equal protection clause in California

2026AplicanoGuevara raises another argument: He contends “[t]he equal protection clause also requires that the accusatory pleading test consider conduct enhancements.” Citing In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 530 , and People v. Macias (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 465, 472 , AplicanoGuevara asserts, “‘[t]he first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.’” AplicanoGuevara argues, “[i]n the instant case, a defendant who is charged solely with a sub

2026(In re S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293 .) In any event, the argument lacks merit. “‘The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the California Constitution guarantee all persons the 7 Section 387 provides that an order that changes a previous order by removing a child “from the physical custody of a parent, guardian, relative, or friend and directing placement in a foster home” shall be made only after a noticed hearing on a supplemental petition. 8 Because Cristal was granted de facto parent status after removal, we only focus on the equal protect

2024(See In re Spencer S. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1323 [“appellate courts have discretion to address constitutional issues raised on appeal [citation], particularly where the issue presented is ‘a pure question of law’ turning on undisputed facts [citation] or when ‘ “important issues of public policy are at issue” ’ ”].) “ ‘The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.’ ” (Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 253 .) Abs

2024At this first step of the two-part equal protection inquiry, the reviewing court asks “not whether persons are similarly situated for all purposes, but ‘whether they are similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged.’ ” (Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 253 , quoting 16 PEOPLE v. HARDIN Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

2026“The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no state may ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.’ This provision is ‘essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.’ [Citation.] ‘At core, the requirement of equal protection ensures that the government does not treat a group of people unequally without some justification.’ ” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 847, fn. omitted; see ibid., fn. 2 [“The California Constitution also guarantees equal protection of the

2026I part ways from the majority’s reasoning, which follows a line of authority that “collapse[s] the separate Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment analyses into one.” (People v. Thompson (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1058 , 1073, review granted September 24, 2025, S292540 (Thompson); see also People v. Baldwin (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 978 , 1004 [following Thompson].) I agree with the majority’s conclusion but reach it through the equal protection analysis our Supreme Court applied in People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 (Hardin) and People v. Williams (2024) 17 Cal.5th 99 (Williams).

2025We do not address whether the two groups are similarly situated and instead consider only “whether the challenged difference in treatment is adequately justified under the applicable standard of review.” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 851.) 9 “Classifying defendants by sentencing date is not made on the basis of race, alienage, national origin, gender or legitimacy, which requires a greater level of scrutiny. [Citations.] Generally, if the classification does not involve a suspect class, legislation is presumed to be valid under the equal protection clause if the statutory classification is

2025We do not address whether the two groups are similarly situated and instead consider only “whether the challenged difference in treatment is adequately justified under the applicable standard of review.” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 851.) 9 “Classifying defendants by sentencing date is not made on the basis of race, alienage, national origin, gender or legitimacy, which requires a greater level of scrutiny. [Citations.] Generally, if the classification does not involve a suspect class, legislation is presumed to be valid under the equal protection clause if the statutory classification is

2025(See McKee, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1207 [when certain due process protections are guaranteed by statute, even if not constitutionally required, the denial of those protections to one group must be reasonably justified in order to pass muster under the equal protection clause].) 28.

2025In People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172 (McKee I) the California Supreme Court applied heightened scrutiny to an equal protection challenge to a change effected by initiative that altered the SVPA commitment term from two years to indefinite detention.

2025(Ibid.) In rejecting the equal protection challenge, Johnson overruled People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185 (Hofsheier), which found requiring mandatory registration for those convicted of nonforcible oral copulation with a minor while allowing discretionary registration for those convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor violated 29. equal protection principles.

2022(Id. at p. 876.) The defendant argued that the registration requirement violated the equal protection doctrine under the reasoning of People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185 (Hofsheier), which “interpreted the federal and state equal protection clauses as invalidating mandatory sex offender registration for a 22-year-old defendant convicted of nonforcible oral copulation with a person 16 years of age (§ 288a, subd. (b)(1)), for the reason that a same-aged defendant convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse with a same-aged minor (§ 261.5) is subject to discretionary registration.” (Johnson,

2023“The concept of equal protection recognizes that persons who are similarly situated with respect to a law’s legitimate purposes must be treated equally. [Citation.] Accordingly, ‘ “[t]he first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.” ’ [Citation.] ‘This initial inquiry is not whether persons are similarly situated for all purposes, but “whether they are similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged.” ’ ” (People v. Brown (2012)

2022General Legal Principles and Standard of Review “The concept of equal protection recognizes that persons who are similarly situated with respect to a law’s legitimate purposes must be treated equally. [Citation.] Accordingly, ‘ “[t]he first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.” ’ [Citation.] ‘This initial inquiry is not whether persons are similarly situated for all purposes, but “whether they are similarly situated for purposes of t

2025(See People v. Buffington (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1155 [“If persons are not similarly situated for purposes of the law, an equal protection claim fails at the threshold”]; accord, People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.4th 834, 851 [“threshold ‘similarly situated’ ” analysis no longer necessary to resolve equal protection challenges, but principle, as here, “that the challenged disparate treatment did not involve groups that were similarly situated for purposes of the law in question” remains valid].) In other words, where the Legislature may fairly distinguish between groups, as it did 5 We also

2025(Gerson, supra 80 Cal.App.5th at 1089.) “If persons are not similarly situated for purposes of the law, an equal protection claim fails at the threshold. [citations omitted] The question is not whether persons are similarly situated for all purposes, but ‘whether they are similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged.’ [citations omitted]” (People v. Buffington (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1155 .) In finding that the defendant was eligible for the credits the Gerson court indicated a desire to avoid elevating form over substance.

2022(Barrett, at p. 1107 [“[a] prerequisite to a meritorious claim is that individuals ‘“similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law receive like treatment”’”]; see People v. Navarro (2021) 12 Cal.5th 285 , 346; In re Lemanuel C. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 33, 38 .) “The next step of an equal protection analysis asks whether the disparate treatment of two similarly situated groups is justified by a constitutionally sufficient state interest. [Citation.] Varying levels of judicial scrutiny apply depending on the type of claim. ‘[M]ost legislation is tested only to determine if the c

2021(See People v. Floyd (2003) 31 Cal.4th 179, 188 [acknowledging that the effective date of all legislation is arbitrary but rejecting an equal protection claim on that basis].)5 In sum, Senate Bill 136 applies only to cases not final on appeal on the effective date of the enactment.

2026Molina argues that “some offenders of subdivision (a) could be older than some offenders of subdivision (c)(1).” However, this does not demonstrate an equal protection violation. “ ‘[W]hen conducting rational basis review, we must accept any gross generalizations and rough accommodations that the Legislature seems to have made.’ [Citation.] ‘A classification is not arbitrary or irrational simply because there is an “imperfect fit between means and ends” ’ [citations], or ‘because it may be “to some extent both underinclusive and overinclusive” ’ [citations].” (Johnson v. Department of Justice

2025(Johnson, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 883 .) “In light of the legitimate purposes of sex offender registration, and the plausible and actual legislative concerns …, it cannot be said that the differentiated treatment of section 261.5 and section 288a offenders ‘so lack[s] rationality’ that it constitutes ‘a constitutionally impermissible denial of equal protection.’ ” (Id. at p. 887.) In addressing an equal protection challenge to the Sexually Violent Predators Act (Welf. & Inst.

2023To establish a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause, a defendant must show “ ‘that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.’ ” (Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 253 ; In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 530 .) “[A]n equal protection claim cannot succeed, and does not require further analysis, unless there is some showing that the two groups are sufficiently similar with respect to the purpose of the law in question that some level of scrutiny is required in order to determine whether the distin

2023To establish a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause, a defendant must show “ ‘that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.’ ” (Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 253 ; In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 530 .) “[A]n equal protection claim cannot succeed, and does not require further analysis, unless there is some showing that the two groups are sufficiently similar with respect to the purpose of the law in question that some level of scrutiny is required in order to determine whether the distin

2023The equal protection clause requires the state to treat all persons similarly situated alike or, conversely, to avoid all classifications that are “ ‘arbitrary or irrational’ and those that reflect ‘ “a bare … desire to harm a politically unpopular group.” ’ ” (Legg v. Department of Justice (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 504 , 510, citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. (1985) 473 U.S. 432, 446, 447 , superseded by statute on other grounds.) Sullivan failed to provide any evidence putting into dispute the fact the restrictions stated in section 4350 applied to all patients and detainees housed

2022The U.S. Constitution provides, “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its 26 jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” (U.S. Const., 14th Amend., § 1.) Similarly, article I, section 7, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution provides: “A person may not be . . . denied equal protection of the laws . . . .” These guarantees are “essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” (See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. (1985) 473 U.S. 432, 439 .) An equal protection claim has two essential elements: “ ‘The first prerequisite to a m

2015“The state may not . . . arbitrarily accord privileges to or impose disabilities upon one class unless some rational distinction between those included in and those excluded from the class exists. ‘The concept of the equal protection of the laws compels recognition of the proposition that persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law receive like treatment.’ ” (In re Gary W. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 296, 303 [quoting Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State of California (1969) 71 Cal.2d 566, 578 ].) “The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is

1995The essence of equal protection is that “persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law receive like treatment.” (Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State of California (1969) 71 Cal.2d 566, 578 [ 79 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 456 P.2d 645 ].) “The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner. [Citation.]” (In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 530 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 317 , 601 P.2d 549 ], fn. omitted.) Under the 1990 amendment, the per

2026A. Section 231.7 “ ‘ “Both the federal and state Constitutions prohibit any advocate’s use of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors based on race.” ’ ” (People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719 , 759-760.) “ ‘ “Doing so violates both the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution and the right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16 of the California Constitution.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “Excluding by peremptory challenge even ‘a single juror on the basis of race or ethnicity is an error of c

2023Peremptory Challenges Prior to 2022 “ ‘ “Both the federal and state Constitutions prohibit any advocate’s use of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors based on race.” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “Doing so violates both the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution and the right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16 of the California Constitution.” ’ ” (People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719 , 759–760.) 19 “Before January 1, 2022, trial courts examined peremptory challenges under the three

1992(Parr v. Municipal Court (1971) 3 Cal.3d 861, 864 [ 92 Cal.Rptr. 153 , 479 P.2d 353 ]; laws that are de facto hostile to a certain group violate the equal protection clause.)” Respondent’s brief asserted but did not support the claim that “appellant has wholly failed to show that civil litigants are similarly situated to criminal defendants." Strict scrutiny is required for classifications affecting fundamental rights such as procreation (Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942) 316 U.S. 535 [ 86 L.Ed. 1655 , 62 S.Ct. 1110 ]), interstate travel (Shapiro v. Thompson (1969) 394 U.S. 618 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 600 , 89

1992(Parr v. Municipal Court (1971) 3 Cal.3d 861, 864 [ 92 Cal.Rptr. 153 , 479 P.2d 353 ]; laws that are de facto hostile to a certain group violate the equal protection clause.)” Respondent’s brief asserted but did not support the claim that “appellant has wholly failed to show that civil litigants are similarly situated to criminal defendants." Strict scrutiny is required for classifications affecting fundamental rights such as procreation (Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942) 316 U.S. 535 [ 86 L.Ed. 1655 , 62 S.Ct. 1110 ]), interstate travel (Shapiro v. Thompson (1969) 394 U.S. 618 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 600 , 89

2018I, § 1 ; People v. Buza (2018) 4 Cal.5th 658 , 689-690, 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 681 , 413 P.3d 1132 .) Such a claim may give rise to a cause of action under the California right to privacy (see Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1 , 35-40, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834 , 865 P.2d 633 ) or require a more stringent equal protection analysis (see Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584 , 597, 96 Cal.Rptr. 601 , 487 P.2d 1241 ) in a future case. 1 All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 Hereafter, we use "sample" as a shorthand for the full range of biological sampl

2018I, § 1 ; People v. Buza (2018) 4 Cal.5th 658 , 689-690, 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 681 , 413 P.3d 1132 .) Such a claim may give rise to a cause of action under the California right to privacy (see Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1 , 35-40, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834 , 865 P.2d 633 ) or require a more stringent equal protection analysis (see Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584 , 597, 96 Cal.Rptr. 601 , 487 P.2d 1241 ) in a future case. 1 All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 Hereafter, we use "sample" as a shorthand for the full range of biological sampl

2026It concerns equal protection and the Legislature’s decision to extend an ameliorative benefit to one class but not another. “[I]n contrast to a cruel and unusual punishment analysis, the equal protection inquiry asks whether there is a rational basis for the Legislature to treat certain individuals differently when prescribing the consequences under an ameliorative 2 statute . . . .” (Williams, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 133.) The rational basis test asks “whether the unequal treatment bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.” (Williams, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 124.) A challen

2026I part ways from the majority’s reasoning, which follows a line of authority that “collapse[s] the separate Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment analyses into one.” (People v. Thompson (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1058 , 1073, review granted September 24, 2025, S292540 (Thompson); see also People v. Baldwin (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 978 , 1004 [following Thompson].) I agree with the majority’s conclusion but reach it through the equal protection analysis our Supreme Court applied in People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 (Hardin) and People v. Williams (2024) 17 Cal.5th 99 (Williams).

2024The right to equal protection of the laws is violated when ‘the government . . . treat[s] a [similarly situated] group of people unequally without some justification.’ [Citations.] ‘The California equal protection clause offers substantially similar protection to the federal equal protection clause.’ ” (People v. Jackson (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 189 , 195 (Jackson).) “To succeed on an equal protection claim, [Munoz] must first show that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.” (People v. Edwards (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 183, 195

2022(Williams, at p. 493.) The court held “the threat of recidivism by violent sexual offenders—as demonstrated by the Legislature’s enactment of several comprehensive statutory schemes to curb such recidivism among such offenders—provides a rational basis for the Legislature’s decision to exclude one strikers from the reach of section 3051.” (Williams, at p. 493; but see People v. Edwards (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 183, 197 [holding carve-out for one-strike offenders unconstitutional]; In re Woods, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th pp. 753-760 [same].) 18 We follow the Wilkes decision in holding the differential

2025(Ibid.) In Hardin, our Supreme 3 In addressing Getzels’s equal protection claim, we consider decisions of the United States Supreme Court and other federal courts as persuasive authority because the equal protection provision of the California Constitution is “‘substantially the equivalent of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.’” (Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 571 .) 9 Court held that courts no longer needed to ask this threshold question when the challenged classification appears on the face of the law.

2025(Ibid.) In Hardin, our Supreme 3 In addressing Getzels’s equal protection claim, we consider decisions of the United States Supreme Court and other federal courts as persuasive authority because the equal protection provision of the California Constitution is “‘substantially the equivalent of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.’” (Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 571 .) 9 Court held that courts no longer needed to ask this threshold question when the challenged classification appears on the face of the law.

2025(See also Williams v. Illinois (1970) 399 U.S. 235, 241-242 [invalidating on equal protection grounds a facially neutral statute that authorized imprisonment for an indigent’s failure to pay fines]; Griffin v. Illinois (1956) 351 U.S. 12, 19 [finding a state’s failure to provide indigent defendants in a criminal case with a trial transcript at public expense so that they could obtain adequate appellate 12 review violated the equal protection clause].) In In re Antazo, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pages 108 through 116, the California Supreme Court held that an indigent defendant could not be imprisoned

2021(In re Antazo, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 116 .) Accordingly, an equal protection violation did not occur, and we reject appellant’s constitutional challenges.

2009(Grodin et al., The California State Constitution: A Reference Guide (1993) p. 47.) Former section 11 of article I of the original 1849 Constitution stated, “All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation” and section 21 of article I of the 1879 Constitution added, “nor shall any citizen, or class of citizens, be granted privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not be granted to all citizens.” These provisions were “substantially the equivalent of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” (Department of Mental Hyg

2009(Grodin et al., The California State Constitution: A Reference Guide (1993) p. 47.) Former section 11 of article I of the original 1849 Constitution stated, “All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation” and section 21 of article I of the 1879 Constitution added, “nor shall any citizen, or class of citizens, be granted privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not be granted to all citizens.” These provisions were “substantially the equivalent of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” (Department of Mental Hyg

2013The equal protection clause simply requires that, ‘in defining a class subject to legislation, the distinctions that are drawn have “some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made.”’ [Citation.] Absolute equality is not required; the Constitution permits lines to be drawn. [Citation.] The distinction drawn by section 1109 between domestic violence offenses and all other offenses is clearly relevant to the evidentiary purposes for which this distinction is made.” (Id. at p. 1311, citing Estelle v. Dorrough (1975) 420 U.S. 534 , 538-539 and Douglas v. California (1963) 372 U.

1996Destitute defendants must be afforded as adequate" and effective "appellate review as defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts." ( Id. at p. 19 [100 L.Ed. at p. 899] (plur. opn. by Black, J.).) Concurring in the judgment, Justice Frankfurter rested solely on the equal protection clause. ( Id. at pp. 20-26 [100 L.Ed. at pp. 900-903] (cone. opn. of Frankfurter, J.).) In Douglas v. California (1963) 372 U.S. 353 [ 9 L.Ed.2d 811 , 83 S.Ct. 814 ] (hereafter sometimes Douglas ), the court passed on the following rule of state criminal appellate procedure, which had been announced in Peopl

2025The equal protection clause is violated when “the government . . . treat[s] a [similarly situated] group of people unequally without some justification.” (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 288 .) “The degree of required justification depends on the classification at issue.

2025(People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 880, fn. 14 ; People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 854 ; People v. Gray (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 148 , 168.) A reviewing court may exercise its discretion to reach the merits of an equal protection claim based on a facial challenge that was not raised below, because unlike as-applied constitutional claims, facial challenges involve pure questions of law that are not “correctable only by examining factual findings in the record or remanding to the trial court for further findings.” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887 .) Section 3051, subdivis

2026They 5 guarantee that persons similarly situated shall be treated equally under the law.” (People v. Alvarez (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1114 , fns. omitted.) “ ‘ “The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.” [Citations.] This initial inquiry is not whether persons are similarly situated for all purposes, but “whether they are similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged.” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Morales (2016) 63 Cal.

2025It is not necessary to go to the second prong.” Washington and Magana timely appealed. 16 DISCUSSION In both Washington and Magana II, we applied the equal protection framework set forth by the Supreme Court in People v. Morales (2016) 63 Cal.4th 399 , 408 and McKee I, supra, 47 Cal.4th at page 1202 .