equal protection clause in Wisconsin

2021Thus, she asserts, § 51.20(1)(am) violates her right to equal protection of the laws. ¶33 "To prove an equal protection clause violation, the party challenging a statute's constitutionality must show that 'the state unconstitutionally treats members of similarly situated classes differently.'" State v. West, 2011 WI 83, ¶90 , 336 Wis. 2d 578 , 800 N.W.2d 929 (quoting Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 318 ).

2013For example, in Post, we found that in all but one of the equal protection challenges, "[t]he state's compelling interest in protecting the public provides the necessary justification for the differential treatment of the class of sexually violent persons." Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 321 . ¶57 In Post, we did, however, find that an equal protection violation existed because Chapter 980 did not allow a committed individual the right to request a jury at his or her discharge hearing.

2016The equal protection clause "is designed to assure that those who are similarly situated will be treated similarly." Treiber v. Knoll, 135 Wis. 2d 58, 68 , 398 N.W.2d 756 (1987).

2016The equal protection clause "is designed to assure that those who are similarly situated will be treated similarly." Treiber v. Knoll, 135 Wis. 2d 58, 68 , 398 N.W.2d 756 (1987).

2017In reviewing the constitutionality of a statute on an equal protection challenge, we begin with "the principle repeatedly stated" by our supreme court, as well as the United States Supreme Court, that "all legislative acts are presumed constitutional." Sambs v. City of Brookfield, 97 Wis. 2d 356, 370 , 293 N.W.2d 504 (1980).

2017In reviewing the constitutionality of a statute on an equal protection challenge, we begin with "the principle repeatedly stated" by our supreme court, as well as the United States Supreme Court, that "all legislative acts are presumed constitutional." Sambs v. City of Brookfield, 97 Wis. 2d 356, 370 , 293 N.W.2d 504 (1980).

2025Equal Protection ¶50 “The equal protection clause requires that the legislature have reasonable and practical grounds for the classifications that it draws.” Quintana, 308 Wis. 2d 615, ¶79 . “[T]he state retains broad discretion to create classifications so long as the classifications have a reasonable basis.” State v. McManus, 152 Wis. 2d 113, 131 , 447 N.W.2d 654 (1989).

2021The equal protection clause protects by requiring that the State “have reasonable and practical grounds for the classifications that it draws.” State v. Quintana, 2008 WI 33, ¶79 , 308 Wis. 2d 615 , 748 N.W.2d 447 .

2016Among his many arguments, Asfoor contended that a conviction under Wis. Stat. § 940.24 (1) (1973-74) "violate[d] the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Eighth Amendment in that a conviction of injury by negligent use of a weapon is a felony while conviction of homicide by negligent use of a weapon, sec. 940.08, [1973-74], is a misdemeanor." Asfoor, 75 Wis. 2d at 437 .

2002That Radke is asserting an equal protection claim is demonstrated by his reliance on State v. Asfoor, 75 Wis. 2d 411, 440-41, 249 N.W.2d 529 (1977).

2014Having rejected the premise that Act 10 implicates a fundamental right, the plaintiffs' equal protection claim necessarily fails under rational basis review. ¶76 While courts express various iterations of the rational basis test, we have often quoted the United States Supreme Court's articulation in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961): 20 Generally, when considering an equal protection challenge, this court will uphold the statute if we find that the legislative classification is supported by a rational basis.

2014Having rejected the premise that Act 10 implicates a fundamental right, the plaintiffs' equal protection claim necessarily fails under rational basis review. ¶76 While courts express various iterations of the rational basis test, we have often quoted the United States Supreme Court's articulation in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961): 20 Generally, when considering an equal protection challenge, this court will uphold the statute if we find that the legislative classification is supported by a rational basis.

2000Bethke's constitutional argument springs from certain language in Szarzynski v. YMCA, Camp Minikani, 184 Wis. 2d 875 , 517 N.W.2d 135 (1994), where the supreme court considered an equal protection challenge closely akin to the one before us.

2000Bethke's constitutional argument springs from certain language in Szarzynski v. YMCA, Camp Minikani, 184 Wis. 2d 875 , 517 N.W.2d 135 (1994), where the supreme court considered an equal protection challenge closely akin to the one before us.

2026Consequently, “no State has any authority under the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to use race as a factor in affording educational opportunities among its citizens.” Id. at 204 (citation omitted).

2026Consequently, “no State has any authority under the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to use race as a factor in affording educational opportunities among its citizens.” Id. at 204 (citation omitted).

2005Provided, however, that the legislature may, from time to time, by statute provide that a valid verdict, in civil cases, may be based on the votes of a specified number of the jury, not less than five-sixths thereof. [2] Article I, Section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution states in relevant part: "Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries, or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or character; he ought to obtain justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay, conformably to the la

1992See Richards v. Cullen, 150 Wis. 2d 935, 942 , 442 N.W.2d 574, 577 (Ct. App. 1989). 12 Other, "intermediate" levels of scrutiny are applied to legislative classifications based on gender, which must be "substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental interest," and illegitimacy, which must be "substantially related to a legitimate state interest." Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41 . 13 With respect to marital status, Phillips's only argument is that because marital status discrimination in employment is prohibited by the WFEA, "marital status classifications" should be subject to str

2018State v. Smith , 2010 WI 16 , ¶ 12, 323 Wis. 2d 377 , 780 N.W.2d 90 . ¶37 In bringing an equal protection challenge, the challenging party must show that the statute "treats members of similarly situated classes differently." Castellani v. Bailey , 218 Wis. 2d 245 , 261, 578 N.W.2d 166 (1998).

2018State v. Smith , 2010 WI 16 , ¶ 12, 323 Wis. 2d 377 , 780 N.W.2d 90 . ¶37 In bringing an equal protection challenge, the challenging party must show that the statute "treats members of similarly situated classes differently." Castellani v. Bailey , 218 Wis. 2d 245 , 261, 578 N.W.2d 166 (1998).

1995One challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears "a heavy burden"; and where, as here, the claim is that a legislative classification violates the equal protection clause, the challenger "must prove abuse of legislative discretion beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Hart, 89 Wis. 2d 58, 64 , 277 N.W.2d 843, 846 (1979). 6 *764 We use a "rational basis" test to evaluate such a challenge: the classification will be upheld if there is any rational basis to support it.

1995One challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears "a heavy burden"; and where, as here, the claim is that a legislative classification violates the equal protection clause, the challenger "must prove abuse of legislative discretion beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Hart, 89 Wis. 2d 58, 64 , 277 N.W.2d 843, 846 (1979). 6 *764 We use a "rational basis" test to evaluate such a challenge: the classification will be upheld if there is any rational basis to support it.

2019Equal Protection Standards; Appropriate Level Of Scrutiny ¶19 " 'The equal protection clause requires that the legislature have reasonable and practical grounds for the classifications that it draws.' " State v. Smith , 2010 WI 16 , ¶15, 323 Wis. 2d 377 , 780 N.W.2d 90 (quoted source omitted). ¶20 Determining whether a statute violates the equal protection clause requires answering three questions: (1) does the statute create a distinct classification of citizens?; (2) does the statute treat the distinct class in a significantly different manner from those outside the class?; and (3) is the di

2019Equal Protection Standards; Appropriate Level Of Scrutiny ¶19 " 'The equal protection clause requires that the legislature have reasonable and practical grounds for the classifications that it draws.' " State v. Smith , 2010 WI 16 , ¶15, 323 Wis. 2d 377 , 780 N.W.2d 90 (quoted source omitted). ¶20 Determining whether a statute violates the equal protection clause requires answering three questions: (1) does the statute create a distinct classification of citizens?; (2) does the statute treat the distinct class in a significantly different manner from those outside the class?; and (3) is the di

2005See Sambs v. City of Brookfield, 97 Wis. 2d 356, 377-78 , 293 N.W.2d 504 (1980); Stanhope v. Brown County, 90 Wis. 2d 823, 842-44 , 280 N.W.2d 711 (1979) (both cases involved plaintiffs injured in automobile accidents due to highway defects; caps in Wis. Stat. §§ 81.15 and 895.43 limited recovery to $25,000). 6 ¶ 340.

2005See Sambs v. City of Brookfield, 97 Wis. 2d 356, 377-78 , 293 N.W.2d 504 (1980); Stanhope v. Brown County, 90 Wis. 2d 823, 842-44 , 280 N.W.2d 711 (1979) (both cases involved plaintiffs injured in automobile accidents due to highway defects; caps in Wis. Stat. §§ 81.15 and 895.43 limited recovery to $25,000). 6 ¶ 340.

1994Ford Hopkins Co. v. Mayor, 226 Wis. 215, 222 , 276 N.W. 311 (1937)), in which the following five factors were identified as being relevant to an equal protection analysis: `(1) All classification must be based upon substantial distinctions which make one class really different from another. `(2) The classification adopted must be germane to the purpose of the law. `(3) The classification must not be based upon existing circumstances only.... `(4) To whatever class a law may apply, it must apply equally to each member thereof. `(5) That the characteristics of each class should be so far differe

1994Ford Hopkins Co. v. Mayor, 226 Wis. 215, 222 , 276 N.W. 311 (1937)), in which the following five factors were identified as being relevant to an equal protection analysis: `(1) All classification must be based upon substantial distinctions which make one class really different from another. `(2) The classification adopted must be germane to the purpose of the law. `(3) The classification must not be based upon existing circumstances only.... `(4) To whatever class a law may apply, it must apply equally to each member thereof. `(5) That the characteristics of each class should be so far differe

2024Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 507 , 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978) (addressing an equal protection challenge to Wisconsin’s health care liability and patient compensation laws and concluding that the strict scrutiny standard does not apply). 9 No. 2023AP1383 the public policy balancing test when, as here, a statutory exception to disclosure applies.

2024Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 507 , 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978) (addressing an equal protection challenge to Wisconsin’s health care liability and patient compensation laws and concluding that the strict scrutiny standard does not apply). 9 No. 2023AP1383 the public policy balancing test when, as here, a statutory exception to disclosure applies.

1994See San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973); Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 2331 (1992) (the equal protection clause requires that a classification *887 rationally further a legitimate state interest). [5] [4, 5] Further, "`[e]very presumption must be indulged to sustain the law if at all possible and, wherever doubt exists as to a legislative enactment's constitutionality, it must be resolved in favor of constitutionality....'" Racine Steel Castings v. Hardy, 144 Wis. 2d 553, 559 , 426 N.W.2d 33 (1988) (quoting State ex rel.

1994See San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973); Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 2331 (1992) (the equal protection clause requires that a classification *887 rationally further a legitimate state interest). [5] [4, 5] Further, "`[e]very presumption must be indulged to sustain the law if at all possible and, wherever doubt exists as to a legislative enactment's constitutionality, it must be resolved in favor of constitutionality....'" Racine Steel Castings v. Hardy, 144 Wis. 2d 553, 559 , 426 N.W.2d 33 (1988) (quoting State ex rel.

2007We will "uphold a statute under an equal protection analysis [i]f a rational basis exists to support the classification, unless the statute impinges on a fundamental right or creates a classification based on a suspect criterion." Czapinski, 236 Wis. 2d 316, ¶ 27 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted).

2007We will "uphold a statute under an equal protection analysis [i]f a rational basis exists to support the classification, unless the statute impinges on a fundamental right or creates a classification based on a suspect criterion." Czapinski, 236 Wis.2d 316, ¶ 27 , 613 N.W.2d 120 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted).

2006See Maurin, 274 Wis. 2d 28, ¶ 214 (Abrahamson, C.J., and Crooks, J., concurring, joined in part by Bradley, J.).

2006See Maurin, 274 Wis.2d 28, ¶ 214 , 682 N.W.2d 866 (Abrahamson, C.J., and Crooks, J., concurring, joined in part by Bradley, J.).

2004Id. at 125 . [7] As we explain below, our decision here is driven by Brendan's lack of a substantial relationship with Selena. [8] In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), one of the earlier Supreme Court cases dealing with whether an unmarried biological father has parental rights that rise to a constitutionally protected level, the court held for Stanley, who lived with his children and their mother, because "nothing in this record indicates that Stanley is or has been a neglectful father who has not cared for his children." Id. at 655 . [9] In Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), whe

2004Id. at 125 . [7] As we explain below, our decision here is driven by Brendan's lack of a substantial relationship with Selena. [8] In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), one of the earlier Supreme Court cases dealing with whether an unmarried biological father has parental rights that rise to a constitutionally protected level, the court held for Stanley, who lived with his children and their mother, because "nothing in this record indicates that Stanley is or has been a neglectful father who has not cared for his children." Id. at 655 . [9] In Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), whe

2000See State v. McKenzie, 151 Wis. 2d 775, 779 , 446 N.W.2d 77, 78 (Ct. App. 1989) (statute passes constitutional muster against an equal- protection challenge if "a rational basis exists to support the classification, unless the statute impinges on a fundamental right or creates a classification based on a suspect criterion").

2000See State v. McKenzie, 151 Wis. 2d 775, 779 , 446 N.W.2d 77, 78 (Ct. App. 1989) (statute passes constitutional muster against an equal- protection challenge if "a rational basis exists to support the classification, unless the statute impinges on a fundamental right or creates a classification based on a suspect criterion").

2025Equal Protection ¶50 “The equal protection clause requires that the legislature have reasonable and practical grounds for the classifications that it draws.” Quintana, 308 Wis. 2d 615, ¶79 . “[T]he state retains broad discretion to create classifications so long as the classifications have a reasonable basis.” State v. McManus, 152 Wis. 2d 113, 131 , 447 N.W.2d 654 (1989).

2025Equal Protection ¶50 “The equal protection clause requires that the legislature have reasonable and practical grounds for the classifications that it draws.” Quintana, 308 Wis. 2d 615, ¶79 . “[T]he state retains broad discretion to create classifications so long as the classifications have a reasonable basis.” State v. McManus, 152 Wis. 2d 113, 131 , 447 N.W.2d 654 (1989).

1996In Funk v. Wollin Silo & Equip., Inc., 148 Wis. 2d 59 , 435 N.W.2d 244 (1989), the supreme court considered an equal protection challenge to § 893.89, STATS., which provided in relevant part that no action for injury resulting from an improvement to real property may be brought "more than 6 years after the substantial completion of construction.

1996In Funk v. Wollin Silo & Equip., Inc., 148 Wis. 2d 59 , 435 N.W.2d 244 (1989), the supreme court considered an equal protection challenge to § 893.89, STATS., which provided in relevant part that no action for injury resulting from an improvement to real property may be brought "more than 6 years after the substantial completion of construction.