Terry stop in Ohio

2026"The subjective intent of the officer to allow the individual to leave is irrelevant; the test is objective and is based upon whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave." State v. Berry, 2018-Ohio-4791, ¶ 29 (5th Dist.). {¶ 14} An investigatory stop is also known as a "Terry stop." In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968), the United States Supreme Court determined that "a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest."

2026Investigatory Detention and Arrest {¶33} “An investigative stop, or Terry stop, under the Fourth Amendment allows an officer to briefly stop and temporarily detain individuals in order to investigate possible criminal activity.” State v. Collins, 2019-Ohio-1724, ¶ 20-22 , (4th Dist.), citing State v. Staten, 2003-Ohio-4592 , ¶ 22 (4th Dist.), citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

2026“The determination whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop must be based on the totality of circumstances ‘viewed through the eyes of the reasonable and prudent police officer on the scene who must react to events as they unfold.’” State v. Hairston, 2019-Ohio-1622, ¶ 10 , quoting State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86 (1991).

2026“The determination whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop must be based on the totality of circumstances ‘viewed through the eyes of the reasonable and prudent police officer on the scene who must react to events as they unfold.’” State v. Hairston, 2019-Ohio-1622, ¶ 10 , quoting State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86 (1991).

2025“Reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop ‘is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.’” Tidwell, 2021-Ohio-2072, at ¶ 20 , quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). “‘Both factors—quantity and quality—are considered in the “totality of the circumstances—the whole picture,” * * *, that PAGE 9 OF 19 Case No. 2025-L-009 must be taken into account when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion.’ [White], quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981).

2025As is true of a Terry stop, an officer initiating a traffic stop must have reasonable suspicion—or, in other words, a “ ‘particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity,’ ” Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 380 , 140 S.Ct. 1183 , 206 L.Ed.2d 412 (2020), quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-418 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981).

2024A Terry stop is “more intrusive than a consensual encounter but less intrusive than a formal custodial arrest.” State v. Thornton, 2023-Ohio-1404 , 213 N.E.3d 808, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Taylor, 106 Ohio App.3d 741, 748 , 667 N.E.2d 60 (2d Dist.1995). {¶ 11} “Reasonable suspicion entails some minimal level of objective justification * * *[,] something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but less than the level of suspicion required for probable cause.” State v. Jones, 70 Ohio App.3d 554, 556-57 , 591 N.E.2d 810 (2d Dist.1990), citing Terry at 27 .

2024A Terry stop is “more intrusive than a consensual encounter but less intrusive than a formal custodial arrest.” State v. Thornton, 2023-Ohio-1404 , 213 N.E.3d 808, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Taylor, 106 Ohio App.3d 741, 748 , 667 N.E.2d 60 (2d Dist.1995). {¶ 11} “Reasonable suspicion entails some minimal level of objective justification * * *[,] something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but less than the level of suspicion required for probable cause.” State v. Jones, 70 Ohio App.3d 554, 556-57 , 591 N.E.2d 810 (2d Dist.1990), citing Terry at 27 .

2026“Reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop ‘is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.’” State v. Tidwell, 2021-Ohio-2072, ¶ 20 , quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). “‘Both factors—quantity and quality—are considered in the “totality of the circumstances—the whole picture,” . . . , that must be taken into account when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion.’” Id., quoting White at 330 , quoting Cortez at 417 .

2026“Reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop ‘is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.’” State v. Tidwell, 2021-Ohio-2072, ¶ 20 , quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). “‘Both factors—quantity and quality—are considered in the “totality of the circumstances—the whole picture,” . . . , that must be taken into account when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion.’” Id., quoting White at 330 , quoting Cortez at 417 .

2024The Court explained that, “we hold that an anonymous tip lacking indicia of reliability of the kind contemplated in Adams [v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 , 146–147, 92 S.Ct. 1921 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972)], and [Alabama v.] White [ 496 U.S. 325 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 ], does not justify a stop and frisk whenever and however it alleges the illegal possession of a firearm.” {¶51} In Adams, supra, at 147 , the Court upheld a Terry stop of a suspect based upon an informant’s tip because the officer knew the informant personally and received information from him in the past.

2024The Court explained that, “we hold that an anonymous tip lacking indicia of reliability of the kind contemplated in Adams [v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 , 146–147, 92 S.Ct. 1921 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972)], and [Alabama v.] White [ 496 U.S. 325 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 ], does not justify a stop and frisk whenever and however it alleges the illegal possession of a firearm.” {¶51} In Adams, supra, at 147 , the Court upheld a Terry stop of a suspect based upon an informant’s tip because the officer knew the informant personally and received information from him in the past.

2026Thus, “the ‘temporary and relatively nonthreatening detention involved in a traffic stop or Terry stop does not constitute Miranda custody[.]’ ” Id., quoting Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 113 . {¶34} “Generally, handcuffing and detaining an individual without probable cause constitutes an illegal arrest pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Vaughters v. Scioto Cnty., Ohio, Sheriff's Dep't, 1997 WL 596298 , *2 (4th Dist.

2024The “temporary and relatively nonthreatening detention involved in a traffic stop or Terry stop does not constitute Miranda custody.” Id. at 113 . {¶18} As the Oles court explained: If the inquiry were whether the driver felt free to leave, then every traffic stop could be considered a custodial interrogation because ‘few motorists would feel free either to disobey a directive to pull over or to leave the scene of a traffic stop without being told they might do so.’ Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 436 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 .

2024We disagree. {¶10} The United States Supreme Court has summarized the constitutional implications of the Fourth Amendment on traffic stops as follows: A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that violation. “[A] relatively brief encounter,” a routine traffic stop is “more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ . . . than to a formal arrest.” Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984), in turn citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).

2020See Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998) (concluding that the detention of a person to be issued a citation does not amount to a full custodial arrest, but is “more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ ”).

2026As with a Terry stop, to initiate or continue a traffic stop, an officer must have at least a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity based on “articulable facts that give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the individual is currently engaged in or is about to engage in criminal activity.” Id. {¶31} The Supreme Court has held that whether an officer had a reasonable suspicion to justify the investigative stop “must be viewed in light of the totality of the surrounding circumstances.” State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177 (1988), paragraph one of PAGE 9 OF 17 Case No. 2025-L-087 the s

2025For a Terry stop to be valid, “an officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrants that intrusion.” State v. Daniels, 2013-Ohio-1081 , ¶ 10 (6th Dist.) The actions of the officer to determine whether a Terry stop is valid is viewed through “the eyes of a reasonable and cautious police officer on the scene, guided by his experience and training.” State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177, 179 (1988), citing United States v. Hall, 525 F.2d 857, 859 (1976).

2025Moreover, he may not be detained even momentarily for his refusal to listen or answer.” Id. {¶25} The second type of contact is generally referred to as “a Terry stop” and is predicated upon reasonable suspicion.

2025Under the Terry doctrine, “certain seizures are justifiable ... if there is articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983).

2013The only justification for the stop was a named informant’s saying the driver - Shawn Brooks - was “intoxicated.” I agree with the majority that a strong showing as to other indicia of reliability may be unnecessary to justify a Terry stop, based on the tip of a “known informant.” Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 300 , 720 N.E.2d 507 (1999).

2008Whether police have a `reasonable suspicion' is gleaned from considering the totality of the circumstances." State v. Andrews (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 86 , 87 . {¶ 23} Further, "[w]hen a police officer bases his initial Terry stop solely upon a radio dispatch or broadcast, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that so long as the factual basis for the dispatch is proven, after a challenge thereto has been lodged, the stop is constitutionally justified." Id., citing U.S. v. Hensley (1985), 469 U.S. 221 . {¶ 24} Accordingly, this court has held that "when a Terry stop is predicated solely

2022It is also important to remember that “[t]here is no ‘automatic firearm exception’ to the Terry rule.” Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dept., 785 F.3d 1128, 1132 (6th Cir.2015), citing Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 , 120 S.Ct. 1375 , 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000). {¶50} The majority opinion emphasizes that it was the totality of the circumstances that justified the stop.

2022It is also important to remember that “[t]here is no ‘automatic firearm exception’ to the Terry rule.” Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dept., 785 F.3d 1128, 1132 (6th Cir.2015), citing Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 , 120 S.Ct. 1375 , 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000). {¶50} The majority opinion emphasizes that it was the totality of the circumstances that justified the stop.

2024A Terry stop is “more intrusive than a consensual encounter but less intrusive than a formal custodial arrest.” State v. Thornton, 2023-Ohio-1404 , 213 N.E.3d 808, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Taylor, 106 Ohio App.3d 741, 748 , 667 N.E.2d 60 (2d Dist.1995). {¶ 11} “Reasonable suspicion entails some minimal level of objective justification * * *[,] something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but less than the level of suspicion required for probable cause.” State v. Jones, 70 Ohio App.3d 554, 556-57 , 591 N.E.2d 810 (2d Dist.1990), citing Terry at 27 .

2024A Terry stop is “more intrusive than a consensual encounter but less intrusive than a formal custodial arrest.” State v. Thornton, 2023-Ohio-1404 , 213 N.E.3d 808, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Taylor, 106 Ohio App.3d 741, 748 , 667 N.E.2d 60 (2d Dist.1995). {¶ 11} “Reasonable suspicion entails some minimal level of objective justification * * *[,] something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but less than the level of suspicion required for probable cause.” State v. Jones, 70 Ohio App.3d 554, 556-57 , 591 N.E.2d 810 (2d Dist.1990), citing Terry at 27 .

2016"Further, 'the seizure of a person without the authority of a warrant is per se unreasonable, and therefore unconstitutional, unless an exception applies.' " Id., quoting Dorsey at ¶ 17, citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). " 'One such exception is commonly known as an investigative or Terry stop.' " Id., quoting Dorsey at ¶ 17, citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). {¶ 11} In the context of automobile seizures, the Terry exception permits a police officer to stop an individual if the officer, based on specific and articulable facts, has reasonable suspicion of criminal ac

2016"Further, 'the seizure of a person without the authority of a warrant is per se unreasonable, and therefore unconstitutional, unless an exception applies.' " Id., quoting Dorsey at ¶ 17, citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). " 'One such exception is commonly known as an investigative or Terry stop.' " Id., quoting Dorsey at ¶ 17, citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). {¶ 11} In the context of automobile seizures, the Terry exception permits a police officer to stop an individual if the officer, based on specific and articulable facts, has reasonable suspicion of criminal ac

2019While unprovoked flight from the police in an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking may be sufficient to justify a Terry stop, see Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 , 120 S.Ct. 673 , 145 L.Ed.2d 570 , there was no evidence that Stocks was walking from a particular home or area (as -9- opposed to the neighborhood as a whole) that was known for drug activity.

2019While unprovoked flight from the police in an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking may be sufficient to justify a Terry stop, see Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 , 120 S.Ct. 673 , 145 L.Ed.2d 570 , there was no evidence that Stocks was walking from a particular home or area (as -9- opposed to the neighborhood as a whole) that was known for drug activity.

2025The reasonableness of a Terry stop “depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.” United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574 , 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975).

2025The reasonableness of a Terry stop “depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.” United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574 , 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975).

2011Delaware v. Prouse (1979), 440 U.S. 648, 653 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 ; State v. Gedeon (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d 617, 618 , 611 N.E.2d 972 ; State v. Heinrichs (1988), 46 Ohio App.3d 63 , 545 N.E.2d 1304 . {¶ 18} When “an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid regardless of the officers underlying subjective intent or motivation for stopping the vehicle in question.” Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3 , 11–12, 8 1996-Ohio-431 , 665 N.E.2d 10

2011Delaware v. Prouse (1979), 440 U.S. 648, 653 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 ; State v. Gedeon (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d 617, 618 , 611 N.E.2d 972 ; State v. Heinrichs (1988), 46 Ohio App.3d 63 , 545 N.E.2d 1304 . {¶ 18} When “an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid regardless of the officers underlying subjective intent or motivation for stopping the vehicle in question.” Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3 , 11–12, 8 1996-Ohio-431 , 665 N.E.2d 10

2019This rule traces its beginning to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and therefore, the type of stop involved is referred to as a “Terry stop.” In Terry, the United States Supreme Court “implicitly acknowledged the authority of the police to make a forcible stop of a person when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.” (Emphasis deleted.) United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702 , 103 S.Ct. 2637 , 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). {¶ 20} Precisely defining “reasonable suspicion” is not

2019This rule traces its beginning to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and therefore, the type of stop involved is referred to as a “Terry stop.” In Terry, the United States Supreme Court “implicitly acknowledged the authority of the police to make a forcible stop of a person when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.” (Emphasis deleted.) United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702 , 103 S.Ct. 2637 , 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). {¶ 20} Precisely defining “reasonable suspicion” is not

2013No.2002-A-0078, 2003-Ohio-5535 , ¶16, citing State v. Evans, 67 Ohio St.3d 405, 414 , 618 N.E.2d 162 (1993); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 378 , 113 S.Ct. 2130 , 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993); Lozada, 92 Ohio St.3d at 77, 748 N.E.2d 520 . {¶29} When determining whether a Terry stop was reasonable, we are to look to the totality of the circumstances.

2013No.2002-A-0078, 2003-Ohio-5535 , ¶16, citing State v. Evans, 67 Ohio St.3d 405, 414 , 618 N.E.2d 162 (1993); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 378 , 113 S.Ct. 2130 , 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993); Lozada, 92 Ohio St.3d at 77, 748 N.E.2d 520 . {¶29} When determining whether a Terry stop was reasonable, we are to look to the totality of the circumstances.

2023Montgomery No. 22726, 2009-Ohio-158, ¶ 21 , citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 , 100 S.Ct. 1870 , 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). {¶ 17} The second type of encounter is an investigatory detention, often referred to as a “Terry stop,” which is more intrusive than a consensual encounter but less intrusive than a formal custodial arrest.

2023Montgomery No. 22726, 2009-Ohio-158, ¶ 21 , citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 , 100 S.Ct. 1870 , 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). {¶ 17} The second type of encounter is an investigatory detention, often referred to as a “Terry stop,” which is more intrusive than a consensual encounter but less intrusive than a formal custodial arrest.

2024The court referred to United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002), as providing that a police officer may rely on his experience and training to infer and deduce all of the information he has that an untrained person may not consider. {¶18} The court then discussed the law as to officers performing a pat down of an individual for weapons after making a valid Terry stop.

2024The court referred to United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002), as providing that a police officer may rely on his experience and training to infer and deduce all of the information he has that an untrained person may not consider. {¶18} The court then discussed the law as to officers performing a pat down of an individual for weapons after making a valid Terry stop.

2015Compare State v. Freeman, 64 Ohio St.2d 291, 295 (1980) (Terry stop deemed proper where an officer observed a man sitting alone in running vehicle for 20 minutes at 3:00 a.m. outside of a motel located in a high crime area, with the officer being aware of recent criminal activity in that same motel parking lot); State v. Jones, 9th Dist.

2008State v. Freeman (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 291 , 414 N.E.2d 1044 , paragraph one of the syllabus. {¶ 88} However, a stop does not have to meet the Terry test if it involves a consensual encounter.

2026“The determination whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop must be based on the totality of circumstances ‘viewed through the eyes of the reasonable and prudent police officer on the scene who must react to events as they unfold.’” State v. Hairston, 2019-Ohio-1622, ¶ 10 , quoting State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86 (1991).

2026“The determination whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop must be based on the totality of circumstances ‘viewed through the eyes of the reasonable and prudent police officer on the scene who must react to events as they unfold.’” State v. Hairston, 2019-Ohio-1622, ¶ 10 , quoting State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86 (1991).