equal protection clause in Massachusetts

2026"The use of peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors solely because of their race is prohibited by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution." Commonwealth v. Grier, 490 Mass. 455 , 458 (2022), citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986).

2018"The use of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors solely because of bias presumed to derive from their membership in discrete community groups is prohibited both by art. 12 [of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights], see [ *679 Soares , 377 Mass. at 486 -488 , 387 N.E.2d 499 ], and the equal protection clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution], see Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79 , 84-88 [ 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 ] (1986)." Commonwealth v. Harris , 409 Mass. 461 , 464, 567 N.E.2d 899 (1991).

2018"The use of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors solely because of bias presumed to derive from their membership in discrete community groups is prohibited both by art. 12 [of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights], see [ *679 Soares , 377 Mass. at 486 -488 , 387 N.E.2d 499 ], and the equal protection clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution], see Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79 , 84-88 [ 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 ] (1986)." Commonwealth v. Harris , 409 Mass. 461 , 464, 567 N.E.2d 899 (1991).

2018"The use of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors solely because of bias presumed to derive from their membership in discrete community groups is prohibited both by art. 12 [of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights], see [ *679 Soares , 377 Mass. at 486 -488 , 387 N.E.2d 499 ], and the equal protection clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution], see Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79 , 84-88 [ 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 ] (1986)." Commonwealth v. Harris , 409 Mass. 461 , 464, 567 N.E.2d 899 (1991).

2006The review of an equal protection claim under the Massachusetts Constitution is generally the same as the review of a Federal equal protection claim, see Dickerson v. Attorney Gen., 396 Mass. 740, 743 (1986); Zeller v. Cantu, 395 Mass. 76, 83-84 (1985), although we have recognized that “[t]he Massachusetts Constitution is, if anything, more protective of individual liberty and equality than the Federal Constitution . . . .” Goodridge v. Department of Pub.

1995Our decision in Dickerson v. Attorney Gen., supra, fully analyzed an equal protection challenge to the gatekeeper provision.

2009The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment mandates that “all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).

2006The equal protection clause “is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).

1982The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution “requires, at a minimum, that a . . . classification bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.” Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 766 (1977), quoting from Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.

1977In particular, classifications based on illegitimacy, though not subject to “strictest scrutiny,” are subject to a scrutiny under the equal protection clause which is “not a toothless one.” Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977), and cases cited.

1984See id. at 101-103 . 21 Previously, this court has interpreted challenges to a jury selection procedure under Federal law and held that only purposeful discrimination against a discrete group constitutes a violation of the equal protection clause.

1984He appeals the denial of this motion as a violation of his rights under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 6 The simple answer to this claim is that “classifications based on age alone do not involve identifiable or distinctive groups for Federal constitutional purposes.” Commonwealth v. Bastarache, 382 Mass. 86, 100 (1980).

2018"The use of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors solely because of bias presumed to derive from their membership in discrete community groups is prohibited both by art. 12 [of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights], see [ *679 Soares , 377 Mass. at 486 -488 , 387 N.E.2d 499 ], and the equal protection clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution], see Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79 , 84-88 [ 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 ] (1986)." Commonwealth v. Harris , 409 Mass. 461 , 464, 567 N.E.2d 899 (1991).

2018"The use of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors solely because of bias presumed to derive from their membership in discrete community groups is prohibited both by art. 12 [of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights], see [ *679 Soares , 377 Mass. at 486 -488 , 387 N.E.2d 499 ], and the equal protection clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution], see Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79 , 84-88 [ 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 ] (1986)." Commonwealth v. Harris , 409 Mass. 461 , 464, 567 N.E.2d 899 (1991).

2025Because the Commonwealth's nonresident firearm licensing scheme neither violates a fundamental right nor relies on a suspect classification, we evaluate the right to travel challenge and the equal protection challenge under rational basis review.[17] See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) ("if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end"); Federal Communications Comm'n v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) ("a statutory classification t

1992See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976); Dickerson, supra at 743 .

2003See Smith v. Commissioner of Revenue, 383 Mass. 139, 141 (1981), citing Weinstock v. Hull, 367 Mass. 66, 70 , appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 805 (1975) (“Any distinction in a tax statute that has a rational basis will survive a challenge under the equal protection clause”).

1989“Any distinction in a tax statute that has a rational basis will survive a challenge under the equal protection clause.” Smith v. Commissioner of Revenue, 383 Mass. 139, 141 (1981).

1982“Under the equal protection clause, in the absence of a suspect classification, our role remains ‘limited to determining whether the classification involved rationally “furthers a legitimate State interest.”’” Blue Hills Cemetery, Inc. v. Board of Registration in Embalming ir Funeral Directing, 379 Mass. 368, 376 (1979), quoting Johnson v. Martignetti, 374 Mass. 784, 791 (1978).

1982When economic regulation is challenged as a violation of the equal protection clause, the traditional inquiry is “whether the classification involved rationally furthers a legitimate State interest.” Blue Hills Cemetery, Inc. v. Board of Registration in Embalming & Funeral Directing, 379 Mass. 368, 376 (1979), quoting from Johnson v. Martignetti, 374 Mass. 784, 791 (1978).

2010See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495 (1977).

1984We conclude that we need not decide whether the evidence in this case supports the judge’s findings of purposeful discrimination in violation of the equal-protection clause under the “rule of exclusion” espoused by the United States Supreme Court. 4 See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 , 494 & n.13 (1977).

2007Health, supra, quoting Rubinovitz v. Rogato, supra at 910 .

2006Plaintiffs who claim an equal protection violation must “identify and relate specific instances where persons situated similarly ‘in all relevant aspects’ were treated differently, instances which have the capacity to demonstrate that [the plaintiffs] were ‘singled . . . out for unlawful oppression.’ ” Rubinovitz v. Rogato, supra at 910 , quoting Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1989).

1993In the present case, the “corresponding right under the equal protection clause,” Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 373 Mass. 645, 654 (1977), is the right of a class of litigants not to be singled out for “arbitrary and irrational” treatment when seeking legal relief made available by the State.

1993See Coggins v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 397 Mass. 525, 538 (1986). [21] In the present case, the "corresponding right under the equal protection clause," Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 373 Mass. 645, 654 (1977), is the right of a class of litigants not to be singled out for "arbitrary and irrational" treatment when seeking legal relief made available by the State.

2000McSweeney v. Cambridge, 422 Mass. 648, 657 (1996), quoting Commonwealth v. Henry’s Drywall Co., 366 Mass. 539, 541 (1974).

1977See Commonwealth v. Henry’s Drywall Co. Inc. 366 Mass. 539, 544-547 (1974); Commonwealth v. MacKenzie, 368 Mass. 613, 616-618 (1975); Rosary v. Commissioner of Pub.

2019See DuPont v. Commissioner of Con., 448 Mass. 389, 399-400 (2007) (internal quotations and citations omitted) ("An equal protection claim can only succeed if a plaintiff establishes that government action discriminates against similarly situated persons ....").

2015A claim under the equal protection clause requires that Jaynes show that (1) in comparison with others similarly situated, he was selectively treated and (2) that “such selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, . . . intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person.” DuPont v. Commissioner of Correction, 448 Mass. 389, 398-399 (2007), quoting from Cote-Whitacre v. Department of Pub.

2012Moreover, because the equal protection clause is chiefly concerned with discriminatory intent, see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976), the strict scrutiny doctrine demands an especially thorough inquiry into legislative motive, including “such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.” Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 546 (1999), quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.

1995“To prove a violation of the equal protection clause, a plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with discriminatory intent.” Id., citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-242 (1976).

2008In the Matter of Corliss, 424 Mass. 1005, 1006 (1997).

2007Matter of Corliss, 424 Mass. 1005, 1006 (1997).

1999The distinction between sex offender inmates and other inmates," in terms of classification, is subject to the rational relationship test in which inquiry is limited to whether the “challenged distinction rationally furthers [a] legitimate, articulated state purpose.” Mc-Ginnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973); McNeil v. Commissioner of Correction, 417 Mass. 818, 827 (1994).

1974In considering a similar challenge to an aspect of New York’s statutory scheme of “good conduct” sentence deductions, the United States Supreme Court applied the “traditional” equal protection standard of review which limits judicial inquiry to the question “whether the challenged distinction rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose.” McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U. S. 263,270 (1973).

1993Id.

1986Cf. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 77 (1972) (once an appeal is afforded, it is a violation of the equal protection principle to grant a right of appeal to some litigants and to deny the right capriciously or arbitrarily to others). 3.

1989Begley v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 349 Mass. 458, 460 (1965); Sisters of the Holy Cross of Mass. v. Brookline, 347 Mass. 486 , 495 (1969). ‘The equal protection clause.. . limits legislative discretion in delineating classifications only to the extent of forbidding ‘arbitrary or irrational’ classifications, or discrimination which is ‘invidious.’ [Citations Omitted].” Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 28 (1971).

1982See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 17 (1979); Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 27-28 (1971).

1985See Shell Oil Co. v. Revere, 383 Mass. 682, 690-691 (1981). 4.

1985We conclude that the equal protection challenge to the department’s decision fails because the distinction “rationally ‘furthers a legitimate State interest.’ ” Shell Oil Co. v. Revere, 383 Mass. 682, 690 (1981), quoting Opinion of the Justices, 368 Mass. 857,865 (1975).

1982“Under the equal protection clause, in the absence of a suspect classification, our role remains ‘limited to determining whether the classification involved rationally “furthers a legitimate State interest.”’” Blue Hills Cemetery, Inc. v. Board of Registration in Embalming ir Funeral Directing, 379 Mass. 368, 376 (1979), quoting Johnson v. Martignetti, 374 Mass. 784, 791 (1978).

1982When economic regulation is challenged as a violation of the equal protection clause, the traditional inquiry is “whether the classification involved rationally furthers a legitimate State interest.” Blue Hills Cemetery, Inc. v. Board of Registration in Embalming & Funeral Directing, 379 Mass. 368, 376 (1979), quoting from Johnson v. Martignetti, 374 Mass. 784, 791 (1978).

2013“The use of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors solely because of bias presumed to derive from their membership in discrete community groups is prohibited both by art. 12 [of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights], see Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 486-488 , cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979), and the equal protection clause, see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84-88 (1986).” Commonwealth v. Harris, 409 Mass. 461, 464 (1991) (Harris).

2010Rodriguez argues that the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge of the sole Hispanic venireperson violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84-89 (1986), and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 486-488 , cert, denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979). 15 The issue arose as follows.

2010Opinion of the Justices, 368 Mass. 831, 845 (1975), quoting from Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (“If the classification has some ‘reasonable basis,’ it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification ‘is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality’ ”).

1997In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), the United States Supreme Court addressed the question of the constitutional validity, under the Equal Protection clause, of welfare regulations which establish categories of recipients.

1994In Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95, 102 (1972), the Supreme Court invalidated, based on equal protection grounds, a city ordinance restricting all picketing, except peaceful labor picketing, near schools.

1994In Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95, 102 (1972), the Supreme Court invalidated, based on equal protection grounds, a city ordinance restricting all picketing, except peaceful labor picketing, near schools.