equal protection clause in New Hampshire

2012This article “is basically an equal protection clause in that it implies that all litigants similarly situated may appeal to the courts both for relief and for defense under like conditions and with like protection and without discrimination.” State v. Basinow, 117 N.H. 176, 177 (1977) (quotation omitted).

2004We have observed that Part I, Article 14 of our State Constitution “is basically an equal protection clause in that it implies that all litigants similarly situated may appeal to the courts both for relief and for defense under like conditions and with like protection and without discrimination.” State v. Basinow, 117 N.H. 176, 177 (1977) (quotations omitted).

2001“The first question in an equal protection analysis is whether the State action in question treats similarly situated persons differently.” LeClair v. LeClair, 137 N.H. 213, 222 , 624 A.2d 1350, 1355 (1993) (quotation omitted).

2001“The first question in an equal protection analysis is whether the State action in question treats similarly situated persons differently.” LeClair v. LeClair, 137 N.H. 213, 222 , 624 A.2d 1350, 1355 (1993) (quotation omitted).

2011“Where a classification realistically reflects the fact that the two groups are not similarly situated in certain circumstances, and the legislation’s differing treatment of the groups is sufficiently related to a government interest, it will survive an equal protection challenge.” Sandra H., 150 N.H. at 638 (quotations, brackets and citation omitted).

2011“Where a classification realistically reflects the fact that the two groups are not similarly situated in certain circumstances, and the legislation’s differing treatment of the groups is sufficiently related to a government interest, it will survive an equal protection challenge.” Id. (quotations, brackets and citation omitted).

2011The plaintiff argues that RSA 507:7-e, I, “causes [injured workers] ... to be treated differently from other injury victims.” Relying upon an equal protection test that we have overruled, see Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 932 (1980), overruled by Cmty. Res. for Justice v. City of Manchester, 154 N.H. 748 (2007), the plaintiff articulates an equal protection argument that is nearly identical to his third constitutional argument, which he raises under Part I, Article 14 of the State Constitution.

1986Although the defendant appears to assume that the equal protection claim must be judged under the so-called middle tier test of Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 932 , 424 A.2d 825, 830-31 (1980) (reasonable, not arbitrary, having fair and substantial relation to legislative object), we agree with the county that the rational basis test is the appropriate one to apply in assessing both the State and the federal claim.

1979The equal protection clause mandates that "those who are similarly situated be similarly treated." Belkner v. Preston, 115 N.H. 15, 17 , 332 A.2d 168, 170 (1975); U.S. CONST. amend.

1979The equal protection clause mandates that "those who are similarly situated be similarly treated." Belkner v. Preston, 115 N.H. 15, 17 , 332 A.2d 168, 170 (1975); U.S. CONST. amend.

2004On occasion, our past decisions have articulated an equal protection test where the “first inquiry concerning equal protection is whether persons similarly situated are being treated differently under the statutory law.” Gazzola v. Clements, 120 N.H. 25, 29 (1980).

2002We follow our holding in Gazzola v. Clements, 120 N.H. 25, 29 (1980), that “persons whose land is about to be taken by the State are ‘similarly situated.’” We now turn to the second question in the equal protection analysis, which is “whether the classification created by the statute is justifiable.

2004“In considering an equal protection challenge under our State Constitution, we must first determine the appropriate standard of review by examining the purpose and scope of the State-created classification and the individual rights affected.” Estate of Robitaille, 149 N.H. at 596 ; see Boehner v. State, 122 N.H. 79, 83-84 (1982).

1993In considering an equal protection challenge under our State Constitution, “we must first determine the appropriate standard of review: strict scrutiny; fair and substantial relationship; or rational basis.” Boehner v. State, 122 N.H. 79, 83 , 441 A.2d 1146, 1148 (1982).

2000“The first question in an equal protection analysis is whether the State action in question treats similarly situated persons differently.” Appeal of Marmac, 130 N.H. 53, 58 , 534 A.2d 710, 713 (1987).

2000“The first question in an equal protection analysis is whether the State action in question treats similarly situated persons differently.” Appeal of Marmac, 130 N.H. 53, 58 , 534 A.2d 710, 713 (1987).

2023“In considering an equal protection challenge under our State Constitution, we must first determine the correct standard of review by examining the purpose and scope of the State-created classification and the individual rights affected.” Cmty. Res. for Justice v. City of Manchester, 154 N.H. 748, 758 (2007) (quotation and brackets omitted).

2021Nonetheless, we determined that both the plurality opinion and the dissenting opinion in Crawford embraced “a test comparable to intermediate scrutiny” and that we, likewise, “believe that the flexible standard that we adopted in Akins includes a test that is similar to intermediate scrutiny.” Id.3; see Cmty. Res. for Justice v. City of Manchester, 154 N.H. 748 , 3 As Justice Stevens observed in Crawford, in neither Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279 (1992), nor Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992), did the Supreme Court identify any litmus test for 13 762 (2007) (in the context of an equal prote

1990SOUTER, J., dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the court’s conclusion that RSA 507-B:2,1, violates articles 2,12 and 14 of part I of the Constitution of New Hampshire insofar as it would provide municipal immunity for liability arising out of ownership, occupation, and maintenance of “public sidewalks, streets [and] highways. . . .” In explaining why, I will confine my thoughts to what I see as a mis application of the accepted middle-tier equal protection standard and say nothing more about article 14, given this court’s view that the article mirrors the equal protection standard for scr

1990SOUTER, J., dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the court’s conclusion that RSA 507-B:2,1, violates articles 2,12 and 14 of part I of the Constitution of New Hampshire insofar as it would provide municipal immunity for liability arising out of ownership, occupation, and maintenance of “public sidewalks, streets [and] highways. . . .” In explaining why, I will confine my thoughts to what I see as a mis application of the accepted middle-tier equal protection standard and say nothing more about article 14, given this court’s view that the article mirrors the equal protection standard for scr

2001“The first question in an equal protection analysis is whether the State action in question treats similarly situated persons differently.” Abbott, 139 N.H. at 417 (quotation omitted).

2001“Legislation merely regulating economic benefits and burdens, with no other significant feature, is reviewable under the rational basis criterion when challenged under the equal protection clause.” Petition of Abbott, 139 N.H. 412, 418 (1995) (quotation and brackets omitted).

1991The doctrine of equal protection demands that “all persons similarly situated should be treated alike,” Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985), and therefore “[t]he first question in an equal protection analysis is whether the State action in question treats similarly situated persons differently.” Appeal of Marmac, 130 N.H. 53, 58 , 534 A.2d 710, 713 (1987).

1989Therefore, our only inquiry under the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution is whether the statute is “rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” Cleburne, supra at 440 ; see Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362 (1970).

2024Lennartz v. Oak Point Assocs., 167 N.H. 459, 462 (2015); see also Huckins v. McSweeney, 166 N.H. 176, 181 (2014) (asserting that Part I, Article 14 “is basically an equal protection clause in that it implies that all litigants similarly situated may appeal to the courts both for relief and for defense under like conditions and with like protection and without discrimination” (quotation omitted)).

2020Part I, Article 14 “is basically an equal protection clause in that it implies that all litigants similarly situated may appeal to the courts both for relief and for defense under like conditions and with like protection and without discrimination.” Id. at 181 (quotation omitted).

2023The ZBA and the BOC contend that the plaintiffs “are not challenging any classification inherent in the ordinance itself (none exists), but rather are still advancing a selective enforcement argument.” We agree with their characterization of the plaintiffs’ argument. “[A]n equal protection challenge to an ordinance is an assertion that the government impermissibly established classifications and, therefore, treated similarly situated individuals in a different manner.” Taylor v. Town of Plaistow, 152 N.H. 142, 146 (2005) (quotation omitted).

2013“An equal protection challenge to an ordinance is an assertion that the government impermissibly established classifications and, therefore, treated similarly situated individuals in a different manner.” Taylor v. Town of Plaistow, 152 N.H. 142, 146 (2005) (brackets omitted).

2021Nonetheless, we determined that both the plurality opinion and the dissenting opinion in Crawford embraced “a test comparable to intermediate scrutiny” and that we, likewise, “believe that the flexible standard that we adopted in Akins includes a test that is similar to intermediate scrutiny.” Id.3; see Cmty. Res. for Justice v. City of Manchester, 154 N.H. 748 , 3 As Justice Stevens observed in Crawford, in neither Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279 (1992), nor Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992), did the Supreme Court identify any litmus test for 13 762 (2007) (in the context of an equal prote

2018Pursuant to that balancing test, determining whether HB 1264 unconstitutionally infringes upon a complaining party's equal right to vote requires weighing "the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights that [a complaining party] seeks to vindicate against the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule, taking into consideration the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the [complaining party's] rights." Akins , 154 N.H. at 72 , 904 A.2d 702 (quotation and ellipsis omitted); see Burdick v. Takushi , 50

2014We conclude that FairPoint’s equal protection claim, like the one analyzed in Rochester III, is one of “selective enforcement,” and not an equal protection challenge to the tax scheme itself for “impermissibly establishing] classifications and, therefore, treating] similarly situated individuals in a different manner.” State v. Hofland, 151 N.H. 322, 325, 326 (2004) (quotations omitted).

2014See Rochester III, 156 N.H. at 630-31 ; see also Hofland, 151 N.H. at 325-26 (noting selective enforcement and classification as alternative means of establishing equal protection violation). *657 “The equal protection clause protects an entity from state action which selects it out for discriminatory treatment by subjecting it to taxes not imposed on others of the same class.” Rochester III, 156 N.H. at 630 (quotation and brackets omitted). “[T]o determine whether [FairPoint’s] right to equal protection is being violated, we must apply the rational basis test.” Id. (quotation omitted).

2014See Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal v. Webster County, 488 U.S. 336, 345-46 (1989) (“The equal protection clause protects the individual from state action which selects him out for discriminatory treatment by subjecting him to taxes not imposed on others of the same class.

2007“The equal protection clause protects [an entity] from state action which selects [it] out for discriminatory treatment by subjecting [it] to taxes not imposed on others of the same class.” Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm’n of Webster Cty., 488 U.S. 336, 345 (1989) (quotation and citation omitted).

1993“If the persons are not similarly situated, ... no equal protection problem is involved.” Locke v. Ladd, 119 N.H. 136, 138 , 399 A.2d 962, 963 (1979).

1993“If the persons are not similarly situated, ... no equal protection problem is involved.” Locke v. Ladd, 119 N.H. 136, 138 , 399 A.2d 962, 963 (1979).

1979Richardson v. Brunelle, 119 N.H. 104, 107 , 398 A.2d 838, 840-41 (1979); see Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).

1979Richardson v. Brunelle, 119 N.H. 104, 107 , 398 A.2d 838, 840-41 (1979); see Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). [14] The plaintiffs have alleged that the $50,000 limitation on recovery violates due process because it is harsh and unreasonable compared to their alleged damages of $3,070,000 and $5,000,000.

2024Lennartz v. Oak Point Assocs., 167 N.H. 459, 462 (2015); see also Huckins v. McSweeney, 166 N.H. 176, 181 (2014) (asserting that Part I, Article 14 “is basically an equal protection clause in that it implies that all litigants similarly situated may appeal to the courts both for relief and for defense under like conditions and with like protection and without discrimination” (quotation omitted)).

2024Id.

2020Additionally, in Merrill, we observed that private property ownership rights are fundamental rights under the New Hampshire Constitution, and, therefore, we held that “any party aggrieved by the governing body’s findings with respect to blight, necessity, and public purpose is entitled to a de novo trial before the superior court.” Merrill, 124 N.H. at 14-15 (explaining that it would violate the equal protection clause of the State Constitution to provide fewer procedural safeguards to landowners whose property is to be taken for municipal redevelopment use, as opposed to highway use).

1988The plaintiff bases her claim of right to a pre-decision hearing on Merrill v. City of Manchester, 124 N.H. 8 , 466 A.2d 923 (1983) and Gazzola v. Clements, 120 N.H. 25 , 411 A.2d 147 (1980), each of which rested on an equal protection analysis that the plaintiff has failed to develop in this case.

2018In light of our holding in Gould v. Concord Hospital , 126 N.H. 405 , 493 A.2d 1193 (1985), that "the classification created by RSA 556:11 violated the equal protection clause of the New Hampshire Constitution," we did not apply the statute as written.

2018In light of our holding in Gould v. Concord Hospital , 126 N.H. 405 , 493 A.2d 1193 (1985), that "the classification created by RSA 556:11 violated the equal protection clause of the New Hampshire Constitution," we did not apply the statute as written.

2013State v. Hofland, 151 N.H. 322, 325 (2004) (quotation omitted); see Anderson v. Motorsports Holdings, 155 N.H. 491, 499 (2007); Bacon v. Town of Enfield, 150 N.H. 468, 473-74 (2004); Pope v. Little Boar’s Head Dist., 145 N.H. 531, 535 (2000); Alexander v. Town of Hampstead, 129 N.H. 278, 283 (1987); State v. Monahan, 125 N.H. 17, 26 (1984); State v. Pinsince, 105 N.H. 38, 41 (1963).

2007In addition, it “must assert and demonstrate that the Town impermissibly established classifications and, therefore, treated similarly situated individuals in a different manner in order to set forth an equal protection claim.” Id. (brackets and quotations omitted).

2006Instead it is an "economic and social" regulation that will withstand an equal protection challenge if the classification is "reasonable, not arbitrary . . . and bears a rational relationship to a permissible state objective." Village of Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 8 , 94 S.Ct. 1536 (quotations and brackets omitted).

2006Instead it is an "economic and social" regulation that will withstand an equal protection challenge if the classification is "reasonable, not arbitrary . . . and bears a rational relationship to a permissible state objective." Village of Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 8 , 94 S.Ct. 1536 (quotations and brackets omitted).

2001Therefore, the “first question in an equal protection analysis is whether the State action in question treats similarly situated persons differently.” Id. (quotation omitted).

1992See State v. LaPorte, 134 N.H. 73, 76-78 , 587 A.2d 1237, 1239-40 (1991) (examining statute under rational relation review and making no distinction between State and Federal Constitutions).

1988See Boehner v. State, 122 N.H. 79, 83-84 , 441 A.2d 1146, 1148 (1982) (quoting Opinion of the Justices, 117 N.H. 749, 758 , 379 A.2d 782, 788 (1977)); see also Cleburne v. Cleburne Learning Center, Inc., 473 U.S. at 440 (rational basis test applied to review “social or economic legislation” on fourteenth amendment equal protection review).

1988See Boehner v. State, 122 N.H. 79, 83-84 , 441 A.2d 1146, 1148 (1982) (quoting Opinion of the Justices, 117 N.H. 749, 758 , 379 A.2d 782, 788 (1977)); see also Cleburne v. Cleburne Learning Center, Inc., 473 U.S. at 440 (rational basis test applied to review “social or economic legislation” on fourteenth amendment equal protection review).

2024See Avery, 173 N.H. at 736-37; see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 205-06 (1962) (noting that voters have standing to bring equal protection challenges to complain of vote dilution and observing that “[m]any of the cases have assumed rather than articulated the premise in deciding the merits of similar claims”).