Terry stop in District of Columbia

2025“To determine if a Terry stop was supported by reasonable articulable suspicion, a court must examine whether the totality of ‘the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the stop was appropriate.’” Mayo v. United States, 315 A.3d 606 , 620 (D.C. 2024) (en banc) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22 ).

2025This court, however, has held that “[t]he fact 9 A Terry stop “involves a . . . temporary detention, designed to last only until a preliminary investigation either generates probable cause or results in the release of the suspect.” In re M.E.B., 638 A.2d 1123 , 1126 (D.C. 1993); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 14 that an encounter may be a reasonable seizure within the scope of Terry for Fourth Amendment purposes does not automatically and necessarily remove it from Miranda’s Fifth Amendment protections.” Morton, 125 A.3d at 688 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).

2018See United States v. Turner, 699 A.2d 1125, 1129 (D.C. 1997) (―[W]e have routinely held that an imperfect description, coupled with close spatial and temporal proximity between the reported crime and seizure, justifies a Terry stop‖). 13 The more difficult question, then, is whether there was sufficient corroborating evidence to allow the police to conclude that the tip was ―reliable in its assertion of illegality‖ and thus to reasonably suspect that Mr. Miles was carrying a gun.

2018See United States v. Turner , 699 A.2d 1125 , 1129 (D.C. 1997) ("[W]e have routinely held that an imperfect description, coupled with close spatial and temporal proximity between the reported crime and seizure, justifies a Terry stop").

2024Duhart, 589 A.2d at 900 (explaining that “the circumstances of the suspect’s efforts to avoid the police must be such as permit[] a rational conclusion that flight indicated a consciousness of guilt” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also, e.g., Miles, 181 A.3d at 644 (considering whether the “character” of appellant’s flight was “incriminating” to assess whether police had the requisite justification to conduct a Terry stop); see generally Glover, 589 U.S. at 385-86 (noting that “[t]his court’s precedents have repeatedly affirmed that the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is

2015See, e.g., In re A.S., 827 A.2d 46, 46-48 (D.C.2003) (no basis for Terry stop where suspect in high-drug area walked away from police and made stuffing motion in waistband area; court emphasizes that motion “could be the person’s tucking in his shirt, scratching his side, pulling up his pants, arranging his underwear, pager, cell phone, or Walkman, etc.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Duhart v. United States, 589 A.2d 895, 899 (D.C.1991) (display of “something” to another person without evidence of exchange did not provide reasonable articulable suspicion; . “there' are innumerable innoc

2022And although our court acknowledged that the character of the area where a stop occurred could be a relevant consideration “in determining the reasonableness of the officer’s 25 The Court explained that the officers who conducted the Terry stop in Wardlow were “converging on an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking in order to investigate drug transactions,” “anticipated encountering a large number of people in the area including drug customers and individuals serving as lookouts” saw Mr. Wardlow, who was “holding an opaque bag,” look at them and run, and “in this context, . . . decided t

2022And although our court acknowledged that the character of the area where a stop occurred could be a relevant consideration “in determining the reasonableness of the officer’s 25 The Court explained that the officers who conducted the Terry stop in Wardlow were “converging on an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking in order to investigate drug transactions,” “anticipated encountering a large number of people in the area including drug customers and individuals serving as lookouts” saw Mr. Wardlow, who was “holding an opaque bag,” look at them and run, and “in this context, . . . decided t

2024Id. at 47-48 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re D.J., 532 A.2d 138 , 142-43 (D.C. 1987) (modified on other grounds by Allison v. United States, 623 A.2d 590 (D.C. 1993)) (rejecting the government’s argument that appellant’s act of “putting his hands in his pockets” “raised sufficient cause for suspicion to justify a Terry stop”); cf. Morgan v. United States, 121 A.3d 1235, 1237-38 (D.C. 2015) (holding police officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop based on a report from a citizen who saw appellant “‘reach[] into the back of his pants and pull[] som

2022Id. at 47–48; see also In re D.J., 532 A.2d 138 , 142–43 (D.C. 1987) (modified on other grounds by Allison v. United States, 623 A.2d 590 (D.C. 1993)) (rejecting government’s argument that appellant’s act of “putting his hands in his pockets” “raised sufficient cause for suspicion to justify a Terry stop”); cf. Morgan v. United States, 121 A.3d 1235 , 1237–38 (D.C. 2015) (officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct Terry stop based on report from citizen who saw appellant “‘reach[] into the back of his pants and pull[] something out and put it back in’ during the exchange of smal

2025Mayo, 315 A.3d at 637. 12 To have reasonable suspicion, officers “need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” Mitchell v. United States, 314 A.3d 1144 , 1151 (D.C. 2024) (quotation and citation omitted). “[T]he police need not rule out every innocent explanation for suspicious behavior in order to justify an investigatory stop.” Pridgen v. United States, 134 A.3d 297 , 304 n.20 (D.C. 2016) (quotation and citation omitted). “[I]nnocent individual acts or circumstances do not rule out a finding of reasonable suspicion,” and “the Terry standard does not require that an officer rule ou

2025Mayo, 315 A.3d at 637. 12 To have reasonable suspicion, officers “need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” Mitchell v. United States, 314 A.3d 1144 , 1151 (D.C. 2024) (quotation and citation omitted). “[T]he police need not rule out every innocent explanation for suspicious behavior in order to justify an investigatory stop.” Pridgen v. United States, 134 A.3d 297 , 304 n.20 (D.C. 2016) (quotation and citation omitted). “[I]nnocent individual acts or circumstances do not rule out a finding of reasonable suspicion,” and “the Terry standard does not require that an officer rule ou

2025Mayo, 315 A.3d at 637. 12 To have reasonable suspicion, officers “need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” Mitchell v. United States, 314 A.3d 1144 , 1151 (D.C. 2024) (quotation and citation omitted). “[T]he police need not rule out every innocent explanation for suspicious behavior in order to justify an investigatory stop.” Pridgen v. United States, 134 A.3d 297 , 304 n.20 (D.C. 2016) (quotation and citation omitted). “[I]nnocent individual acts or circumstances do not rule out a finding of reasonable suspicion,” and “the Terry standard does not require that an officer rule ou

2025Mayo, 315 A.3d at 637. 12 To have reasonable suspicion, officers “need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” Mitchell v. United States, 314 A.3d 1144 , 1151 (D.C. 2024) (quotation and citation omitted). “[T]he police need not rule out every innocent explanation for suspicious behavior in order to justify an investigatory stop.” Pridgen v. United States, 134 A.3d 297 , 304 n.20 (D.C. 2016) (quotation and citation omitted). “[I]nnocent individual acts or circumstances do not rule out a finding of reasonable suspicion,” and “the Terry standard does not require that an officer rule ou

2001Compare In re T.L.L., 729 A.2d 334 (D.C.1999) (description of black male, 14-18 years old, medium complexion, wearing dark clothes insufficient to support finding of probable cause); Junior v. United States, 634 A.2d 411, 420 (D.C.1993) (description of older black male, gray and black facial hair, and detailed clothing description, insufficient to support probable cause); Bryant v. United States, 599 A.2d 1107, 1112 (D.C.1991) (description of black male wearing brown suede-like jacket and gray khaki pants too general to support Terry stop); Cauthen v. United States, 592 A.2d 1021, 1023-24 (D.C

1997While a description applicable to large numbers of people will not suffice to *1129 justify the seizure of an individual, see Brown, supra, 590 A.2d at 1017 , other circumstances can provide sufficient particularity. 3 Because we examine the totality of the circumstances and require far less than certainty, we have routinely held that an imperfect description, coupled with close spatial and temporal proximity between the reported crime and seizure, justifies a Terry stop.

2024See, e.g., id. (“Officers may handcuff a suspect during a Terry stop if ‘some specific fact or circumstance . . . support[s] a reasonable belief that the use of handcuffs [i]s necessary.’” (quoting Katz, 285 A.3d at 1303) (alterations in Brown)); id. (handcuffing during a Terry stop permissible when an individual is “suspected of a violent armed offense and there is reason to believe they are presently armed”); Pridgen v. United States, 134 A.3d 297, 301 (D.C. 2016) (stop-and-frisk “may entail the use of handcuffs to restrain the suspect”); White v. United States, 68 A.3d 271, 283 (D.C. 2013)

2024If the circumstances make it reasonable to do so, officers during a Terry stop may also (1) use physical force to seize the individual (as Sergeant Jaquez did in this case), id. at 28 ; (2) conduct a limited search, i.e., a frisk, of the individual’s person for weapons, id. at 25-26, 29 ; and (3) place the individual in handcuffs, Womack v. United States, 673 A.2d 603, 608-10 (D.C. 1996).

2025Cf. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (explaining that officers need not prove criminal conduct by a preponderance of the evidence to conduct a Terry stop).

2024Similarly overlooking Sergeant Jaquez’s dive-tackle-grab, the government argued that under the Supreme Court’s decision in Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 , Mr. Mayo’s “unprovoked flight” in a “[h]igh crime area,” as well as his “messing with [his] waistband,” gave the GRU officers in the second car ample basis to conduct a Terry stop.

2025This court, however, has held that “[t]he fact 9 A Terry stop “involves a . . . temporary detention, designed to last only until a preliminary investigation either generates probable cause or results in the release of the suspect.” In re M.E.B., 638 A.2d 1123 , 1126 (D.C. 1993); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 14 that an encounter may be a reasonable seizure within the scope of Terry for Fourth Amendment purposes does not automatically and necessarily remove it from Miranda’s Fifth Amendment protections.” Morton, 125 A.3d at 688 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).

2024The two most common justifications for handcuffing a suspect in the midst of a Terry stop are (1) that they pose “an objective safety concern,” or (2) that there is some “objective reason to believe” the suspect poses a distinct “flight risk.” Id. at 1306; see also In re M.E.B., 638 A.2d 1123 , 1128 (D.C. 1993) (“[C]ourts have generally upheld the use of 12 handcuffs in the context of a Terry stop where it was reasonably necessary to protect the officers’ safety or to thwart a suspect’s attempt to flee.”).

2015This court offered the same reasoning in In re I.J.: "What otherwise would be a permissible Terry stop should be deemed an arrést, necessitating Miranda warnings, when the suspect is 'confronted with the obvious evidence of guilt.’ ■ Because Miranda’s focus is on the perceptions of the reasonable person, it is necessary to recognize that a suspect would reasonably believe that the police intend .to arrest him because the police have evidence against him.” In re I.J., 906 A.2d at 261 (quoting Miley, 477 A.2d at 722 (other citations omitted)). .

2006Thus, this court has held that what otherwise would be a permissible Terry stop should be deemed an arrest, necessitating Miranda warnings, when the suspect is "confronted with the obvious evidence of guilt." Id.

2025One exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement is that “the police may briefly detain a person for an investigatory or Terry stop, even if they lack probable cause, if the officers have a reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts that the person has just committed a crime.” Bennett v. United States, 26 A.3d 745, 751 (D.C. 2011) (quotation and citation omitted); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

2025“Seizures based on guilt by association run afoul of the bedrock Fourth Amendment requirement of particularized suspicion to conduct a Terry stop.” Bennett v. United States, 26 A.3d 745, 751 (D.C. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2009“Where there is a challenge to an improper Terry stop, the threshold question is whether [and when] a seizure ... occurred.” See Jackson, supra, 805 A.2d at 983 ; United States v. Barnes, 496 A.2d 1040, 1042 (D.C.1985).

1996Compare Powell, supra, 649 A.2d at 1084-85 (reversing conviction where officer had testified only that one fact relied on in effecting Terry stop was the suspect’s turn into an alley, but trial court went further and characterized turn as “unusual”) with Barnes, supra, 496 A.2d at 1041 (validating Terry frisk where officer had factual reason to believe that suspect might be armed).

2007The Supreme Court has stated, however, that "reasonable suspicion [justifying a Terry stop] can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. at 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 .

2007The Supreme Court has stated, however, that "reasonable suspicion [justifying a Terry stop] can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. at 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 .

1991In determining whether a Terry stop is lawful, the court must look to the "totality of the circumstances." Alabama v. White, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990), quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S.Ct. 690, 694 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). [4] Even if each specific act by a suspect could be perceived in isolation as an innocent act, "the observing police officer may see a combination of facts that make out an articulable suspicion." United States v. Bennett, 514 A.2d 414, 416 (D.C.1986).

1991In determining whether a Terry stop is lawful, the court must look to the “totality of the circumstances.” Alabama v. White, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990), quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S.Ct. 690, 694 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). 4 Even if each specific act by a suspect could be perceived in isolation as an innocent act, “the observing police officer may see a combination of facts that make out an articulable suspicion.” United States v. Bennett, 514 A.2d 414, 416 (D.C.1986).

2024Assessing whether law enforcement officers had the requisite reasonable articulable suspicion to justify a Terry stop, however, also requires some balancing by judges of the “weighty social objective,” Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979), of “effective crime prevention and detection” against the Fourth Amendment’s protection of the “sanctity of the individual,” Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 26 . 25 To determine if a Terry stop was supported by reasonable articulable suspicion, a court must examine whether the totality of “the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure . . . ‘warra

2010To justify a Terry stop, “the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Id. at 274, 122 S.Ct. 744 ; see also Umanzor v. United States, 803 A.2d 983, 992 (D.C.2002).

2021Cf. Jackson v. United States, 805 A.2d 979 , 985–86 (D.C. 2002) (“A consensual police encounter may progress to a Terry stop.

2016“Various factors are considered in determining whether a Terry stop is justified, *170 including ‘the time of day, flight, the high crime nature of the location, furtive hand movements, an informant’s tip, a. person’s reaction to questioning, a report of criminal activity or gunshots, and viewing of an object or bulge indicating a weapon.’” Jackson, 805 A.2d at 988 -89 (quoting Anderson v. United States, 658 A.2d 1036, 1038 (D.C.1995)).

2016“Various factors are considered in determining whether a Terry stop is justified, *170 including ‘the time of day, flight, the high crime nature of the location, furtive hand movements, an informant’s tip, a. person’s reaction to questioning, a report of criminal activity or gunshots, and viewing of an object or bulge indicating a weapon.’” Jackson, 805 A.2d at 988 -89 (quoting Anderson v. United States, 658 A.2d 1036, 1038 (D.C.1995)).

2010“Various factors are considered in determining whether a Terry stop is justified, including ‘the time of day, flight, the high crime nature of the location, furtive hand movements, an informant’s tip, a person’s reaction to questioning, a report of criminal activity or gunshots, and viewing of an object or bulge indicating a weapon.” Id. at 989. (quoting Anderson v. United States, 658 A.2d 1036, 1038 (D.C.1995)).

2024Compare Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 682-88 (upholding Terry stop lasting twenty minutes), and McIlwain v. United States, 568 A.2d 470, 473 (D.C. 1989) (upholding Terry stop lasting thirty minutes), with United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709-10 (1983) (holding that, under circumstances, Terry stop lasting ninety minutes was unreasonably long).

2006See Resper, 793 A.2d at 454 (holding there was only a Terry stop, but no custody, even though the suspect was frisked and driven to the police station in the back of a police vehicle, because the suspect was advised he was not under arrest and went with police voluntarily); McIlwain, 568 A.2d at 472-73 (holding that suspect was not in custody, even though confined to his room by police, where he was told that he was not under arrest and did not have to speak with the police).

2022When an officer conducting a Terry stop “has reason to believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous, he may conduct a weapons search limited in scope to this protective purpose.” Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 ). 13 Appellant was armed and dangerous when the officers first encountered him.

2018In support of this holding, the Court cited precedent recognizing that "the fact that the stop occurred in a 'high crime area' [is] among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis," id. (citing Adams v. Williams , 407 U.S. 143 , 144, 147-48, 92 S.Ct. 1921 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) ), and the Court further reasoned that "[h]eadlong flight," which it called "the consummate act of evasion," is "not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing" but is "certainly suggestive of such," id.

2025It is undisputed that the initial seizure of D.W. was an investigative detention (also called a Terry stop) and therefore was lawful if the police had “a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). 8 The general framework for determining whether the police had reasonable, articulable suspicion is well settled.

2024It is undisputed in this case that the initial seizure of Mr. Mayo was an investigative detention (also called a Terry stop) and therefore was lawful if Sergeant Jaquez had “a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).

1996Compare Hensley, supra, 469 U.S. at 229, 234-36 , 105 S.Ct. at 680-81, 683-84 (affirming conviction where suspect had been admittedly wanted for questioning for some time, and was fortuitously spotted driving through town with another known felon; court explicitly relied on the police’s prior inability to locate the suspect) with Davis, supra, 394 U.S. at 727-28 , 89 S.Ct. at 1398 (reversing conviction where police effected an alleged Terry stop of suspect to obtain fingerprint samples, which constituted a procedure that “need not come unexpectedly or at an inconvenient time”); see also Hensle

1996Compare Hensley, supra, 469 U.S. at 229, 234-36 , 105 S.Ct. at 680-81, 683-84 (affirming conviction where suspect had been admittedly wanted for questioning for some time, and was fortuitously spotted driving through town with another known felon; court explicitly relied on the police’s prior inability to locate the suspect) with Davis, supra, 394 U.S. at 727-28 , 89 S.Ct. at 1398 (reversing conviction where police effected an alleged Terry stop of suspect to obtain fingerprint samples, which constituted a procedure that “need not come unexpectedly or at an inconvenient time”); see also Hensle

2025Mayo, 315 A.3d at 637. 12 To have reasonable suspicion, officers “need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” Mitchell v. United States, 314 A.3d 1144 , 1151 (D.C. 2024) (quotation and citation omitted). “[T]he police need not rule out every innocent explanation for suspicious behavior in order to justify an investigatory stop.” Pridgen v. United States, 134 A.3d 297 , 304 n.20 (D.C. 2016) (quotation and citation omitted). “[I]nnocent individual acts or circumstances do not rule out a finding of reasonable suspicion,” and “the Terry standard does not require that an officer rule ou

2025Mayo, 315 A.3d at 637. 12 To have reasonable suspicion, officers “need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” Mitchell v. United States, 314 A.3d 1144 , 1151 (D.C. 2024) (quotation and citation omitted). “[T]he police need not rule out every innocent explanation for suspicious behavior in order to justify an investigatory stop.” Pridgen v. United States, 134 A.3d 297 , 304 n.20 (D.C. 2016) (quotation and citation omitted). “[I]nnocent individual acts or circumstances do not rule out a finding of reasonable suspicion,” and “the Terry standard does not require that an officer rule ou

2018Rather, for a tip to justify a Terry stop, there must be corroborating circumstances that show that the "tip [is] reliable in its assertion of illegality." Id. 10 This means that when, as in the present case, the police receive an anonymous tip alleging a subject's possession or use of a firearm, the police must typically "see[ ] something that confirm[s] the presence of a gun"-which is to say, something that corroborates the tip that there was a gun-before stopping the subject.

2000On the one hand, an anonymous telephone tip is ordinarily insufficient to establish probable cause for an arrest, Sanders v. United States, 751 A.2d 952, 953-56 (D.C.2000); or even reasonable articulable suspicion warranting a “Terry stop.” See, e.g., Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 ,---, 120 S.Ct. *670 1375, 1378-80, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000). 7 Moreover, confirmation by the police of innocent information provided by the tipster is insufficient to support a Terry seizure, for “[t]he reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its t

2024Assessing whether law enforcement officers had the requisite reasonable articulable suspicion to justify a Terry stop, however, also requires some balancing by judges of the “weighty social objective,” Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979), of “effective crime prevention and detection” against the Fourth Amendment’s protection of the “sanctity of the individual,” Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 26 . 25 To determine if a Terry stop was supported by reasonable articulable suspicion, a court must examine whether the totality of “the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure . . . ‘warra

2007As the court said: “[Ojfficers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation!;] • • • • [T]he fact that the stop occurred in a ‘high crime area’ [is] among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis.” Id. (citation omitted).