sentencing conditions constituted an unconstitutional seizure. ¶17 In this regard, we have explained that “not all contacts between police officers and citizens are breaches of fundamental rights.” State v. McClellan, 2024 MT 276, ¶ 13 , 419 Mont. 132 , 559 P.3d 816 ; see State v. Rymal, 2024 MT 277 , ¶ 14, 419 Mont. 144 , 559 P.3d 839 (implicit within the Terry standard “is that not every police-citizen encounter or interaction necessa 2025Roberts also argues that “[t]he officer has to have particularized suspicion to even approach Mr. Roberts,” and that merely speaking to Roberts about his prior sentencing conditions constituted an unconstitutional seizure. ¶17 In this regard, we have explained that “not all contacts between police officers and citizens are breaches of fundamental rights.” State v. McClellan, 2024 MT 276, ¶ 13 , 419 Mont. 132 , 559 P.3d 816 ; see State v. Rymal, 2024 MT 277 , ¶ 14, 419 Mont. 144 , 559 P.3d 839 (implicit within the Terry standard “is that not every police-citizen encounter or interaction necessa | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| State v. Farabee green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| State v. Jarman green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| State v. Wagner green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| State v. Merrill green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Seaman
green
2 sentences2024Zeimer, ¶ 29 (citing State v. Sharp, 217 Mont. 40, 47 , 702 P.2d 959, 963 (1985), and State v. Seaman, 2005 MT 307, ¶ 29 , 329 Mont. 429 , 124 P.3d 1137 (citing Sharp in community caretaker context)); Delgado, 466 U.S. at 226 , 104 S. Ct. at 1768 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). 2024Zeimer, ¶ 29 (citing State v. Sharp, 217 Mont. 40, 47 , 702 P.2d 959, 963 (1985), and State v. Seaman, 2005 MT 307, ¶ 29 , 329 Mont. 429 , 124 P.3d 1137 (citing Sharp in community caretaker context)); Delgado, 466 U.S. at 226 , 104 S. Ct. at 1768 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| State v. Randy Graham green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| State v. Case green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. D. Zimmerman
neutral
2 sentences2024McElroy, ¶ 15 (citing State v. Zimmerman, 2018 MT 94, ¶ 17 , 391 Mont. 210 , 417 P.3d 289 ). ¶14 Here, Connelly had particularized suspicion to conduct the initial traffic stop based on Loberg’s expired registration. 2024McElroy, ¶ 15 (citing State v. Zimmerman, 2018 MT 94, ¶ 17 , 391 Mont. 210 , 417 P.3d 289 ). ¶14 Here, Connelly had particularized suspicion to conduct the initial traffic stop based on Loberg’s expired registration. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. K. Massey
green
2 sentences2024Hoover, ¶ 15; State v. Massey, 2016 MT 316, ¶ 9 , 385 Mont. 460 , 385 P.3d 544 ; State v. Jarman, 1998 MT 277, ¶ 9 , 291 Mont. 391 , 967 P.2d 1099 ; State v. Martinez, 2003 MT 65, ¶ 20 , 314 Mont. 434 , 67 P.3d 207 ; State v. Reynolds, 272 Mont. 46, 49 , 899 P.2d 540, 542 (1995); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S. Ct. 690, 694-95 (1981); Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-17 , 88 S. Ct. at 1877 . ¶20 Implicit, a fortiori, in the threshold Mendenhall/Terry standard for determining when a constitutional “seizure” of a person occurs is that not every police-citizen encounter or interaction ne 2024Hoover, ¶ 15; State v. Massey, 2016 MT 316, ¶ 9 , 385 Mont. 460 , 385 P.3d 544 ; State v. Jarman, 1998 MT 277, ¶ 9 , 291 Mont. 391 , 967 P.2d 1099 ; State v. Martinez, 2003 MT 65, ¶ 20 , 314 Mont. 434 , 67 P.3d 207 ; State v. Reynolds, 272 Mont. 46, 49 , 899 P.2d 540, 542 (1995); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S. Ct. 690, 694-95 (1981); Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-17 , 88 S. Ct. at 1877 . ¶20 Implicit, a fortiori, in the threshold Mendenhall/Terry standard for determining when a constitutional “seizure” of a person occurs is that not every police-citizen encounter or interaction ne | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| State v. Hamper green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| State v. Steinmetz green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Boyer green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Chelsea Strom green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt Cty. green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Katz v. United States green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Hardaway green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. D. Hurlbert green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Litchfield v. State green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Minnesota v. Dickerson green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| State Ex Rel. Great Northern Railway Co. v. District Court of the Second Judicial District green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.