Terry stop in Minnesota

2015State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. 2000).

2015State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. 2000).

2025The Terry exception to the probable cause and warrant requirements allows a police officer to conduct a pat-frisk of a person, meaning a carefully limited search of the outer clothing in an attempt to discover weapons, when the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that the person is “armed and dangerous” and “criminal activity may be afoot.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 .

2025The Terry exception to the probable cause and warrant requirements allows a police officer to conduct a pat-frisk of a person, meaning a carefully limited search of the outer clothing in an attempt to discover weapons, when the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that the person is “armed and dangerous” and “criminal activity may be afoot.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 .

2015State v. White, 489 N.W.2d 792, 794 (Minn. 1992) (“[T]hat this novice officer had not formally placed defendant under arrest but was continuing . . . on a Terry stop rationale does not foreclose the state from . . . justifying the search as an incidental search.”); see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 , 100 S. Ct. 2556, 2564 (1980) (“Where the formal arrest followed quickly on the heels of the challenged search of petitioner’s person, we do not believe it particularly important that the search preceded the arrest rather than vice versa.”).

2010United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 , 105 S.Ct. 675, 680 , 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 , 700-01 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 2587 , 2593 n. 12, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981); State v. White, 489 N.W.2d 792, 793 (Minn.1992); State v. Schinzing, 342 N.W.2d 105, 109 (Minn.1983).

2013See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 227-28, 230-31, 233-34 , 105 S.Ct. 675, 679-80, 681, 682-83 , 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985) (assuming, in its discussion of whether officers may conduct a Terry stop of a vehicle based on reasonable suspicion that the driver is wanted for committing a felony, that a vehicle stop by an officer with probable cause to arrest would be valid).

2013See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 227-28, 230-31, 233-34 , 105 S.Ct. 675, 679-80, 681, 682-83 , 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985) (assuming, in its discussion of whether officers may conduct a Terry stop of a vehicle based on reasonable suspicion that the driver is wanted for committing a felony, that a vehicle stop by an officer with probable cause to arrest would be valid).

2025The United States Supreme Court has explained that “the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked . . . .” Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 96 (emphasis added).

2025The United States Supreme Court has explained that “the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked . . . .” Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 96 (emphasis added).

2024“A Terry stop permits an officer who suspects that an individual is engaged in illegal activity and also believes that a suspect may be armed and dangerous to frisk the suspect in order to reduce concerns that the suspect poses a danger to officer safety.” State v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 250-51 (Minn. 2007).

2016See State v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 253 (Minn. 2007) (enumerating the five factor test for determining whether police have exceeded the permissible scope of a Terry stop) (citing United States v. Raino, 980 F.2d 1148, 1149-50 (8th Cir. 1992)).

2016In re Welfare of G.M., 560 N.W.2d 687, 690 (Minn. 1997). 3 Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures.

2005(NMN) M., 542 N.W.2d 54, 57 (Minn.App.1996) (noting *449 that “the grounds for making the stop can be based on the collective knowledge of all investigating officers”), aff'd, 560 N.W.2d 687 (Minn.1997); see also United States v. Chhunn, 11 F.3d 107, 110 (8th Cir.1993) (looking to the collective knowledge of the officers to determine the reasonableness of a Terry stop); 3 United States v. Home, 4 F.3d 579, 585 (8th Cir.1993) (noting requirement that there be “some degree of communication” of knowledge).

1984The trial judge also compared the instant ease to that of State v. Johnson, 257 N.W.2d 308 (Minn.1977), which involved the suppression of evidence discovered following the investigatory stop of a vehicle of which the officer was “suspicious.” Applying the Terry standard, the court found the search to be unconstitutional because the officer could not articulate any reason for suspecting that criminal activity was occurring.

1984The trial judge also compared the instant ease to that of State v. Johnson, 257 N.W.2d 308 (Minn.1977), which involved the suppression of evidence discovered following the investigatory stop of a vehicle of which the officer was “suspicious.” Applying the Terry standard, the court found the search to be unconstitutional because the officer could not articulate any reason for suspecting that criminal activity was occurring.

2025Id. at 364 ; State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 842 (Minn. 2011).

2025Id. at 364 ; State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 842 (Minn. 2011).

2025See, e.g., Malecha, 3 N.W.3d at 577-78 (applying exclusionary rule to “deter[] unlawful government conduct” and “promote[] the public perception of fairness in the judicial process” (emphasis omitted)); State v. Hardy, 577 N.W.2d 212, 217 (Minn. 1998) (excluding evidence obtained through illegal search “to eliminate the incentive for police officers who have detained a person on a Terry stop to overstep the limits of the stop”); State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163, 178-80 (Minn. 2007) (excluding illegally obtained evidence because “the police conduct involved is capable of repetition and . . . ap

2015See State v. Hardy, 577 N.W.2d 212, 217 (Minn. 1998) (reiterating that “the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct” and that by excluding evidence, “we seek to eliminate the incentive for police officers who have detained a person on a Terry stop to overstep the limits of the stop”).

2024State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008).

2012Id. at 395, 397; see also State v. Hollins, 789 N.W.2d 244, 250 (Minn.App.2010) (following Timberlake and holding that defendant’s possession of a handgun at a nightclub was sufficient to create reasonable suspicion that he carried the gun unlawfully, absent any indication that he held a permit, justifying a Terry detention), review denied (Minn. Dec. 22, 2010).

2016See State v. Gilchrist, 299 N.W.2d 913, 916 (Minn. 1980) (holding informant’s tip that suspect may have been involved in recent homicide and possessed firearms and officer knowledge of suspect’s criminal history of firearms-related offenses supported a Terry stop); State v. Bellikka, 490 N.W.2d 660, 663 (Minn. App. 1992) (holding police knowledge of a driver’s history of burglary offenses strengthened officer’s reasonable suspicion that he was involved in a recent burglary), review denied (Minn. Nov. 25, 1992); State v. Munoz, 385 N.W.2d 373, 376 (Minn. App. 1986) (holding officer’s knowledge

1985See also State v. Gilchrist, 299 N.W.2d 913 (Minn.1980).

2016See State v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 253 (Minn. 2007) (enumerating the five factor test for determining whether police have exceeded the permissible scope of a Terry stop) (citing United States v. Raino, 980 F.2d 1148, 1149-50 (8th Cir. 1992)).

2007United States v. Raino, 980 F.2d 1148, 1149-50 (8th Cir.1992).

2007See id. at 514 ("[S]hortly before Officer Waller frisked defendant, Officer Champion and his tracking dog appeared on the scene and Champion stated that the dog had followed the track from the house where the intrusion occurred to the place where Waller had first seen defendant * * *."); see also Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 136 (noting that scope of permissible Terry stop can be expanded to support "investigation of only those additional offenses for which the officer develops a reasonable, articulable suspicion within the time necessary to resolve the originally-suspected offense.").

2007See id. at 514 (“[Sjhortly before Officer Waller frisked defendant, Officer Champion and his tracking dog appeared on the scene and Champion stated that the dog had followed the track from the house where the intrusion occurred to the place where Waller had first seen defendant * * see also Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 136 (noting that scope of permissible Terry stop can be expanded to support “investigation of only those additional offenses for which the officer develops a reasonable, articula-ble suspicion within the time necessary to resolve the originally-suspected offense.”).

2010United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 , 105 S.Ct. 675, 680 , 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 , 700-01 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 2587 , 2593 n. 12, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981); State v. White, 489 N.W.2d 792, 793 (Minn.1992); State v. Schinzing, 342 N.W.2d 105, 109 (Minn.1983).

1992United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 , 105 S.Ct. 675, 680 , 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700-01, n. 12 , 101 S.Ct. 2587, 2593, n. 12 , 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981); State v. Schinzing, 342 N.W.2d 105, 109 (Minn.1985); State v. Pleas, 329 N.W.2d 329 (Minn.1983); 3 W.

2007See id. at 514 ("[S]hortly before Officer Waller frisked defendant, Officer Champion and his tracking dog appeared on the scene and Champion stated that the dog had followed the track from the house where the intrusion occurred to the place where Waller had first seen defendant * * *."); see also Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 136 (noting that scope of permissible Terry stop can be expanded to support "investigation of only those additional offenses for which the officer develops a reasonable, articulable suspicion within the time necessary to resolve the originally-suspected offense.").

2007See id. at 514 (“[Sjhortly before Officer Waller frisked defendant, Officer Champion and his tracking dog appeared on the scene and Champion stated that the dog had followed the track from the house where the intrusion occurred to the place where Waller had first seen defendant * * see also Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 136 (noting that scope of permissible Terry stop can be expanded to support “investigation of only those additional offenses for which the officer develops a reasonable, articula-ble suspicion within the time necessary to resolve the originally-suspected offense.”).

2004Gonzalez, 273 Ill.Dec. 360 , 789 N.E.2d at 266 ; United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1230 (10th Cir.2001) (en banc); cf. State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 135-36 (Minn.1999) (stating that “even if a search is supported by probable cause, the scope of the search and any detention of the suspect must still be reasonable.”).

2004Gonzalez, 273 Ill.Dec. 360 , 789 N.E.2d at 266 ; United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1230 (10th Cir.2001) (en banc); cf. State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 135-36 (Minn.1999) (stating that “even if a search is supported by probable cause, the scope of the search and any detention of the suspect must still be reasonable.”).

2003Reasonable, articulable suspicion requires a showing that the stop was “not the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity.” State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919, 921 (Minn.1996).

1997See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 , - - -, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1776-77 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (stating that routine traffic stops are constitutional where police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred); State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919, 921-22 (Minn.1996) (same); Berge, 374 N.W.2d at 733 (same).

2004We of course do not suggest that a traffic stop supported by probable cause may not exceed the bounds set by the Fourth Amendment on the scope of a Terry stop. 468 U.S. at 439 n. 29, 104 S.Ct. 3138 .

2004We of course do not suggest that a traffic stop supported by probable cause may not exceed the bounds set by the Fourth Amendment on the scope of a Terry stop. 468 U.S. at 439 n. 29, 104 S.Ct. 3138 .

1993We find no exigent circumstances and although it is permissible to detain a person during the execution of a search warrant when that person is present at the scene, Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 , 101 S.Ct. 2587 , 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981), there is no authority for detaining a person under the circumstances in this case and we decline to thus extend the limits of a Terry stop.

1993We find no exigent circumstances and although it is permissible to detain a person during the execution of a search warrant when that person is present at the scene, Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 , 101 S.Ct. 2587 , 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981), there is no authority for detaining a person under the circumstances in this case and we decline to thus extend the limits of a Terry stop.

2003Cf. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 504 , 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1328 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (holding that officers’ conduct was more intrusive than necessary to effectuate investigative detention where officers stopped person suspected of transporting drugs, seized his airline ticket and driver’s license, and asked him to accompany them to interrogation room adjacent to airport concourse); Gallegos v. City of Colorado Springs, 114 F.3d 1024, 1031-32 (10th Cir.1997) (holding that officers acted reasonably in response to perceived threat to their safety and did not escalate Terry stop into unlawful a

2003Cf. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 504 , 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1328 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (holding that officers’ conduct was more intrusive than necessary to effectuate investigative detention where officers stopped person suspected of transporting drugs, seized his airline ticket and driver’s license, and asked him to accompany them to interrogation room adjacent to airport concourse); Gallegos v. City of Colorado Springs, 114 F.3d 1024, 1031-32 (10th Cir.1997) (holding that officers acted reasonably in response to perceived threat to their safety and did not escalate Terry stop into unlawful a

2025Id. at 364 ; State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 842 (Minn. 2011).

2025Id. at 364 ; State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 842 (Minn. 2011).

2024We review the validity of a Terry stop by applying a two-step inquiry: first, we consider “whether the stop was justified at its inception”; second, we consider whether the actions of the police during the stop “were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop.” State v. Balenger, 667 N.W.2d 133, 137 (Minn. App. 2003) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 21, 2003).

2007This court reversed the district court holding that the detaining officers performed a lawful Terry stop because “the circumstances warranted [the officer’s] belief that his safety and the safety of others was threatened.” Id. at 138 .

2016State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn. 1992). 3 [Kong] out of the car and then search him,” and because the district court ruled that the search of Kong was valid.

2015A Terry stop “permits a protective frisk for weapons.” Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d at 844 .

1983In a footnote the Court added: If the purpose underlying a Terry stop— investigating possible criminal activity— is to be served, the police must under certain circumstances be able to detain the individual for longer than the brief time period involved in Terry and Adams [v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 , 92 S.Ct. 1921 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) ].

1983In a footnote the Court added: If the purpose underlying a Terry stop— investigating possible criminal activity— is to be served, the police must under certain circumstances be able to detain the individual for longer than the brief time period involved in Terry and Adams [v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 , 92 S.Ct. 1921 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) ].

2025See, e.g., Malecha, 3 N.W.3d at 577-78 (applying exclusionary rule to “deter[] unlawful government conduct” and “promote[] the public perception of fairness in the judicial process” (emphasis omitted)); State v. Hardy, 577 N.W.2d 212, 217 (Minn. 1998) (excluding evidence obtained through illegal search “to eliminate the incentive for police officers who have detained a person on a Terry stop to overstep the limits of the stop”); State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163, 178-80 (Minn. 2007) (excluding illegally obtained evidence because “the police conduct involved is capable of repetition and . . . ap