equal protection clause in Missouri

1999See, e.g., Mahoney v. Doerhoff Surgical Services, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 503 (Mo. banc 1991); Missourians for Tax Justice v. Holden, 959 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Mo. banc 1997).

1999See, e.g., Mahoney v. Doerhoff Surgical Services, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 503 (Mo. banc 1991); Missourians for Tax Justice v. Holden, 959 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Mo. banc 1997).

2000In Tyler v. Mitchell, 853 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Mo.App.1993), this court found that it was “not enough under the equal protection clause for a claimant to assert that he has been deprived of a benefit granted to others.” Quoting J.

1996As this court said in Tyler v. Mitchell, 853 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Mo.App.1993): It is not enough under the equal protection clause for a claimant to assert that he has been deprived of a benefit granted to others....

2009The United States Supreme Court held in Batson that the equal protection clause guarantees a defendant that venirepersons will not be excluded from the jury venire on account of race. 476 U.S. at 86, 106 S.Ct. 1712 .

2009The United States Supreme Court held in Batson that the equal protection clause guarantees a defendant that venire-persons will not be excluded from the jury venire on account of race. 476 U.S. at 86, 106 S.Ct. 1712 .

2015Cf. Parker, 836 S.W.2d at 940 ("[t]he removal of even one African-American person from the venire for racial reasons constitutes a violation of the equal protection clause regardless of the racial composition of the selected jury”).

1993“Batson challenges were meant to protect not only the defendant’s equal protection rights but also the equal protection rights of excluded venirepersons.” State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930, 933 (Mo. banc 1992).

2014State v. Young, 362 S.W.3d 386, 397 (Mo. banc 2012).

2013Had this case required this Court to determine the constitutionality of discrimination based on sexual orientation, it would be guided by federal law, for the Missouri Constitution’s equal protection clause is coextensive with the Fourteenth Amendment, see State v. Young, 362 S.W.3d 386, 396 (Mo. banc 2012), and this Court has been reluctant to extend the scope of the Missouri Constitution’s equal protection clause beyond that of its federal cognate.

2011Article I, Section 2 of the Missouri Constitution states “[t]hat all persons are created equal and are entitled to equal rights and opportunity under the law.” “In deciding whether a statute violates the Equal Protection clause, this Court engages in a two-part analysis.” Etling v. Westport Heating & Cooling Seros., Inc., 92 S.W.3d 771, 774 (Mo. banc 2003) (footnote omitted).

2008In determining whether a statute violates the equal protection clause, we must first decide whether a classification “operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class ...” Etling v. Westport Heating & Cooling Services, Inc., 92 S.W.3d 771, 774 (Mo. banc 2003) (citation omitted).

2017That an explanation may have a racially disparate impact is relevant to the third step of the Batson analysis, but is “not ... conclusive in the preliminary race-neutrality .step of the Batson inquiry.” Hernandez , 500 U.S at 362, 111 S.Ct. 1859 ; see also Washington, 288 S.W.3d at 316 (“Even if a prosecutor’s criterion might result in the disproportionate removal of a certain racial group, the disproportionate impact does not turn a prosecutor’s actions into a per se violation of the equal protection clause.”).

2003Id. “ ‘The credibility of the prosecutor’s explanation goes to the heart of the equal protection analysis, and once that has been settled, there seems nothing left to review.’ ” Id., 123 S.Ct. at 1041 (quoting Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 367 , 111 S.Ct. at 1870 ).

2016This Court rejected an equal protection challenge to the damages cap of section 538.210 in Adams By and Through Adams v. Children’s Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898 (Mo. banc 1992). 11 The plaintiffs in Adams claimed that section 538.210 unconstitutionally denied medical malpractice plaintiffs the equal protection of the law by capping noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases but not in other personal injury cases.

2016This Court rejected an equal protection challenge to the damages cap of section 538.210 in Adams By and Through Adams v. Children’s Mercy Hosp.. 832 S.W.2d 898 (Mo. banc 1992). 11 The plaintiffs in Adams claimed that section 538.210 unconstitutionally denied medical malpractice plaintiffs the equal protection of the law by capping noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases but not in other personal injury cases.

1993Appellant also cites Blaske v. Smith & Entzeroth, Inc., 821 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. banc 1991), which involved an equal protection claim challenging different statutes of limitations for architects and materialmen.

1993Appellant also cites Blaske v. Smith & Entzeroth, Inc., 821 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. banc 1991), which involved an equal protection claim challenging different statutes of limitations for architects and materialmen.

2022“It is well settled that the government's imposition of punishment of one person more harshly than another does not, of itself, give rise to an equal protection violation.” State Bd. of Reg’n for Healing Arts v. Brown, 121 S.W.3d 234, 236 (Mo. 2003).

2016“It is well settled that the imposition of [discipline] on one person more harshly than another does not, of itself, give rise to an equal protection violation.” Mo. State Bd. of Registration for Healing Arts v. Brown, 121 S.W.3d 234, 236 (Mo.banc 2003).

2020"The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race." Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).

1996To prevail on an equal protection challenge, a defendant must show that a “necessary discriminatory racial purpose [is] express or appear[s] on the face of the statute” or that the statute, as applied, “invidi *795 ously discriminate[s] on the basis of race.” Id. at 241 , 96 S.Ct. at 2048.

1968A slightly earlier and more analogous case is Armijo, Administratrix of the Estate of Tomas Telles v. Wesselius, Wash., 440 P.2d 471 , decided by the Supreme Court of that state en banc on May 2, 1968.

1968See also Armijo v. Wesselius, 73 Wash.Dec.2d 721, 440 P.2d 471 , decided May 2, 1968, by the Supreme Court of Washington.

2021Curiously, the Labor Groups do not argue the department of corrections exemption violates the equal protection clause. 4 are, however, adequate justifications for treating these dissimilar labor organizations differently under the law. “[T]o successfully raise an equal protection challenge, one first must show that he or she is similarly situated to those who he alleges receive different treatment.” Coyne v. Edwards, 395 S.W.3d 509, 519 (Mo. banc 2013).

2021Curiously, the Labor Groups do not argue the department of corrections exemption violates the equal protection clause. 4 are, however, adequate justifications for treating these dissimilar labor organizations differently under the law. “[T]o successfully raise an equal protection challenge, one first must show that he or she is similarly situated to those who he alleges receive different treatment.” Coyne v. Edwards, 395 S.W.3d 509, 519 (Mo. banc 2013).

2016Similarly, Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S. 250, 251 , 94 S.Ct. 1076 , 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974), struck down a one-year residency requirement as a condition to receiving nonemergency hospitalization or medical care at the county’s expense as a violation of the equal protection clause.

2016Similarly, Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S. 250, 251 , 94 S.Ct. 1076 , 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974), struck down a one-year residency requirement as a condition to receiving nonemergency hospitalization or medical care at the county’s expense as a violation of the equal protection clause.

2015See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 , 105 S.Ct. 3249 , 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (applying rational basis review in an equal protection challenge to a zoning ordinance); see also Wrigley Properties, Inc. v. City of Ladue, 369 S.W.2d 397, 400 (Mo.1963) (zoning ordinance substantially restricting land use is constitutional if the reasonableness of the restrictions are fairly debatable).

2015See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 , 105 S.Ct. 3249 , 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (applying rational basis review in an equal protection challenge to a zoning ordinance); see also Wrigley Properties, Inc. v. City of Ladue, 369 S.W.2d 397, 400 (Mo.1963) (zoning ordinance substantially restricting land use is constitutional if the reasonableness of the restrictions are fairly debatable).

1992See State v. Crump, 747 S.W.2d 193 (Mo. App., E.D.1988); State v. West, 766 S.W.2d 103 (Mo.App., E.D.1989).

1988In State v. Crump, 747 S.W.2d 193 (Mo.App.1988) and State v. Vincent, 755 S.W.2d 400 (Mo.App.E.D.1988) we held that a defendant lacks standing to raise an equal protection claim under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) where the jury selected has a racial composition comparable to the one here.

2022Sys., 411 S.W.3d 796, 805 (Mo. banc 2013) (Missouri courts are “guided by federal law” in addressing claims under the Missouri Constitution’s equal protection clause because the “clause is coextensive with the Fourteenth Amendment,” and the Missouri Supreme Court “has been reluctant to extend the scope of the Missouri Constitution’s equal protection clause beyond that of its federal cognate.”). 13 Point Three In point three, the Bakers contend that the trial court erred in granting DHSS’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissing count 5 of their petition.

2015Id. at 804 .

2003See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243 , 90 S.Ct. 2018 , 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970) (considering disparity in criminal sentencing).

2003See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243 , 90 S.Ct. 2018 , 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970) (considering disparity in criminal sentencing).

2020The Court cited Riche v. Director of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331, 337 (Mo. banc 1999) for the proposition that “under [an] Equal Protection analysis, the state could grant special safeguards to younger drivers who are subject to special sanctions that are not applicable to adult drivers.” Id. at 406 (emphasis added).

2020The Court cited Riche v. Director of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331, 337 (Mo. banc 1999) for the proposition that “under [an] Equal Protection analysis, the state could grant special safeguards to younger drivers who are subject to special sanctions that are not applicable to adult drivers.” Id. at 406 (emphasis added).

2014“However, when the treatment at issue does not involve a fundamental right or a suspect classification, it survives an equal protection challenge so long as it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate government interest.” Artman v. State Bd. of Registration for Healing Arts, 918 S.W.2d 247, 252 (Mo. banc 1996).

2008Id. at 252 .