equal protection clause in Texas

2022Grp., LLC, 502 S.W.3d 859, 868 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, no pet.) (reversing trial court’s denial of plea to jurisdiction as to equal-protection claim because pleading made mere conclusory statement that plaintiff was treated differently from others similarly situated but did not allege any facts describing how parties were similarly situated or nature of alleged different treatment); Sanders v. Palunsky, 36 S.W.3d 222, 225 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (“[T]o assert an equal protection claim [that is not based on a suspect class], the deprived party must establish two elem

2014“Like the federal [C]onstitution, the equal- protection clause of the state [C]onstitution directs governmental actors to treat all similarly situated persons alike.” Johnson, 353 at 503 (citing Sanders v. Palunsky, 36 S.W.3d 222 , 224–225 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 , 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3254 (1985))).

2024City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985); see also City of Dallas v. Jones 331 S.W.3d 781, 787 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. dism’d) (“It is critical [in an equal-protection challenge] that the plaintiff allege he is being treated differently from those whose situation is directly comparable in all material respects.” (emphasis added)).

2018See City of Cleburne , 473 U.S. at 476 , 105 S.Ct. 3249 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("To my knowledge, the Court has never before treated an equal protection challenge to a statute on an as-applied basis.").

2020Cannady, 11 S.W.3d at 215 ; Walker, 222 S.W.3d at 711 ; see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (“[I]f a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.”).

2016See Cannady v. State, 11 S.W.3d 205, 214-15 (Tex. Crim.App.2000) (concluding that the analysis of an equal-protection challenge under the United States Constitution is the same as the analysis of an equal-rights challenge under article I, section 3 of the Texas Constitution); Lewis v. State, 448.

2021Unless the challenged ordinance discriminates against a suspect class, the ordinance generally must only be rationally related to a legitimate state interest to survive an equal-protection challenge. 20 Id.

2021“Economic regulations, including zoning decisions, have traditionally been afforded only rational relation scrutiny under the equal protection clause.” Id.

2017App. 1987). “[A] statutory classification that does not discriminate against a suspect class need only be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose to survive an equal protection challenge.” Ex parte Morales, 212 S.W.3d 483, 500 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. ref’d) (citing Henderson v. State, 962 S.W.2d 544, 560 (Tex. Crim.

2016Unless a statute interferes with a “fundamental right” or discriminates against a “suspect class,” the statute ordinarily will survive an equal-protection challenge if “the challenged classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.” Henderson v. State, 962 S.W.2d 544 , 560 .

2015See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 , 125 S. Ct. 1141 , 160 L.

2015See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 , 125 S. Ct. 1141 , 160 L.

2025Another clear defintion of a "class of one" equal protection claim in found in: Plyler V Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) The Supreme Court ruled: An equal protection claim may be asserted by plaintiff as a "class of one" if he alleges: 1) he has intentionally been treated different from others similarly situated, 2) there is no reational basis for the difference in treatment, Further, "the purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure against intentional and arbitrary discrimination and a plaintiff must allege he is being treated differently from those whose situation 3 is directly compara

2025Another clear defintion of a "class of one" equal protection claim in found in: Plyler V Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) The Supreme Court ruled: An equal protection claim may be asserted by plaintiff as a "class of one" if he alleges: 1) he has intentionally been treated different from others similarly situated, 2) there is no reational basis for the difference in treatment, Further, "the purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure against intentional and arbitrary discrimination and a plaintiff must allege he is being treated differently from those whose situation 3 is directly compara

2016City of Dallas v. Jones, 331 S.W.3d 781, 787 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2010, pet. dism’d); Leonard v. Abbott, 171 S.W.3d 451, 458 (Tex.App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied).

2015“The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure persons against intentional and arbitrary discrimination.” City of Dallas v. Jones, 331 S.W.3d 781, 787 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. dism’d) (citing Leonard v. Abbott, 171 S.W.3d 451, 458 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied)).

2020See, e.g., Ex parte Harris, 946 S.W.2d 79, 80 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997)(“the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that inmates receive credit for their pretrial jail time if they had been unable to post bond due to their indigence, even though the relevant statute provided that the award of such credit was discretionary with the trial court”).

2005In support of his claims, the appellant relies upon cases such as Ex parte Harris, 946 S.W.2d 79, 80 (Tex.Crim.App.1997), which held the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that an indigent inmate receiving the maximum sentence must be credited with pre-trial jail time otherwise discretionary with the trial court; Ex parte Gomez, 15 S.W.3d 103, 104 (Tex.Crim.App.2000), in which the Court of Criminal Appeals ordered the Department of Criminal Justice to ensure that the applicant be considered for good conduct credit for pre-trial time spent in a juvenile detention facil

2024“The principles that apply to the systematic exclusion of potential jurors on the ground of race are essentially the same for grand juries and for petit juries[.]” Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 , 626 n.3 (1972); see, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (in formation of jury, equal protection is violated by race-based use of peremptory strikes); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953) (venire); Alexander, 405 U.S. at 628 (grand jury); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 , 492–93 (1977) (grand jury). “[I]n order to show that an equal protection violation has occurred in the

2015Appellant submits that the record supports the claim that the State violated the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution when it used its peremptory strikes against potential jurors Syrene Mitchell, Louise Horsley and Freddie Watson in a racially discriminatory manner contrary to the holding of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 , 106 S. C. 1712, 90 L.

2024City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985); see also City of Dallas v. Jones 331 S.W.3d 781, 787 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. dism’d) (“It is critical [in an equal-protection challenge] that the plaintiff allege he is being treated differently from those whose situation is directly comparable in all material respects.” (emphasis added)).

2015“The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure persons against intentional and arbitrary discrimination.” City of Dallas v. Jones, 331 S.W.3d 781, 787 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. dism’d) (citing Leonard v. Abbott, 171 S.W.3d 451, 458 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied)).

2023Sonnenschein is contending that the Board Members did not uniformly apply this provision to his application as compared to those of others similarly situated, a colorable claim falling under protection of the equal protection clauses. 8 See Whitworth v. Bynum, 699 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Tex. 1985) (“Under the rational basis test . . . similarly situated individuals must be treated equally under the statutory classification unless there is a rational basis for not doing so.”); see also Lindquist v. City of Pasadena, 525 F.3d 383 , 386–87 (5th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that equal protection guarantee ex

2022Sonnenschein is contending that the Board Members did not uniformly apply this provision to her application as compared to those of others similarly situated, a colorable claim falling under protection of the equal-protection clauses.9 See Whitworth v. Bynum, 699 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Tex. 1985) (“Under the rational basis test . . . similarly situated individuals must be treated equally under the statutory classification unless there is a rational basis for not doing so.”); see also Lindquist v. City of Pasadena, 525 F.3d 383 , 386–87 (5th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that equal-protection guarantee ext

2020See id. (conclusory allegation that inmate was treated differently from other sex offenders failed to state a claim where inmate did not identify any other prisoners who were sexual offenders and were allowed to enroll in computer courses and inmate did not allege that other prisoners were convicted of the same offense as he was or that they were allowed into the same courses for which he applied); see also Kyles v. Garrett, 222 F. App’x 427, 429 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (holding that a prisoner’s conclusory allegations that others similarly situated had been granted parole were insufficie

2004The equal-protection analysis under the federal Equal Protection Clause “applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.” Bell v. Low Income Women, 95 S.W.3d 253, 266 (Tex.2002).

2014CODE ANN. § 37.004(a) (Vernon 2008) (providing for “declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations” when construction or validity of municipal ordinance is challenged)). 8 “[n]o other industrial customer in the City has been treated like Downstream” and that the closure of Downstream’s wastewater service on May 26, 2010, without prior notice “violates the equal protection clause, Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution.” It therefore seeks to enjoin the City’s “administrative actions regarding rate increases and frivolous violations.” “[T]he equal protection clause of the state

2014CODE ANN. § 37.004(a) (Vernon 2008) (providing for “declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations” when construction or validity of municipal ordinance is challenged)). 8 “[n]o other industrial customer in the City has been treated like Downstream” and that the closure of Downstream’s wastewater service on May 26, 2010, without prior notice “violates the equal protection clause, Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution.” It therefore seeks to enjoin the City’s “administrative actions regarding rate increases and frivolous violations.” “[T]he equal protection clause of the state

2007See Black v. State, 26 S.W.3d 895, 898 (Tex.Crim.App.2000).

2007See Black v. State, 26 S.W.3d 895, 898 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000).

2024However, “the equal protection of the laws must coexist with the practical necessity that most legislation classifies for one purpose or another, with resulting disadvantage to –21– various groups or persons.” Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).

2021In Romer, the Supreme Court considered an equal protection challenge to an amendment to the state constitution of Colorado that prohibited all legislative, executive, or judicial action to protect “homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships . . . .” See Romer, 517 U.S. at 624 .

2024See Downs v. State, 244 S.W.3d 511, 518 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. ref’d) (explaining that to prevail on an equal-protection claim, “the party complaining must establish two elements: (1) the party was treated differently than other similarly situated parties; and (2) the party was treated differently without a rational basis by the government” and that under the first element, “it is axiomatic that the Equal Protection Clause does not require things different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same”).

2018“Differences based on various factual traits, circumstantial nuances, and peculiarities, which by virtue of their differences make them amenable to disparate treatment, are not a basis for an equal protection claim.” Downs, 244 S.W.3d at 518 ; accord Rivers, 2017 WL 2492610 , at *2.

2015"The purpose of the equal protection clause of Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within a staters jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terrns of a 18 Page 27 of 98 statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents." Village of ~Villowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).

2005See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech , 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); see also Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission of Webster County , 488 U.S. 336, 345-46 (1989). "'The purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents.'" Olech , 528 U.S. at 564 (quoting Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County , 260 U.S. 441, 445 (1923) ( quoting Sunday Lake Iron Co. v.

2023Employees Pension Sys., 458 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tex. 2015) (quoting Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637, 647 (Tex. 2004)).

2011We held that state and federal equal-protection guarantees relate to “equality between persons as such, rather than between areas, and ... territorial uniformity is not a constitutional prerequisite.” Id. at 646-47 (citation omitted).

2024“The principles that apply to the systematic exclusion of potential jurors on the ground of race are essentially the same for grand juries and for petit juries[.]” Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 , 626 n.3 (1972); see, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (in formation of jury, equal protection is violated by race-based use of peremptory strikes); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953) (venire); Alexander, 405 U.S. at 628 (grand jury); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 , 492–93 (1977) (grand jury). “[I]n order to show that an equal protection violation has occurred in the

2024“The principles that apply to the systematic exclusion of potential jurors on the ground of race are essentially the same for grand juries and for petit juries[.]” Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 , 626 n.3 (1972); see, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (in formation of jury, equal protection is violated by race-based use of peremptory strikes); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953) (venire); Alexander, 405 U.S. at 628 (grand jury); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 , 492–93 (1977) (grand jury). “[I]n order to show that an equal protection violation has occurred in the

1997Otherwise, a statute will ordinarily survive an equal protection challenge if "the challenged classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose." Id. ("rational basis" test).

1997Otherwise, a statute will ordinarily survive an equal protection challenge if “the challenged classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.” Id. (“rational basis” test).

2015See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 , 567 n.7, 568-574 (1975) (On issue of judicial review of an enforcement decision of an administrative agency of the executive branch, the Court rejected the agency’s contention that its decisions are unreviewable exercises of prosecutorial discretion) and Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) (Holding that “some selectivity” in enforcing criminal laws does 44 not violate the equal protection clause, but a defendant may show that the decision to prosecute was based upon an improper purpose).

2015One such restraints, imposed by the Equal Protection clause of the Fifth Amendment, “is that the decision whether to prosecute may not be based on ‘an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’" Id., quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 . (1962).

2018“A threshold for asserting an equal-protection challenge is demonstrating that a classification discriminates among similarly situated individuals.” Friesenhahn, 2018 WL 828959 , at *3 (quoting Modarresi v. State, 488 S.W.3d 455 , 467–68 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.)); see Smith v. State, 898 S.W.2d 838, 847 (Tex. Crim.

2018Id. ; see also Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney , 442 U.S. 256 , 272, 99 S.Ct. 2282 , 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979) (noting that the focus of an equal protection challenge is the validity of the legislative classification).

2007Spring Branch I.S.D. v. Stamos, 695 S.W.2d 556, 559 (Tex.1985).

2007Spring Branch I.S.D. v. Stamos , 695 S.W.2d 556, 559 (Tex. 1985).