equal protection clause in Michigan

1971The prohibition of the equal protection clause goes no further than the invidious discrimination.’ Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. (1955), 348 US 483, 489 ( 75 S Ct 461 , 99 L ed 563, 573).

1971The prohibition of the equal protection clause goes no further than the invidious discrimination.’ Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. (1955), 348 US 483, 489 ( 75 S Ct 461 , 99 L ed 563, 573).

1979Furthermore, an equal protection argument was previously addressed by the Court in Shavers, supra, at 624, fn 51 , and the statutory requirements were found not to be constitutionally offensive: "The classification reflects a legislative policy which, although it discriminates between victims, does not in our judgment constitute an invidious discrimination offending the equal protection clause." See also O'Donnell v State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co, 404 Mich 524 ; 273 NW2d 829 (1979).

1979Furthermore, an equal protection argument was previously addressed by the Court in Shavers, supra, at 624, fn 51 , and the statutory requirements were found not to be constitutionally offensive: "The classification reflects a legislative policy which, although it discriminates between victims, does not in our judgment constitute an invidious discrimination offending the equal protection clause.” See also O’Donnell v State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co, 404 Mich 524 ; 273 NW2d 829 (1979).

2025“When state legislation creates a classification scheme that is based on suspect factors, such as race, national origin, ethnicity or alienage, or that affects a fundamental interest, courts apply a high standard of review, labeled ‘strict scrutiny.’ ” Wysocki, 248 Mich App at 351-352 (citations omitted).

2020Wysocki, 248 Mich App at 354 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2019In re Parole of Hill, 298 Mich App 404, 420 ; 827 NW2d 407 (2012).

2019In re Parole of Hill, 298 Mich App 404, 420 ; 827 NW2d 407 (2012).

2019See id.

2019See id.

2018See Bostic v Schaefer, 760 F3d 352, 397 (CA 4, 2014) (NIEMEYER, J., dissenting), and cases cited therein.

2018See Bostic v. Schaefer , 760 F.3d 352 , 397 (C.A. 4, 2014) ( Niemeyer , J., dissenting), and cases cited therein.

2024“A ‘class of one’ may initiate an equal protection claim by alleging that he or she ‘has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.’ ” Id., quoting Village of Willowbrook, 528 US at 564 .2 However, if the challenger “cannot establish that he was treated unequally in some material way, then there is no violation of equal protection.” James, 326 Mich App at 106 .

2016US Const, Am XIV; Const 1963, art 1, §2. “ ‘The purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents.’ ” Vill of Willowbrook v Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000), quoting Sioux City Bridge Co. v Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 445 (1923).

1987Fox v Employment Security Commission, 379 Mich 579, 589 ; 153 NW2d 644, 647-648 (1967); Beauty Built Construction Co v City of Warren, 375 Mich 229, 236 ; 134 NW2d 214, 218 (1965); Palmer Park Theatre Co v Highland Park, 362 Mich 326, 347-348 ; 106 NW2d 845, 855-856 (1961).[ 3 ] *554 More recently, in Rouge Parkway Associates v City of Wayne 4 the Supreme Court summarized the burden on plaintiffs seeking to challenge legislative enactments based on equal protection, saying: An equal protection analysis, particularly where there is no suggestion of a suspect classification such as race, begins

1987Fox v Employment Security Commission, 379 Mich 579, 589 ; 153 NW2d 644, 647-648 (1967); Beauty Built Construction Co v City of Warren, 375 Mich 229, 236 ; 134 NW2d 214, 218 (1965); Palmer Park Theatre Co v Highland Park, 362 Mich 326, 347-348 ; 106 NW2d 845, 855-856 (1961).[ 3 ] *554 More recently, in Rouge Parkway Associates v City of Wayne 4 the Supreme Court summarized the burden on plaintiffs seeking to challenge legislative enactments based on equal protection, saying: An equal protection analysis, particularly where there is no suggestion of a suspect classification such as race, begins

1987Fox v Employment Security Commission, 379 Mich 579, 589 ; 153 NW2d 644, 647-648 (1967); Beauty Built Construction Co v City of Warren, 375 Mich 229, 236 ; 134 NW2d 214, 218 (1965); Palmer Park Theatre Co v Highland Park, 362 Mich 326, 347-348 ; 106 NW2d 845, 855-856 (1961).[ 3 ] *554 More recently, in Rouge Parkway Associates v City of Wayne 4 the Supreme Court summarized the burden on plaintiffs seeking to challenge legislative enactments based on equal protection, saying: An equal protection analysis, particularly where there is no suggestion of a suspect classification such as race, begins

1987Fox v Employment Security Commission, 379 Mich 579, 589 ; 153 NW2d 644, 647-648 (1967); Beauty Built Construction Co v City of Warren, 375 Mich 229, 236 ; 134 NW2d 214, 218 (1965); Palmer Park Theatre Co v Highland Park, 362 Mich 326, 347-348 ; 106 NW2d 845, 855-856 (1961).[ 3 ] *554 More recently, in Rouge Parkway Associates v City of Wayne 4 the Supreme Court summarized the burden on plaintiffs seeking to challenge legislative enactments based on equal protection, saying: An equal protection analysis, particularly where there is no suggestion of a suspect classification such as race, begins

1973Thus, "Moreover, under the equal protection clause, the students contend that the importance of education to the welfare of individuals and the nation requires the courts to invalidate the legislation if potential, alternative statutes incorporating the desirable aspects of the present system can also achieve substantially equal per pupil expenditures. 13 * * * The McInnis plaintiffs, like those in Serrano , relied upon Brown v Board of Education, 347 US 483 ; 74 S Ct 686 ; 98 L Ed 873 (1954), Douglas v California, 372 US 353 ; 83 S Ct 814 ; 9 L Ed 2d 811 (1963), and Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 53

1973Thus, "Moreover, under the equal protection clause, the students contend that the importance of education to the welfare of individuals and the nation requires the courts to invalidate the legislation if potential, alternative statutes incorporating the desirable aspects of the present system can also achieve substantially equal per pupil expenditures. 13 * * * The McInnis plaintiffs, like those in Serrano , relied upon Brown v Board of Education, 347 US 483 ; 74 S Ct 686 ; 98 L Ed 873 (1954), Douglas v California, 372 US 353 ; 83 S Ct 814 ; 9 L Ed 2d 811 (1963), and Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 53

2018Milan v. Ann Arbor Charter Twp. , 486 Mich. 311 , 318-319, 783 N.W.2d 695 (2010), the Michigan Supreme Court enunciated the applicable legal principles governing an equal protection challenge: The equal protection clauses of the Michigan and United States constitutions provide that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the law.

2018Milan v. Ann Arbor Charter Twp. , 486 Mich. 311 , 318-319, 783 N.W.2d 695 (2010), the Michigan Supreme Court enunciated the applicable legal principles governing an equal protection challenge: The equal protection clauses of the Michigan and United States constitutions provide that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the law.

2021The level of review in an equal-protection claim depends “on the nature of the alleged classification.” Crego v Coleman, 463 Mich 248, 283 ; 615 NW2d 218 (2000) (KELLY, J., dissenting).

2021The level of review in an equal-protection claim depends “on the nature of the alleged classification.” Crego v Coleman, 463 Mich 248, 283 ; 615 NW2d 218 (2000) (KELLY, J., dissenting).

2000Notably, Ramseur involved both an equal protection claim under Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79 ; 106 S Ct 1712 ; 90 L Ed 2d 69 (1986), and a Sixth Amendment claim under Duren .

2000Notably, Ramseur involved both an equal protection claim under Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79 ; 106 S Ct 1712 ; 90 L Ed 2d 69 (1986), and a Sixth Amendment claim under Duren .

2010We mean only that we have been persuaded in the past that interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment have accurately conveyed the meaning of Const' 1963, art 1, § 2 as well. [Id. at 6 n 3.] 8 City of Cleburne v Cleburne Living Ctr, Inc, 473 US 432, 439 ; 105 S Ct 3249 ; 87 L Ed 2d 313 (1985). 9 Watson v Williams, 329 Fed Appx 193, 196 (CA 10, 2009) (citing City of Cleburne, 473 US at 439 , for the proposition that an equal protection claim “requires a threshold allegation that the plaintiff was treated differently from similarly situated individuals”); Gilmore v

2010We mean only that we have been persuaded in the past that interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment have accurately conveyed the meaning of Const' 1963, art 1, § 2 as well. [Id. at 6 n 3.] 8 City of Cleburne v Cleburne Living Ctr, Inc, 473 US 432, 439 ; 105 S Ct 3249 ; 87 L Ed 2d 313 (1985). 9 Watson v Williams, 329 Fed Appx 193, 196 (CA 10, 2009) (citing City of Cleburne, 473 US at 439 , for the proposition that an equal protection claim “requires a threshold allegation that the plaintiff was treated differently from similarly situated individuals”); Gilmore v

1988After discussing the two-tiered approach applied by the United States Supreme Court in reviewing an equal protection claim, our Supreme Court noted that a commentator believed that a third test was emerging as evidenced by the decision in Reed v Reed, 404 US 71 ; 92 S Ct 251 ; 30 L Ed 2d 225 (1971).

1988After discussing the two-tiered approach applied by the United States Supreme Court in reviewing an equal protection claim, our Supreme Court noted that a commentator believed that a third test was emerging as evidenced by the decision in Reed v Reed, 404 US 71 ; 92 S Ct 251 ; 30 L Ed 2d 225 (1971).

2023“Where the proponent of an equal protection argument is not a member of a protected class, or does not allege violation of a fundamental right, the equal protection claim is reviewed using the rational basis test.” Id.

2022“Where the proponent of an equal protection argument is not a member of a protected class, or does not allege violation of a fundamental right, the equal protection claim is reviewed using the rational basis test.” Houdek v Centreville Twp, 276 Mich App 568, 585-586 ; 741 NW2d 587 (2007).

2018In 1972, in Reich v State Hwy Dep’t, 386 Mich 617, 623-624 ; 194 NW2d 700 (1972), abrogated by Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 477 Mich 222 ; 731 NW2d 41 (2007), the Supreme Court held that then-extant 60-day notice provision in MCL 691.1404 was unconstitutional on its face because it violated the equal protection clause by requiring that governmental tort-feasors be given notice where none is required for private tort-feasors.3 Reich did not address MCL 224.31, but shortly after it was decided, we concluded in Crook v Patterson, 42 Mich App 241, 242 ; 201 NW2d 676 (1972), that the rationale i

2018Finally, in 1996, in [Brown v Manistee Co Rd Comm, 452 Mich 354 ; 550 NW2d 215 (1996), overruled by Rowland, 477 Mich 197 ], this Court reassessed the propriety of the Hobbs decision and declined to overrule it on the basis of stare decisis and legislative acquiescence. [Rowland, 477 Mich at 206-209 (some alterations in original).] Relevant to the current appeal, this Court in Crook v Patterson, 42 Mich App 241, 242 ; 201 NW2d 676 (1972), held—in a half-page decision that relied exclusively on Reich—that MCL 224.21 violated the equal protection clause and was, therefore, unconstitutional and v

1983In applying this standard to cases challenging these types of statutes the Supreme Court has not only entertained a presumption of constitutionality, e.g., McGowan v Maryland, 366 US 420, 425-426 ; 81 S Ct 1101 ; 6 L Ed 2d 393 (1961); Madden v Kentucky, 309 US 83, 88 ; 60 S Ct 406 ; 84 L Ed 590 ; 125 ALR 1383 (1940), and placed the burden on the challenging party to show that the law has no reasonable basis, Lindsley v Natural Carbonic Gas Co, 220 US 61 ; 31 S Ct 337 ; 55 L Ed 369 (1911), but has in fact upheld the legislation in nearly every challenge brought under the equal protection clause

1983In applying this standard to cases challenging these types of statutes the Supreme Court has not only entertained a presumption of constitutionality, e.g., McGowan v Maryland, 366 US 420, 425-426 ; 81 S Ct 1101 ; 6 L Ed 2d 393 (1961); Madden v Kentucky, 309 US 83, 88 ; 60 S Ct 406 ; 84 L Ed 590 ; 125 ALR 1383 (1940), and placed the burden on the challenging party to show that the law has no reasonable basis, Lindsley v Natural Carbonic Gas Co, 220 US 61 ; 31 S Ct 337 ; 55 L Ed 369 (1911), but has in fact upheld the legislation in nearly every challenge brought under the equal protection clause

1970This position is untenable because this issue has been settled in the case of Naudzius v. Lahr (1931), 253 Mich 216, 221 , wherein it is stated: “A right of action for a tort to happen in the future is not property, and may be abrogated by the legislature.” The issue raised by plaintiff’s claim that the statute denies her equal protection of the laws was also raised in the case of Naudzius v. Lahr, supra, wherein the Court set forth the conditions that are necessary to hold a statute invalid under the equal protection clause, and ruled that the Michigan guest statute was constitutional.

1970This position is untenable because this issue has been settled in the case of Naudzius v. Lahr (1931), 253 Mich 216, 221 , wherein it is stated: “A right of action for a tort to happen in the future is not property, and may be abrogated by the legislature.” The issue raised by plaintiff’s claim that the statute denies her equal protection of the laws was also raised in the case of Naudzius v. Lahr, supra, wherein the Court set forth the conditions that are necessary to hold a statute invalid under the equal protection clause, and ruled that the Michigan guest statute was constitutional.

2022See Nordlinger v Hahn, 505 US 1, 10 ; 112 S Ct 2326 ; 120 L Ed 2d 1 (1992) (“The Equal Protection Clause . . . keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike.”).

2022See Nordlinger v Hahn, 505 US 1, 10 ; 112 S Ct 2326 ; 120 L Ed 2d 1 (1992) (“The Equal Protection Clause . . . keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike.”).

2018However, in Stankevich , this Court was not presented with the issue that we are in this case, that being whether a provision of the CCA is unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff on due-process and equal-protection grounds in light of the fact that plaintiff was not able to enter into a legal same-sex marriage before Obergefell . 3 In Romer v. Evans , 517 U.S. 620 , 623, 631-632, 635, 116 S.Ct. 1620 , 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996), the United States Supreme Court employed the rational-basis standard of review when considering an equal-protection challenge to an amendment to Colorado's state constit

2018However, in Stankevich , this Court was not presented with the issue that we are in this case, that being whether a provision of the CCA is unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff on due-process and equal-protection grounds in light of the fact that plaintiff was not able to enter into a legal same-sex marriage before Obergefell . 3 In Romer v. Evans , 517 U.S. 620 , 623, 631-632, 635, 116 S.Ct. 1620 , 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996), the United States Supreme Court employed the rational-basis standard of review when considering an equal-protection challenge to an amendment to Colorado's state constit