Terry stop in Wyoming

2003Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 219-220 (Wyo.1994) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)); see also McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Wyo.1999).

2003Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 219-220 (Wyo.1994) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)); see also McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Wyo.1999).

2003Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 219-220 (Wyo.1994) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)); see also McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Wyo.1999).

2003Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 219-220 (Wyo.1994) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)); see also McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Wyo.1999).

2017Damato v. State, 2003 WY 13, ¶ 9 , 64 P.3d 700, 704-05 (Wyo. 2003).

2017Damato v. State, 2003 WY 13, ¶ 9 , 64 P.3d 700, 704-05 (Wyo. 2003).

2014The Perdue court held that police officers must advise suspects of their constitutional rights even in the context of a Terry stop, "if they ... take highly intrusive steps to protect themselves from danger." Id., 8 F.3d at 1465 .

2014The Perdue court held that police officers must advise suspects of their constitutional rights even in the context of a Terry stop, "if they ... take highly intrusive steps to protect themselves from danger." Id., 8 F.3d at 1465 .

2009A traffic stop is analogous to a second tier investigatory detention and is sometimes termed a Terry stop 3 Barch v. State, 2004 WY 79, ¶ 7 , 92 P.3d 828, 831 (2004). "[AJn investigative detention must be temporary, lasting no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop ..." O'Boyle, ¶ 47, 117 P.3d at 414 .

2009A traffic stop is analogous to a second tier investigatory detention and is sometimes termed a Terry stop 3 Barch v. State, 2004 WY 79, ¶ 7 , 92 P.3d 828, 831 (2004). "[AJn investigative detention must be temporary, lasting no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop ..." O'Boyle, ¶ 47, 117 P.3d at 414 .

2026Either way, Judge, it’s still an inappropriate stop. [¶20] Mr. Glenn concedes “defense counsel could have, and probably should have, more articulately advocated both prongs of the Terry analysis.” Nonetheless, he points to our holding that “[i]n determining the scope of an issue brought to the district court’s attention, we will read any ambiguity in the conditional plea agreement ‘against the Government and in favor of a defendant’s appellate rights.’” Brown v. State, 2019 WY 42 , ¶ 13, 439 P.3d 726, 731 (Wyo. 2019) (quoting United States v. Anderson, 374 F.3d 955, 957 (10th Cir. 2004)).

2026Either way, Judge, it’s still an inappropriate stop. [¶20] Mr. Glenn concedes “defense counsel could have, and probably should have, more articulately advocated both prongs of the Terry analysis.” Nonetheless, he points to our holding that “[i]n determining the scope of an issue brought to the district court’s attention, we will read any ambiguity in the conditional plea agreement ‘against the Government and in favor of a defendant’s appellate rights.’” Brown v. State, 2019 WY 42 , ¶ 13, 439 P.3d 726, 731 (Wyo. 2019) (quoting United States v. Anderson, 374 F.3d 955, 957 (10th Cir. 2004)).

2003Brown agreed with the following statement: While Terry stops generally must be fairly nonintrusive, officers may take necessary steps to protect themselves if the cireum-stances reasonably warrant such measures. "[Tlhe use of guns in connection with a stop is permissible where the police reasonably believe [the weapons] are necessary for their protection." United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1273 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 916 , 103 S.Ct. 1898 , 77 L.Ed.2d 286 (1983). spore ok ok This holding is consistent with the recent trend allowing police to use handcuffs or place suspe

1997In holding that police officers may draw their weapons without transforming an otherwise valid Terry stop into an arrest, the court stated: While Terry stops generally must be fairly nonintrusive, officers may take necessary steps to protect themselves if the circumstances reasonably warrant such measures. “[T]he use of guns in connection with a stop is permissible where the police reasonably believe [the weapons] are necessary for their protection.” United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1273 (10th Cir.1982), ce rt. denied 461 U.S. 916 , 103 S.Ct. 1898 , 77 L.Ed.2d 286 (1983). * * * * * * *

1999See Keehn v. Town of Torrington, 834 P.2d 112 (Wyo.1992).

1999See Keehn v. Town of Torrington, 834 P.2d 112 (Wyo.1992).

2009A traffic stop is analogous to a second tier investigatory detention and is sometimes termed a Terry stop 3 Barch v. State, 2004 WY 79, ¶ 7 , 92 P.3d 828, 831 (2004). "[AJn investigative detention must be temporary, lasting no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop ..." O'Boyle, ¶ 47, 117 P.3d at 414 .

2007Mr. Batten focuses his argument on the second part of the Terry analysis, presumably because the trooper was justified in stopping him for the broken headlight. *1241 [T11l]l "[An investigative detention must be temporary, lasting no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, and the seope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification." O'Boyle, ¶ 47, 117 P.3d at 414 .

2014In United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 , 105 S.Ct. 675 , 83 LEd.2d 604 (1985), the Supreme Court held that when officers initiated a Terry stop based on a flyer or bulletin, reliance on the flyer or bulletin was proper so long as the officers that issued the flyer had a reasonable suspicion about the person it targeted.

2014In United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 , 105 S.Ct. 675 , 83 LEd.2d 604 (1985), the Supreme Court held that when officers initiated a Terry stop based on a flyer or bulletin, reliance on the flyer or bulletin was proper so long as the officers that issued the flyer had a reasonable suspicion about the person it targeted.

2003Brown v. State, 944 P.2d 1168 (Wyo.1997).

2003Such measures are warranted however, only if "the facts available to the officer would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate." Id. [[Image here]] Shareef, 100 F.3d at 1502 ; see also Eckenrod v. State, 2003 WY 51, ¶ 16 , 67 P.3d 635, 640 (Wyo.2003); Brown v. State, 944 P.2d 1168, 1172 (Wyo.1997); and United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1462-63 (10th Cir.1993).

2026Either way, Judge, it’s still an inappropriate stop. [¶20] Mr. Glenn concedes “defense counsel could have, and probably should have, more articulately advocated both prongs of the Terry analysis.” Nonetheless, he points to our holding that “[i]n determining the scope of an issue brought to the district court’s attention, we will read any ambiguity in the conditional plea agreement ‘against the Government and in favor of a defendant’s appellate rights.’” Brown v. State, 2019 WY 42 , ¶ 13, 439 P.3d 726, 731 (Wyo. 2019) (quoting United States v. Anderson, 374 F.3d 955, 957 (10th Cir. 2004)).

2026Either way, Judge, it’s still an inappropriate stop. [¶20] Mr. Glenn concedes “defense counsel could have, and probably should have, more articulately advocated both prongs of the Terry analysis.” Nonetheless, he points to our holding that “[i]n determining the scope of an issue brought to the district court’s attention, we will read any ambiguity in the conditional plea agreement ‘against the Government and in favor of a defendant’s appellate rights.’” Brown v. State, 2019 WY 42 , ¶ 13, 439 P.3d 726, 731 (Wyo. 2019) (quoting United States v. Anderson, 374 F.3d 955, 957 (10th Cir. 2004)).

2025Levenson, ¶ 24, 508 P.3d at 237 n.6 (quoting Fertig v. State, 2006 WY 148, ¶ 19 , 146 P.3d 492, 498 (Wyo. 2006)). [¶13] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend.

2025Levenson, ¶ 24, 508 P.3d at 237 n.6 (quoting Fertig v. State, 2006 WY 148, ¶ 19 , 146 P.3d 492, 498 (Wyo. 2006)). [¶13] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend.

2024To justify an investigative detention, an officer must show “‘specific and articulable facts and rational inferences which give rise to a[n] [objectively] reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or may be committing a crime[.]’” Flood v. State, 2007 WY 167, ¶ 14 , 169 P.3d 538, 543-44 (Wyo. 2007) (quoting Custer v. State, 2006 WY 72, ¶ 13 , 135 P.3d 620, 624 (Wyo. 2006), and citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (other citation omitted)).1 An arrest, on the other hand, requires probable cause that 1 The case before us does not involve a “Terry stop,

2024To justify an investigative detention, an officer must show “‘specific and articulable facts and rational inferences which give rise to a[n] [objectively] reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or may be committing a crime[.]’” Flood v. State, 2007 WY 167, ¶ 14 , 169 P.3d 538, 543-44 (Wyo. 2007) (quoting Custer v. State, 2006 WY 72, ¶ 13 , 135 P.3d 620, 624 (Wyo. 2006), and citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (other citation omitted)).1 An arrest, on the other hand, requires probable cause that 1 The case before us does not involve a “Terry stop,

2024To justify an investigative detention, an officer must show “‘specific and articulable facts and rational inferences which give rise to a[n] [objectively] reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or may be committing a crime[.]’” Flood v. State, 2007 WY 167, ¶ 14 , 169 P.3d 538, 543-44 (Wyo. 2007) (quoting Custer v. State, 2006 WY 72, ¶ 13 , 135 P.3d 620, 624 (Wyo. 2006), and citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (other citation omitted)).1 An arrest, on the other hand, requires probable cause that 1 The case before us does not involve a “Terry stop,

2024To justify an investigative detention, an officer must show “‘specific and articulable facts and rational inferences which give rise to a[n] [objectively] reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or may be committing a crime[.]’” Flood v. State, 2007 WY 167, ¶ 14 , 169 P.3d 538, 543-44 (Wyo. 2007) (quoting Custer v. State, 2006 WY 72, ¶ 13 , 135 P.3d 620, 624 (Wyo. 2006), and citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (other citation omitted)).1 An arrest, on the other hand, requires probable cause that 1 The case before us does not involve a “Terry stop,

2021Mr. Mahaffy does not dispute the initial traffic stop was justified; he focuses on the second part of the Terry test. [¶19] “The second part of the Terry inquiry is the reasonableness of the detention.” Pier, 2019 WY 3 , ¶ 19, 432 P.3d at 897 (citation omitted).

2021Mr. Mahaffy does not dispute the initial traffic stop was justified; he focuses on the second part of the Terry test. [¶19] “The second part of the Terry inquiry is the reasonableness of the detention.” Pier, 2019 WY 3 , ¶ 19, 432 P.3d at 897 (citation omitted).