equal protection clause in New York

2015As the proponents of an equal protection claim, petitioners had the burden of demonstrating that the implementation of a five percent threshold “lacks a rational basis” (Bay Park Ctr. for Nursing & Rehabilitation, LLC v Shah, 111 AD3d 1227 , 1230 [2013]; see generally Port Jefferson Health Care Facility v Wing, 94 NY2d 284, 290 [1999]).

2015As the proponents of an equal protection claim, petitioners had the burden of demonstrating that the implementation of a five percent threshold “lacks a rational basis” (Bay Park Ctr. for Nursing & Rehabilitation, LLC v Shah, 111 AD3d 1227 , 1230 [2013]; see generally Port Jefferson Health Care Facility v Wing, 94 NY2d 284, 290 [1999]).

2021That said, although the majority has correctly stated the standard governing an equal protection claim based upon selective enforcement under 42 USC § 1983 , we do not agree that petitioners have met the "impermissible considerations" component of that standard ( Bower Assoc. v Town of Pleasant Val. , 2 NY3d 617, 631 [2004]).

2021We also conclude that petitioners did not establish that they had a substantial equal protection claim. "[A] violation of equal protection arises where first , a person (compared with other similarly situated) is selectively treated and second , such treatment is based on impermissible considerations such as[, inter alia,] malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person" ( id. at 631 ; see Clubside, Inc. , 468 F3d at 158-159 ; Harlen Assoc. , 273 F3d at 499 ).

1986This, however, only begins the equal protection analysis since "[t]here is hardly a law on the books that does not affect some people differently from others” (San Antonio School Dist. v Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 60 [Stewart, J., concurring]).

1982Standards under fair cross-section requirements and the equal protection clause differ somewhat in that fair cross-section “distinctiveness” encompasses the broader principle that juries should be drawn from a source fairly representative of the community, whereas equal protection focuses upon classes which have historically been discriminatorily excluded or substantially underrepresented based upon race or national origin, etc. (see Commonwealth v Bastarache, __ Mass _, _, 414 NE2d 984, 992 ; compare Taylor v Louisiana, 419 US 522 , with Castaneda v Partida, 430 US 482 , and San Antonio Schoo

2014More over, the regulation does not run afoul of the equal protection clause of the State or Federal Constitution inasmuch as it is supported by a rational basis (see generally Affronti v Crosson, 95 NY2d 713, 720 [2001], cert denied 534 US 826 [2001]), namely, giving flexibility to social services districts to determine how to allocate finite child care resources.

2014More over, the regulation does not run afoul of the equal protection clause of the State or Federal Constitution inasmuch as it is supported by a rational basis (see generally Affronti v Crosson, 95 NY2d 713, 720 [2001], cert denied 534 US 826 [2001]), namely, giving flexibility to social services districts to determine how to allocate finite child care resources.

2024Under the well-established Batson framework, "[o]nce a prima facie showing of discrimination is made, the nonmovant must come forward with a race-neutral explanation," and if the nonmovant fails to "meet this burden, an equal protection violation is established" ( People v Smocum , 99 NY2d 418, 422 [2003], citing Batson v Kentucky , 476 US 79 [1986]). "[T]he job of enforcing Batson rests first and foremost with trial judges" who are supposed to "operate at the front lines of American justice" ( Flowers v Mississippi , 588 US 284, 302 [2019]).

2022Because "a proffered race-neutral reason cannot withstand a Batson objection where it is based on a statement that the prospective juror did not in fact make" ( People v Coleman , 195 AD3d [*2]1411, 1413 [4th Dept 2021]; see generally People v Fabregas , 130 AD3d 939, 941-942 [2d Dept 2015]; People v Dalhouse , 240 AD2d 420, 422 [2d Dept 1997], lv denied 91 NY2d 871 [1997]), "an equal protection violation was established" ( Smocum , 99 NY2d at 422 ; see Smouse , 160 AD3d at 1355).

1990Center, 39 NY2d 326, 332 , quoting Dandridge v Williams, 397 US 471, 485 .) We have said that "[ijf any conceivable state of facts will support the classification, said provisions will not be held violative of the equal protection clause” (Maresca v Cuomo, 64 NY2d 242, 250 [emphasis added]; see also, Matter of Doe v Coughlin, 71 NY2d 48, 56-57 ).

1985Co. v Board of Equalization, 451 US 648, 668 ; Schweiker v Wilson, 450 US, at p 230 ; Dandridge v Williams, 397 US 471, 485 , supra; Matter of Tolub v Evans, 58 NY2d 1, 8 , appeal dismissed 460 US 1076 ; Lighthouse Shores v Town of Islip, 41 NY2d, at p 12; Montgomery v Daniels, 38 NY2d 41, 61 .) A statute violates the equal protection clause only when “the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective.” (McGowan v Maryland, 366 US 420, 425 .) Plaintiffs’ denial of equal protection claims are without merit since the allocation formula of section B

1995Finally, the plaintiffs’ Equal Protection challenge must fail since there is a rational basis for the statutory classifications insofar as the separate contracts requirement applies to special types of work that, as a rule, are subcontracted by general contractors (see, Maresca v Cuomo, 64 NY2d 242, 250 ; New York State Socy. of Enrolled Agents v New York State Div. of Tax Appeals, 161 AD2d 1, 8 ).

1995Finally, the plaintiffs’ Equal Protection challenge must fail since there is a rational basis for the statutory classifications insofar as the separate contracts requirement applies to special types of work that, as a rule, are subcontracted by general contractors (see, Maresca v Cuomo, 64 NY2d 242, 250 ; New York State Socy. of Enrolled Agents v New York State Div. of Tax Appeals, 161 AD2d 1, 8 ).

2005In resolving this inquiry, we are instructed that the classification at issue “ ‘must be upheld against an equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification’ ” (Port Jefferson Health Care Facility v Wing, 94 NY2d 284, 290 [1999], cert denied 530 US 1276 [2000], quoting Heller v Doe, supra at 320 ).

2003More specifically, “[u]nder the rational basis standard, the Legislature, in creating a classification, ‘need not actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification,’ ” but “ ‘[i]nstead, a classification must be upheld against an equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification’ ” (Port Jefferson Health Care Facility v Wing, supra, 94 NY2d at 290 [emphasis in original], quoting Heller v Doe, 509 US 312, 320 [1993]).

1995In addressing an equal protection claim, the initial decision must involve a determination as to the correct standard of review (Montgomery v Daniels, 38 NY2d 41 ).

1991In addressing an equal protection claim, the threshold decision involves determination of the standard of review (Montgomery v Daniels, 38 NY2d 41, 59 , supra).

1986In the alternative the court will consider the effect of the equal protection clause on the gender-based statutory classification. 2 FAMILY COURT ACT § 518, AS WRITTEN, VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION As presently written, Family Court Act § 518 contains a statutory classification based on sex which renders it subject to scrutiny under the equal protection clause (Caban v Mohammed, 441 US 380 ; Orr v Orr, 440 US 268 ; People v Liberta, 64 NY2d 152 ).

1985The change with respect to the person who could be required to pay alimony was constitutionally required in light of the Supreme Court’s 1979 decision in Orr v Orr ( 440 US 268 ), which held that the Alabama statutory scheme which imposed alimony obligations on husbands only violated the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution.

2004“Gender-based distinctions must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives in order to withstand judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection clause.” (Caban, supra at 388 [internal quotation marks omitted].) The Court of Appeals, analyzing the Supreme Court’s Quilloin decision, wrote that “the Supreme Court identified the issue, unresolved by Stanley , as one of the degree of protection a State must afford the rights of an unwed father in a situation, such as that presented here, in which the countervailing interests are more s

2004The appropriate standard for review was stated in Caban : "Gender-based distinctions must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives in order to withstand judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection clause." ( Caban , supra at 388 [internal quotation marks omitted].) The Court of Appeals, analyzing the Supreme Court's Quilloin decision, wrote that "the Supreme Court identified the issue, unresolved by Stanley , as one of the degree of protection a State must afford the rights of an unwed father in a situation, such as that pres

2026A defendant's rights under Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79 (1986) are guaranteed by the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.

2026A defendant's rights under Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79 (1986) are guaranteed by the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.

2020Ctr. of State of NY, 39 NY2d 326, 384 [1976] [applying a form of scrutiny higher than rational basis to evaluate Equal Protection challenge to affirmative action admissions practices at a medical school]). - 20 - - 21 - No. 74 & 75 Most relevant to these appeals is Cooper v Morin ( 49 NY2d 69 [1979]), which resolved a constitutional challenge to pretrial confinement at the Monroe County jail.

2006Ctr. of State of N.Y., 39 NY2d at 332 .) Rational basis review has been applied to an equal protection challenge arising out of differential treatment of insanity acquittees committed to secure facilities pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law § 330.20 and involuntary committees transferred administratively to secure facilities.

1982Rather, it held that legislation permitting such electors was, within the confines of the facts and the State legislation, not violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and deemed those provisions to be acceptable exceptions to the one-person one-vote principle established in Reynolds v Sims ( 377 US 533 ).

1976While it is true that in Landes standing was not an issue because plaintiff was a duly designated nominee of the Democratic Party for the office of Councilman in the Town of North Hempstead, the court held that "the proscription against nonlandowners as town councilmen amounts to a 'dilution’ or 'debasement’ of the vote” of plaintiff and other residents of the town "not unlike that occasioned by the malapportionment which the Supreme Court has held violative of the equal protection clause.” (Id, p 421, citing Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533 , rehearing den 379 US 870 and Gray v Sanders, 372 US 368

2005And, tellingly, the majority’s rejection of the equal protection claim does not include any hint or suggestion of how preventing the plaintiff from asserting a wrongful death claim promotes the State’s interest in fostering the institution of marriage, “thus leaving [its] constitutional analysis incomplete” (Trimble v Gordon, 430 US 762, 769 [1977]).

1981Although the Supreme Court has never formally abandoned its two-tier approach to the equal protection clause, during the past decade the “mere rationality” test has been applied with more intensified scrutiny than was the case under the Warren court (compare the “rational relationship” cases cited above with, e.g., Trimble v Gordon, 430 US 762 ; Craig v Boren, 429 US 190; Stanton v Stanton, 421 US 7 ; Jimenez v Weinberger, 417 US 628; James v Strange, 407 US 128 ; Reed v Reed, 404 US 71 ; see, also, San Antonio School Dist. v Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 70 [Marshall, J., dissenting] ).

2005No person shall, because of race, color, creed or religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights by any other person or by any firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision of the state.” With respect to the first sentence of section 11, the Court of Appeals has held that the sentence is “obviously an equal protection clause” and “is no more broad in coverage than its Federal prototype.” (Dorsey v Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 NY 512, 530 [1949].) Since the decision in Dorsey , our Court of Appeals has reiterated that the guarantee of equ

1985We have held that the State constitutional equal protection clause (NY Const, art I, § 11) is no broader in coverage than the Federal provision (see, e.g., Matter of Esler v Walters, 56 NY2d 306, 313-314 ) and this equation with the Federal provision extends to the requirement of “State action” in order for the equal protection clause to be applicable (Dorsey v Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 NY 512, 530-531 , cert denied 339 US 981 ).

1970The United States Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit struck down this procedure, on the finding that it was “ adequately established that top position on the ballot is one of a number of factors which tend to affect the outcome of 'an election, and which may have a substantial effect although degree varies with the circumstances.” (Weisberg v. Powell, 417 F. 2d 388, 392 .) It was also held in that case that where discrimination is sufficiently established, the right to relief under the equal protection clause is not diminished by the fact that the discrimination relates to political rights,

1967Tick Wo has been interpreted and applied in many instances by both the Supreme Court and other courts, and the test to be used in determining whether there exists a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution has been refined to the point of clarity and preciseness. cl The unlawful administration by state officers of a state statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination.' This may ap

2001Thus, in reviewing the validity of taxation classifications, “the equal protection clause does not prevent State Legislatures from drawing lines that treat one class of individuals or entities differently from others unless the difference in treatment is ‘palpably arbitrary’ or amounts to an ‘invidious discrimination’ ” (Trump v Chu, 65 NY2d 20 , 25, citing, inter alia, Lehnhausen v Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 US 356, 360 ).

1999We noted in Trump v Chu ( 65 NY2d 20 ) that, in reviewing the validity of taxation classifications “the equal protection clause does not prevent State Legislatures from drawing lines that treat one class of individuals or entities differently from others unless the difference in treatment *290 is ‘palpably arbitrary’ or amounts to an ‘invidious discrimination’” (id., at 25, citing, inter alia, Lehnhausen v Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 US 356, 360 ).

2005Thus, the convenience test constitutes an across-the-board standard designed to comply with both due process and the Commerce Clause. 6 IV Nordlinger v Hahn ( 505 US 1 [1992]) established the equal protection standard for tax cases: “the Equal Protection Clause is satisfied so long as there is a plausible policy reason for the classification, the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based rationally may have been considered to be true by the governmental decision-maker, and the relationship of the classification to its goal is not so attenuated as to render the distincti

2005Nordlinger v Hahn ( 505 US 1 [1992]) established the equal protection standard for tax cases: "the Equal Protection Clause is satisfied so long as there is a plausible policy reason for the classification, the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based rationally may have been considered to be true by the governmental decisionmaker, and the relationship of the classification to its goal is not so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational" ( id. at 11 [citations omitted]).

2014As long as the State had a rational basis for making such a distinction, it will pass constitutional muster under an equal protection challenge” (Matter of Tolub v Evans, 58 NY2d 1, 8 [1982]; see Henry v Milonas, 91 NY2d at 268 ; Cass v State of New York, 58 NY2d 460, 464 [1983]).

1995It is now well settled that upon a challenge to the constitutionality of a statutorily-created judicial pay disparity among Judges of comparable courts, " 'the geographical distinctions created by the [Unified Court Budget Act] must be predicated upon a rational basis to survive an equal protection challenge (Cass v State of New York, 58 NY2d 460 ; Weissman v Evans, 56 NY2d 458 )’ ” (Weissman v Bellacosa, 129 AD2d 189, 192-193 , quoting Kendall v Evans, 126 AD2d 703, 704 , affd 72 NY2d 963 ; see also, Mackston v State of New York, 200 AD2d 717 ).

1985Co. v Board of Equalization, 451 US 648, 668 ; Schweiker v Wilson, 450 US, at p 230 ; Dandridge v Williams, 397 US 471, 485 , supra; Matter of Tolub v Evans, 58 NY2d 1, 8 , appeal dismissed 460 US 1076 ; Lighthouse Shores v Town of Islip, 41 NY2d, at p 12; Montgomery v Daniels, 38 NY2d 41, 61 .) A statute violates the equal protection clause only when “the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective.” (McGowan v Maryland, 366 US 420, 425 .) Plaintiffs’ denial of equal protection claims are without merit since the allocation formula of section B

1985(McGowan v Maryland, 366 US 420, 427 ; Salsburg v Maryland, 346 US 545 ; Walsh v Commonwealth of Mass., supra, at p 158; Matter of Colt Inds. v Finance Administrator of City of N. Y., 54 NY2d 533, 544 .) As long as the State had a rational basis for making such a distinction, it will pass constitutional muster under an equal protection challenge”.

1975The omission of the Legislature to make provision for the adoption of destitute or dependent children of physically ill parents, while making such a provision for children of mentally ill parents, does not invalidate the statute under the equal protection clause for, as the court noted in Williamson v Lee Optical Co. ( 348 US 483, 489 ): "The problem of legislative classification is a perennial one, admitting of no doctrinaire definition.

1969The City of New York has not violated the equal protection clause by regulating liquid and frozen eggs and not regulating other egg products. “ It is no requirement of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all ” (Railway Express v. New York, 336 U. S. 106, 110 ). “ The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others.” (Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 489 .) The question in this case is whether the City of New York may forbid to interstate commerce liquid and frozen eggs which meet the Federal stand

1983The equal protection clause does not require a State officer to choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all (see New Orleans v Dukes, 427 US 297, 305 ).

1982Use of the physical character of the retail operation (City of New Orleans v Dukes, 427 US 297 ), its geographical location (McGowan v Maryland, 366 US 420 ); and the type of merchandise sold as interrelating with the first two (Wegmaris Food Markets v State of New York, 76 AD2d 95 ) have all survived the equal protection test.

1977Indeed, the power of the Legislature to regulate fiscal affairs is greater, in relation to the equal protection clause, than in any other field (Madden v Kentucky, 309 US 83, 87-88 ; San Antonio School Dist. v Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 24, 29 ).

1975Although the amount of tax was based on an out-of-State event, the court found that the classification was not arbitrary within the meaning of the equal protection clause since "The treatment accorded the two kinds of deposits may have resulted from the differences in the difficulties and expenses of tax collection” (Madden, 309 US 83, 90 , supra).

1995It is now well settled that upon a challenge to the constitutionality of a statutorily-created judicial pay disparity among Judges of comparable courts, " 'the geographical distinctions created by the [Unified Court Budget Act] must be predicated upon a rational basis to survive an equal protection challenge (Cass v State of New York, 58 NY2d 460 ; Weissman v Evans, 56 NY2d 458 )’ ” (Weissman v Bellacosa, 129 AD2d 189, 192-193 , quoting Kendall v Evans, 126 AD2d 703, 704 , affd 72 NY2d 963 ; see also, Mackston v State of New York, 200 AD2d 717 ).

1994It is well-settled that upon a challenge to the constitutionality of a statutorily created judicial pay disparity among Judges of comparable courts, " 'the geographical distinctions created by the [Unified Court Budget Act] must be predicated upon a rational basis [in order] to survive an equal protection challenge (Cass v State of New York, 58 NY2d 460 ; Weissman v Evans, 56 NY2d 458 )’ ” (Weissman v Bellacosa, 129 AD2d 189, 192-193 , quoting Kendall v Evans, 126 AD2d 703, 704 , affd 72 NY2d 963 ; see also, Edelstein v Crosson, 187 AD2d 694, 696 ).

1990In deciding the validity of an equal protection claim, our inquiry is directed toward three considerations: (1) the character of the classification, (2) the nature of the individual interest or right affected by the classification, and (3) the quality of the State interest promoted by the classification (see, Dunn v Blumstein, supra).

1983As stated by Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion for the Supreme Court in Dunn (supra, at p 342 ): “residence laws must be measured by a strict equal protection test: they are unconstitutional unless the State can demonstrate that such laws are ‘necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.’” This the Town of North Hempstead cannot do.

1975The United States Supreme Court has clearly indicated that Congress may not, in enacting Federal legislation, authorize States to violate the equal protection clause (Shapiro v Thompson, 394 US 618, 641 ).

1972Because durational residency requirements must inevitably impinge upon such constitutionally secured rights as to the right to vote and the right of interstate travel (see, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson , 394 U. S. 618 ), they must be closely scrutinized under this strict equal protection test and, when challenged, the onus of establishing that "no less intrusive means" will advance a substantial and compelling State interest devolves upon the State ( Oregon v. Mitchell , 400 U. S., at p. 238 [opn. of BRENNAN, WHITE and MARSHALL, JJ.]).