equal protection clause in Florida

2017See, e.g., Duncan v. Moore, 754 So. 2d 708, 712 (Fla. 2000).

2017See, e.g., Duncan v. Moore, 754 So.2d 708, 712 (Fla. 2000).

2003As the First District stated in Keys Title, "[i]t would be proper to sustain an equal protection challenge to a statute only if `the Legislature could not have had any reasonable ground for believing that there were public considerations justifying the particular classification and distinction made.'" 741 So.2d at 602 (quoting North Ridge General Hosp. v. City of Oakland Park, 374 So.2d 461, 465 (Fla.1979)).

2003Corp., 605 So.2d 62, 69 (Fla.1992) (holding that an equal protection challenge must be rejected if there is a "plausible reason for the classification"); Lewis v. Mathis, 345 So.2d 1066 (Fla.1977); Keys Title, 741 So.2d at 602 (citing North Ridge General Hosp. v. City of Oakland Park, 374 So.2d 461 (Fla. 1979)).

2003Corp., 605 So.2d 62, 69 (Fla.1992) (holding that an equal protection challenge must be rejected if there is a "plausible reason for the classification"); Lewis v. Mathis, 345 So.2d 1066 (Fla.1977); Keys Title, 741 So.2d at 602 (citing North Ridge General Hosp. v. City of Oakland Park, 374 So.2d 461 (Fla. 1979)).

2001As the Florida Supreme Court explained, a statute meets the rational relationship test if "any state of facts can reasonably be conceived that will sustain the classification attempted by the Legislature." See North Ridge General Hospital v. City of Oakland Park, 374 So.2d 461, 464 (Fla.1979), citing Lewis v. Mathis, 345 So.2d 1066, 1068 (Fla.1977); see also Gallagher v. Motors Insurance Corporation, 605 So.2d 62, 69 (Fla.1992) (holding that an equal protection challenge must be rejected if there is a "plausible reason" for the classification).

2023Dist. v. Kalitan, 219 So. 3d 49, 56 (Fla. 2017) (extending the reasoning in McCall to find the statutory caps applicable in personal injury cases were also unconstitutional as violative of the equal protection clause as they did “not bear a rational relationship to the Legislature’s stated interest in addressing the medical malpractice crisis.” (emphasis added)); Est. of McCall v. U.S., 134 So. 3d 894 (Fla. 2014) (disregarding the stated factual findings of the legislature in ruling the statutory cap on wrongful death noneconomic damages recoverable in a medical malpractice action violated the

2017“Unless a suspect class or fundamental right protected by the Florida Constitution is implicated by the challenged provision, the rational basis test will apply to evaluate an equal protection challenge.” McCall, 134 So. 3d at 901 .

1998As the Florida Supreme Court explained in In re Greenberg's Estate, 390 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1980), it is not necessary under the equal protection clause to treat all persons in an identical manner.

1984Rather, the statutory classification to be held unconstitutionally violative of the equal protection clause under this test must cause different treatments so disparate as relates to the difference in classification so as to be wholly arbitrary. 390 So.2d at 42 .

2006See Soverino v. State, 356 So.2d 269, 271-72 (Fla.1978) (upholding section 784.07, Florida Statutes (Supp.1976), against an equal-protection challenge, in part because the Legislature's decision to grant greater protection to public officials performing indispensable public services "fosters the public safety and welfare").

1997It follows then that to demonstrate a violation of the equal protection clause, a party must show that the statutory classification bears no rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. 434 So.2d at 308 ; see also Soverino v. State, 356 So.2d 269, 271-72 (Fla.1978) (test is whether classification rests on some difference bearing reasonable and just relation to the object of the legislation).

1997It follows then that to demonstrate a violation of the equal protection clause, a party must show that the statutory classification bears no rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. 434 So.2d at 308 ; see also Soverino v. State, 356 So.2d 269, 271-72 (Fla.1978) (test is whether classification rests on some difference bearing reasonable and just relation to the object of the legislation).

1997It follows then that to demonstrate a violation of the equal protection clause, a party must show that the statutory classification bears no rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. 434 So.2d at 308 ; see also Soverino v. State, 356 So.2d 269, 271-72 (Fla.1978) (test is whether classification rests on some difference bearing reasonable and just relation to the object of the legislation).

1982See also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 , 90 S.Ct. 1153 , 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970) (In the area of economics, a state does not violate the Equal Protection clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect.) [2] The Court in Shapiro made it clear that: We imply no view of the validity of waiting-period or residence requirements determining eligibility to vote, eligibility for tuition-free education, to obtain a license to practice a profession, to hunt or fish, and so forth.

1982See also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 , 90 S.Ct. 1153 , 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970) (In the area of economics, a state does not violate the Equal Protection clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect.) [2] The Court in Shapiro made it clear that: We imply no view of the validity of waiting-period or residence requirements determining eligibility to vote, eligibility for tuition-free education, to obtain a license to practice a profession, to hunt or fish, and so forth.

2018McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292-94 (1987) (finding a defendant who alleges an equal protection violation must prove both a discriminatory purpose and effect; he or she must present evidence specific to his own case, instead of relying on statistical evidence of disparities); Foster v. State, 614 So. 2d 455, 463 (Fla. 1992) (citing McCleskey to find the defendant could not prove that prosecutors acted with discriminatory purpose by presenting statistics that white-victim defendants were more likely to be convicted of first- degree murder; he presented no evidence of purposeful discriminati

1995The Court reiterated that "a defendant who alleges an equal protection violation has the burden of proving `the existence of purposeful discrimination' [citation omitted]"... and "that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose." Id.

2013Moreover, “[a]n essential element of an equal protection claim is that the persons claiming disparate treatment must be similarly situated to those to whom they compare themselves.” Peterson v. Minn. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 591 N.W.2d 76, 79 (Minn.Ct.App. 1999) (quotation omitted); City of Cle-burne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 , 105 S.Ct. 3249 , 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985).

2013Moreover, “[a]n essential element of an equal protection claim is that the persons claiming disparate treatment must be similarly situated to those to whom they compare themselves.” Peterson v. Minn. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 591 N.W.2d 76, 79 (Minn.Ct.App. 1999) (quotation omitted); City of Cle-burne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 , 105 S.Ct. 3249 , 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985).

2013See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 397-99 , 91 S.Ct. 668 , 28 L.Ed.2d 130 (1971).

2013See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 397-99 , 91 S.Ct. 668 , 28 L.Ed.2d 130 (1971).

2012See [Davis v.] Bandemer, 478 U.S. [109,] 118-27, 106 S.Ct. 2797 [ 92 L.Ed.2d 85 (1986) ]; In re Senate Joint Resolution 2G, 597 So.2d at 278-80.

2012See [Davis v.] Bandemer, 478 U.S. [109,] 118-27, 106 S.Ct. 2797 [ 92 L.Ed.2d 85 (1986) ]; In re Senate Joint Resolution 2G, 597 So.2d at 278-80.

2003Corp., 605 So.2d 62, 69 (Fla.1992) (holding that an equal protection challenge must be rejected if there is a "plausible reason for the classification"); Lewis v. Mathis, 345 So.2d 1066 (Fla.1977); Keys Title, 741 So.2d at 602 (citing North Ridge General Hosp. v. City of Oakland Park, 374 So.2d 461 (Fla. 1979)).

2001As the Florida Supreme Court explained, a statute meets the rational relationship test if "any state of facts can reasonably be conceived that will sustain the classification attempted by the Legislature." See North Ridge General Hospital v. City of Oakland Park, 374 So.2d 461, 464 (Fla.1979), citing Lewis v. Mathis, 345 So.2d 1066, 1068 (Fla.1977); see also Gallagher v. Motors Insurance Corporation, 605 So.2d 62, 69 (Fla.1992) (holding that an equal protection challenge must be rejected if there is a "plausible reason" for the classification).

2000See King, 557 So.2d at 902 (rejecting an equal protection challenge to Florida's rewritten HFO act, finding that the classification created by the statute had "some reasonable basis and thus does not offend the constitution simply because it may result in some degree of inequality") (citing Bell v. State, 369 So.2d 932 (Fla.1979) (reflecting that the "mere failure to prosecute all offenders is no ground for a claim of denial of equal protection")).

1990In Bell v. State, 369 So.2d 932 (Fla. 1979), the supreme court addressed an equal protection challenge to a criminal statute: In order to constitute a denial of equal protection, the selective enforcement must be deliberately based on an unjustifiable or arbitrary classification.

1977In striking down a Tennessee statute which precluded a Tennessee resident from voting because he would not have been at the time of the next election a resident for one year, the United States Supreme Court in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 92 S.Ct. 995 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972), stated: “In sum, durational residence laws must be measured by a strict equal protection test: they are unconstitutional unless the State can demonstrate that such laws are ‘necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.’ Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, [394 U.S.] at 634, [ 89 S.Ct. at 1331 , 22 L.Ed.2d at 615

1977In striking down a Tennessee statute which precluded a Tennessee resident from voting because he would not have been at the time of the next election a resident for one year, the United States Supreme Court in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 92 S.Ct. 995 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972), stated: “In sum, durational residence laws must be measured by a strict equal protection test: they are unconstitutional unless the State can demonstrate that such laws are ‘necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.’ Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, [394 U.S.] at 634, [ 89 S.Ct. at 1331 , 22 L.Ed.2d at 615

2016Since indigency in this context is a relative term rather than a classification, fitting “the problem of this ease into .an equal protection framework is a task too Procrustean to be rationally accomplished,” North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723 [ 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 ] (1969).

2016Since indigency in this context is a relative term rather than a classification, fitting “the problem of this ease into .an equal protection framework is a task too Procrustean to be rationally accomplished,” North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723 [ 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 ] (1969).

2009Daniels v. O’Connor, 243 So.2d 144, 146 (Fla.1971).

1974In Daniels v. O'Connor, 243 So.2d 144 (Fla. 1971), this Court stated that it is well settled that the equal protection clause is violated when a classification made by an act is arbitrary and unreasonable.

1984The Florida Supreme Court, in Caldwell v. Mann, 157 Fla. 633 , 26 So.2d 788 *479 (1946), applied the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution to a statute regulating the marketing of fish in certain counties.

1984The Florida Supreme Court, in Caldwell v. Mann, 157 Fla. 633 , 26 So.2d 788 *479 (1946), applied the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution to a statute regulating the marketing of fish in certain counties.

2001An equal protection challenge to a statute that does not involve a fundamental right or suspect classification is evaluated by the rational relationship test. [5] Keys Title, 741 So.2d at 602 (citing Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 , 101 S.Ct. 2376 , 69 L.Ed.2d 40 (1981)).

2001An equal protection challenge to a statute that does not involve a fundamental right or suspect classification is evaluated by the rational relationship test. [5] Keys Title, 741 So.2d at 602 (citing Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 , 101 S.Ct. 2376 , 69 L.Ed.2d 40 (1981)).

2000See Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank Lines, Inc., 432 So.2d 567, 568 (Fla.1983)(recognizing that, the equal protection clause “protects against discrimination by ‘states,’ and ‘erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful’ ’’Xquoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 , 68 S.Ct. 836 , 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948)); see also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.

2000See Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank Lines, Inc., 432 So.2d 567, 568 (Fla.1983)(recognizing that, the equal protection clause “protects against discrimination by ‘states,’ and ‘erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful’ ’’Xquoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 , 68 S.Ct. 836 , 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948)); see also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.

2000Of course, a defendant may still mount an equal protection challenge where prosecutorial discretion is alleged to have been deliberately exercised pursuant to an "unjustifiable standard." Cf. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 , 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978)(observing that, "[w]ithin the limits set by the legislature's constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, `the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation' so long as `the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as r

2000Of course, a defendant may still mount an equal protection challenge where prosecutorial discretion is alleged to have been deliberately exercised pursuant to an "unjustifiable standard." Cf. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 , 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978)(observing that, "[w]ithin the limits set by the legislature's constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, `the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation' so long as `the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as r