Terry stop in Wisconsin

2026All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version. 5 Constitution is “substantively identical” to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, appellate courts have “historically interpreted [it] in accord with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Dumstrey, 2016 WI 3, ¶14 , 366 Wis. 2d 64 , 873 N.W.2d 502 . ¶13 “‘No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his [or her] own person, free from all restraint or interference of others,

2026“An investigatory stop, though a seizure, allows police officers to briefly ‘detain a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.’” Id. (citation omitted). ¶9 When a person under investigation pursuant to a Terry stop is moved from one location to another, there exists a two-part inquiry: (1) whether the person was moved within the “vicinity” of the incident; and (2) whether the purpose in moving the person within the vicinity was reasonable.

2026Like a Terry stop, the detention is typically brief and “comparatively nonthreatening.” Id. at 439-40.

2026Like a Terry stop, the detention is typically brief and “comparatively nonthreatening.” Id. at 439-40.

2025As our supreme court stated in State v. Young, 2006 WI 98, ¶20 , 294 Wis. 2d 1 , 717 N.W.2d 729 : [A]n investigatory or Terry stop[] usually involves only temporary questioning and thus constitutes only a minor infringement on personal liberty.

2025As our supreme court stated in State v. Young, 2006 WI 98, ¶20 , 294 Wis. 2d 1 , 717 N.W.2d 729 : [A]n investigatory or Terry stop[] usually involves only temporary questioning and thus constitutes only a minor infringement on personal liberty.

2020Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) ("No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded . . . than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference by others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law."). ¶51 The warrantless seizure here is a routine traffic stop, characterized as "a relatively brief encounter . . . more analogous to a so-called Terry stop . . . than to a formal 2 arrest." Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998) (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (qu

2020Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) ("No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded . . . than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference by others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law."). ¶51 The warrantless seizure here is a routine traffic stop, characterized as "a relatively brief encounter . . . more analogous to a so-called Terry stop . . . than to a formal 2 arrest." Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998) (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (qu

2024See, e.g., Bies v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 457, 469 , 251 N.W.2d 461 (1977) (determining that "any warrantless intrusion must be as limited as is reasonably possible consistent with the purpose justifying it in the first instance"); Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354 ("Like a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure's 'mission'——to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop[.]"); State v. Floyd, 2017 WI 78, ¶21 , 377 Wis. 2d 394 , 898 N.W.2d 560 ("Traffic stops are meant to be brief interactions with law enforcement officers,

2024The justification for restricting a person's liberty ends when the welfare-check justification is resolved, provided no other independent reason exists to detain the person.9 See also State v. Brooks, 2020 WI 60, ¶10 , 392 Wis. 2d 8 402, 944 N.W.2d 832 (A traffic stop can "last no longer than necessary to complete the purpose of the [] stop."); Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015) ("Like a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure's 'mission'——to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop, and atte

2022I also worry that the majority/lead opinion over-complicates its analysis by importing Fourth Amendment principles from other contexts, even though this case requires only a straightforward application of Terry.2 Therefore, I respectfully concur. ¶62 In order to justify a Terry stop, the police must have "reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000).

2022I also worry that the majority/lead opinion over-complicates its analysis by importing Fourth Amendment principles from other contexts, even though this case requires only a straightforward application of Terry.2 Therefore, I respectfully concur. ¶62 In order to justify a Terry stop, the police must have "reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000).

2022See State v. Chambers, 55 Wis. 2d 289, 294 , 198 N.W.2d 377 (1972) (recognizing the Terry standard). 4 inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant’ the intrusion of the stop.” Post, 301 Wis. 2d 1, ¶10 (quoted source omitted); Vogt, 356 Wis. 2d 343, ¶29 (reasonable suspicion requires more than a “savvy hunch” from an officer); State v. Houghton, 2015 WI 79, ¶¶12, 21 , 364 Wis. 2d 234 , 868 N.W.2d 143 .

2022See State v. Chambers, 55 Wis. 2d 289, 294 , 198 N.W.2d 377 (1972) (recognizing the Terry standard). 4 inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant’ the intrusion of the stop.” Post, 301 Wis. 2d 1, ¶10 (quoted source omitted); Vogt, 356 Wis. 2d 343, ¶29 (reasonable suspicion requires more than a “savvy hunch” from an officer); State v. Houghton, 2015 WI 79, ¶¶12, 21 , 364 Wis. 2d 234 , 868 N.W.2d 143 .

2026All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version. 5 Constitution is “substantively identical” to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, appellate courts have “historically interpreted [it] in accord with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Dumstrey, 2016 WI 3, ¶14 , 366 Wis. 2d 64 , 873 N.W.2d 502 . ¶13 “‘No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his [or her] own person, free from all restraint or interference of others,

2026All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version. 5 Constitution is “substantively identical” to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, appellate courts have “historically interpreted [it] in accord with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Dumstrey, 2016 WI 3, ¶14 , 366 Wis. 2d 64 , 873 N.W.2d 502 . ¶13 “‘No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his [or her] own person, free from all restraint or interference of others,

2020However, if under the totality of the circumstances a detained motorist's freedom of 34 action is curtailed to a degree associated with a formal arrest, he or she is entitled to the "full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda." Id. at 440 (citing Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam)); see State v. Griffith, 2000 WI 72 , ¶69 n.14, 236 Wis. 2d 48 , 613 N.W.2d 72 (noting that the United States Supreme Court has "made clear that if a detained motorist is treated in such a manner that he or she is rendered 'in custody' for practical purposes, Miranda protections are tri

2020However, if under the totality of the circumstances a detained motorist's freedom of 34 action is curtailed to a degree associated with a formal arrest, he or she is entitled to the "full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda." Id. at 440 (citing Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam)); see State v. Griffith, 2000 WI 72 , ¶69 n.14, 236 Wis. 2d 48 , 613 N.W.2d 72 (noting that the United States Supreme Court has "made clear that if a detained motorist is treated in such a manner that he or she is rendered 'in custody' for practical purposes, Miranda protections are tri

2000The Terry exception to the probable cause requirement has a "narrow scope." Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93 (1979). ¶ 47.

2000The Terry exception to the probable cause requirement has a "narrow scope." Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93 (1979). ¶ 47.

1995In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968), the United States Supreme Court recognized that "a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest." Such an "intermediate response" is appropriate, for example, "in order to determine [a suspect's] identity or maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information. . . ." Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972). [5, 6] To determine whether a "Terry stop" is appropriate, a cour

1993The Stop In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968), the United States Supreme Court recognized the legitimacy of an investigative stop: "[A] police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possi *446 bly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest." In Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-46 (1972) (citations omitted), the Court provided the following description of a Terry stop: The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for prob

2024See, e.g., Bies v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 457, 469 , 251 N.W.2d 461 (1977) (determining that "any warrantless intrusion must be as limited as is reasonably possible consistent with the purpose justifying it in the first instance"); Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354 ("Like a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure's 'mission'——to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop[.]"); State v. Floyd, 2017 WI 78, ¶21 , 377 Wis. 2d 394 , 898 N.W.2d 560 ("Traffic stops are meant to be brief interactions with law enforcement officers,

2024See, e.g., Bies v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 457, 469 , 251 N.W.2d 461 (1977) (determining that "any warrantless intrusion must be as limited as is reasonably possible consistent with the purpose justifying it in the first instance"); Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354 ("Like a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure's 'mission'——to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop[.]"); State v. Floyd, 2017 WI 78, ¶21 , 377 Wis. 2d 394 , 898 N.W.2d 560 ("Traffic stops are meant to be brief interactions with law enforcement officers,

2026Similarly, the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of time.” Royer, 460 U.S. at 500 . ¶31 Birchfield, which we have already discussed, concerned whether the Fourth Amendment permitted warrantless breath tests and warrantless blood tests as a search conducted incident to a lawful arrest.

2009When a temporary detention is justified, we still examine the circumstances of the detention to determine whether "the investigative means used in the continued seizure are 'the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion'" and whether it lasted " 'no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.'" State v. Arias, 2008 WI 84, ¶ 32 , 311 Wis. 2d 358 , 752 N.W.2d 748 (quoting Royer, 460 U.S. at 500 ); see also United States v. Novak, 870 F.2d 1345, 1352 (7th Cir. 1989) ("To qualify as a mere Terry stop, a detention must be limited in s

2024See, e.g., Bies v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 457, 469 , 251 N.W.2d 461 (1977) (determining that "any warrantless intrusion must be as limited as is reasonably possible consistent with the purpose justifying it in the first instance"); Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354 ("Like a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure's 'mission'——to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop[.]"); State v. Floyd, 2017 WI 78, ¶21 , 377 Wis. 2d 394 , 898 N.W.2d 560 ("Traffic stops are meant to be brief interactions with law enforcement officers,

2024See, e.g., Bies v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 457, 469 , 251 N.W.2d 461 (1977) (determining that "any warrantless intrusion must be as limited as is reasonably possible consistent with the purpose justifying it in the first instance"); Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354 ("Like a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure's 'mission'——to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop[.]"); State v. Floyd, 2017 WI 78, ¶21 , 377 Wis. 2d 394 , 898 N.W.2d 560 ("Traffic stops are meant to be brief interactions with law enforcement officers,

2024“Second, we review the application of constitutional principles to those facts independently of the decision[] rendered by the circuit court ....” Id. ¶17 A Terry stop, “complies with the Fourth Amendment ‘if the police have reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed, is being committed, or is about to be committed.’” State v. Genous, 2021 WI 50, ¶7 , 397 Wis. 2d 293 , 961 N.W.2d 41 (quoted source omitted).

2022In this case, the court of appeals erred by utilizing a "divide-and-conquer analysis." See District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. __ , 138 S. Ct. 577, 588 (2018) (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002)). ¶25 Reasonable suspicion is "a low bar[.]" Genous, 397 Wis. 2d 293, ¶8 (citing Young, 294 Wis. 2d 1, ¶21 ; State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶19 , 245 Wis. 2d 206 , 629 N.W.2d 625 ); see also Anderson I, 389 Wis. 2d 106 , ¶33 ("Reasonable suspicion is a fairly low standard to meet." (citing Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 206 , An officer may frisk a person during a Terry stop if the 10 offic

2017An officer may expand the scope of the inquiry "only to investigate 'additional suspicious factors [that] come to the officer's attention.'" State v. Hogan, 2015 4 No. 2015AP1294-CR.awb WI 76, ¶35, 364 Wis. 2d 167 , 868 N.W.2d 124 (quoting State v. Betow, 226 Wis. 2d 90, 94 , 593 N.W.2d 499 (Ct. App. 1999)). ¶59 Like a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic stop context is determined by the seizure's "mission," which is to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns.

2017An officer may expand the scope of the inquiry "only to investigate 'additional suspicious factors [that] come to the officer's attention.'" State v. Hogan, 2015 4 No. 2015AP1294-CR.awb WI 76, ¶35, 364 Wis. 2d 167 , 868 N.W.2d 124 (quoting State v. Betow, 226 Wis. 2d 90, 94 , 593 N.W.2d 499 (Ct. App. 1999)). ¶59 Like a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic stop context is determined by the seizure's "mission," which is to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns.

2022See State v. Chambers, 55 Wis. 2d 289, 294 , 198 N.W.2d 377 (1972) (recognizing the Terry standard). 4 inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant’ the intrusion of the stop.” Post, 301 Wis. 2d 1, ¶10 (quoted source omitted); Vogt, 356 Wis. 2d 343, ¶29 (reasonable suspicion requires more than a “savvy hunch” from an officer); State v. Houghton, 2015 WI 79, ¶¶12, 21 , 364 Wis. 2d 234 , 868 N.W.2d 143 .

2022See State v. Chambers, 55 Wis. 2d 289, 294 , 198 N.W.2d 377 (1972) (recognizing the Terry standard). 4 inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant’ the intrusion of the stop.” Post, 301 Wis. 2d 1, ¶10 (quoted source omitted); Vogt, 356 Wis. 2d 343, ¶29 (reasonable suspicion requires more than a “savvy hunch” from an officer); State v. Houghton, 2015 WI 79, ¶¶12, 21 , 364 Wis. 2d 234 , 868 N.W.2d 143 .

2024See State v. Ellis, 469 P.3d 65, 77 (Kan. 2020) (holding 9 that "a public safety or welfare stop is not for investigative purposes and must end as soon as the officer determines the citizen is not in need of help"); United States v. Harris, 747 F.3d 1013, 1017 (8th Cir. 2014) (noting that the "scope of the encounter must be carefully tailored to satisfy the purpose of the initial detention, and the police must allow the person to proceed once the officer has completed the officer's inquiry, unless, of course, the officer obtains further reason to justify the stop"); State v. Acrey, 64 P.3d 594

2024See State v. Ellis, 469 P.3d 65, 77 (Kan. 2020) (holding 9 that "a public safety or welfare stop is not for investigative purposes and must end as soon as the officer determines the citizen is not in need of help"); United States v. Harris, 747 F.3d 1013, 1017 (8th Cir. 2014) (noting that the "scope of the encounter must be carefully tailored to satisfy the purpose of the initial detention, and the police must allow the person to proceed once the officer has completed the officer's inquiry, unless, of course, the officer obtains further reason to justify the stop"); State v. Acrey, 64 P.3d 594

2024See State v. Ellis, 469 P.3d 65, 77 (Kan. 2020) (holding 9 that "a public safety or welfare stop is not for investigative purposes and must end as soon as the officer determines the citizen is not in need of help"); United States v. Harris, 747 F.3d 1013, 1017 (8th Cir. 2014) (noting that the "scope of the encounter must be carefully tailored to satisfy the purpose of the initial detention, and the police must allow the person to proceed once the officer has completed the officer's inquiry, unless, of course, the officer obtains further reason to justify the stop"); State v. Acrey, 64 P.3d 594

2024See State v. Ellis, 469 P.3d 65, 77 (Kan. 2020) (holding 9 that "a public safety or welfare stop is not for investigative purposes and must end as soon as the officer determines the citizen is not in need of help"); United States v. Harris, 747 F.3d 1013, 1017 (8th Cir. 2014) (noting that the "scope of the encounter must be carefully tailored to satisfy the purpose of the initial detention, and the police must allow the person to proceed once the officer has completed the officer's inquiry, unless, of course, the officer obtains further reason to justify the stop"); State v. Acrey, 64 P.3d 594

2024See State v. Ellis, 469 P.3d 65, 77 (Kan. 2020) (holding 9 that "a public safety or welfare stop is not for investigative purposes and must end as soon as the officer determines the citizen is not in need of help"); United States v. Harris, 747 F.3d 1013, 1017 (8th Cir. 2014) (noting that the "scope of the encounter must be carefully tailored to satisfy the purpose of the initial detention, and the police must allow the person to proceed once the officer has completed the officer's inquiry, unless, of course, the officer obtains further reason to justify the stop"); State v. Acrey, 64 P.3d 594

2024See State v. Ellis, 469 P.3d 65, 77 (Kan. 2020) (holding 9 that "a public safety or welfare stop is not for investigative purposes and must end as soon as the officer determines the citizen is not in need of help"); United States v. Harris, 747 F.3d 1013, 1017 (8th Cir. 2014) (noting that the "scope of the encounter must be carefully tailored to satisfy the purpose of the initial detention, and the police must allow the person to proceed once the officer has completed the officer's inquiry, unless, of course, the officer obtains further reason to justify the stop"); State v. Acrey, 64 P.3d 594