equal protection clause in Indiana

1982However, in her separate concurring opinion Justice O'Connor reviewed the two prongs of Justice Rehnquist's equal protection analysis and concluded that "[a] review of the factors used in deciding that the one-year statute of limitation cannot withstand an equal protection challenge indicates that longer periods of limitation for paternity suits also may be unconstitutional." 102 S.Ct. at 1558 .

1982However, in her separate concurring opinion Justice O’Connor reviewed the two prongs of Justice Rehnquist’s equal protection analysis and concluded that “[a] review of the factors used in deciding that the one-year statute of limitation cannot withstand an equal protection challenge indicates that longer periods of limitation for paternity suits also may be unconstitutional.” 102 S.Ct. at 1558 .

1997Despite contrary arguments, sex has not yet been determined to be a “suspect classification” by a majority of the United States Supreme Court so as to necessitate the application of the so-called high scrutiny test.... [T]he United States Supreme Court has expressly recognized that the equal protection standard of Reed v. Reed (1971), 404 U.S. 71 , 92 S.Ct. 251 , 30 L.Ed.2d 225 , should be utilized. [Citation omitted].

1997Despite contrary arguments, sex has not yet been determined to be a “suspect classification” by a majority of the United States Supreme Court so as to necessitate the application of the so-called high scrutiny test.... [T]he United States Supreme Court has expressly recognized that the equal protection standard of Reed v. Reed (1971), 404 U.S. 71 , 92 S.Ct. 251 , 30 L.Ed.2d 225 , should be utilized. [Citation omitted].

1992Div. (1988), Ind.App., 528 N.E.2d 854 , a case in which this Court upheld an equal protection challenge to IND.CODE § 22-4-15-1{(c)(1).

1992Div. (1988), Ind. App., 528 N.E.2d 854 , a case in which this Court upheld an equal protection challenge to IND.

1980Regarding the traditional equal protection test in that case we stated: “In order for this classification to satisfy the guarantee of equal protection, it ‘must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.’ Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, (1920) 253 U.S. 412 , 40 S.Ct. 560 , 64 L.Ed. 989 ; Reed v. Reed, (1971) 404 U.S. 71 , 92 S.Ct. 251 , 30 L.Ed.2d 225 ; Reilly v. Robertson, supra [ 266 Ind. 29 , 360 N.E.2d 171 ].

1980Regarding the traditional equal protection test in that case we stated: “In order for this classification to satisfy the guarantee of equal protection, it ‘must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.’ Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, (1920) 253 U.S. 412 , 40 S.Ct. 560 , 64 L.Ed. 989 ; Reed v. Reed, (1971) 404 U.S. 71 , 92 S.Ct. 251 , 30 L.Ed.2d 225 ; Reilly v. Robertson, supra [ 266 Ind. 29 , 360 N.E.2d 171 ].

1984Although the Court has never been called upon to address the precise issue confronting us, in Lalli v. Lalli (1978), 439 U.S. 259 , 99 S.Ct. 518 , 58 L.Ed.2d 508 it was confronted with an equal protection challenge to a similar statute.

1984Although the Court has never been called upon to address the precise issue confronting us, in Lalli v. Lalli (1978), 439 U.S. 259 , 99 S.Ct. 518 , 58 L.Ed.2d 508 it was confronted with an equal protection challenge to a similar statute.

1976In referring to an equal protection claim raised under Art. 4, §§22 and 23, of the Indiana Constitution, this Court stated the same test in Evansville-Vanderburgh Levee Authority District v. Kamp, (1960) 240 Ind. 659 , 168 N.E.2d 208 : “The constitutional provisions referred to do not prohibit a classification of the objects of legislation so long as there is a relationship between the classification used and the purpose of the act which inheres in the subject matter.” 240 Ind. 662 .

1976In referring to an equal protection claim raised under Art. 4, §§22 and 23, of the Indiana Constitution, this Court stated the same test in Evansville-Vanderburgh Levee Authority District v. Kamp, (1960) 240 Ind. 659 , 168 N.E.2d 208 : “The constitutional provisions referred to do not prohibit a classification of the objects of legislation so long as there is a relationship between the classification used and the purpose of the act which inheres in the subject matter.” 240 Ind. 662 .

2018“Moreover, a plaintiff alleging a violation of the equal protection clause must not only establish that he was treated differently, but he must also establish that the defendants acted with discriminatory intent.” Id.

2016“Moreover, a plaintiff alleging a violation of the equal protection clause must not only establish that she was treated differently, but she must also establish that the defendants acted with discriminatory intent.” Id.

2010U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-34 , 116 S.Ct. 2264 , 135 L.Ed.2d 735 (1996). "[Njeither federal nor state government acts compatibly with the equal protection principle when a law or official policy denies to women, simply because they are women, full citizenship stature-equal opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in and contribute to society based on their individual talents and capacities." Id. at 532 , 116 S.Ct. 2264 .

2010U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-34 , 116 S.Ct. 2264 , 135 L.Ed.2d 735 (1996). "[Njeither federal nor state government acts compatibly with the equal protection principle when a law or official policy denies to women, simply because they are women, full citizenship stature-equal opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in and contribute to society based on their individual talents and capacities." Id. at 532 , 116 S.Ct. 2264 .

1980The first definitive ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court regarding the constitutionality of compulsory retirement schemes appeared in the decision of Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia (1976), 427 U.S. 307 , 96 S.Ct. 2562 , 49 LEd.2d 520. 3 There, the plaintiff, an officer of the Uniformed Branch of the Massachusetts State Police, brought an action alleging that a state statute requiring uniformed state policemen to retire at age fifty violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.

1980The first definitive ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court regarding the constitutionality of compulsory retirement schemes appeared in the decision of Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia (1976), 427 U.S. 307 , 96 S.Ct. 2562 , 49 LEd.2d 520. 3 There, the plaintiff, an officer of the Uniformed Branch of the Massachusetts State Police, brought an action alleging that a state statute requiring uniformed state policemen to retire at age fifty violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.

1998Id.

1997Id.

1996T.B., 511 U.S. 127 , 114 S.Ct. 1419 , 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994) which held that intentional discrimination on the basis of gender during jury selection violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

1996T.B., 511 U.S. 127 , 114 S.Ct. 1419 , 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994) which held that intentional discrimination on the basis of gender during jury selection violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

1984Although the Swain analysis was directed to an equal protection challenge, we find it equally applicable to Defendant's Sixth Amendment challenge, and, in addition, we do not believe that Swain's precedential value is altered by the Supreme Court's holding in Taylor v. Louisiana, (1975) 419 U.S. 522 , 95 S.Ct. 692 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 , upon which Defendant further relies.

1984Although the Swain analysis was directed to an equal protection challenge, we find it equally applicable to Defendant's Sixth Amendment challenge, and, in addition, we do not believe that Swain's precedential value is altered by the Supreme Court's holding in Taylor v. Louisiana, (1975) 419 U.S. 522 , 95 S.Ct. 692 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 , upon which Defendant further relies.

1994Phillips v. State (1986), Ind., 496 N.E.2d 87, 89 .

1992Phillips v. State (1986), Ind., 496 N.E.2d 87 citing Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 .

1992As Justice Marshall pointed out in Dur», the appropriate equal protection test varies, "depending upon the interest affected or the classification involved." Dunn, 405 U.S. at 335 , 92 S.Ct. at 999 .

1992As Justice Marshall pointed out in Dur», the appropriate equal protection test varies, "depending upon the interest affected or the classification involved." Dunn, 405 U.S. at 335 , 92 S.Ct. at 999 .

1992However, Haas also teaches that a program of interscholastic sports, "after having been provided," id. (original emphasis), must be administered without violation of the fourteenth amendment, at least if the case involves an equal protection claim arising from gender-based discrimination.

1975Justice Hunter, speaking for the majority, cited and relied on Reed v. Reed, supra. To withstand constitutional challenge, then, the classification: “ ‘ “must be reasonable . . . and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.” ’ Reed v. Reed, (1971), *184 404 U.S. 71, 76 , 92 S.Ct. 251, 254 , 30 L.Ed.2d 225, 229 ; Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia (1920), 253 U.S. 412, 415 , 40 S.Ct. 560 , 64 L.Ed. 989 .” (Emphasis supplied.) Haas, 259 Ind. at 522 , 289 N.E.2d

1984The Court noted that an equal protection challenge might be sustained when in case after case the prosecutor "is responsible for the removal of Negroes who have been selected as qualified jurors by the jury commissioners and who have survived challenges for cause, with the result that no Negroes ever serve on petit juries." Id. at 223 , 85 S.Ct. at 837 , 13 L.Ed.2d at 774 .

1984The Court noted that an equal protection challenge might be sustained when in case after case the prosecutor "is responsible for the removal of Negroes who have been selected as qualified jurors by the jury commissioners and who have survived challenges for cause, with the result that no Negroes ever serve on petit juries." Id. at 223 , 85 S.Ct. at 837 , 13 L.Ed.2d at 774 .

1987Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed. 2d 69 ; Weekly v. State (1986), Ind., 496 N.E.2d 29 .

1987Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 ; Weekly v. State (1986), Ind., 496 N.E.2d 29 .

1981MBM alleges the discrimination between owners and mortgagees is violative of the equal protection requirements of the United States and Indiana constitutions. 8 In addressing an equal protection challenge: “If neither a fundamental right nor a suspect classification is involved, the standard of review is that the classification not be arbitrary or unreasonable ... and that a ‘fair and substantial’ relationship exist between the classification and the purpose of the legislation creating it. ...” Sidle v. Majors (1976), 264 Ind. 206, 210 , 341 N.E.2d 763, 767 .

1981MBM alleges the discrimination between owners and mortgagees is violative of the equal protection requirements of the United States and Indiana constitutions. 8 In addressing an equal protection challenge: “If neither a fundamental right nor a suspect classification is involved, the standard of review is that the classification not be arbitrary or unreasonable ... and that a ‘fair and substantial’ relationship exist between the classification and the purpose of the legislation creating it. ...” Sidle v. Majors (1976), 264 Ind. 206, 210 , 341 N.E.2d 763, 767 .